EXP-23278: Fix duplicate Authorization header on recursive HTTPS clones - #93
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When subrepo auth runs over HTTPS token (GH_USER/GH_TOKEN or
S7_GIT_USER/S7_GIT_TOKEN), s7 injects its auth into the child git's
environment as GIT_CONFIG_* entries, appending past any GIT_CONFIG_COUNT
the environment already carried. Recursing into a nested s7 subrepo spawns
a fresh s7 process (via that subrepo's post-checkout hook) that inherits
this environment and appended its own copy on top. Because
http.<url>.extraheader is multi-valued in git, the child then sent two
identical Authorization headers, and GitHub rejected the request with
HTTP 400 ("Duplicate header: Authorization") — breaking every nested
clone/fetch (e.g. rd2 -> RDPDFKit -> SPFlounder -> Eigen). Top-level
clones were unaffected.
Make the auth-env builder idempotent: stamp S7_GIT_AUTH_INJECTED on the
environment it produces and, when an ancestor s7 already stamped it, reuse
that environment verbatim instead of layering a second extraheader.
Add tests for the marker stamp, reuse-on-inherited-env, and a multi-level
nesting chain asserting a single Authorization header survives.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastey
previously approved these changes
Jul 30, 2026
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Great fix.
One tiny suggestion on the tests. Up to you.
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| - (void)testStampsInjectedMarker { | ||
| NSDictionary<NSString *, NSString *> *const env = | ||
| [GitRepository gitHubTokenAuthTaskEnvironmentForUser:@"alice" token:@"abc" processEnvironment:@{}]; | ||
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| XCTAssertEqualObjects(@"1", env[@"S7_GIT_AUTH_INJECTED"]); | ||
| } |
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I think, this is an implementation detail. The other two tests are fine – they test the behaviour. This one – I would rather remove it.
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Makes sense, removed it 👍
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When subrepo auth runs over HTTPS token (
GH_USER/GH_TOKENorS7_GIT_USER/S7_GIT_TOKEN), s7 injects its auth into the child git's environment asGIT_CONFIG_*entries, appending past anyGIT_CONFIG_COUNTthe environment already carried. Recursing into a nested s7 subrepo spawns a fresh s7 process (via that subrepo's post-checkout hook) that inherits this environment and appended its own copy on top. Becausehttp.<url>.extraheaderis multi-valued in git, the child then sent two identical Authorization headers, and GitHub rejected the request with HTTP 400 ("Duplicate header: Authorization") — breaking every nested clone/fetch. Top-level clones were unaffected.Make the auth-env builder idempotent: stamp
S7_GIT_AUTH_INJECTEDon the environment it produces and, when an ancestor s7 already stamped it, reuse that environment verbatim instead of layering a second extraheader.Add tests for the marker stamp, reuse-on-inherited-env, and a multi-level nesting chain asserting a single Authorization header survives.
Note
Medium Risk
Changes HTTPS token auth environment construction for child git processes; behavior is narrowed with an idempotency guard and covered by new tests, but mistakes could still break nested clones or auth in CI.
Overview
Fixes nested HTTPS subrepo clones failing with GitHub HTTP 400 (
Duplicate header: Authorization) when each nested s7 process appended anotherhttp.https://github.com/.extraheaderonto inheritedGIT_CONFIG_*env.gitHubTokenAuthTaskEnvironmentForUser:token:processEnvironment:now stampsS7_GIT_AUTH_INJECTED=1on the env it builds and, when that marker is already present, returns the inherited env unchanged instead of adding another Authorization header. Comments clarify that appending past existingGIT_CONFIG_COUNTis for foreign CI config, not nested s7 (nested case uses the marker).Tests expect the marker on first injection, document the CI append case, and add nested reuse plus multi-level chaining checks so only one Basic auth header remains.
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