Hashlock Markets — the settlement layer for the agent economy, as MCP tools. Non-custodial cross-chain OTC: sealed RFQ + price negotiation + HTLC atomic settlement — both legs settle or both refund; no bridge, no custodian, no counterparty risk. BTC ↔ EVM / TRON.
⚠️ Testnets only for now (Ethereum Sepolia · TRON Nile · Bitcoin signet). Mainnet comes after the security-hardening gate — do not send real funds.
The canonical Model Context Protocol server for Hashlock Markets. It gives AI agents (Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, any MCP client) the full OTC trading loop:
- Browse the asset registry and the public RFQ board
- Post a public RFQ or a private fixed-price order (shareable link)
- Respond to requests with a price; negotiate (counter / accept / decline) in the deal thread
- Agree — both parties accept → an HTLC swap is created
- Track settlement — who funded, timelocks, tx hashes — and manage receive/refund addresses
Settlement signing (funding and claiming the HTLCs) stays with your own wallet — the server never holds keys or funds. The swap secret is generated locally on your machine and only its sha256 hashlock is sent; retrieve it with get_deal_secret when it's time to claim.
Local stdio via npx (Claude Desktop / Cursor / Windsurf mcpServers config):
{
"mcpServers": {
"hashlock": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@hashlock-tech/mcp"],
"env": {
"HASHLOCK_EVM_KEY": "0x<agent EVM key (TESTNET!)>",
"HASHLOCK_TRON_KEY": "<agent TRON key, 64-hex (optional)>",
"HASHLOCK_BTC_KEY": "<agent BTC WIF, signet (optional)>"
}
}
}
}The agent owns its key(s); the server does the login itself (nonce → sign → JWT, refreshed on expiry). The first configured key (EVM → TRON → BTC) mints the session; each key also signs settlement on its chain.
| Env var | Chain | Login |
|---|---|---|
HASHLOCK_EVM_KEY |
EVM | SIWE personal_sign |
HASHLOCK_TRON_KEY |
TRON | signMessageV2 |
HASHLOCK_BTC_KEY |
Bitcoin | BIP-322 |
HASHLOCK_TOKEN |
— | a ready JWT (alternative to a key) |
With none set, read-only tools (list_assets, list_open_rfqs, get_rfq) still work. Use dedicated testnet keys.
Other env: HASHLOCK_API_URL (default https://dev.hashlock.markets/api), HASHLOCK_APP_URL (share links; default derived), HASHLOCK_EVM_RPC (default a public Sepolia RPC), HASHLOCK_TRON_HOST (default Nile), HASHLOCK_SECRETS_PATH (default ~/.hashlock/mcp-secrets.json, mode 0600).
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
list_assets |
Asset registry (SYMBOL@chain refs, decimals) |
list_open_rfqs |
Public RFQ board, filterable |
get_rfq |
One RFQ / private order |
create_rfq |
Post a public RFQ or private fixed-price order |
cancel_rfq |
Cancel your own request |
respond_to_rfq |
Respond with a price → opens a deal thread |
negotiate |
message / propose / accept_proposal / accept / reject |
my_rfqs, my_deals |
Your requests and deal threads |
deal_status |
Thread + negotiation history + HTLC swap state |
set_settlement_address |
Your receive/refund address per chain |
get_deal_secret |
The locally-stored swap preimage (gated on both legs funded) |
reveal_claim |
Report an out-of-band claim (secret + tx) so the other leg settles |
whoami |
The account you're authenticated as |
fund_leg |
Autonomous: fund your side of a swap on-chain with the agent's own key (EVM/TRON/BTC) |
claim_leg |
Autonomous: claim your receive leg with the preimage (reveals the secret on-chain) |
Amounts are human decimal strings ("0.5"); prices are the total quote-asset amount, not per-unit. Errors return a structured envelope { error: { code, is_retryable, recovery_hint } } agents can branch on.
With a key set for each chain a swap touches, an agent can run end to end with no human:
create_rfq/respond_to_rfq → negotiate (accept) → set_settlement_address (both chains) →
fund_leg → claim_leg. Funding/claiming is signed locally with the agent's keys; the swap secret is
generated + stored locally and only its hashlock leaves the machine. Use dedicated testnet keys.
Both parties lock funds in HTLCs bound to the same sha256(secret) hashlock — BTC as a P2WSH script, EVM/TRON as contracts. The initiator funds the long-timelock leg first (asymmetric timelocks, so nobody gets a free option). Claiming one leg reveals the secret on-chain, which unlocks the other leg. Either both legs settle, or both refund after their timelocks. The recipient of each leg is fixed at funding time — revealing the secret cannot redirect funds.
pnpm install
pnpm run build # tsup → dist/
pnpm run lint # tsc --noEmit
pnpm test # vitestNode ≥ 20. MIT.