Security: Prevent OAuth CSRF, open redirect, and account takeover - #2
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mertcano wants to merge 1 commit into
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Security: Prevent OAuth CSRF, open redirect, and account takeover#2mertcano wants to merge 1 commit into
mertcano wants to merge 1 commit into
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This PR addresses a HIGH-severity vulnerability in the Spotify OAuth connector where the state parameter was unsigned and reusable, and the callback trusted client-supplied user IDs and redirect paths. The flow has been secured with session-bound nonces and strict path validation to prevent account-linking confusion and arbitrary external redirects.
CSRF Protection: Replaced the static, unsigned state payload with a short-lived, single-use nonce stored in a secure, HTTP-only cookie (spotify-oauth-nonce). The callback now strictly verifies this nonce to bind the OAuth flow to the active browser session.
Account Takeover Prevention: Removed reliance on the userId decoded from the OAuth state parameter. The callback now explicitly re-validates the current user's session (req.cookies.get('realism-session')) to ensure connector credentials are only bound to the genuinely authenticated user.
Open Redirect Prevention: Enforced strict relative-path validation for the returnTo parameter in both the initialization and callback routes. Absolute URLs and protocol-relative paths (e.g., //evil.com) are securely downgraded to the default /dashboard route.
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This PR addresses a HIGH-severity vulnerability in the Spotify OAuth connector where the state parameter was unsigned and reusable, and the callback trusted client-supplied user IDs and redirect paths. The flow has been secured with session-bound nonces and strict path validation to prevent account-linking confusion and arbitrary external redirects.
CSRF Protection: Replaced the static, unsigned state payload with a short-lived, single-use nonce stored in a secure, HTTP-only cookie (spotify-oauth-nonce). The callback now strictly verifies this nonce to bind the OAuth flow to the active browser session.
Account Takeover Prevention: Removed reliance on the userId decoded from the OAuth state parameter. The callback now explicitly re-validates the current user's session (req.cookies.get('realism-session')) to ensure connector credentials are only bound to the genuinely authenticated user.
Open Redirect Prevention: Enforced strict relative-path validation for the returnTo parameter in both the initialization and callback routes. Absolute URLs and protocol-relative paths (e.g., //evil.com) are securely downgraded to the default /dashboard route.