fix(runtime): block file and internal navigate targets - #16
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Restrict navigate URLs to public http/https hosts to prevent local file reads and SSRF via snapshot exfiltration. Co-authored-by: esadrianno <esadrianno@gmail.com>
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Summary
Blocks
file://, localhost, and private-network navigate URLs before Playwright navigation.Bug and impact
Any MCP/companion caller could navigate to
file:///etc/passwdor internal HTTP endpoints and exfiltrate page content viasnapshot.Root cause
NavigateCommandSchemaonly validatedz.string().url()with no scheme or host policy.Fix and validation
assertAllowedNavigateUrl(http/https public hosts only).BrowserRuntime.navigate.@webchain/protocol.pnpm --filter @webchain/protocol testandpnpm --filter @webchain/runtime test