Status: EXPERIMENTAL. Early spike / prototype -- the CLI, APIs, and on-disk formats will change without notice; no stability or security guarantees yet; not production-ready. Use at your own risk.
fabric is a standalone Rust CLI and local daemon that hides iroh behind local Unix sockets.
Consumer tools do not link to iroh, know NodeAddr formats, or open QUIC streams. They ask fabric for a local socket connected to a remote service, then speak their own protocol over that socket.
Install the same fabric release on both macOS or Linux machines:
curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/compoundingtech/fabric/main/install.sh | sh
fabric --versionThe installer puts fabric in ~/.local/bin by default. Add that directory to
PATH if fabric --version is not found.
On each machine, print its stable NodeID:
fabric idInstalling Fabric creates a new local identity but trusts no remote machine. There is no account, central trust service, or automatic pairing: exchange the public NodeIDs over a channel you trust, and add each side to the other side's allow-list. Adding a peer authorizes that NodeID at Fabric's transport boundary; remote shell and exec remain separate, default-deny target-side capabilities.
Exchange those NodeIDs over a trusted channel. Trust machine B on machine A:
fabric add <machine-b-node-id> machine-b
fabric upfabric add is only a convenience writer. Automated or image-based installs
can deploy the complete authorized-keys file instead; see
Declarative Peer Config.
Trust machine A on machine B:
fabric add <machine-a-node-id> machine-a
fabric upTrust is deliberately mutual: each daemon accepts connections only from NodeIDs in its own allow-list. Verify the connection from either machine:
fabric status
fabric ping machine-bRun fabric ping machine-a on machine B. A successful check prints pong, the
round-trip latency, and the active transport path when iroh reports it. The two
daemons are now connected and ready for fabric expose, fabric dial, or the
explicitly enabled remote shell.
For a daemon managed by systemd or launchd instead of the background process
started by fabric up, run fabric down and then:
fabric service install
fabric service statusSee Expose And Dial A Service for the next step.
Adding a new machine — say a travel laptop — to a mesh that already has peers
(say your desktop and a server) is the same mutual-trust step as above, done once
per existing peer. There is no auto-pairing/discovery of trust: you exchange
NodeIDs by hand. Trust is symmetric, so the new machine AND each existing peer
must each fabric add the other. Nothing is copied between machines except NodeID
strings — they are public keys, safe to paste anywhere. The new machine generates
its own identity on first start; you do not copy any file (identity, peers,
config) from an existing machine.
Peers are found by NodeID over iroh discovery (relays), so no address hints are needed and a roaming laptop reconnects on its own as its network changes.
Fabric reports shipped connection facts about each trusted peer by canonical
NodeID: whether it is currently reachable and the connection/backoff state. An
offline peer is not inherently unhealthy and may remain offline indefinitely;
Fabric does not assign peer health types or act as a global availability
authority. A durable last_seen status surface is a desired observability gap,
not a current guarantee.
The architecture MUST isolate network partitions from unrelated local work: each machine and its local processes continue from their last instructions while peers are unreachable, and failure of one remote path MUST NOT cascade into other local work. Existing sessions, routes, and sync state remain owned by the runtime that created them. Replicas may resume synchronization after reconnect, while each consumer remains responsible for safe and atomic application of received state.
Whether an unavailable peer matters is decided by the active session, route, sync, or consuming workload—not by a fleet-wide Fabric health classification. Remote shell continuity across all detach cases and daemon sleep/wake self-healing remain open work in issue #21 and PR #22. A future remote st2 PTY attachment composes with this boundary: Fabric transports the stream, while st2/PTY owns the PTY child, terminal policy, and lifecycle/expiry.
curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/compoundingtech/fabric/main/install.sh | sh
fabric --version
fabric service install --allow-shell # launchd/systemd daemon; survives reboot + sleep/wake
fabric id # copy this — the NEW machine's NodeIDGet each existing peer's NodeID by running fabric id on it (or ask whoever runs
it). Then, on the new machine:
fabric add <DESKTOP_NODEID> desktop
fabric add <SERVER_NODEID> server
fabric reload-peersUsing the new machine's NodeID from step 1, run this on the desktop and on every other existing peer:
fabric add <NEW_NODEID> laptop
fabric reload-peersFor a peer you can already reach through the mesh (e.g. a server), you can add the new machine to it without SSH, from any machine that already has exec access to it:
fabric exec server -- ~/.local/bin/fabric add <NEW_NODEID> laptop
fabric exec server -- ~/.local/bin/fabric reload-peers(fabric exec requires the server to have opted in with --allow-exec; otherwise
ssh in and run the same two commands.)
fabric status # each peer should show as reachable
fabric ping server # prints pong + latency + transport (direct/relay)
fabric exec server -- echo ok # if that peer enabled --allow-exec; prints ok, exit 0If ping/status shows a peer unreachable, the usual cause is one-sided trust —
confirm BOTH the new machine and that peer ran fabric add and
fabric reload-peers. Reachability may start on relay and upgrade to direct
within a few seconds as iroh hole-punches.
cargo build
cargo testThe binary is target/debug/fabric during development.
Fast path for macOS and Linux:
curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/compoundingtech/fabric/main/install.sh | shThe remote installer downloads a matching prebuilt release binary into
~/.local/bin/fabric, prints the installed version, and fails if that version
does not match the targeted release. Ensure ~/.local/bin is on PATH. To
install somewhere else, set FABRIC_BIN_DIR or BIN_DIR.
The remote installer does not silently fall back to source builds. If no prebuilt binary matches your machine, run an explicit source install:
curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/compoundingtech/fabric/main/install.sh | sh -s -- --from-sourcePrebuilt vs. from source. The plain curl … | sh path above downloads a
prebuilt release binary and needs no toolchain — the fast path for a fresh
machine. Every source path (--from-source, a cloned-repo ./install.sh,
make install, cargo install --path ., or cargo build) instead compiles
fabric locally and therefore requires a Rust toolchain; install one first via
rustup:
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh # then: source ~/.cargo/envTo pin a release:
curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/compoundingtech/fabric/main/install.sh | sh -s -- --version v0.1.7From a cloned repo:
./install.shor:
make installThe cloned-repo installer builds the current checkout and copies the release
binary to ~/.local/bin/fabric. It prints the actual installed version; this
path is intentionally for local checkout installs, not remote release installs.
Rust users can also install through Cargo:
cargo install --path .This installs fabric to ~/.cargo/bin, which rustup normally adds to PATH via
~/.cargo/env. Re-run the install command after local changes to update the
installed binary.
For quick development without installing:
cargo run -- <command>
./target/debug/fabric <command>To install fabric as a user-managed service with OS restart supervision:
fabric service installOn Linux this writes and starts a systemd user unit. On macOS this writes and
starts a per-user LaunchAgent. The service runs the foreground daemon directly as
fabric --home <home> daemon; it does not run fabric up. No memory ceiling
is set unless you pass --memory-max-mb. Fabric declares none by default,
because a healthy working set has not been measured, and a ceiling nobody chose
kills the daemon at a number nobody chose. (This README used to say the default
was 1 GiB. It was not.)
If you do set one, leave headroom above fabric's in-process RSS recycle trigger. During endpoint recycle, the replacement endpoint can briefly overlap with the old endpoint in memory; a service cap too close to the 300 MiB recycle threshold lets the OS kill fabric during a successful self-heal.
Both remote shell (fabric shell <peer>) and non-interactive remote exec
(fabric exec <peer> -- <cmd>) are default-deny — a peer serves them only if
it has opted in. They are independent (allowing one does not allow the other):
fabric shell needs allow_shell, fabric exec needs allow_exec.
Check what a daemon serves by running fabric status on it — it prints
shell allowed / disabled and exec allowed / disabled.
These flags are daemon-global and only subtract access. A peer also needs its
own peers.toml allow list to contain shell or exec. A legacy peer with no
allow field remains unrestricted at this gate for compatibility. It still
cannot use shell or exec unless the daemon-global flag enables that capability.
Enable them with flags on fabric service install:
fabric service install --allow-shell # serve remote shell
fabric service install --allow-shell --allow-exec # serve both
fabric service install --no-allow-shell # persist shell OFF (also --no-allow-exec)On an already-installed daemon, enable the same way — just re-run
fabric service install with the flags you want:
fabric service install --allow-shell --allow-execThe allow flags are read when the daemon starts, so re-installing restarts the
managed daemon to apply them (a brief interruption to any connections currently
going through it). Run it locally or from an independent shell — not over a
fabric shell to that same machine, which would sever the connection driving
the restart. Confirm afterward with fabric status, which prints shell allowed
and exec allowed. (For an unmanaged fabric up daemon, use
fabric restart --allow-shell instead of re-installing.)
If fabric shell <peer> or fabric exec <peer> -- … fails with
unknown peer <peer>, the problem is on the calling side, not the target: the
caller has no trusted peer under that name. Names are per-machine — each machine
can call the same NodeID whatever it likes — so a peer that resolves on one box
may be missing, or named differently, on another. Fix it on the caller:
fabric add <nodeid> <peer> then fabric reload-peers
(see Join An Existing Mesh). This is
independent of whether the target serves shell/exec.
fabric shell gives a real interactive TTY (it allocates a PTY on the remote,
like ssh -t), so job control, stty, and full-screen programs work.
fabric exec is non-interactive — it runs the command with piped stdio and no
TTY, so fabric exec <peer> -- bash -i reports "no job control" / "stdin isn't a
terminal". That is expected: use fabric shell when you want an interactive shell.
Gotcha — the remote shell runs in the daemon's session, not your login
session. fabric shell spawns the shell as a child of the remote fabric daemon.
On a managed install that daemon runs under launchd/systemd — a non-GUI session
with no Keychain/login context. A shell-startup (.bashrc/.zshrc/prompt) that
depends on the GUI login session — e.g. macOS security show-keychain-info on the
login keychain, ssh-add, or anything that blocks waiting for a GUI unlock prompt
— can hang the interactive shell (the connection is fine; the dotfiles are
stuck). To make this easy to guard, fabric sets marker env vars in the remote
session: FABRIC_SHELL=1 inside a fabric shell, FABRIC_EXEC=1 under
fabric exec, and FABRIC_PEER=<nodeid> (the connecting peer — who opened the
session) in both. Gate fragile startup on them rather than running it
unconditionally, e.g. near the top of your .bashrc/.zshrc:
# Skip GUI/login-session-dependent startup when invoked over fabric.
if [ -n "$FABRIC_SHELL" ]; then
# keychain unlock, ssh-add, slow xcode/brew probes, etc. — skip or make non-blocking
return 2>/dev/null || true
fiThe service uses the same fabric home, identity, persisted exposes, and trusted peer allow-list. It does not install SSH keys or change fabric's authorization model.
Migrating an already-installed service across a launchd or systemd identity
change restarts the daemon. Do not perform that switchover through the daemon's
own fabric shell: it severs the only recovery path if the replacement fails.
Build and verify the replacement first, keep a rollback binary, and schedule the
swap for a window with independent machine access.
Upgrading the fabric binary under a running daemon — especially on a remote
machine reached only over fabric shell — must be done lockout-safe: a botched
restart can sever the only path back to the box. Follow this order.
Download a release asset directly, verify it against that asset's published
.sha256, and stage both the old and new binaries with same-directory
renames. A release archive contains exactly one member named literal fabric
(not ./fabric); verify that shape before extracting:
set -eu
tag='v0.2.0+a0478a6'
case "$(uname -s):$(uname -m)" in
Darwin:arm64) target='aarch64-apple-darwin' ;;
Linux:x86_64) target='x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu' ;;
Linux:aarch64|Linux:arm64) target='aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu' ;;
*) echo "unsupported release target: $(uname -s):$(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
asset="fabric-$target.tar.gz"
release_url="https://github.com/compoundingtech/fabric/releases/download/$tag"
download_dir="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$download_dir"' EXIT
curl --fail --location "$release_url/$asset" --output "$download_dir/$asset"
curl --fail --location "$release_url/$asset.sha256" --output "$download_dir/$asset.sha256"
# The release publishes ONE .sha256 per asset, not a combined manifest. The file
# holds "<hash> dist/<archive>", with the builder's path still in it, so
# `shasum -c` fails here. Take field one and compare it ourselves.
expected="$(awk 'NR == 1 { print $1 }' "$download_dir/$asset.sha256")"
test -n "$expected"
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
actual="$(sha256sum "$download_dir/$asset" | awk '{ print $1 }')"
else
actual="$(shasum -a 256 "$download_dir/$asset" | awk '{ print $1 }')"
fi
test "$actual" = "$expected"
members="$(tar -tzf "$download_dir/$asset")"
if [ "$members" != 'fabric' ]; then
printf 'unexpected release archive members:\n%s\n' "$members" >&2
exit 1
fi
tar -xzf "$download_dir/$asset" -C "$download_dir"
test "$("$download_dir/fabric" --version)" = "${tag#v}"
# Confirm this is the exact path in launchd/systemd ExecStart before replacing it.
fabric_path="${FABRIC_BIN_PATH:-$(command -v fabric)}"
test -x "$fabric_path"
rollback="$fabric_path.rollback-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
install -m 755 "$fabric_path" "$rollback.new.$$"
mv -f "$rollback.new.$$" "$rollback"
install -m 755 "$download_dir/fabric" "$fabric_path.new.$$"
mv -f "$fabric_path.new.$$" "$fabric_path"
echo "installed $("$fabric_path" --version); rollback: $rollback"Set tag to the release being installed. FABRIC_BIN_PATH is only needed when
the service's ExecStart binary is not the fabric found on the interactive
shell's PATH. Do not compile a release through fabric exec on a managed
target: the compiler inherits the daemon's service cgroup and, if a memory
ceiling is set, can exhaust it and restart the daemon that provides the
connection.
-
Install the new binary atomically, at the path the daemon runs from.
install.shinstalls via a temp file plus a rename, so it can replace the binary while the daemon is running: the daemon keeps executing the old inode while the path points at the new one. Nevercpover a running binary in place (Linux fails withETXTBSY, "text file busy"). Confirm the daemon's binary path first (from its service unit orps) and install there. Keep the previous binary as a rollback before installing, e.g.cp ~/.local/bin/fabric ~/.local/bin/fabric.rollback. -
Restart through the daemon's supervisor so the restart survives your shell disconnecting. The command depends on how the daemon is supervised:
- systemd user service (
fabric service install, or a custom unit such as a keepalive unit):systemctl --user restart <unit>. systemd re-execs the new binary at the unit'sExecStartpath. - launchd (macOS LaunchAgent):
launchctl kickstart -k gui/$UID/<label>. launchd re-execs the new binary at the plist's program path. - Plain
fabric upbackground daemon (no OS supervisor):fabric restart. A detached helper stops the old daemon and starts a fresh one and survives the invoking shell disconnecting.
Do not use
fabric restartunder systemd or launchd supervision: a clean exit can leave the supervised job stopped while an unmanaged daemon runs. And never run a nakedfabric downthenfabric upover a remote shell — if the shell drops in between, the daemon is down with no supervisor and you are locked out. - systemd user service (
-
Verify from a fresh shell (not the one that drove the restart):
fabric --versionmatches the new release,fabric statusshows trusted peers still reachable, andfabric sync lsif sync is configured. If anything is wrong, restore the rollback binary and restart again.
For a coordinated multi-machine upgrade, stage the new binary on every machine first (install, then hold the restart), then restart them in one planned window to keep the transport blip to a single interval.
By default fabric stores local runtime state in:
~/.local/share/fabric
Use --home <dir> or FABRIC_HOME=<dir> to run multiple local nodes on one
machine.
The identity file contains the persisted iroh secret key. The public key is the node's stable NodeID.
Trusted peers are declarative config. With the default home, fabric reads and writes:
~/.config/fabric/peers.toml
If --home <dir> or FABRIC_HOME=<dir> points at a non-default directory,
fabric reads and writes <dir>/peers.toml instead — an isolated node with its
own allow-list. As a deliberate exception, an explicit --home/FABRIC_HOME
equal to the default state root (~/.local/share/fabric) still uses
~/.config/fabric/peers.toml, so the managed service — which always launches the
daemon as --home <default-root> — and the interactive CLI never disagree about
where peers live. The daemon loads this authoritative allow-list on startup and
when fabric reload-peers is run.
Older default-home installs may have peer entries in
~/.local/share/fabric/config.toml or ~/.local/share/fabric/peers.toml.
Fabric migrates those entries to ~/.config/fabric/peers.toml; an existing
canonical peers.toml wins.
Connection counters live in <home>/telemetry.json. They are counters, not
state the product depends on, so an unreadable file starts the counts over and
says so rather than stopping the daemon. Delete the file to reset the counts.
fabric status answers this from counters that survive a daemon restart:
sessions
hetz lost=4 resumed=4 failed=0 attempts=7 reconnect_p50=2.0s reconnect_max=4.5s
lost_on=direct=3,relay=1 resumed_on=direct=2,relay=2
Read the pair, not either number alone: 4 resumed out of 4 lost and 4 out of 40
are very different systems. attempts counts every retry, so it exceeds lost
whenever a break needed more than one try. reconnect_p50 is the measured time
from the loss to the resume, which is not the retry backoff delay the log line
reports. The percentiles come from bounded histogram buckets, so they are
approximate and never exceed the largest sample seen; reconnect_max is exact.
The path breakdown answers "came back how". A session lost on direct that
resumes on relay is fabric falling back correctly. If that becomes the normal
outcome for a peer, the direct path to it is unhealthy even though the peer
still reports reachable.
A peer with no recorded loss is omitted, and sessions no losses recorded
means nothing has dropped since the counters were last reset.
The peer table above shows one instantaneous ping. fabric status also reports
what every probe since daemon start has measured, split by path:
paths
droppy reachable 252/252
relay 78% n=196 mean=83.0ms max=316.0ms
direct 22% n=56 mean=84.7ms max=680.8ms
hetz reachable 252/252
direct 99% n=250 mean=64.8ms max=335.3ms
relay 1% n=2 mean=74.6ms max=76.6ms
The busiest path is listed first, because which path a peer spends its time on is usually the finding. Compare the two rows for one peer, not one peer against another.
Read the example: hetz holds a direct path 99% of the time at 64.8ms — a
stable address. droppy sits on the relay 78% of the time, and when it does
get a direct path that path is no better on average and far worse at the tail,
680.8ms against 316.0ms. That is what a peer behind a moving address looks like.
Unlike the reconnect percentiles above, these are exact: mean and max
are stored precisely rather than bucketed. Percentiles are deliberately not
reported here — the latency buckets double in width, so around 50–200ms two
genuinely different paths fall into the same bucket and print identical
percentiles, hiding the difference this table exists to show.
This reports facts and reaches no verdict. Nothing here labels a path degraded, and nothing changes routing based on it.
A peer is listed on probe evidence alone, so a healthy peer that has never dropped a session still shows its paths.
The daemon writes one validation log per day to <home>/logs/ and keeps the
most recent 45, deleting older ones. Say this out loud rather than let someone
find it out: a log from more than 45 days ago is gone, and an empty directory is
a bad way to learn that.
Forty-five days is chosen from the job the logs do, not rounded for looks. It has to outlast a month away from the machine, so a fault in the first week is still readable on return, with margin for the gap before anyone looks. At the observed rate of 8.8–10.3 MB per day that is roughly 420 MB.
FABRIC_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS overrides the count. 0 disables deletion
entirely and restores unbounded growth, which is the right trade only if you
would rather spend disk than lose history. An unparseable value falls back to the
default rather than to unbounded, because failing open on an unattended machine
is the worst outcome. The daemon records the value it resolved in the
diagnostic_logging_init line, so the running config is checkable.
This bounds the number of files, which is what stops indefinite growth. It does not bound bytes: one noisy day has reached 587 MB, so a bad run still costs far more than the daily average suggests. Capping that is a question about log volume, not retention.
Fabric does not reclaim logs written before this bound existed. Deleting those is an operator's call.
A production fabric daemon is often load-bearing (it may be your only path to a remote machine), so hack on fabric without touching the prod daemon by running a dev instance on its own home. Because a home owns its control socket, identity/NodeID, config, and (ephemerally) its UDP port, a dev instance on a distinct home is structurally unable to collide with prod.
Set FABRIC_HOME once for your dev shell and every fabric command targets the
dev instance — nothing to forget:
export FABRIC_HOME=~/.local/share/fabric-dev # or a repo-local ./.fabric-dev
fabric up # a manual dev daemon on its own home
fabric status # talks to the dev daemon, not prod
fabric down # stops only the dev daemonRules that keep dev and prod from fighting:
- Prod is the only OS-managed service.
fabric service installrefuses a non-default home — a second managed service would share the one global service label and fight the prod daemon. Dev instances run manually viafabric up, never as an installed service. - Mutating commands warn on a home mismatch. If
fabric down/restartcan't reach a daemon at the target home but one is running on the default home, fabric warns you (you probably forgot--home/FABRIC_HOME, or your dev daemon is down). - The default home is prod. A bare
fabric …with no--home/FABRIC_HOMEtargets~/.local/share/fabric— that's the prod daemon. KeepFABRIC_HOMEset while developing.
The same pattern applies to any per-instance daemon: per-instance home/socket/identity, prod is the one service, dev is a manual run on a distinct home.
Three branches on origin are neither merged into main nor known to be
obsolete, so git branch --merged will never retire them. Before you tidy them
away, read docs/unresolved-branches.md — it says
what is known, what is not, and why deleting them on a guess is the wrong trade.
fabric --versionPrint the installed build version as <semver>+<short-git-sha>.
fabric key gen --out <path>Generate an identity file without a running daemon and print its public NodeID.
The output file is in the same format as <home>/identity.toml, so it can be
pre-installed onto another machine before that machine ever starts fabric.
fabric idPrint this node's stable NodeID, generating and persisting it on first use.
fabric peersRead and list the entries in the authoritative peers.toml.
fabric peers make-explicitReplace each legacy unrestricted peer with an explicit list that preserves all
services available now. The command reads the running daemon's status, so the
list includes the five built-ins and every persisted or ephemeral exposure on
this machine. It then writes peers.toml and reloads the daemon. Existing
explicit lists stay unchanged. A service exposed later is denied until it is
added to that peer's list.
fabric reload-peersValidate peers.toml and apply it to the running daemon without restarting.
The daemon keeps its previously loaded allow-list if parsing or validation
fails.
fabric statusShow the running daemon's local state and echo-ping every trusted peer. Each
peer is reported as reachable or unreachable with round-trip latency and, when
iroh exposes it, the active transport path: direct, relay, or mixed.
Status also prints the daemon build version.
fabric add <nodeid> [name] [--addr-json JSON]Trust a peer NodeID and optionally assign a human name. --addr-json is an
optional local/direct address hint for deterministic same-machine testing; normal
key-only dialing relies on iroh address lookup.
fabric remove <nodeid-or-name>Remove a trusted peer.
fabric up [--foreground] [--allow-shell]Start the local fabric daemon. Without --foreground, this spawns a background
daemon and logs to <home>/logs/daemon.log. After the daemon is ready, fabric up runs the same echo-ping reachability check used by fabric status and
prints one line per trusted peer.
--allow-shell opts this daemon into serving remote shells for trusted peers.
It is off by default.
fabric downStop the local daemon.
fabric restart [--allow-shell | --no-allow-shell]Schedule a lockout-safe daemon restart through a detached helper and return
before the running daemon goes down. This is safe to run over fabric shell: the
helper writes progress to <home>/logs/restart.log, stops the old daemon, and
starts a fresh one even if the invoking shell connection drops.
Plain fabric restart preserves the running daemon's flags, including
--allow-shell. Use --allow-shell or --no-allow-shell to force the restarted
daemon's shell policy.
fabric addrPrint the running daemon's current iroh EndpointAddr as JSON. This is mostly a
local-test aid for --addr-json; it is not part of the consumer contract.
fabric expose <protocol> --socket <local-unix-sock>
fabric expose <protocol> --tcp <host:port>
fabric expose <protocol> --exec [--max-children N] -- <cmd> [args...]
fabric expose <protocol> --ephemeral ...Expose a local service to trusted peers under the protocol's ALPN. --socket
connects each fabric tunnel session to an existing Unix socket service. --tcp
connects each tunnel session to an existing local TCP service. --exec spawns
the configured command with piped stdin/stdout for each fabric tunnel session;
pass the command as argv after --, not as a shell string. Child stderr is
written to the fabric daemon log with the tunnel session id. Exec exposures
default to at most 32 active children per exposure; use --max-children to set
a different per-exposure cap.
Exposes are persisted by default to <home>/config.toml and are restored when
the daemon starts. That same file also stores shell policy; fabric add writes
the separate authoritative peers.toml. Use --ephemeral for short-lived test
exposes that should not survive a daemon restart.
Only permitted remote NodeIDs are accepted before the local socket is opened or
the local TCP connection or exec command starts. If no trusted peer can reach a
new exposure, fabric expose warns once and names the peers that need the new
service in their allow lists.
fabric unexpose <protocol>Stop accepting a protocol and remove its persisted config entry.
fabric dial <peer> <protocol>
fabric dial <peer> <protocol> --tcp <local-host:port>Create and print a local Unix socket path. Connections to that socket are
tunneled to the peer's exposed protocol over iroh. With --tcp, fabric listens
on the local TCP address and forwards each accepted connection to the peer's
exposed protocol.
For example, expose a service listening on TCP port 8080 on machine B:
fabric expose demo-http --tcp 127.0.0.1:8080On machine A, create a local listener that forwards to it:
fabric dial machine-b demo-http --tcp 127.0.0.1:9080Clients on machine A can now use 127.0.0.1:9080. The exposure persists in
fabric's config and returns when the daemon restarts; recreate the dial listener
after restarting machine A's daemon. Run fabric unexpose demo-http on machine
B when the exposure is no longer wanted.
8080 and 9080 above are examples, not recommendations. Pick a port you have
checked, and remember that availability is not permission: a port being free
right now does not make it yours to take. On a machine you share, lsof -i :<port>
tells you what is listening at this instant and nothing about whose port it is.
If a port belongs to somebody's habitual workflow, take a different one — a
dial listener is a local choice and costs nothing to move.
fabric ping <peer>Connectivity and trust test. fabric ping dials the peer's built-in
ACL-gated echo protocol, sends a random nonce, verifies the same bytes come
back, and prints the round-trip latency. When available, it also reports whether
iroh used a direct, relay, or mixed path. Use this first when bringing up a new
machine.
fabric shell <peer>Open an interactive remote shell on a trusted peer over fabric. The server side
must have been started with fabric up --allow-shell; a default fabric up
refuses shell requests. The shell runs as the remote daemon's user and uses the
remote user's $SHELL. Current peers negotiate resumable fabric/shell/1, so
the same remote PTY survives a transient transport drop. A new client
automatically falls back to the byte-compatible one-shot fabric/shell/0
protocol when the peer is running an older Fabric release.
Enabling shell is a security-sensitive opt-in: every trusted peer in
peers.toml can obtain a remote shell while --allow-shell is active. Keep the
allow-list tight, enable shell only on machines where that access is intended,
and use fabric restart --no-allow-shell to turn it back off without risking a
lockout.
fabric service install [--allow-shell | --no-allow-shell] [--memory-max-mb N]
fabric service status
fabric service uninstallInstall, inspect, or remove the OS user service. install starts/restarts the
native service manager entry and enables it for future user sessions. status
delegates to systemctl --user status fabric.service --no-pager on Linux and
launchctl print gui/$UID/com.compoundingtech.fabric on macOS. uninstall stops the
managed service and removes only the systemd/launchd artifact; it leaves the
fabric home, identity, peers, logs, and config in place. No memory ceiling is
set unless --memory-max-mb is passed, and --no-memory-max-mb removes one
that was. Set one only after validating that endpoint recycle can complete
below that cap on the target machine.
These commands are hidden from normal help output and exist to validate the resumable transport in live deployments.
fabric debug echo --socket /tmp/fabric-wan-echo.sockRun a foreground Unix-socket echo service. Use this as the service behind a
generic fabric expose when the remote machine does not have socat or another
Unix-socket echo tool installed.
fabric debug unix-cat --socket <local-dial-sock>Connect stdin/stdout to a Unix socket and keep that one local socket open. This is useful for proving bytes resume over the same local connection after an iroh attach drop.
fabric debug block-tunnels
fabric debug drop-tunnels
fabric debug unblock-tunnelsReject new generic tunnel attaches, close active generic tunnel attaches, and
then allow attaches again. This is intentionally non-destructive: it does not
stop the daemon, and it does not affect the built-in fabric shell ALPN.
A catalog should be carriable by either fabric or git, so the two must agree about what a catalog is. Fabric syncs the attributes git tracks:
| git | fabric | |
|---|---|---|
| file content | yes | yes |
| executable bit | yes | yes |
| symlinks | yes | no — skipped, and logged when skipped |
| modification time | no | recorded but never applied |
| other permission bits | no | no |
Two differences are worth knowing before you rely on either transport.
A chmod on an already-synced file does not propagate. Git propagates one:
a mode change rewrites the tree object and is a real commit. Fabric does not,
because a chmod alters no bytes — see the limitation below. A new file
carries its mode correctly.
A same-content rewrite does not propagate at all. Rewriting a file with identical bytes and a new timestamp changes nothing fabric will send, so a replica keeps its older mtime. Do not read a replica's mtime as an activity signal — if you need a heartbeat, put the time in the file's bytes.
Both are the same limitation: fabric cannot propagate a metadata-only change, because a change that alters no bytes never advances a logical version, and that early return is what keeps applying a peer's content free of echo loops.
fabric sync keeps a folder converged with trusted peers. A declarative config
file lists sync entries; the running daemon watches each folder and syncs
changes to peers near-instantly over fabric's own transport. A tool or a human
just adds an entry and drops files in the folder.
The watcher reacts only to filesystem mutations (create, modify, and remove); opening or reading files does not schedule sync work. Write bursts settle for 150 ms, while a continuously changing tree is coalesced into at most one watcher-driven sync per two-second window. Inbound no-op sessions already queued for the same durable folder generation reuse its pre-merge scan, and routine sync-accept path snapshots are sampled in the default validation log.
Entries live in an authoritative, hand-editable syncs.toml next to peers.toml
(~/.config/fabric/syncs.toml for the default home, <home>/syncs.toml with
--home or FABRIC_HOME):
[[sync]]
name = "catalog" # shared logical key: the SAME name on every machine
folder = "/abs/path/to/catalog" # machine-local; may differ per machine
peers = "*" # "*" = every peer in peers.toml, or ["workstation", "server"]
policy = "catalog" # catalog | bus
# include = ["*.toml"] # optional: only matching files sync (default: all)Two machines are the same sync when they use the same name; their local
folder paths may differ. peers = "*" follows the peers.toml allow-list, so
sync only ever touches already-trusted peers — it adds no new trust surface.
catalog— union, newer-wins, and a delete propagates: a file present on any peer is present on all peers, and a file deleted on any peer is deleted on all peers. Tombstones are retained and never swept, so a delete cannot un-stick. Fabric does NOT restore a local deletion. It did until August 2026, and this README said so; that behaviour is gone, and git is the safety net for a file somebody still wanted.bus— union, newer-wins, and a delete propagates as a versioned tombstone. Tombstones are retained by default. Sweeping them is opt-in: setFABRIC_TOMBSTONE_SWEEP_DAYSin the daemon's environment, and only an entry with an explicitpeerslist sweeps, once every named peer has acknowledged the tombstone.fabric sync lsreports the sweep state per entry assweep=.
Both policies propagate a delete, so the difference today is only whether a tombstone may ever be swept. A tombstone inherited from an older build stays authoritative under both policies: the stale bytes are removed, never revived. If no node retains a copy, Fabric cannot reconstruct deleted content; recreate the file deliberately.
Publication tools must treat every watcher-visible, included path as a durable logical sync key. Stage temporary, backup, and partial files outside the configured sync folder (on the same filesystem when an atomic rename is required), then move only canonical final paths into the folder. Do not use a sibling temporary name inside the synced subtree: either policy will propagate that name as a real key, and deleting it later propagates that delete to every peer. Include globs scope which paths are keys; they do not make matching temporary paths ephemeral.
Conflicts use logical versions, never filesystem mtime (which is unreliable
across machines). A higher logical version always wins. At the same version, a
Present update wins over a Tombstone delete, followed by deterministic
author/content-hash tie-breaks. For example, if two peers start from v1 while
offline, then one edits the file and the other deletes it, both operations are
v2 and the updated file intentionally reappears everywhere. If a peer deletes
that winning update afterward, the delete advances to v3 and removes it
everywhere under bus.
Fabric stores each entry's internal recovery data under
<home>/sync/<sanitized-name>/. state.json is the authoritative atomic record
of both the converged manifest—including bus tombstones—and the files last
observed on local disk; manifest.json is only a compatibility and inspection
projection. Do not edit, delete, or restore either file independently: losing
tombstones can resurrect deleted paths, while losing the observed-disk receipt
can make old physical bytes look like a new local update. A deliberate rollback
or downgrade must stop Fabric and restore the entire per-entry state directory
together with the matching Fabric binary and config, not only manifest.json.
A connected peer that still has a newer logical state can supersede that
rollback on the next reconcile.
fabric sync add <folder> --name <name> [--peers "*"|a,b] [--policy catalog|bus] [--include "*.toml"]
fabric sync ls
fabric sync ls --json
fabric sync rm <name-or-folder>
fabric sync reloadfabric sync add is a convenience writer for syncs.toml; the file can also be
hand-edited or provisioned before the daemon runs. fabric sync reload applies
the file to a running daemon, mirroring reload-peers. The daemon serves and
dials sync over the reserved fabric/sync/1 ALPN, gated by the same peer
allow-list as every other fabric protocol.
fabric sync ls reports present (logical files in the manifest),
tombstones (retained logical deletions), and observed (included paths in the
last durable local-disk receipt). drift=clean means the logical Present paths
and observed bytes agree. A drift=WARNING names missing Present paths,
unexpected observed paths whose manifest is tombstoned or absent, and
mismatched paths whose observed content hash differs from the logical Present.
scan_issues names existing paths that the last scan could not read as syncable
regular files.
A delete propagates only when a complete parent directory listing proves the
path is absent. An unreadable path remains present with an unknown state. A file
over 512 MiB is also present but not syncable: fabric does not read, hash,
overwrite, or send it. Reduce it to 512 MiB or less, or exclude it from the sync
entry. If it is later deleted, the next complete scan propagates that delete.
The per-entry full_scans, inbound_noop_transactions, and
inbound_guarded_transactions counters are monotonic while that name remains
continuously configured in the same daemon process. They let operators measure
whether inbound reconciliation selected the exact-manifest no-scan path or the
guarded scan/materialize path. Ordinary reloads preserve the counters; a daemon
restart or removing and later re-adding the name starts a new counter epoch.
fabric sync ls --json emits a stable array with all of those fields plus a
Boolean drift for automation.
An st2 catalog mixes declarative fleet data, durable bus data, and strictly machine-local runtime state. Do not make the catalog one broad sync entry. Instead, configure these two positive allow-lists on every host:
ST2_CATALOG="${XDG_STATE_HOME:-$HOME/.local/state}/st2/default/catalog"
fabric sync add "$ST2_CATALOG" --name st2-declarations-default --peers "*" --policy catalog --include "_templates/**,agents/**/agent.kdl,plans/**"
fabric sync add "$ST2_CATALOG/agents" --name st2-bus-default --peers "*" --policy bus --include "**/resources/**,**/status"The shell resolves ST2_CATALOG to an absolute, machine-local path. The path may
differ between hosts, but the logical names st2-declarations-default and
st2-bus-default must be identical everywhere. --peers "*" means every peer
already trusted by that host's peers.toml; to pin membership, replace it with
a comma-separated local selector such as --peers "workstation,server" on each
host. Peer aliases may differ between hosts even though the two sync names do
not.
The entries deliberately have different semantics:
st2-declarations-defaultsyncs only templates,agent.kdldeclarations, and plans. It usescatalogpolicy because these files declare desired fleet membership. Retire an agent by editing its declaration (for example, setting its retirement field); do not express retirement by deleting the file.st2-bus-defaultsyncs agent status plus everything belowresources/**. That includes normalresources/inbox,resources/archive,resources/context, andresources/linkspaths. It usesbuspolicy so moves and deletions become tombstones and propagate instead of stale inbox or resource files reappearing.
Warning
PTY registries and process state are strictly machine-local and MUST NEVER
sync. Never sync the entire st2 catalog. In particular, never include
$ST2_CATALOG/pty, sockets, PIDs, locks, exec runtime state, logs, or
temporary, backup, and partial files.
Workspaces and hooks are provisioned separately unless a future explicit
contract says otherwise. Never add a hidden _syncproof fixture; validate
sync with ordinary agent resources and messages instead.
Positive includes are the safety boundary. When publishing an included file, stage it outside the synced folder and move only its canonical final path into place. A broader root, a catch-all include, or a watcher-visible sibling temp file turns machine-local or partial state into a durable logical key.
After configuring every host, apply and check the live daemon:
fabric sync reload
fabric sync ls
fabric status
fabric ping <peer-name>fabric sync ls must show the same two logical names and the same logical
Present/Tombstone counts on every host, with the local catalog paths and
intended peer selectors. In steady state observed equals present and
drift=clean. fabric status and fabric ping must show the selected peers
reachable.
For the default Fabric home, inspect the effective include lists and fail if machine-local paths were added:
FABRIC_SYNCS="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/fabric/syncs.toml"
FABRIC_STATE="${FABRIC_HOME:-$HOME/.local/share/fabric}/sync"
sed -n '1,200p' "$FABRIC_SYNCS"
if grep -Eq '_syncproof|catalog/pty|\.sock|\.pid|events\.jsonl|/logs?/' "$FABRIC_SYNCS"; then
echo "unsafe st2 sync include in $FABRIC_SYNCS" >&2
exit 1
fi
for state in \
"$FABRIC_STATE/st2-bus-default/state.json" \
"$FABRIC_STATE/st2-bus-default/manifest.json" \
"$FABRIC_STATE/st2-declarations-default/state.json" \
"$FABRIC_STATE/st2-declarations-default/manifest.json"
do
test -f "$state"
if grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]+"(pty|exec|run|logs?)/|\.sock"[[:space:]]*:|\.pid"[[:space:]]*:|events\.jsonl"[[:space:]]*:' "$state"; then
echo "machine-local runtime key found in $state" >&2
exit 1
fi
doneNo output from either failure branch is success. The state check intentionally
matches a root pty/ key; an agent identity such as
workstation/pty/resources/... is ordinary allow-listed bus data, not the
sibling catalog/pty registry.
Use normal st2 operations for a harmless end-to-end check. On one host:
PROOF_IDENTITY="${ST_AGENT:?set ST_AGENT to the agent running this check}"
resource_ref="$(st2 resource add "https://github.com/compoundingtech/fabric" --title "st2 sync check" --tag "sync-check" --relation verification)"
message_file="$(st2 message send "$PROOF_IDENTITY" --subject "st2 sync check" -m "ordinary inbox item; verify on every host, then archive")"
printf 'identity=%s resource=%s message=%s\n' "$PROOF_IDENTITY" "$resource_ref" "$message_file"On every host, including the origin, verify the same resource, inbox item, and status:
st2 resource read "$PROOF_IDENTITY" "$resource_ref"
st2 message ls "$PROOF_IDENTITY" | grep -F "$message_file"
st2 status "$PROOF_IDENTITY"Then archive the message once on the origin:
st2 message archive "$PROOF_IDENTITY" "$message_file"On every host, the message must disappear from the inbox and appear once in the archive:
if st2 message ls "$PROOF_IDENTITY" | grep -F "$message_file"; then
echo "message still present in inbox" >&2
exit 1
fi
st2 message ls "$PROOF_IDENTITY" --archive | grep -F "$message_file"If a check has not converged yet, confirm fabric status/fabric ping first
and retry; do not weaken the include lists to make the proof pass.
peers.toml is Fabric's authorized-keys file. It is intentionally
human-editable and can be provisioned before Fabric ever runs. Each
[[peers]] entry accepts:
id(required): the peer's 64-character hexadecimal iroh NodeID.name(optional): a non-empty, unique local alias for commands such asfabric ping workstation.addr(optional): an irohEndpointAddrhint whoseidmust match the peer'sid.allow(optional): the service names this peer may reach. Omit it for legacy unrestricted behavior. An empty list permits no service.
NodeIDs and names must be unique. Normal cross-machine setup should omit
addr; NodeID-based iroh discovery supplies the current addresses.
Trust is local and based on NodeID, not alias: name is only a command-line
label. Each machine must independently list the other NodeID. An optional
allow list limits that peer to named services such as sync, shell, exec,
or an exposure name. A missing list keeps the legacy unrestricted behavior. The
daemon-global shell and exec flags still apply and cannot be overridden by a
peer entry.
A file can mix legacy entries with explicit permissions:
[[peers]]
id = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
name = "workstation"
[[peers]]
id = "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
name = "server"
allow = ["echo", "exec", "send-file", "shell", "sync", "web"]An explicit address hint, mainly useful for deterministic tests, has this exact TOML shape:
[[peers]]
id = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
name = "workstation"
[peers.addr]
id = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
[[peers.addr.addrs]]
Relay = "https://relay.example.com/"
[[peers.addr.addrs]]
Ip = "203.0.113.10:11204"Prefer generating hint data with
fabric add <nodeid> <name> --addr-json "$(fabric addr)" instead of writing it
by hand.
For the default home, install a prepared file and apply it without any interactive command:
FABRIC_CONFIG_DIR="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/fabric"
install -d -m 755 "$FABRIC_CONFIG_DIR"
install -m 644 ./peers.toml "$FABRIC_CONFIG_DIR/peers.toml"
fabric reload-peers
fabric peers
fabric statusIf the daemon is not running yet, omit fabric reload-peers; fabric up,
fabric up --foreground, and the managed service all read the file at startup.
With FABRIC_HOME=/srv/fabric, install it as /srv/fabric/peers.toml and use
that same environment for every Fabric command.
Removing an entry and reloading prevents new connections from that NodeID. Reloading does not forcibly close an already active tunnel or shell; restart in a safe maintenance window when immediate disconnection is required.
Symptom. fabric ping, fabric status, and fabric shell all report the
peer as reachable, yet anything that goes through a dial — fabric dial, or
a consumer like st sync — fails on a loop. st sync shows
fabric pull failed: <peer>::… — re-dialing forever, and
~/.local/share/fabric/logs/service.err.log shows
dial socket connection failed: unknown peer "<peer>".
Cause. A peer-config split between the daemon and the CLI. ping/status
answer from the daemon's in-memory allow-list, but the dial/tunnel path
re-resolves the peer from peers.toml on disk each connection. If the daemon was
launched with a --home whose peers.toml is missing or empty while the CLI
writes to a different peers.toml, the dial path resolves nothing → the tunnel
never opens → the consumer's socket gets zero bytes and times out. This is a
fabric transport issue, not a consumer bug (e.g. st sync's
SyncFailedError-on-rsync --timeout is that consumer behaving correctly). A
default-home fabric add/remove can trigger the split by migrating peers to
~/.config/fabric/peers.toml and removing the legacy in---home copy.
Fix. Make sure the peers file the daemon actually reads contains the peer, then reload:
# Confirm the running daemon's --home (e.g. from `ps` or the service plist),
# then point every command at that same home so the CLI and daemon agree:
fabric --home <daemon-home> add <nodeid> <name>
fabric --home <daemon-home> reload-peers
fabric --home <daemon-home> status # peer should now be reachable AND dialableOn current fabric an explicit --home equal to the default state root resolves
peers from ~/.config/fabric/peers.toml (see State), so a
service-launched daemon and the interactive CLI can no longer diverge this way.
Pre-generate a box identity on a trusted machine:
BOX_ID=$(fabric key gen --out box-identity.toml)
printf '%s\n' "$BOX_ID"Write the new box's peers.toml with the peers it should trust:
[[peers]]
id = "existing-machine-node-id"
name = "workstation"On every existing machine, add the new box to its canonical peers.toml:
[[peers]]
id = "<new-box-node-id>"
name = "new-box"Replace <new-box-node-id> with the value printed in BOX_ID, deploy the file
with the machine's normal configuration-management or file-copy mechanism, and
run fabric reload-peers on a daemon that is already running.
Install the generated identity and prepared peer config on the new box before first boot. For the default paths:
mkdir -p ~/.local/share/fabric ~/.config/fabric
install -m 600 box-identity.toml ~/.local/share/fabric/identity.toml
install -m 644 peers.toml ~/.config/fabric/peers.toml
fabric up
fabric ping workstationIf provisioning with FABRIC_HOME=/path/to/fabric, put both files in that
directory as identity.toml and peers.toml.
The automated integration test is the canonical local walkthrough:
cargo test --test local_sliceIt starts three fabric nodes on one Mac:
- node A exposes a dummy Unix-socket echo service under
pty-view - node B trusts node A, dials
pty-view, and round-trips bytes through fabric - node C has node A's address but is not trusted by node A, and is rejected before node A's local service sees a connection
For a manual run, use separate homes:
FABRIC_A=/tmp/fabric-a
FABRIC_B=/tmp/fabric-b
target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_A" up
target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_B" up
A_ID=$(target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_A" id)
B_ID=$(target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_B" id)
A_ADDR=$(target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_A" addr)
B_ADDR=$(target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_B" addr)
target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_A" add "$B_ID" node-b --addr-json "$B_ADDR"
target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_B" add "$A_ID" node-a --addr-json "$A_ADDR"Start any Unix-socket echo service at /tmp/fabric-a-echo.sock, then:
target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_A" expose pty-view --socket /tmp/fabric-a-echo.sock
target/debug/fabric --home "$FABRIC_B" dial node-a pty-viewThe printed socket on node B is the local pipe a consumer connects to.
Use this procedure to validate Layer 1 over a real Mac-to-Hetzner link without restarting either daemon. Restarting the accept-side daemon is intentionally not part of this test because it would lose the server-side in-memory tunnel session.
The Hetzner supervisor model is undecided and the standalone systemd-per-daemon plan is parked. For the retained daemon run surfaces, see docs/hetzner-supervisor-plan.md.
On Hetzner, start a generic Unix echo service in one shell:
fabric debug echo --socket /tmp/fabric-wan-echo.sockIn another Hetzner shell, expose it:
fabric expose wan-echo --socket /tmp/fabric-wan-echo.sockOn the Mac, dial the service and connect one long-lived local socket:
SOCK=$(fabric dial hetzner wan-echo)
fabric debug unix-cat --socket "$SOCK"Type before and press Enter; it should echo immediately. Then, from Hetzner,
force a clean generic-tunnel drop and temporarily reject reconnects:
fabric debug block-tunnels
fabric debug drop-tunnelsBack in the Mac unix-cat process, type during-drop and press Enter. It should
not echo while blocked, but the process and local socket should stay open. Then
unblock Hetzner:
fabric debug unblock-tunnelsThe during-drop bytes should arrive on the Mac over the same unix-cat
process. Type after and press Enter to confirm the reattached tunnel continues
to carry new bytes.
A consumer such as pty should treat fabric as a local socket provider:
pty ls --remote node-a
-> asks fabric: dial node-a pty-view
-> fabric prints /.../dials/<peer>-pty-view.sock
-> pty connects to that Unix socket
-> pty speaks its own pty-view protocol bytes
The consumer never imports iroh types, parses relay addresses, opens QUIC streams, or implements allow-list checks. Only fabric owns those details.
client machine server machine
+------------------+ +------------------+
| consumer process | | local service |
| pty / app / tool | | socket/tcp/exec |
+--------+---------+ +---------+--------+
| ^
| local Unix socket or TCP |
v |
+--------+---------+ iroh direct or relay +-------+--------+
| fabric daemon |<===============================>| fabric daemon |
| dial listener | QUIC + ALPN | expose handler |
| peer allow-list | | peer allow-list |
+--------+---------+ +-------+--------+
| ^
v |
+--------+---------+ +-------+--------+
| identity.toml | | identity.toml |
| peers.toml | | peers.toml |
| config.toml | | config.toml |
+------------------+ +----------------+
The daemon owns one persisted iroh endpoint per fabric home. <home>/config.toml
stores shell policy and persisted exposes; peers.toml stores the peer
allow-list. fabric expose registers an ALPN and a local Unix socket, TCP, or
exec target in the running daemon and, by default, writes it to config.toml.
On startup, the daemon restores those exposes before binding its accepted ALPN
list. Incoming iroh connections pass through an
EndpointHooks::after_handshake allow-list check before the daemon connects to
a socket/TCP target or spawns an exec target.
fabric dial registers a local Unix listener under <home>/dials. Each local
connection gets a random tunnel session id bound to the remote peer id. Generic
dials use a small framed byte protocol with offsets and ACKs, so unacked bytes
can be replayed after a real iroh attach loss while the local Unix socket stays
open. On the expose side, the Unix socket connection or exec child is bound to
that tunnel session, not to each transient iroh attach, so a reconnect resumes
the same local endpoint. If a detached session exceeds the server TTL, fabric
removes the session and kills/reaps its exec child.
Built-in fabric shell rides this resumable transport. It negotiates
fabric/shell/1 and falls back to the legacy one-shot fabric/shell/0 when the
peer does not offer it, so a mixed-version pair still works and only the newer
pair gets resumption. A shell that loses its transport briefly — a network blip,
a roaming peer, an endpoint recycle — reconnects to the same remote PTY and
replays unacked bytes, and the client prints a status line for the loss, each
reconnect attempt, and the resume.
The limit worth knowing before relying on it: resumption only survives an
outage shorter than the server's detached-session TTL, which defaults to 15
minutes (--server-session-detached-ttl-secs). A closed lid over lunch keeps
its shell; a laptop left overnight does not. Past that window the server reaps
the PTY.
The window is 15 minutes because that is what the cost measures out to, not as a round guess. An idle detached shell buffers nothing — 0 bytes across a full detached window — so holding one costs a session struct and a PTY process and nothing that grows with time.
A session still producing output is the expensive case, and it is bounded too. The replay buffer stops at 4 MiB. Nothing acknowledges a detached session, so the reader waits for buffer space that never frees and the remote process then blocks writing to its own PTY. Measured directly, a runaway producer pins at exactly 4 MiB and stays there. Retention is therefore bounded per session regardless of how long this window is, and in aggregate by the server session cap — 256 MiB at the default of 64 sessions.
Backpressure, not this TTL, is what bounds a runaway remote process. The TTL bounds how long a session lives, not how much it holds.
An earlier version of this section said the replay buffer had no cap, that a runaway shell would reach roughly 17 MB across this window, and that the TTL was the only backstop. All three were wrong. The "no cap" claim was also the stated reason not to raise the TTL further, so that reason no longer applies.
Past the window, the client does not retry a session the server has already
refused: it reports remote shell could not resume, names the expired session,
and exits non-zero, so a dead session ends promptly instead of hanging.
Restarting the remote daemon has the same effect, because the session store is
in memory. What is lost in both cases is the PTY and its scrollback, not just
the connection; only outages shorter than the window resume in place.