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Security: ovurrsl/plugin-warehouse

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting

Report privately through GitHub's advisory form. Please do not open a public issue first.

What the threat model actually is

This package ships TypeScript source and is installed directly from git into someone else's editor build, where the host transpiles it. There is no published artefact to tamper with and no install script — but it also means anything this code does at module scope runs inside the consuming application.

That shapes what is worth reporting:

  • Module-scope side effects. The manifest barrel (src/index.ts) is imported eagerly during the host's server prerender. Anything reachable from it that touches document, window, the network, or the filesystem is a bug and potentially worse than a bug.
  • Supply chain. Workflow actions are pinned to full commit SHAs rather than tags, because a tag can be moved by whoever controls the action's repository. An unpinned action in a pull request is worth flagging.
  • Host store writes. The plugin writes to the host scene through the documented SceneApi / useScene surface only. A write that reaches around it is in scope.

Not in scope

Rendering artefacts, wrong dimensions, and capacity figures that disagree with a catalogue. Those are ordinary bugs — please open an issue with the node settings, which is what makes them reproducible.

Supported versions

Pre-1.0. Fixes land on main; there are no maintained release branches. Pin a commit SHA in your host's dependency and move it deliberately.

There aren't any published security advisories