Escape PR html_url in generated report to prevent HTML injection - #1
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kwsantiago wants to merge 1 commit into
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Escape PR html_url in generated report to prevent HTML injection#1kwsantiago wants to merge 1 commit into
kwsantiago wants to merge 1 commit into
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In
geninfo-to-html.pl, the PRtitleis escaped viapreptitle->encode_entities, but the adjacenthtml_urlis interpolated straight into thehrefattribute with no escaping:$jisdecode_jsonof the GitHub API response (also persisted to the local cache), so thehrefvalue is network/cache-sourced. If that value ever contains a"/</>(a malformed/compromised API response, a tampered cache file, or ajavascript:URI), it breaks out of the attribute and injects arbitrary markup/JS into the report when it is opened in a browser.This escapes the URL the same way the title already is, and blocks non-http(s) schemes:
Verified: output is byte-identical for legitimate GitHub URLs (no-op), and a malicious
html_urlthat previously injected<script>now renders as an emptyhref. The unrelated BM/LA commit-link path is unchanged.