Security updates and patches are actively maintained for the latest release branch of ShareL.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.x | ✅ |
| < 1.0 | ❌ |
We take the security of ShareL and our users seriously. If you discover a security vulnerability or sensitive issue, please report it responsibly rather than opening a public issue.
- GitHub Security Advisory (Preferred): Navigate to the Security Advisories tab on GitHub and click "Report a vulnerability" to open a private disclosure draft.
- Email Disclosure:
If you are unable to use GitHub Security Advisories, send a detailed report to the repository maintainers with:
- A clear description of the vulnerability and its potential impact.
- Exact steps or a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) to reproduce the issue.
- Affected desktop compositors, platforms, or backend dependencies.
- Any suggested remediations or mitigations.
- Initial Acknowledgment: Within 48 hours of report receipt.
- Triage & Assessment: Within 5 business days with status updates on validation and severity evaluation.
- Fix & Advisory Release: Coordinated public disclosure following verification and deployment of a patched release.
- ShareL supports ShareX
.sxcuconfigurations which may contain private API keys, bearer tokens, or basic auth headers. - Uploader secrets and configuration files are stored locally in the user's standard configuration directory (
~/.config/sharel/). - All secret-bearing files (config, history, uploaders) are written with restrictive
0600permissions so only the owning user can read them. - Never share raw
.sxcufiles containing active production tokens publicly.
- Screen captures and screencasts use standard Linux security interfaces, primarily the
XDG Desktop Portal(org.freedesktop.portal.ScreenCast/org.freedesktop.portal.Screenshot) and compositor-authorized pipes. - ShareL never bypasses Wayland isolation policies.
- Child recording processes run in isolated process groups to prevent signal bleeding or unintended session manipulation.
- Webview communication adheres to Tauri IPC protocol boundaries with a Content Security Policy enabled.
- A restrictive CSP is enforced on the webview, limiting script, style, connect, frame, object, and base sources to the local application origin.
- Remote sources are permitted only where the UI genuinely requires them: Google Fonts for typography and the QR code image API for the QR Studio tool.
- No third-party API keys are bundled in the source tree or seeded into the user's configuration.
- Users supply their own credentials by importing
.sxcufiles or entering keys through the Destinations Manager UI.