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The script provides a simple proof for three properties of "VCG auction for Sponsored Search" theory, which are

-- price from VCG auction bounded by general second auction price

-- guarantee of price monotonicity

-- envy-freeness for each pair of bidders

as they are closely linked to the truthfulness of the auction mechanism.

An authoritative statement is documented from the lecture note of Tim Roughgarden https://timroughgarden.org/f16/l/l15.pdf

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A simple script for studying specification and verification of "VCG auction for Sponsored Search" theory

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