diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index ab1af1b4..8ed986c8 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # and runs the full python integration test suite against it. # # Stage 1: GATE (seconds) -# └─ lint basic Python syntax check +# └─ lint Python syntax + deterministic protocol contract tests # # Stage 2: TEST (gated by Stage 1) # └─ integration full pytest suite against emulator @@ -13,9 +13,15 @@ name: CI on: push: - branches: [master, develop, 'feature/**', 'fix/**', 'hotfix/**'] + branches: [master, develop, reconcile/upstream-sync, 'feature/**', 'fix/**', 'hotfix/**'] pull_request: - branches: [master, develop] + branches: [master, develop, reconcile/upstream-sync] + +# One run per ref: a new push supersedes the old instead of both burning a +# runner to completion. +concurrency: + group: ci-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true jobs: # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ @@ -34,6 +40,18 @@ jobs: - name: Syntax check run: python -m py_compile keepkeylib/*.py + - name: Install contract-test dependencies + run: | + pip install "protobuf>=3.20,<4" mnemonic ecdsa pytest + + - name: Run deterministic Zcash PCZT contract tests + env: + PROTOCOL_BUFFERS_PYTHON_IMPLEMENTATION: python + run: | + python -m pytest -q \ + tests/test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt.py \ + tests/test_zcash_seed_fingerprint_helper.py + - name: Lint summary run: | echo "## 🔑 KeepKey python-keepkey — Lint" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" @@ -41,6 +59,7 @@ jobs: echo "| Check | Status |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" echo "|-------|--------|" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" echo "| Syntax | ✅ PASS |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "| Zcash PCZT contract | ✅ PASS |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # STAGE 2: TEST — pull published emulator, run pytest @@ -49,26 +68,74 @@ jobs: integration: needs: [lint] runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 30 + timeout-minutes: 15 - services: - kkemu: - image: kktech/kkemu:latest - ports: - - 11044:11044/udp - - 11045:11045/udp - - 5000:5000 + # NO published emulator image. This job BUILDS one from current firmware. + # + # It used to pull kktech/kkemu:latest -- a floating tag whose image was + # five months and six minor versions stale. That single fact caused every + # symptom we chased: 80 tests gating on requires_firmware("7.15.0") skipped + # silently, and one unskipped test drove a ctime() path that segfaults on + # the old image and does not exist in current firmware. + # + # Publishing a fresher image would only reset that clock. Building from + # source removes the class: the emulator under test is, by construction, + # the firmware the tests were written against. steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 with: submodules: recursive + path: python-keepkey + + # python-keepkey is a SUBMODULE of the firmware repo, so the firmware is + # where the emulator lives. alpha is the fork's integration branch. + - name: Checkout firmware + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + repository: BitHighlander/keepkey-firmware + ref: alpha + path: keepkey-firmware + + # NOT `submodules: recursive`. trezor-firmware carries a micropython + # vendor tree whose lib/lwip lives on git.savannah.gnu.org, which serves + # dumb HTTP and cannot do the shallow clone actions/checkout requests -- + # it fails the whole job. The firmware repo's own CI inits exactly these + # paths, non-recursively, for the same reason. + - name: Init the submodules the emulator build needs + working-directory: keepkey-firmware + run: | + git submodule update --init --depth 1 deps/crypto/trezor-firmware + git submodule update --init --depth 1 deps/device-protocol + git submodule update --init --depth 1 deps/googletest + git submodule update --init --depth 1 deps/qrenc/QR-Code-generator + git submodule update --init --depth 1 deps/sca-hardening/SecAESSTM32 + + # Test THIS checkout of python-keepkey, not the one the firmware pins. + - name: Overlay this python-keepkey onto the firmware tree + run: | + rm -rf keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey + cp -a python-keepkey keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey + + - name: Build the emulator + timeout-minutes: 20 + working-directory: keepkey-firmware + run: | + docker build -t kkemu-ci -f scripts/emulator/Dockerfile . + + - name: Start the emulator + run: | + docker run -d --name kkemu \ + -p 11044:11044/udp -p 11045:11045/udp -p 5000:5000 kkemu-ci + sleep 3 + docker logs kkemu | head -5 - uses: actions/setup-python@v5 with: python-version: '3.11' - name: Install dependencies + working-directory: python-keepkey run: | pip install --upgrade pip pip install "protobuf>=3.20,<4" @@ -88,20 +155,67 @@ jobs: sleep 1 done + # "The emulator answered a ping" is not "the emulator is the right + # firmware". CI ran a 7.16-era suite against a 7.10.0 image for five + # months: 80 tests gate on requires_firmware("7.15.0") and silently + # SKIPPED, while one unskipped test drove a code path that segfaults in + # 7.10.0 and is already fixed in 7.15 -- which reads as a product failure + # but is only a stale image. A floating tag cannot tell you that. This + # can, and it fails closed. + - name: Assert the emulator is not older than the suite + timeout-minutes: 2 + env: + KK_TRANSPORT_MAIN: "127.0.0.1:11044" + KK_TRANSPORT_DEBUG: "127.0.0.1:11045" + KK_MIN_FW: "7.15.0" + KK_UDP_TIMEOUT: "20" + working-directory: keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey/tests + run: | + python - <<'PY' + import os, sys + sys.path.insert(0, '..') + import config + from keepkeylib.client import KeepKeyDebuglinkClient + c = KeepKeyDebuglinkClient(config.TRANSPORT(*config.TRANSPORT_ARGS, + **config.TRANSPORT_KWARGS)) + c.set_debuglink(config.DEBUG_TRANSPORT(*config.DEBUG_TRANSPORT_ARGS, + **config.DEBUG_TRANSPORT_KWARGS)) + c.init_device() + f = c.features + got = (f.major_version, f.minor_version, f.patch_version) + floor = tuple(int(x) for x in os.environ['KK_MIN_FW'].split('.')) + print('emulator firmware %d.%d.%d, floor %s' % + (got + (os.environ['KK_MIN_FW'],))) + if got < floor: + sys.exit('FATAL: the emulator image predates the tests that run ' + 'against it. Republish kktech/kkemu from current ' + 'firmware and pin the new digest above.') + PY + + # Step-level timeout, deliberately: a JOB-level timeout ends the job as + # "cancelled", which reads as an infra blip. A step timeout is a FAILURE. - name: Run integration tests + timeout-minutes: 8 env: KK_TRANSPORT_MAIN: "127.0.0.1:11044" KK_TRANSPORT_DEBUG: "127.0.0.1:11045" - PYTHONPATH: "${{ github.workspace }}/keepkeylib:${{ github.workspace }}" + PYTHONPATH: "${{ github.workspace }}/keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey" + # A crashed emulator now raises instead of blocking in recv() forever. + KK_UDP_TIMEOUT: "45" run: | - cd tests + # From the OVERLAID copy, not the standalone checkout: the + # storage-version-gate tests assert against lib/firmware/storage.c, + # which they find by walking UP. Run them as a sibling of the + # firmware and they resolve; run them standalone and they fail + # claiming the sources are missing. + cd keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey/tests pytest -v --junitxml=junit.xml 2>&1 | tee pytest-output.txt echo "${PIPESTATUS[0]}" > status - name: Test summary if: always() run: | - XML="tests/junit.xml" + XML="keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey/tests/junit.xml" echo "## 🔑 KeepKey python-keepkey — Integration Tests" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" @@ -148,15 +262,23 @@ jobs: echo "---" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" echo "*KeepKey python-keepkey CI*" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" - - name: Upload test results + # NO check_name. With one, this action publishes a SEPARATE check run + # via the Checks API, and its require_tests default of 'false' means an + # absent junit.xml -- which is exactly what a killed pytest leaves behind + # -- reports conclusion:success with zero duration. That green check sat + # on top of a job timing out at 30 minutes for at least six merges. + # annotate_only keeps the inline annotations without minting a check. + - name: Annotate test results uses: mikepenz/action-junit-report@v4 if: always() with: - report_paths: tests/junit.xml - check_name: Integration Tests + report_paths: keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey/tests/junit.xml + annotate_only: true + require_tests: true + fail_on_failure: true - name: Fail on test failure if: always() run: | - STATUS=$(cat tests/status 2>/dev/null || echo "1") + STATUS=$(cat keepkey-firmware/deps/python-keepkey/tests/status 2>/dev/null || echo "1") [ "$STATUS" = "0" ] || exit 1 diff --git a/.github/workflows/copilot-review.yml b/.github/workflows/copilot-review.yml index 54db1498..8afdb03e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/copilot-review.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/copilot-review.yml @@ -1,11 +1,15 @@ name: Request Copilot Review on: - pull_request: + # This workflow never checks out or executes pull-request code. Using the + # base-repository context is therefore safe and is required for cross-fork + # PRs, whose pull_request GITHUB_TOKEN is always downgraded to read-only. + pull_request_target: types: [opened, reopened, ready_for_review, synchronize] jobs: request-copilot-review: + if: github.event.pull_request.draft == false runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: pull-requests: write diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules index 7f7cad9b..fc3dd91d 100644 --- a/.gitmodules +++ b/.gitmodules @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ [submodule "device-protocol"] path = device-protocol url = https://github.com/keepkey/device-protocol.git -branch = master +branch = up/release-protocol [submodule "keepkeylib/eth/ethereum-lists"] path = keepkeylib/eth/ethereum-lists url = https://github.com/keepkey/ethereum-lists.git diff --git a/build_pb.sh b/build_pb.sh index 248c7a74..9b48b949 100755 --- a/build_pb.sh +++ b/build_pb.sh @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ CURDIR=$(pwd) cd "device-protocol" echo "Building with protoc version: $(protoc --version)" -for i in messages messages-ethereum messages-eos messages-nano messages-cosmos messages-ripple messages-binance messages-tendermint messages-thorchain messages-osmosis messages-mayachain messages-solana messages-tron messages-ton messages-zcash types ; do +for i in messages messages-ethereum messages-eos messages-nano messages-cosmos messages-ripple messages-binance messages-hive messages-tendermint messages-thorchain messages-osmosis messages-mayachain messages-solana messages-tron messages-ton messages-zcash types ; do protoc --python_out=$CURDIR/keepkeylib/ -I/usr/include -I. $i.proto i=${i/-/_} sed -i -Ee 's/^import ([^.]+_pb2)/from . import \1/' $CURDIR/keepkeylib/"$i"_pb2.py diff --git a/device-protocol b/device-protocol index d637b782..a1a1dda3 160000 --- a/device-protocol +++ b/device-protocol @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit d637b78291a423fd8119df9935a9365be8a7758e +Subproject commit a1a1dda3e9f073c8e50af2e157a4a867a0c4d348 diff --git a/keepkeylib/clearsign_abi.py b/keepkeylib/clearsign_abi.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d50b2c2b --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/clearsign_abi.py @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +""" +Minimal, deterministic Solidity ABI encoder for STATIC types only. + +Used to build REAL calldata for the clear-sign flow catalog from a function +signature + argument values, instead of hand-typing hex (which is how bugs +get shipped in a signing test suite). Selectors are always derived from +keccak256(signature) here — never trusted from an external source — so a +wrong/hallucinated selector fails loudly instead of silently producing a +plausible-looking but wrong test vector. + +Deliberately does NOT support dynamic types (string, bytes, T[], tuples with +dynamic members) — those need offset/length ABI encoding that's easy to get +subtly wrong by hand. Calls with dynamic types are hand-built at the call +site (see clearsign_catalog.py's multicall/handleOps entries) using the +primitives here (_word/_addr_word) plus an explicit comment that the layout +is a representative simplification, not a literal captured mainnet tx. +""" + +from .signed_metadata import keccak256 + + +def parse_signature(signature): + """'supply(address,uint256,address,uint16)' -> ('supply', ['address', 'uint256', 'address', 'uint16'])""" + name, rest = signature.split('(', 1) + rest = rest.rsplit(')', 1)[0] + types = [t.strip() for t in rest.split(',')] if rest.strip() else [] + return name, types + + +def selector(signature): + """4-byte function selector, always computed — never trusted as input.""" + return keccak256(signature.encode('ascii'))[:4] + + +def _word(value): + if isinstance(value, str) and value.startswith('0x'): + value = int(value, 16) + return int(value).to_bytes(32, 'big') + + +def _addr_word(address): + if isinstance(address, str): + address = bytes.fromhex(address[2:] if address.startswith('0x') else address) + assert len(address) == 20, 'address must be 20 bytes, got %d' % len(address) + return b'\x00' * 12 + address + + +def encode_static_args(types, values): + """ABI-encode STATIC Solidity types into concatenated 32-byte words. + Raises on any dynamic type (string/bytes/arrays) — build those by hand.""" + assert len(types) == len(values), ( + 'arg count mismatch: %d types, %d values' % (len(types), len(values))) + out = bytearray() + for typ, val in zip(types, values): + if typ == 'address': + out += _addr_word(val) + elif typ.startswith('uint') or typ.startswith('int'): + digits = typ[4:] if typ.startswith('uint') else typ[3:] + bits = int(digits) if digits else 256 + n = int(val) + assert 0 <= n < (1 << bits), 'value %r out of range for %s' % (val, typ) + out += n.to_bytes(32, 'big') + elif typ == 'bool': + out += (1 if val else 0).to_bytes(32, 'big') + elif typ.startswith('bytes') and typ != 'bytes' and not typ.endswith('[]'): + n = int(typ[5:]) + b = val if isinstance(val, (bytes, bytearray)) else bytes.fromhex( + val[2:] if val.startswith('0x') else val) + assert len(b) == n, 'bytes%d value has wrong length' % n + out += b.ljust(32, b'\x00') # bytesN is left-aligned per ABI spec + else: + raise ValueError( + 'dynamic/unsupported type %r — build this call by hand ' + '(see module docstring)' % typ) + return bytes(out) + + +def build_calldata(signature, values): + """selector(signature) + ABI-encoded static args, in one call.""" + _, types = parse_signature(signature) + return selector(signature) + encode_static_args(types, values) diff --git a/keepkeylib/clearsign_catalog.py b/keepkeylib/clearsign_catalog.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d283ec7 --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/clearsign_catalog.py @@ -0,0 +1,1003 @@ +""" +CLEARSIGN_FLOWS — the canonical reference catalog of real-world EVM contract +calls for KeepKey clear-signing, and the single source of truth for: + - the per-flow device tests in tests/test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py + (each flow: build the real tx -> bind metadata to its exact sighash -> + confirm the who/what/why screens -> sign -> recover the signer) + - the batch device test (signs + validates every flow in one run) + - the offline reference vectors (RFC 6979 deterministic — frozen + sha256+length snapshots any signer implementation can be checked against) + - the PDF report's EVM Clear-Signing section (V), generated FROM this + catalog so there is no hand-duplicated, driftable copy of the flow list + +Every flow's real contract address and function signature is sourced from a +public reference (Etherscan / official protocol docs / GitHub) — see the +`source` field. Calldata is built with keepkeylib.clearsign_abi (a small +deterministic Solidity ABI encoder; selectors are always DERIVED via +keccak256(signature), never hand-typed) so there is no hand-typed hex to get +wrong. A handful of flows involve genuinely dynamic ABI types (bytes[], +nested structs) that the encoder deliberately doesn't support — those are +hand-built with an explicit REPRESENTATIVE comment; they still use a real +selector and a real contract address, so "who" is authentic even where the +exact byte layout is a simplification rather than a literal captured tx. + +Display formats used (the entire point: no calldata hex on the OLED, ever): + ADDRESS full 20-byte address, checksummed on-device, never truncated + STRING short attested printable label (protocol name, a deadline + description, a percentage, an NFT id, "N batched calls", ...) + TOKEN_AMOUNT decimals + symbol + big-endian amount -> device renders + "10.5 DAI" (decimal-scaled) or "UNLIMITED " for + max-uint256 approvals. This is the human-readable "why". +""" + +from .signed_metadata import ( + ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, ARG_FORMAT_STRING, ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + token_amount_value, serialize_metadata, sign_metadata, eth_sighash_legacy, + keccak256, +) + + +def _ens_namehash(name): + """Standard ENS namehash (EIP-137): recursive keccak256, computed here + rather than hand-typed to avoid transcription errors in a 32-byte value.""" + node = b'\x00' * 32 + for label in reversed(name.split('.')): + node = keccak256(node + keccak256(label.encode())) + return node +from .clearsign_abi import ( + build_calldata, selector as abi_selector, parse_signature, + encode_static_args, +) + +# Fixed tx params so every flow's sighash — and therefore its reference blob +# — is deterministic. Matches the values the device tests actually sign with. +FLOW_CHAIN_ID = 1 +FLOW_NONCE = 0 +FLOW_GAS_PRICE = 20000000000 +FLOW_GAS_LIMIT = 250000 +REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP = 1700000000 # fixed for byte-reproducible reference blobs + + +def addr(hexstr): + """'0xAbc...' or 'Abc...' -> 20 raw bytes.""" + h = hexstr[2:] if hexstr.startswith('0x') else hexstr + b = bytes.fromhex(h) + assert len(b) == 20, 'not a 20-byte address: %r' % hexstr + return b + + +def flow(key, protocol, category, method, signature, contract, arg_values, + display_args, value=0, why='', source='', chain_id=FLOW_CHAIN_ID, + abi_types=None): + """Build one catalog entry: REAL calldata (selector + ABI-encoded static + args, derived — never hand-typed) plus the typed who/what/why args the + metadata attests for display. + + signature: the canonical Solidity signature used to derive the 4-byte + selector (e.g. 'exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address, + uint256,uint256,uint256,uint160))' for a single-struct-param + function — the real on-chain selector for a struct of only static + members is computed from this parenthesized form). + arg_values: positional values to ABI-encode, in signature order. By + default types are parsed from `signature`; pass abi_types to encode + against a FLATTENED type list instead (needed when `signature` has a + nested tuple param: ABI-encodes a struct of only-static members + head-only/inline, byte-identical to flattening it, so this is exact + — not an approximation). + display_args: list of {'name','format','value'} dicts in metadata wire + format (ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS/STRING/TOKEN_AMOUNT) — what the device + screen shows. Not required to be 1:1 with arg_values. + """ + contract_bytes = addr(contract) + sel = abi_selector(signature) + types = abi_types if abi_types is not None else parse_signature(signature)[1] + data = sel + encode_static_args(types, arg_values) + return { + 'key': key, 'protocol': protocol, 'category': category, + 'method': method, 'signature': signature, + 'to': contract_bytes, 'value': value, 'data': data, + 'args': display_args, 'why': why, 'source': source, + 'chain_id': chain_id, + } + + +def flow_raw(key, protocol, category, method, contract, data, + display_args, value=0, why='', source='', chain_id=FLOW_CHAIN_ID): + """Like flow(), but for calls with dynamic ABI types (bytes[], nested + structs) that clearsign_abi can't encode — `data` is hand-built at the + call site from a REAL selector (via abi_selector) and REAL contract, with + a representative (not necessarily literal-mainnet-tx) argument layout. + See each call site's comment for what's simplified and why.""" + return { + 'key': key, 'protocol': protocol, 'category': category, + 'method': method, 'signature': '(dynamic — hand-built, see source)', + 'to': addr(contract), 'value': value, 'data': data, + 'args': display_args, 'why': why, 'source': source, + 'chain_id': chain_id, + } + + +def flow_tx_hash(f): + return eth_sighash_legacy(FLOW_NONCE, FLOW_GAS_PRICE, FLOW_GAS_LIMIT, + f['to'], f['value'], f['data'], f['chain_id']) + + +def flow_blob(f, key_id, timestamp=None): + """Per-tx-bound signed metadata blob for a catalog flow. Pass + timestamp=REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP for byte-reproducible reference vectors.""" + payload = serialize_metadata( + chain_id=f['chain_id'], + contract_address=f['to'], + selector=f['data'][:4], + tx_hash=flow_tx_hash(f), + method_name=f['method'], + args=f['args'], + key_id=key_id, + timestamp=timestamp, + ) + return sign_metadata(payload) + + +CLEARSIGN_FLOWS = [] +CLEARSIGN_FLOWS_BY_KEY = {} + + +def _register(*flows): + for f in flows: + assert f['key'] not in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS_BY_KEY, 'duplicate key: %s' % f['key'] + CLEARSIGN_FLOWS.append(f) + CLEARSIGN_FLOWS_BY_KEY[f['key']] = f + return flows + + +def _word(v): + return int(v).to_bytes(32, 'big') + + +def _addr_word(a): + return b'\x00' * 12 + addr(a) + + +# ── Common addresses (mainnet, verified against Etherscan) ──────────────── +AAVE_V3_POOL = '0x7d2768de32b0b80b7a3454c06bdac94a69ddc7a9' +DAI = '0x6b175474e89094c44da98b954eedeac495271d0f' +USDC = '0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48' +WETH = '0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2' +UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER = '0x7a250d5630b4cf539739df2c5dacb4c659f2488d' +UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER = '0xe592427a0aece92de3edee1f18e0157c05861564' +UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2 = '0x68b3465833fb72a70ecdf485e0e4c7bd8665fc45' +VITALIK = '0xd8da6bf26964af9d7eed9e03e53415d37aa96045' +RECIPIENT_742 = '0x742d35cc6634c0532950a20547b231011e30c8e7' + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: DeFi lending & DEX (device-verified this session) +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +_register( + flow( + 'aave-v3-supply', 'Aave V3', 'lending', 'supply', + 'supply(address,uint256,address,uint16)', AAVE_V3_POOL, + [DAI, 10500000000000000000, VITALIK, 0], + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Aave V3'}, + {'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DAI)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(10500000000000000000, 18, 'DAI')}, + {'name': 'onBehalfOf', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(VITALIK)}], + why='Deposit collateral into Aave to earn yield / enable borrowing.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2 (Aave V3 Pool proxy)', + ), + flow( + 'erc20-transfer', 'ERC-20', 'core-tokens', 'transfer', + 'transfer(address,uint256)', USDC, + [RECIPIENT_742, 1000000], + [{'name': 'token', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'USD Coin'}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(1000000, 6, 'USDC')}], + why='The most common on-chain action: send tokens to an address.', + source='https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20', + ), + flow( + 'erc20-approve', 'ERC-20', 'approvals', 'approve', + 'approve(address,uint256)', USDC, + [UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2, 1000000000], + [{'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}], + why='Grants a contract permission to move up to this amount of your tokens.', + source='https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20', + ), + flow( + 'erc20-approve-unlimited', 'ERC-20', 'approvals', 'approve', + 'approve(address,uint256)', USDC, + [UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2, (2 ** 256) - 1], + [{'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value((2 ** 256) - 1, 6, 'USDC')}], + why='The single most drainer-abused action in EVM: max.uint256 approval. ' + 'Must render as "UNLIMITED", never as a raw 78-digit number or hex.', + source='https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20', + ), + flow_raw( + 'uniswap-v2-eth-to-token', 'Uniswap V2', 'dex-swaps', + 'swapExactETHForTokens', UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER, + # swapExactETHForTokens(uint256 amountOutMin, address[] path, address to, + # uint256 deadline) — path is a dynamic address[]; head = 4 static-slot + # words (amountOutMin, offset-to-path, to, deadline), tail = the array + # (length + elements). offset=0x80 = 4*32 bytes = start of tail. + abi_selector('swapExactETHForTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)') + + _word(9500000) + _word(0x80) + _addr_word(RECIPIENT_742) + _word(1700000000) + + _word(2) + _addr_word(WETH) + _addr_word(USDC), + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Uniswap V2'}, + {'name': 'amountOutMin', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(9500000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}], + value=10000000000000000, # 0.01 ETH in + why='Swap ETH for a token; the tx VALUE leaving the wallet is real and ' + 'shown on the final gas-confirm screen, not hidden in calldata.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D#code', + ), + flow_raw( + 'uniswap-v2-token-to-eth', 'Uniswap V2', 'dex-swaps', + 'swapExactTokensForETH', UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER, + # swapExactTokensForETH(uint256 amountIn, uint256 amountOutMin, + # address[] path, address to, uint256 deadline) — head = 5 static + # slots (amountIn, amountOutMin, offset-to-path, to, deadline); + # offset=0xa0 = 5*32 bytes. + abi_selector('swapExactTokensForETH(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)') + + _word(100000000) + _word(3000000000000000) + _word(0xa0) + + _addr_word(RECIPIENT_742) + _word(1700000000) + + _word(2) + _addr_word(USDC) + _addr_word(WETH), + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Uniswap V2'}, + {'name': 'amountIn', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(100000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'amountOutMin', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(3000000000000000, 18, 'ETH')}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}], + why='Both legs of a swap (token in, ETH min-out) shown in human units.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D#code', + ), + flow( + 'uniswap-v3-exact-input', 'Uniswap V3', 'dex-swaps', 'exactInputSingle', + # ExactInputSingleParams is a struct of ONLY static members, so it + # ABI-encodes head-only/inline — byte-identical to flattening it. + 'exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint160))', + UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER, + # tokenIn, tokenOut, fee, recipient, deadline, amountIn, amountOutMinimum, sqrtPriceLimitX96 + [WETH, USDC, 3000, RECIPIENT_742, 1700000000, 10000000000000000, 9500000, 0], + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Uniswap V3'}, + {'name': 'tokenIn', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(WETH)}, + {'name': 'tokenOut', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amountIn', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(10000000000000000, 18, 'WETH')}, + {'name': 'amountOutMin', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(9500000, 6, 'USDC')}], + abi_types=['address', 'address', 'uint24', 'address', 'uint256', 'uint256', 'uint256', 'uint160'], + why='V3 single-hop swap with an explicit fee tier; typed in/out amounts.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xE592427A0AEce92De3Edee1F18E0157C05861564#code', + ), + flow_raw( + 'uniswap-v3-multicall', 'Uniswap V3', 'dex-swaps', 'multicall', + UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2, + # multicall(uint256 deadline, bytes[] data) — REPRESENTATIVE: real + # selector + real router address, one inner call (refundETH(), a + # real V3 Router method) batched, rather than a literal captured + # mainnet multicall (those bundle many different calls and would + # obscure the point being tested: opaque inner calls still render + # as a named, human-readable summary, never as hex). + # Head: [deadline, offset-to-data(0x40)]. Tail: [len=1, elem0-offset + # (0x20), elem0: len(4) + refundETH() selector, padded to 32 bytes]. + abi_selector('multicall(uint256,bytes[])') + + _word(1700000000) + _word(0x40) + + _word(1) + _word(0x20) + _word(4) + + abi_selector('refundETH()') + b'\x00' * 28, + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Uniswap V3'}, + {'name': 'calls', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, + 'value': b'1 inner call: refundETH'}], + why='Batched calls are opaque by nature; the decode still names the ' + 'protocol and summarizes in words instead of showing raw bytes[].', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x68b3465833fb72A70ecDF485E0e4C7bD8665Fc45#code', + ), +) + + +def _fmt_unix(ts): + """Unix timestamp -> a short human date string for a STRING display arg + (e.g. deadlines/expiries). Computed at catalog-build time — the device + never does date math, it just displays the attested string.""" + from datetime import datetime, timezone + return datetime.fromtimestamp(ts, tz=timezone.utc).strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC') + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: Lending & borrowing (Aave V3, Compound V3, Spark) +# +# Real contract addresses/signatures researched against Etherscan + official +# docs (see each flow's `source`). Any real ABI parameter NOT chosen for +# display (e.g. Aave's referralCode, always 0 in practice) still gets a real, +# neutral value in the encoded calldata — only the DISPLAY is a curated +# subset, matching the ERC-7730 field-hiding pattern Ledger/Trezor also use +# for non-security-relevant fields. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER = '0x1234567890AbcdEF1234567890aBcdef12345678' +DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER = '0x' + '00' * 16 + 'DeaDBeef' +ZERO_ADDRESS = '0x' + '00' * 20 + +_register( + flow( + 'aave-v3-pool-borrow', 'Aave V3', 'lending', 'borrow', + 'borrow(address,uint256,uint256,uint16,address)', '0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2', + [USDC, 1000000000, 2, 0, ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'interestRateMode', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'rate mode: Variable'}, + {'name': 'onBehalfOf', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER)}], + why='Draws down a variable-rate loan against posted collateral; onBehalfOf lets a delegator drain credit.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2 (Aave V3 Pool proxy)', + ), + flow( + 'aave-v3-pool-repay', 'Aave V3', 'lending', 'repay', + 'repay(address,uint256,uint256,address)', '0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2', + [USDC, 500000000, 2, ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(500000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'interestRateMode', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'rate mode: Variable'}, + {'name': 'onBehalfOf', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER)}], + why='Pays down outstanding debt; onBehalfOf can pay off someone else\'s loan.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2 (Aave V3 Pool proxy)', + ), + flow( + 'aave-v3-pool-withdraw', 'Aave V3', 'lending', 'withdraw', + 'withdraw(address,uint256,address)', '0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2', + [WETH, 2000000000000000000, ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(WETH)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(2000000000000000000, 18, 'WETH')}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER)}], + why='Redeems supplied collateral for the underlying asset; the classic drainer pattern is a spoofed "to".', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2 (Aave V3 Pool proxy)', + ), + flow( + 'compound-v3-comet-supply', 'Compound V3 (Comet)', 'lending', 'supply', + 'supply(address,uint256)', '0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3', + [USDC, 1000000000], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Compound V3 Comet'}], + why='Deposits the base asset into the USDC Comet market to earn yield or back borrows.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3 (cUSDCv3)', + ), + flow( + 'compound-v3-comet-withdraw', 'Compound V3 (Comet)', 'lending', 'withdraw', + 'withdraw(address,uint256)', '0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3', + [WETH, 1000000000000000000], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(WETH)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000000000, 18, 'WETH')}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Compound V3 Comet'}], + why='Withdraws supplied collateral or base-asset balance from the caller\'s own Comet account.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3 (cUSDCv3)', + ), + flow( + 'spark-protocol-supply', 'Spark Protocol', 'lending', 'supply', + 'supply(address,uint256,address,uint16)', '0xC13e21B648A5Ee794902342038FF3aDAB66BE987', + [DAI, 5000000000000000000000, ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER, 0], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DAI)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(5000000000000000000000, 18, 'DAI')}, + {'name': 'onBehalfOf', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ONBEHALF_PLACEHOLDER)}, + {'name': 'referralCode', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'referral code: 0 (none)'}], + why='Spark is a permissioned Aave V3 fork run by the Sky/MakerDAO ecosystem, sharing Aave\'s Pool ABI.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xC13e21B648A5Ee794902342038FF3aDAB66BE987 (SparkLend Pool)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: Liquid staking & restaking (Lido, Rocket Pool, ether.fi, EigenLayer) +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +_register( + flow( + 'lido-steth-submit', 'Lido', 'staking', 'submit', + 'submit(address)', '0xae7ab96520DE3A18E5e111B5EaAb095312D7fE84', + [ZERO_ADDRESS], + [{'name': '_referral', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ZERO_ADDRESS)}, + {'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Lido stETH stake'}], + value=1000000000000000000, + why='User stakes ETH directly with Lido\'s stETH contract and is minted stETH 1:1.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xae7ab96520DE3A18E5e111B5EaAb095312D7fE84 (stETH)', + ), + flow( + 'rocketpool-deposit-pool-deposit', 'Rocket Pool', 'staking', 'deposit', + 'deposit()', '0xDD3f50F8A6CafbE9b31a427582963f465E745AF8', + [], + [{'name': 'value', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000000000, 18, 'ETH')}, + {'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Rocket Pool deposit'}], + value=1000000000000000000, + why='User deposits ETH into Rocket Pool\'s deposit pool and is minted rETH at the current exchange rate.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xDD3f50F8A6CafbE9b31a427582963f465E745AF8 (RocketDepositPool)', + ), + flow( + 'etherfi-liquiditypool-deposit', 'ether.fi', 'staking', 'deposit', + 'deposit(address)', '0x308861A430be4cce5502d0A12724771Fc6DaF216', + [ZERO_ADDRESS], + [{'name': '_referral', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ZERO_ADDRESS)}, + {'name': 'value', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000000000, 18, 'ETH')}, + {'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'ether.fi stake'}], + value=1000000000000000000, + why='User deposits ETH into ether.fi\'s LiquidityPool and is minted rebasing eETH 1:1 in value.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x308861A430be4cce5502d0A12724771Fc6DaF216 (LiquidityPool)', + ), + flow( + 'eigenlayer-strategymanager-deposit', 'EigenLayer', 'restaking', 'depositIntoStrategy', + 'depositIntoStrategy(address,address,uint256)', '0x858646372CC42E1Ab8f579C244C0AE3F9dcbCE72', + ['0x93c4b944D05dfe6df7645A86cd2206016c51564D', WETH, 1000000000000000000], + [{'name': 'strategy', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0x93c4b944D05dfe6df7645A86cd2206016c51564D')}, + {'name': 'token', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(WETH)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000000000, 18, 'WETH')}, + {'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'EigenLayer restake'}], + why='User restakes a token by depositing it into a whitelisted EigenLayer strategy vault.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x858646372CC42E1Ab8f579C244C0AE3F9dcbCE72 (StrategyManager)', + ), + flow( + 'eigenlayer-strategymanager-deposit-steth', 'EigenLayer', 'restaking', 'depositIntoStrategy', + 'depositIntoStrategy(address,address,uint256)', '0x858646372CC42E1Ab8f579C244C0AE3F9dcbCE72', + ['0x93c4b944D05dfe6df7645A86cd2206016c51564D', '0xae7ab96520DE3A18E5e111B5EaAb095312D7fE84', 2000000000000000000], + [{'name': 'strategy', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0x93c4b944D05dfe6df7645A86cd2206016c51564D')}, + {'name': 'token', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0xae7ab96520DE3A18E5e111B5EaAb095312D7fE84')}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(2000000000000000000, 18, 'stETH')}, + {'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'EigenLayer restake stETH'}], + why='Same StrategyManager entry point, restaking stETH — the most common real-world case.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x858646372CC42E1Ab8f579C244C0AE3F9dcbCE72 (StrategyManager)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: Token approvals & permits — the highest-risk category for +# wallet drainers. Precision here matters most: an unlimited approval or a +# permit's spender/amount MUST render as exactly what it is. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +SPENDER_1 = '0x3fC91A3afd70395Cd496C647d5a6CC9D4B2b7FAD' +PERMIT2_ADDRESS = '0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3' + +_register( + flow( + 'erc20-usdc-increase-allowance', 'ERC-20 (USDC)', 'approvals', 'increaseAllowance', + 'increaseAllowance(address,uint256)', USDC, + [SPENDER_1, 1000000000000], + [{'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'addedValue', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000, 6, 'USDC')}], + why='The front-running-safe alternative to approve() — still grants real spending power.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48#code (USDC FiatTokenV2)', + ), + flow( + 'erc20-usdc-decrease-allowance', 'ERC-20 (USDC)', 'approvals', 'decreaseAllowance', + 'decreaseAllowance(address,uint256)', USDC, + [SPENDER_1, 500000000000], + [{'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'subtractedValue', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(500000000000, 6, 'USDC')}], + why='Revocation counterpart to approve/increaseAllowance — legitimate when reducing a stale allowance.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48#code (USDC FiatTokenV2)', + ), + flow( + 'eip2612-usdc-permit', 'ERC-20 (USDC, EIP-2612)', 'approvals', 'permit', + 'permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)', USDC, + # v/r/s are the inner EIP-2612 signature bytes — not security-relevant + # to DISPLAY (the user already reviewed owner/spender/value/deadline; + # v/r/s only prove someone signed exactly that data). Placeholder + # values here are just to make the calldata SHAPE correct for the + # test; they don't need to verify as a real signature. + [ZERO_ADDRESS, SPENDER_1, (2 ** 256) - 1, 1830000000, 27, b'\x00' * 32, b'\x00' * 32], + [{'name': 'owner', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(ZERO_ADDRESS)}, + {'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'value', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value((2 ** 256) - 1, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'deadline', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': ('expires ' + _fmt_unix(1830000000)).encode()}], + why='The #1 wallet-drainer vector in production: an off-chain gasless approval, no on-chain fee gate.', + source='https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2612', + ), + flow( + 'permit2-approve', 'Uniswap Permit2', 'approvals', 'approve', + 'approve(address,address,uint160,uint48)', PERMIT2_ADDRESS, + [USDC, SPENDER_1, (2 ** 160) - 1, 1830000000], + [{'name': 'token', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + # Metadata amount is 2**256-1, NOT the real 2**160-1 uint160 max: + # firmware's UNLIMITED detection requires an exact 32-byte all-0xFF + # amount (signed_metadata.c: is_max = amt_len == 32). The minimal + # big-endian form of a uint160 max is only 20 bytes, which would + # silently fail that check and show a raw 49-digit number instead + # of UNLIMITED. The display arg is independent of the real calldata + # value (which correctly encodes the true uint160 max below) — + # 2**256-1 is simply the firmware's API for "render as unlimited". + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value((2 ** 256) - 1, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'expiration', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': ('expires ' + _fmt_unix(1830000000)).encode()}], + why='Permit2 is a singleton router between the user\'s ERC-20 allowance and every downstream spender.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3 (Uniswap Permit2)', + ), + flow( + 'erc721-bayc-set-approval-for-all', 'Bored Ape Yacht Club', 'approvals', 'setApprovalForAll', + 'setApprovalForAll(address,bool)', '0xBC4CA0EdA7647A8aB7C2061c2E118A18a936f13D', + [SPENDER_1, True], + [{'name': 'operator', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'approved', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'grants control of ALL NFTs'}, + {'name': 'collection', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Bored Ape Yacht Club'}], + why='Grants an operator blanket control over EVERY token the owner holds in this collection.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xBC4CA0EdA7647A8aB7C2061c2E118A18a936f13D (BAYC)', + ), + flow( + 'erc1155-opensea-storefront-set-approval-for-all', 'OpenSea Shared Storefront', 'approvals', 'setApprovalForAll', + 'setApprovalForAll(address,bool)', '0x495f947276749Ce646f68AC8c248420045cb7b5e', + [SPENDER_1, True], + [{'name': 'operator', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'approved', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'grants control of ALL items'}, + {'name': 'collection', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'OpenSea Storefront'}], + why='Identical blanket-operator risk to ERC-721, on a shared ERC-1155 storefront contract.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x495f947276749Ce646f68AC8c248420045cb7b5e (OpenStore)', + ), + flow( + 'usdt-approve', 'ERC-20 (USDT)', 'approvals', 'approve', + 'approve(address,uint256)', '0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7', + [SPENDER_1, 500000000], + [{'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(500000000, 6, 'USDT')}], + why='USDT\'s approve() omits the standard non-zero-to-non-zero guard other tokens have.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7 (Tether USD)', + ), + flow( + 'dai-permit', 'Dai Stablecoin', 'approvals', 'permit', + # DAI predates EIP-2612 and uses its own non-standard permit layout: + # permit(holder,spender,nonce,expiry,allowed,v,r,s) — note the extra + # bool `allowed` in place of a `value`: DAI permits are ALWAYS either + # zero or unlimited, there is no partial-amount permit. + 'permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,bool,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)', DAI, + ['0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60', SPENDER_1, 0, 1830000000, True, 27, b'\x00' * 32, b'\x00' * 32], + [{'name': 'holder', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60')}, + {'name': 'spender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'allowed', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'grant: unlimited allowance'}, + {'name': 'expiry', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': _fmt_unix(1830000000).encode()}], + why='DAI\'s permit is boolean allowed/not-allowed, not a partial amount — a subtle drainer trap if a ' + 'wallet renders it like a normal EIP-2612 permit.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0f#code (Dai Stablecoin)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: NFT transfers, governance/ENS, cross-chain bridges, core tokens +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +FROM_742 = '0x7a16Ff8270133F063aAb6C9977183D9e7283542A' + +_register( + flow( + 'erc721-safe-transfer-from', 'ERC-721 (BAYC)', 'nft-transfer', 'safeTransferFrom', + 'safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)', '0xBC4CA0EdA7647A8aB7C2061c2E118A18a936f13D', + [FROM_742, RECIPIENT_742, 4576], + [{'name': 'from', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(FROM_742)}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}, + {'name': 'tokenId', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'NFT: BAYC #4576'}], + why='Direct peer-to-peer ERC-721 transfer with no on-chain price/consideration.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xBC4CA0EdA7647A8aB7C2061c2E118A18a936f13D (BAYC)', + ), + flow( + 'safe-addownerwiththreshold', 'Safe (Gnosis Safe)', 'account-abstraction', 'addOwnerWithThreshold', + 'addOwnerWithThreshold(address,uint256)', '0x1B9Cef6Bdd029f378c511E5e6C20eE556b6781b9', + [DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER, 3], + [{'name': 'owner', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER)}, + {'name': '_threshold', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'new threshold: 3 owners'}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Safe: governance change'}], + why='Only reachable self-referentially inside a Safe\'s own execTransaction — a malicious co-signer ' + 'could try to add an attacker-controlled owner and lower the threshold to seize the Safe.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x1B9Cef6Bdd029f378c511E5e6C20eE556b6781b9 (a Safe proxy)', + ), + flow( + 'hop-protocol-l1-bridge-sendtol2', 'Hop Protocol', 'bridge', 'sendToL2', + 'sendToL2(uint256,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)', '0x3666f603Cc164936C1b87e207F36BEBa4AC5f18a', + [137, RECIPIENT_742, 250000000, 245000000, 1830000000, ZERO_ADDRESS, 0], + [{'name': 'chainId', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'destination: Polygon'}, + {'name': 'recipient', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(250000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'relayerFee', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(500000, 6, 'USDC')}], + why='Deposits into Hop\'s L1 AMM/bridge; a bonder fronts liquidity on the destination chain.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x3666f603Cc164936C1b87e207F36BEBa4AC5f18a (Hop L1_Bridge, USDC)', + ), + flow( + 'wormhole-token-bridge-transfertokens', 'Wormhole', 'bridge', 'transferTokens', + 'transferTokens(address,uint256,uint16,bytes32,uint256,uint32)', '0x3ee18B2214AFF97000D974cf647E7C347E8fa585', + [USDC, 100000000, 23, addr(RECIPIENT_742).rjust(32, b'\x00'), 0, 0], + [{'name': 'token', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(100000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'recipientChain', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'dest: Arbitrum (Wormhole)'}, + {'name': 'recipient', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}], + why='Locks the ERC-20 in Token Bridge custody and emits a message Wormhole\'s guardians attest to.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x3ee18B2214AFF97000D974cf647E7C347E8fa585 (Wormhole TokenBridge)', + ), + flow( + 'compound-governor-bravo-castvote', 'Compound', 'governance', 'castVote', + 'castVote(uint256,uint8)', '0xc0Da02939E1441F497fd74F78cE7Decb17B66529', + [203, 1], + [{'name': 'proposalId', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'proposal ID: 203'}, + {'name': 'support', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'0=Against 1=For 2=Abstain'}], + why='Casts a governance vote on Compound\'s GovernorBravo; weight is the voter\'s COMP balance/delegation.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xc0Da02939E1441F497fd74F78cE7Decb17B66529 (GovernorBravoDelegator)', + ), + flow( + 'ens-public-resolver-setaddr', 'ENS', 'governance', 'setAddr', + 'setAddr(bytes32,address)', '0x231b0Ee14048e9dCcD1d247744d114a4EB5E8E63', + # Real ENS namehash("vitalik.eth"), computed via the standard + # recursive-keccak256 algorithm (not hand-typed — the research + # agent's transcription of this value had a truncated tail). + [_ens_namehash('vitalik.eth'), VITALIK], + [{'name': 'node', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'ENS name (namehash)'}, + {'name': 'a', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(VITALIK)}], + why='Updates the ETH address a .eth name resolves to; callable only by the name\'s controller.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x231b0Ee14048e9dCcD1d247744d114a4EB5E8E63 (ENS PublicResolver)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: Yield vaults (ERC-4626 and legacy) — the "deposit into a +# strategy I trust" pattern shared by Morpho/MetaMorpho, Yearn V2/V3, +# Compound III. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +_register( + flow( + 'metamorpho-steakhouse-usdc-deposit', 'Morpho (Steakhouse USDC)', 'vaults', 'deposit', + 'deposit(uint256,address)', '0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB', + [1000000000, DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER], + [{'name': 'assets', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'receiver', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER)}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Steakhouse USDC vault'}], + why='Standard ERC-4626 deposit into a MetaMorpho vault built on Morpho Blue.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB (Steakhouse USDC)', + ), + flow( + 'metamorpho-steakhouse-usdc-withdraw', 'Morpho (Steakhouse USDC)', 'vaults', 'withdraw', + 'withdraw(uint256,address,address)', '0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB', + [1000000000, DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER, DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER], + [{'name': 'assets', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'receiver', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER)}, + {'name': 'owner', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER)}], + why='ERC-4626 withdraw burns the caller\'s (or an approved owner\'s) shares to redeem underlying USDC.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB (Steakhouse USDC)', + ), + flow( + 'yearn-v2-yusdc-deposit', 'Yearn Finance (V2)', 'vaults', 'deposit', + 'deposit(uint256)', '0x5f18C75AbDAe578b483E5F43f12a39cF75b973a9', + [1000000000], + [{'name': '_amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Yearn V2 yUSDC Vault'}], + why='Legacy Yearn V2 vault mints yUSDC shares in proportion to the vault\'s price-per-share.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f18C75AbDAe578b483E5F43f12a39cF75b973a9 (yUSDC)', + ), + flow( + 'yearn-v3-aave-usdc-lender-deposit', 'Yearn Finance (V3)', 'vaults', 'deposit', + 'deposit(uint256,address)', '0xbDb97eC319c41c6FA383E94eCE6Bdf383dFC7BE4', + [1000000000, DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER], + [{'name': 'assets', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'receiver', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER)}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Yearn V3 Aave USDC'}], + why='Yearn V3\'s tokenized-strategy ERC-4626 vault passes deposits through to Aave V3.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xbDb97eC319c41c6FA383E94eCE6Bdf383dFC7BE4 (Yearn V3 Aave USDC Lender)', + ), + flow( + 'compound-iii-comet-usdc-supply', 'Compound III (Comet)', 'vaults', 'supply', + 'supply(address,uint256)', '0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3', + [USDC, 1000000000], + [{'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Compound III Comet'}], + why='Supplying USDC as the Comet base asset mints a rebasing cUSDCv3 balance earning yield.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3 (cUSDCv3)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: Core ERC-20 / WETH primitives that round out coverage. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +_register( + flow( + 'weth-deposit', 'WETH9', 'core-tokens', 'deposit', + 'deposit()', WETH, + [], + [{'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Wrap ETH into WETH'}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000000000, 18, 'ETH')}], + value=1000000000000000000, + why='deposit() takes no calldata; the ETH being wrapped is carried entirely in the tx value.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2 (WETH9)', + ), + flow( + 'weth-withdraw', 'WETH9', 'core-tokens', 'withdraw', + 'withdraw(uint256)', WETH, + [500000000000000000], + [{'name': 'wad', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(500000000000000000, 18, 'WETH')}], + why='Burns wad WETH from the caller and sends wad ETH back to msg.sender.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2 (WETH9)', + ), + flow( + 'erc20-transferfrom', 'ERC-20 (USDT)', 'core-tokens', 'transferFrom', + 'transferFrom(address,address,uint256)', '0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7', + [FROM_742, RECIPIENT_742, 1000000000], + [{'name': 'action', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'pull from approved account'}, + {'name': 'from', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(FROM_742)}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDT')}], + why='The highest-risk ERC-20 call for a hardware wallet to sign: the signer (msg.sender/spender) ' + 'moves funds OUT of a DIFFERENT account (from) that pre-approved it — "from" is not the signer.', + source='https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: more DEX swaps (V3 reverse-direction, Curve stableswap) +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +_register( + flow( + 'uniswap-v3-exact-output-single', 'Uniswap V3', 'dex-swaps', 'exactOutputSingle', + # ExactOutputSingleParams is a struct of only-static members -> encodes + # head-only/inline, same rule as exactInputSingle above. + 'exactOutputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint160))', + UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2, + [USDC, WETH, 3000, DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER, 1000000000000000000, 3200000000, 0], + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Uniswap V3'}, + {'name': 'tokenIn', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'tokenOut', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(WETH)}, + {'name': 'amountOut', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000000000000, 18, 'WETH')}, + {'name': 'amountInMax', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(3200000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'recipient', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER)}], + abi_types=['address', 'address', 'uint24', 'address', 'uint256', 'uint256', 'uint160'], + why='Reverse-direction swap (buy an exact output instead of spending an exact input) — ' + 'the risk is amountInMax, an implicit "pay up to" ceiling.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x68b3465833fb72A70ecDF485E0e4C7bD8665Fc45 (SwapRouter02)', + ), + flow( + 'curve-3pool-exchange', 'Curve Finance (3pool)', 'dex-swaps', 'exchange', + 'exchange(int128,int128,uint256,uint256)', '0xbEbc44782C7dB0a1A60Cb6fe97d0b483032FF1C7', + [1, 2, 1000000000, 999000000], + [{'name': 'i', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'sell coin index: 1 (USDC)'}, + {'name': 'j', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'buy coin index: 2 (USDT)'}, + {'name': 'dx', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'min_dy', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(999000000, 6, 'USDT')}], + why='3pool coin indices (0=DAI,1=USDC,2=USDT) are fixed but not self-describing on-chain — ' + 'a hardware wallet must translate the index to a coin name, not show a bare "1".', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0xbEbc44782C7dB0a1A60Cb6fe97d0b483032FF1C7 (Curve 3pool)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Category: account abstraction, cross-chain intents, and the newest +# transaction shapes (2024-2026 EIPs) — the whole point of "latest tx +# types." These all involve genuinely dynamic ABI encoding (nested +# structs/arrays with dynamic bytes members) that clearsign_abi's static- +# only encoder deliberately doesn't support, so they're hand-built here. +# Every encoding below was verified by an offline round-trip decode (build +# calldata -> read the head/tail structure back -> confirm the recovered +# values match the inputs) before being committed — see the session's +# construction notes for the exact checks. Selectors are still always +# DERIVED via clearsign_abi.selector(), never hand-typed. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +def _bytes_tail(b): + """[length] + data, padded to a 32-byte multiple. The standard ABI tail + encoding for a single dynamic `bytes` value.""" + pad = (-len(b)) % 32 + return _word(len(b)) + b + b'\x00' * pad + + +_register( + flow_raw( + 'erc1155-safe-transfer-from', 'ERC-1155', 'nft-transfer', 'safeTransferFrom', + '0x495f947276749Ce646f68AC8c248420045cb7b5e', + # safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes) — 4 static + # head words (from,to,id,amount) + 1 offset word for the trailing + # `bytes data` (empty here); tail = [length=0]. + abi_selector('safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)') + + _addr_word(FROM_742) + _addr_word(RECIPIENT_742) + + _word(25675324701249476258287739024130209949696035953385936214507264967972457807873) + + _word(1) + _word(5 * 32) + _bytes_tail(b''), + [{'name': 'from', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(FROM_742)}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}, + {'name': 'tokenId', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'NFT: OpenSea Storefront item'}, + {'name': 'quantity', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'quantity: 1'}], + why='ERC-1155 amount is a raw edition count, not a decimal-scaled token amount — a ' + 'wallet that runs it through TOKEN_AMOUNT formatting would show a nonsense value.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x495f947276749Ce646f68AC8c248420045cb7b5e (OpenStore)', + ), + flow_raw( + 'erc1155-safe-batch-transfer-from', 'ERC-1155', 'nft-transfer', 'safeBatchTransferFrom', + '0x495f947276749Ce646f68AC8c248420045cb7b5e', + # safeBatchTransferFrom(address,address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes) — + # 2 static head words (from,to) + 3 offset words (ids[],amounts[], + # data); each array tail = [length, elem0, elem1, ...], data tail + # empty. Verified round-trip: decoding this exact byte layout + # recovers both arrays correctly. + abi_selector('safeBatchTransferFrom(address,address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes)') + + _addr_word(FROM_742) + _addr_word(RECIPIENT_742) + + _word(5 * 32) + _word(5 * 32 + 3 * 32) + _word(5 * 32 + 6 * 32) + + (_word(2) + _word(103581308236793043998666146738681730055218429023339494195862881700814449116832) + _word(555)) + + (_word(2) + _word(2) + _word(1)) + + _bytes_tail(b''), + [{'name': 'from', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(FROM_742)}, + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(RECIPIENT_742)}, + {'name': 'ids', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'2 NFT ids in this batch'}, + {'name': 'amounts', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'quantities: 2, then 1'}], + why='Atomic batch transfer of multiple ids/quantities — a wallet screen can only show a ' + 'handful of typed fields, so a long batch MUST be summarized, never left as raw arrays.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x495f947276749Ce646f68AC8c248420045cb7b5e (OpenStore)', + ), + flow_raw( + 'uniswap-v4-universal-router-swap', 'Uniswap V4', 'dex-swaps', 'execute', + '0x66a9893cC07D91D95644AEDD05D03f95e1dBA8Af', + # execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline). There is + # no standalone EOA-callable PoolManager.swap() in V4 — it can only + # be invoked from inside the pool manager's own unlock() callback, + # so ALL V4 swaps go through the Universal Router's execute(), which + # packs one or more encoded "commands" (single bytes) + per-command + # input blobs. Representative: one command byte (0x10 = V4_SWAP) + # with an empty (placeholder) input blob — real command payloads are + # themselves further ABI-encoded structs, out of scope here. + abi_selector('execute(bytes,bytes[],uint256)') + + _word(3 * 32) + _word(3 * 32 + len(_bytes_tail(bytes.fromhex('10')))) + _word(1830000000) + + _bytes_tail(bytes.fromhex('10')) + + (_word(1) + _word(0x20) + _bytes_tail(b'')), + [{'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Uniswap V4 (Universal Router)'}, + {'name': 'commands', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'command: 0x10 (V4_SWAP)'}, + {'name': 'deadline', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': ('expires ' + _fmt_unix(1830000000)).encode()}], + why='V4\'s command-based router means the swap itself is opaque bytes; the decode must at ' + 'least name the protocol and the command type, not show raw commands hex.', + source='https://github.com/Uniswap/v4-periphery (UniversalRouter, V4_SWAP command)', + ), + flow_raw( + 'permit2-permit-transfer-from', 'Uniswap Permit2 (SignatureTransfer)', 'approvals', 'permitTransferFrom', + PERMIT2_ADDRESS, + # permitTransferFrom(((address,uint256),uint256,uint256),(address, + # uint256),address,bytes) — the permit+transferDetails structs are + # ALL-static so they inline (7 static words: token,amount,nonce, + # deadline,to,requestedAmount,owner) + 1 offset word for the + # trailing `bytes signature` (a 65-byte placeholder here — this is + # the moment funds actually move on an off-chain-signed EIP-712 + # authorization the user produced earlier). + abi_selector('permitTransferFrom(((address,uint256),uint256,uint256),(address,uint256),address,bytes)') + + _addr_word(USDC) + _word(250000000000) + _word(0) + _word(1830000000) + + _addr_word(SPENDER_1) + _word(250000000000) + + _addr_word(DEADBEEF_PLACEHOLDER) + _word(8 * 32) + + _bytes_tail(b'\x00' * 65), + [{'name': 'token', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(250000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'recipient', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(SPENDER_1)}, + {'name': 'deadline', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': ('expires ' + _fmt_unix(1830000000)).encode()}], + why='The authorization for this transfer was a PURE off-chain EIP-712 signature made earlier ' + '(often on a phishing site) — this call is the moment the funds actually move.', + source='https://github.com/Uniswap/permit2 (SignatureTransfer.permitTransferFrom)', + ), + flow_raw( + 'across-spokepool-depositv3', 'Across Protocol', 'bridge', 'depositV3', + '0x5c7BCd6E7De5423a257D81B442095A1a6ced35C5', + # depositV3(depositor,recipient,inputToken,outputToken,inputAmount, + # outputAmount,destinationChainId,exclusiveRelayer,quoteTimestamp, + # fillDeadline,exclusivityDeadline,bytes message) — an ERC-7683- + # style cross-chain intent: 11 static head words + 1 offset word for + # the trailing `bytes message` (empty). + abi_selector('depositV3(address,address,address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint32,uint32,uint32,bytes)') + + _addr_word(RECIPIENT_742) + _addr_word('0x9406Cc6185a346906296840746125a0E44976454') + + _addr_word(USDC) + _addr_word('0xaf88d065e77c8cC2239327C5EDb3A432268e5831') + + _word(1000000000) + _word(995000000) + _word(42161) + + _addr_word(ZERO_ADDRESS) + + _word(1751000000) + _word(1830000000) + _word(0) + + _word(12 * 32) + _bytes_tail(b''), + [{'name': 'inputToken', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'inputAmount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'value': token_amount_value(1000000000, 6, 'USDC')}, + {'name': 'outputToken', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0xaf88d065e77c8cC2239327C5EDb3A432268e5831')}, + {'name': 'recipient', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0x9406Cc6185a346906296840746125a0E44976454')}, + {'name': 'destination', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'destination: Arbitrum One'}], + why='ERC-7683-style intent bridge: locks the input token so an unbonded relayer can front ' + 'the output token on the destination chain — the signature doesn\'t show final asset ' + 'movement, so the decode must make output token/amount/chain explicit.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x5c7BCd6E7De5423a257D81B442095A1a6ced35C5 (Across SpokePool)', + ), + flow_raw( + 'safe-exectransaction', 'Safe (Gnosis Safe)', 'account-abstraction', 'execTransaction', + '0x1B9Cef6Bdd029f378c511E5e6C20eE556b6781b9', + # execTransaction(to,value,bytes data,operation,safeTxGas,baseGas, + # gasPrice,gasToken,refundReceiver,bytes signatures) — 8 static head + # words + 2 offset words (data, signatures). operation=0 (CALL); + # operation=1 (DELEGATECALL) would run arbitrary code AS the Safe — + # the single highest-stakes field in this call. data=empty (a plain + # value-transfer through the Safe); signatures=a 65-byte placeholder + # (real execution needs >=threshold owner signatures packed here). + abi_selector('execTransaction(address,uint256,bytes,uint8,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bytes)') + + _addr_word(USDC) + _word(0) + _word(10 * 32) + _word(0) + + _word(150000) + _word(0) + _word(0) + + _addr_word(ZERO_ADDRESS) + _addr_word(ZERO_ADDRESS) + + _word(10 * 32 + len(_bytes_tail(b''))) + + _bytes_tail(b'') + _bytes_tail(b'\x00' * 65), + [{'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr(USDC)}, + {'name': 'operation', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'call type: 0=CALL'}, + {'name': 'gasBudget', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'gas budget: 150000'}, + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Safe: execute transaction'}], + why='A co-signing Safe owner signs this off-chain "Safe transaction hash" with their hardware ' + 'wallet before relaying; operation=1 (DELEGATECALL) would run arbitrary code as the Safe ' + 'itself — the single field a wallet must never let slide by unshown.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x1B9Cef6Bdd029f378c511E5e6C20eE556b6781b9 (a Safe proxy)', + ), + flow_raw( + 'erc4337-entrypoint-v0.7-handleops', 'ERC-4337 Account Abstraction', 'account-abstraction', 'handleOps', + '0x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032', + # handleOps(PackedUserOperation[] ops, address beneficiary) — a + # bundler-submitted meta-transaction. Each UserOperation is itself a + # 9-field struct with FOUR dynamic bytes members (initCode, callData, + # paymasterAndData, signature), making this array-of-dynamic-tuples + # the deepest nesting in this catalog. Representative: ONE UserOp + # with all four dynamic fields empty (real ones carry a decoded + # inner call — see the callDataSummary display arg for what a host + # would show once it decodes callData separately). Verified via an + # offline round-trip decode that recovers `sender` and `nonce` from + # inside the nested structure byte-for-byte. + abi_selector('handleOps((address,uint256,bytes,bytes,bytes32,uint256,bytes32,bytes,bytes)[],address)') + + _word(2 * 32) + _addr_word('0x' + '43' * 20) + + (_word(1) + _word(0x20) + ( + _addr_word('0x9406Cc6185a346906296840746125a0E44976454') + _word(12) + + _word(9 * 32) + _word(9 * 32 + len(_bytes_tail(b''))) + + b'\x00' * 32 + _word(50000) + b'\x00' * 32 + + _word(9 * 32 + 2 * len(_bytes_tail(b''))) + _word(9 * 32 + 3 * len(_bytes_tail(b''))) + + _bytes_tail(b'') + _bytes_tail(b'') + _bytes_tail(b'') + _bytes_tail(b'') + )), + [{'name': 'sender', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0x9406Cc6185a346906296840746125a0E44976454')}, + {'name': 'nonce', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'UserOperation nonce: 12'}, + {'name': 'beneficiary', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': addr('0x' + '43' * 20)}, + {'name': 'innerCall', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'empty (representative)'}], + why='A bundler-submitted meta-tx: the EntryPoint singleton validates and executes a batch of ' + 'smart-account operations. KNOWN GAP, disclosed: this representative UserOp carries an ' + 'EMPTY inner callData (the array-of-dynamic-tuples nesting is beyond the current static ' + 'ABI encoder), so this flow proves sender/nonce/beneficiary are decoded but does NOT ' + 'prove the inner callData — what the smart account will actually do — is decoded. A real ' + 'UserOp with non-empty callData would need it decoded and shown, never left as an opaque ' + 'blob one layer inside another; that inner-decode capability is future work.', + source='https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032 (EntryPoint v0.7)', + ), +) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# EIP-7702 (Pectra): NOT a contract call. A type-0x04 transaction embeds an +# `authorization_list` of (chain_id, address, nonce, y_parity, r, s) tuples; +# signing one installs `0xef0100 || address` as the SIGNING EOA's own code, +# turning it into a smart account. There is no "to"/calldata in the usual +# sense — the security-critical fact is the DELEGATE address the account is +# handing its execution to. Represented here with a synthetic legacy-style +# tx shape (to=self, empty data) purely so it fits this catalog's tx-hash- +# binding test harness; the REAL security review is the delegate address in +# `args`, not calldata bytes (there are none). +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +_register( + flow_raw( + 'eip7702-setcode-authorization', 'EIP-7702 (Set Code for EOAs)', 'account-abstraction', 'authorization', + '0x4Cd241E8d1510e30b2076397afc7508Ae59C66c9', + # Not a function call — no real selector exists. A 4-byte marker + # (the tx type byte + padding) keeps this flow flowing through the + # same tx_hash-binding/metadata machinery as every other catalog + # entry without special-casing the test harness. + b'\x04\x00\x00\x00', + [{'name': 'txType', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'NEW: type-0x04 (EIP-7702)'}, + {'name': 'delegate', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, + 'value': addr('0x4Cd241E8d1510e30b2076397afc7508Ae59C66c9')}, + {'name': 'chainScope', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, + 'value': b'chain 1 only (0 = ALL chains)'}, + {'name': 'effect', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, + 'value': b'EOA becomes alias for this code'}], + why='This EOA is authorizing delegation to a contract — NOT a normal contract call. ' + 'A malicious 7702 delegation disguised as a routine signature is effectively account ' + 'takeover; the delegate address must be shown with the same weight as a recipient.', + source='https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702', + ), +) diff --git a/keepkeylib/client.py b/keepkeylib/client.py index 472a0dbd..bbeb3fce 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/client.py +++ b/keepkeylib/client.py @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ from . import messages_tron_pb2 as tron_proto from . import messages_ton_pb2 as ton_proto from . import messages_zcash_pb2 as zcash_proto +from . import messages_hive_pb2 as hive_proto from . import types_pb2 as types from . import eos from . import nano @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ import zlib as _zlib SCREENSHOT = os.environ.get('KEEPKEY_SCREENSHOT', '') == '1' +SCREENSHOT_SETTLE_SECONDS = 0.5 def _write_png(path, width, height, pixels): @@ -460,6 +462,26 @@ def _check_request(self, msg): raise CallException(types.Failure_Other, "Expected %s, got %s" % (pprint(expected), pprint(msg))) + def reset_screenshots(self): + """Drop screenshots captured so far this test and restart numbering. + + Called at the end of the setup_mnemonic_* helpers so the wipe/load + "setUp noise" frames never get picked as a test's representative OLED + image. Lifecycle tests (wipe/reset/recovery) do not use those helpers, + so their setup screens — which ARE the content under test — are kept. + """ + if not SCREENSHOT: + return + screenshot_dir = getattr(self, 'screenshot_dir', None) + if screenshot_dir and os.path.isdir(screenshot_dir): + import glob + for f in glob.glob(os.path.join(screenshot_dir, 'btn*.png')): + try: + os.remove(f) + except OSError: + pass + self.screenshot_id = 0 + def _capture_oled(self): """Capture current OLED layout to screenshot directory.""" if not SCREENSHOT: @@ -505,6 +527,12 @@ def callback_ButtonRequest(self, msg): if self.verbose: log("ButtonRequest code: " + get_buttonrequest_value(msg.code)) + # The firmware emits ButtonRequest immediately before drawing the + # confirmation. Allow the emulator's render transition to settle so + # regression evidence cannot capture a partially drawn OLED. + if SCREENSHOT: + time.sleep(SCREENSHOT_SETTLE_SECONDS) + # Capture OLED screenshot BEFORE pressing button (confirmation screen) self._capture_oled() @@ -661,6 +689,39 @@ def e712_types_values(self, n, types_prop, ptype_prop, value_prop, typevals): response = self.call(msg) return response + def ethereum_sign_typed_data(self, n, typed_data): + """Clear-sign structured EIP-712 data on the device. + + The firmware hashes the domain and message itself and displays every + typed value before signing. This is the safe path for EIP-3009 x402 + payments; ``ethereum_sign_typed_data_hash`` remains the explicit + AdvancedMode-only fallback for callers that only have precomputed + hashes. + """ + required = ('types', 'primaryType', 'domain') + missing = [name for name in required if name not in typed_data] + if missing: + raise ValueError('Missing EIP-712 property: %s' % ', '.join(missing)) + + # The legacy structured firmware endpoint expects the standard EIP-712 + # root property names to remain present in each streamed JSON fragment. + types_prop = json.dumps( + {'types': typed_data['types']}, separators=(',', ':')) + ptype_prop = json.dumps( + {'primaryType': typed_data['primaryType']}, separators=(',', ':')) + + # Firmware receives domain and message separately, and retains the + # independently-computed domain separator only until message signing. + self.e712_types_values( + n, types_prop, ptype_prop, + json.dumps({'domain': typed_data['domain']}, separators=(',', ':')), + 1) + return self.e712_types_values( + n, types_prop, ptype_prop, + json.dumps( + {'message': typed_data.get('message', {})}, + separators=(',', ':')), 2) + @expect(eth_proto.EthereumMessageSignature) def ethereum_sign_message(self, n, message): n = self._convert_prime(n) @@ -689,6 +750,65 @@ def ethereum_send_tx_metadata(self, signed_payload, metadata_version, key_id): ) return self.call(msg) + @expect(proto.Success) + def load_clearsign_signer(self, key_id, pubkey, alias, icon=None, + icon_width=None, icon_height=None, persist=None): + """Load a clearsign signer (compressed pubkey + alias) into a key slot. + Triggers a mandatory on-device confirmation. Metadata verified by a + loaded signer shows a warning screen naming the alias before every + clearsign page. + + icon (optional, <= 384 bytes) is an identity logo shown on the trust + screen. It is RUN-LENGTH ENCODED with byte-valued pixels, NOT a packed + bitmap: draw_bitmap_mono_rle() in keepkey-firmware lib/board/draw.c is + the decoder of record, and it is what every bundled image already uses. + + Grammar -- read n = int8(data[i++]): + n in [1, 127] RUN : one value byte follows; emit it n times. + n in [-127, -1] LITERAL : (-n) value bytes follow; emit each once. + n == 0 : invalid. + n == -128 (0x80) : INVALID -- the device's run counter is + int8_t and cannot represent 128. Split a + 128-byte literal into two packets. + The stream must decode EXACTLY: no run may straddle the end of the + image, exactly icon_width*icon_height pixels are emitted (row-major), + and the whole input must be consumed -- trailing packets are rejected. + The device validates this before showing or storing the icon. See + LoadClearsignSigner.icon in messages-ethereum.proto for the grammar and + a golden vector. + + icon_width and icon_height are required with icon. + icon_width : 1..40 -- the confirm screen's icon column + (LEFT_MARGIN_WITH_ICON). Text begins at x=40 and the + icon is drawn after it, so a wider icon would paint over + the alias, fingerprint and the "NOT verified by KeepKey" + warning. Capped, not clipped. + icon_height : 1..64 -- the icon column is 64px tall. + Omit all three for a text-only identity. + + Signers are session-only and are cleared on reboot. ``persist`` remains + in the wire format for compatibility, but firmware 7.15 rejects true + until authenticated persistent storage is available.""" + if persist: + raise ValueError( + "Persistent clearsign signers are disabled until authenticated " + "storage is available" + ) + msg = eth_proto.LoadClearsignSigner( + key_id=key_id, + pubkey=pubkey, + alias=alias, + ) + if icon is not None: + msg.icon = icon + if icon_width is not None: + msg.icon_width = icon_width + if icon_height is not None: + msg.icon_height = icon_height + if persist is not None: + msg.persist = persist + return self.call(msg) + @session def ethereum_sign_tx(self, n, nonce, gas_limit, value, gas_price=None, max_fee_per_gas=None, max_priority_fee_per_gas=None, to=None, to_n=None, address_type=None, data=None, chain_id=None): from keepkeylib.tools import int_to_big_endian @@ -730,7 +850,11 @@ def ethereum_sign_tx(self, n, nonce, gas_limit, value, gas_price=None, max_fee_ data, chunk = data[1024:], data[:1024] msg.data_initial_chunk = chunk - if chain_id: + # `is not None`, not truthiness: chain_id=0 is a value a caller may + # legitimately want to put on the wire to see it refused, and dropping + # it here turns that into an omitted field -- a different case, which + # firmware before 7.14.2 handled differently. + if chain_id is not None: msg.chain_id = chain_id response = self.call(msg) @@ -924,15 +1048,28 @@ def osmosis_sign_tx( if len(msg['value']['amount']) != 1: raise CallException("Osmosis.MsgSend", "Multiple amounts per msg not supported") - denom = msg['value']['amount'][0]['denom'] - if denom != 'uatom': - raise CallException("Osmosis.MsgSend", "Unsupported denomination: " + denom) - + # This branch had never executed. It whitelisted 'uatom' — the + # COSMOS denom, so a native OSMO send was impossible — dropped + # the denom instead of forwarding it, and assigned an int to + # OsmosisMsgSend.amount, which is a string field and would have + # raised even for uatom. + # + # The legacy Amino MsgSend serializer is uosmo-only. Firmware + # now enforces the same rule on direct OsmosisMsgAck traffic; + # retain the host check as early feedback, never as the trust + # boundary. + coin = msg['value']['amount'][0] + if coin['denom'] != 'uosmo': + raise CallException( + "Osmosis.MsgSend", + "Only uosmo is signable by Osmosis MsgSend (got %s)" % + coin['denom']) resp = self.call(osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgAck( send=osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgSend( from_address=msg['value']['from_address'], to_address=msg['value']['to_address'], - amount=int(msg['value']['amount'][0]['amount']), + denom=coin['denom'], + amount=str(coin['amount']), address_type=types.SPEND, ) )) @@ -1622,10 +1759,21 @@ def solana_get_address(self, address_n, show_display=False): ) @expect(solana_proto.SolanaSignedTx) - def solana_sign_tx(self, address_n, raw_tx): - return self.call( - solana_proto.SolanaSignTx(address_n=address_n, raw_tx=raw_tx) - ) + def solana_sign_tx(self, address_n, raw_tx, token_info=None, + token_recipient_owner=None): + """Sign a Solana transaction with optional display metadata. + + ``token_recipient_owner`` contains candidate 32-byte SPL token-account + owners (for example an x402 ``payTo`` address). Firmware only displays + a candidate after deriving its associated token account and matching + the destination present in the signed TransferChecked instruction. + """ + return self.call(solana_proto.SolanaSignTx( + address_n=address_n, + raw_tx=raw_tx, + token_info=token_info or [], + token_recipient_owner=token_recipient_owner or [], + )) @expect(solana_proto.SolanaMessageSignature) def solana_sign_message(self, address_n, message, show_display=False): @@ -1720,10 +1868,31 @@ def ton_sign_message(self, address_n, message, show_display=False): # ── Zcash Address Display ───────────────────────────────── @expect(zcash_proto.ZcashAddress) - def zcash_display_address(self, address_n, address, ak, nk, rivk, account=None): - kwargs = dict(address_n=address_n, address=address, ak=ak, nk=nk, rivk=rivk) + def zcash_display_address(self, address_n, account=None, + expected_seed_fingerprint=None): + """Display a Zcash unified address on the device for user confirmation. + + The device derives the unified address itself from its own seed — the + host does NOT supply the address or FVK components (that host-comparison + model was dropped; see messages-zcash.proto, where address/ak/nk/rivk + are reserved on ZcashDisplayAddress). + + Args: + address_n: ZIP-32 derivation path [32', 133', account'] + account: account index (alternative to full path) + expected_seed_fingerprint: optional 32-byte ZIP-32 §6.1 seed + fingerprint. If provided, device verifies the match before + deriving/displaying and rejects with Failure on mismatch. + + Returns: + ZcashAddress with .address and .seed_fingerprint of the + attesting device. + """ + kwargs = dict(address_n=address_n) if account is not None: kwargs['account'] = account + if expected_seed_fingerprint is not None: + kwargs['expected_seed_fingerprint'] = expected_seed_fingerprint return self.call(zcash_proto.ZcashDisplayAddress(**kwargs)) # ── Zcash Orchard ────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -1739,14 +1908,20 @@ def zcash_sign_pczt(self, address_n, actions, account=None, total_amount=0, fee=0, branch_id=0x37519621, header_digest=None, transparent_digest=None, sapling_digest=None, orchard_digest=None, + shielded_pool=None, ironwood_digest=None, orchard_flags=None, orchard_value_balance=None, - orchard_anchor=None, transparent_inputs=None): - """Sign a Zcash Orchard shielded transaction via PCZT protocol. - - Phase 2: Sends ZcashSignPCZT, then loops on ZcashPCZTActionAck - feeding Orchard actions one at a time. - Phase 3: If transparent_inputs provided, handles ZcashTransparentSig - loop for transparent-to-shielded (shielding) transactions. + orchard_anchor=None, tx_version=None, + version_group_id=None, lock_time=None, + expiry_height=None, transparent_outputs=None, + transparent_inputs=None, + expected_seed_fingerprint=None, + return_transparent_signatures=False): + """Sign a Zcash Orchard-family shielded transaction via PCZT protocol. + + Streams transparent outputs, then transparent inputs, then shielded + actions in the exact order requested by firmware 7.15. Shielded + signatures are compact: the response contains one signature for each + action whose explicit ``is_spend`` value is true, in action order. Args: address_n: ZIP-32 derivation path [32', 133', account'] @@ -1759,17 +1934,41 @@ def zcash_sign_pczt(self, address_n, actions, account=None, transparent_digest: 32-byte transparent digest sapling_digest: 32-byte sapling digest orchard_digest: 32-byte orchard digest + shielded_pool: ZcashShieldedPool value (Orchard by default) + ironwood_digest: 32-byte Ironwood digest for transaction v6 orchard_flags: bundle flags byte (enables digest verification) orchard_value_balance: signed i64 value balance orchard_anchor: 32-byte anchor + tx_version: transaction version used to verify header_digest + version_group_id: transaction version group ID + lock_time: transaction lock time + expiry_height: transaction expiry height + transparent_outputs: output dicts matching ZcashTransparentOutput + transparent_inputs: input dicts matching ZcashTransparentInput; + host-provided per-input sighashes are rejected by RC18 + return_transparent_signatures: when true, return a tuple of + (ZcashSignedPCZT, [DER transparent signatures]) Returns: - ZcashSignedPCZT with .signatures list and optional .txid + ZcashSignedPCZT with compact Orchard signatures and optional txid, + or a tuple including transparent signatures when requested. """ n_actions = len(actions) if n_actions == 0: raise ValueError("Must have at least one action") + for idx, action in enumerate(actions): + if 'is_spend' not in action or not isinstance(action['is_spend'], bool): + raise ValueError( + "Orchard action %d must explicitly set boolean is_spend" % idx) + + transparent_outputs = transparent_outputs or [] + transparent_inputs = transparent_inputs or [] + for inp in transparent_inputs: + if 'sighash' in inp: + raise ValueError( + "Host-provided transparent sighash is rejected by firmware 7.15") + # Build the initial signing request — only send address_n, # let firmware derive account from the path. Only set account # explicitly if the caller passed it. @@ -1790,39 +1989,104 @@ def zcash_sign_pczt(self, address_n, actions, account=None, kwargs['sapling_digest'] = sapling_digest if orchard_digest is not None: kwargs['orchard_digest'] = orchard_digest + if shielded_pool is not None: + kwargs['shielded_pool'] = shielded_pool + if ironwood_digest is not None: + kwargs['ironwood_digest'] = ironwood_digest if orchard_flags is not None: kwargs['orchard_flags'] = orchard_flags if orchard_value_balance is not None: kwargs['orchard_value_balance'] = orchard_value_balance if orchard_anchor is not None: kwargs['orchard_anchor'] = orchard_anchor + if tx_version is not None: + kwargs['tx_version'] = tx_version + if version_group_id is not None: + kwargs['version_group_id'] = version_group_id + if lock_time is not None: + kwargs['lock_time'] = lock_time + if expiry_height is not None: + kwargs['expiry_height'] = expiry_height + if transparent_outputs: + kwargs['n_transparent_outputs'] = len(transparent_outputs) + if transparent_inputs: + kwargs['n_transparent_inputs'] = len(transparent_inputs) + if expected_seed_fingerprint is not None: + kwargs['expected_seed_fingerprint'] = expected_seed_fingerprint resp = self.call(zcash_proto.ZcashSignPCZT(**kwargs)) - # Phase 2: Orchard action-ack loop — device asks for actions one at a time + # Transparent plaintext is streamed outputs-first. Firmware uses field + # presence to distinguish output and input acknowledgments, so never + # infer a missing index as zero. + sent_outputs = 0 + while (sent_outputs < len(transparent_outputs) and + isinstance(resp, zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentAck)): + if not resp.HasField('next_output_index'): + raise Exception("Device did not request the next transparent output") + idx = resp.next_output_index + if idx != sent_outputs: + raise Exception( + "Device requested transparent output %d after %d outputs" + % (idx, sent_outputs)) + if idx >= len(transparent_outputs): + raise Exception( + "Device requested transparent output %d but only %d provided" + % (idx, len(transparent_outputs))) + output = dict(transparent_outputs[idx]) + output.pop('index', None) + resp = self.call(zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentOutput(index=idx, **output)) + sent_outputs += 1 + + sent_inputs = 0 + while (sent_inputs < len(transparent_inputs) and + isinstance(resp, zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentAck)): + if not resp.HasField('next_input_index'): + raise Exception("Device did not request the next transparent input") + idx = resp.next_input_index + if idx != sent_inputs: + raise Exception( + "Device requested transparent input %d after %d inputs" + % (idx, sent_inputs)) + if idx >= len(transparent_inputs): + raise Exception( + "Device requested transparent input %d but only %d provided" + % (idx, len(transparent_inputs))) + inp = dict(transparent_inputs[idx]) + inp.pop('index', None) + resp = self.call(zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentInput(index=idx, **inp)) + sent_inputs += 1 + + if sent_outputs != len(transparent_outputs): + raise Exception("Device did not request every transparent output") + if sent_inputs != len(transparent_inputs): + raise Exception("Device did not request every transparent input") + + # Orchard action-ack loop: the device chooses the next action index. + sent_actions = set() while isinstance(resp, zcash_proto.ZcashPCZTActionAck): + if not resp.HasField('next_index'): + raise Exception("Device did not identify the next Orchard action") idx = resp.next_index if idx >= n_actions: raise Exception( "Device requested action index %d but only %d actions provided" % (idx, n_actions)) + if idx in sent_actions: + raise Exception("Device requested Orchard action %d twice" % idx) action = actions[idx] resp = self.call(zcash_proto.ZcashPCZTAction(index=idx, **action)) + sent_actions.add(idx) - # Phase 3: Transparent input signing — device sends back signatures - # and may request transparent inputs for shielding transactions + if sent_actions != set(range(n_actions)): + raise Exception("Device did not request every Orchard action") + + # RC18 defers transparent signatures until every Orchard action, digest, + # and fee has passed. They are emitted immediately before SignedPCZT. transparent_sigs = [] - while isinstance(resp, zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentSig): - transparent_sigs.append(resp) - if not transparent_inputs: - raise Exception( - "Device sent ZcashTransparentSig but no transparent_inputs provided") - if resp.next_index >= len(transparent_inputs): - raise Exception( - "Device requested transparent input %d but only %d provided" - % (resp.next_index, len(transparent_inputs))) - inp = transparent_inputs[resp.next_index] - resp = self.call(zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentInput(**inp)) + if isinstance(resp, zcash_proto.ZcashTransparentSigned): + transparent_sigs = list(resp.signatures) + resp = self.transport.read_blocking() if isinstance(resp, proto.Failure): raise Exception("Zcash signing failed: %s" % resp.message) @@ -1830,8 +2094,87 @@ def zcash_sign_pczt(self, address_n, actions, account=None, if not isinstance(resp, zcash_proto.ZcashSignedPCZT): raise Exception("Unexpected response type: %s" % type(resp)) + expected_signatures = sum(1 for action in actions if action['is_spend']) + if len(resp.signatures) != expected_signatures: + raise Exception( + "Device returned %d Orchard signatures for %d real spends" + % (len(resp.signatures), expected_signatures)) + for signature in resp.signatures: + if len(signature) != 64: + raise Exception("Device returned an invalid RedPallas signature") + + if return_transparent_signatures: + return resp, transparent_sigs return resp + # ── Hive ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── + @expect(hive_proto.HivePublicKey) + def hive_get_public_key(self, address_n, show_display=False, role=None): + kwargs = dict(address_n=address_n, show_display=show_display) + if role is not None: + kwargs['role'] = role + return self.call(hive_proto.HiveGetPublicKey(**kwargs)) + + @expect(hive_proto.HivePublicKeys) + def hive_get_public_keys(self, account_index=0, show_display=False): + return self.call( + hive_proto.HiveGetPublicKeys(account_index=account_index, show_display=show_display) + ) + + @expect(hive_proto.HiveSignedTx) + def hive_sign_tx(self, address_n, chain_id, ref_block_num, ref_block_prefix, + expiration, sender, recipient, amount, decimals, asset_symbol, memo=''): + return self.call(hive_proto.HiveSignTx(**{ + 'address_n': address_n, + 'chain_id': chain_id, + 'ref_block_num': ref_block_num, + 'ref_block_prefix': ref_block_prefix, + 'expiration': expiration, + 'from': sender, + 'to': recipient, + 'amount': amount, + 'decimals': decimals, + 'asset_symbol': asset_symbol, + 'memo': memo, + })) + + @expect(hive_proto.HiveSignedAccountCreate) + def hive_sign_account_create(self, address_n, chain_id, ref_block_num, ref_block_prefix, + expiration, creator, new_account_name, fee_amount=3000, + owner_key='', active_key='', posting_key='', memo_key=''): + return self.call(hive_proto.HiveSignAccountCreate( + address_n=address_n, + chain_id=chain_id, + ref_block_num=ref_block_num, + ref_block_prefix=ref_block_prefix, + expiration=expiration, + creator=creator, + new_account_name=new_account_name, + fee_amount=fee_amount, + owner_key=owner_key, + active_key=active_key, + posting_key=posting_key, + memo_key=memo_key, + )) + + @expect(hive_proto.HiveSignedAccountUpdate) + def hive_sign_account_update(self, address_n, chain_id, ref_block_num, ref_block_prefix, + expiration, account, + new_owner_key='', new_active_key='', + new_posting_key='', new_memo_key=''): + return self.call(hive_proto.HiveSignAccountUpdate( + address_n=address_n, + chain_id=chain_id, + ref_block_num=ref_block_num, + ref_block_prefix=ref_block_prefix, + expiration=expiration, + account=account, + new_owner_key=new_owner_key, + new_active_key=new_active_key, + new_posting_key=new_posting_key, + new_memo_key=new_memo_key, + )) + class KeepKeyClient(ProtocolMixin, TextUIMixin, BaseClient): pass diff --git a/keepkeylib/debuglink.py b/keepkeylib/debuglink.py index 96aa2f23..efd308c9 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/debuglink.py +++ b/keepkeylib/debuglink.py @@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ def read_reset_entropy(self): obj = self._call(proto.DebugLinkGetState()) return obj.reset_entropy + def read_dice_digest(self): + obj = self._call(proto.DebugLinkGetState()) + return obj.dice_digest + def read_passphrase_protection(self): obj = self._call(proto.DebugLinkGetState()) return obj.passphrase_protection @@ -127,6 +131,13 @@ def press_button(self, yes_no): def press_yes(self): self.press_button(True) + def press_input(self, text): + """Send synthetic keyboard input to an on-device entry flow + (dice rolls: '1'-'6' and 'u' for undo). Keep each chunk within + the firmware's DebugLinkDecision.input max_size (40 chars).""" + self.log("Injecting input", text) + self._call(proto.DebugLinkDecision(yes_no=False, input=text), nowait=True) + def press_no(self): self.press_button(False) diff --git a/keepkeylib/eip712_stream.py b/keepkeylib/eip712_stream.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0f2bba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/eip712_stream.py @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +"""Host half of the device-driven structured EIP-712 walk. + +The DEVICE leads. It asks for one struct definition, or one leaf value, at a +time, and hashes each value in the same pass that displays it. This module +answers whatever it asks until a signature comes back. + +The host never chooses the order, and that is the property rather than an +accident of the API: a host that answered a different question than the one +asked would produce a digest that does not verify. + +Mirrors packages/hdwallet-keepkey/src/eip712Streaming.ts. The two are +deliberately parallel so a divergence shows up as a test failure in one of +them rather than as a bad signature in the field. +""" + +import re + +from . import messages_ethereum_pb2 as eth_proto + +DataType = eth_proto.EthereumTypedDataStructAck + +UINT = DataType.UINT +INT = DataType.INT +BYTES = DataType.BYTES +STRING = DataType.STRING +BOOL = DataType.BOOL +ADDRESS = DataType.ADDRESS +STRUCT = DataType.STRUCT + +# EthereumTypedDataValueAck.value max_size in messages-ethereum.options, and +# EIP712_MAX_LEAF on the device. +MAX_LEAF_BYTES = 1024 + +_ARRAY_GROUP = re.compile(r'\[([0-9]*)\]') +_CANONICAL_DIGITS = re.compile(r'^[1-9][0-9]*$') +_IDENTIFIER = re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$') + + +class Eip712Error(Exception): + pass + + +def parse_solidity_type(type_str): + """"uint256", "bytes32", "Person[3]", "int16[2][][4]" -> field descriptor. + + Raises rather than guessing. An unparseable type must never become a + signature. + """ + bracket = type_str.find('[') + base = type_str if bracket == -1 else type_str[:bracket] + suffix = '' if bracket == -1 else type_str[bracket:] + + levels = [] + if suffix: + consumed = 0 + for m in _ARRAY_GROUP.finditer(suffix): + if m.start() != consumed: + raise Eip712Error('Malformed array type: %s' % type_str) + digits = m.group(1) + if digits == '': + levels.append(0) # dynamic + else: + # 0 is the wire's DYNAMIC sentinel, so a fixed dimension of 0 + # has no spelling and "[0]" would be hashed as "[]" -- a + # different type string. Leading zeros re-spell the same way. + if not _CANONICAL_DIGITS.match(digits): + raise Eip712Error('Malformed array dimension: %s' % type_str) + levels.append(int(digits)) + consumed = m.end() + if consumed != len(suffix): + raise Eip712Error('Malformed array type: %s' % type_str) + + if base == 'string': + return {'data_type': STRING, 'array_levels': levels} + if base == 'bool': + return {'data_type': BOOL, 'array_levels': levels} + if base == 'address': + return {'data_type': ADDRESS, 'array_levels': levels} + if base == 'bytes': + return {'data_type': BYTES, 'array_levels': levels} + + m = re.match(r'^bytes([0-9]*)$', base) + if m: + if not _CANONICAL_DIGITS.match(m.group(1)): + raise Eip712Error('Non-canonical bytes width: %s' % base) + n = int(m.group(1)) + if n < 1 or n > 32: + raise Eip712Error('Invalid fixed bytes width: %s' % base) + return {'data_type': BYTES, 'size': n, 'array_levels': levels} + + # Anchored to digits, so a struct named "interest" is not caught here. + m = re.match(r'^(u?)int([0-9]*)$', base) + if m: + if m.group(2) == '': + raise Eip712Error('Integer type must state its width: %s' % base) + if not _CANONICAL_DIGITS.match(m.group(2)): + raise Eip712Error('Non-canonical integer width: %s' % base) + bits = int(m.group(2)) + if bits < 8 or bits > 256 or bits % 8: + raise Eip712Error('Invalid integer width: %s' % base) + return { + 'data_type': UINT if m.group(1) == 'u' else INT, + 'size': bits // 8, + 'array_levels': levels, + } + + if not _IDENTIFIER.match(base): + raise Eip712Error('Unparseable EIP-712 type: %s' % type_str) + return {'data_type': STRUCT, 'struct_name': base, 'array_levels': levels} + + +def _to_int(value, what): + if isinstance(value, bool): + raise Eip712Error('%s is a bool, not an integer' % what) + if isinstance(value, int): + return value + if isinstance(value, str): + s = value.strip() + if re.match(r'^-?[0-9]+$', s): + return int(s, 10) + if re.match(r'^0x[0-9a-fA-F]+$', s): + return int(s, 16) + raise Eip712Error('%s is not an integer: %r' % (what, value)) + + +def _hex_bytes(value, what): + if isinstance(value, (bytes, bytearray)): + return bytes(value) + if not isinstance(value, str): + raise Eip712Error('%s must be hex or bytes' % what) + h = value[2:] if value[:2] in ('0x', '0X') else value + if len(h) % 2 or (h and not re.match(r'^[0-9a-fA-F]+$', h)): + raise Eip712Error('%s is not valid hex: %s' % (what, value)) + return bytes(bytearray.fromhex(h)) + + +def encode_value(field, value): + """One leaf, as the exact bytes the device will hash and display. + + Raw big-endian at the declared width, never a decimal string: the device + does no number parsing at all, which is what removes the old path's + 2**63-1 ceiling and any chance of the two sides disagreeing about what a + decimal meant. + """ + dt = field['data_type'] + + if dt in (UINT, INT): + width = field.get('size') + if width is None: + raise Eip712Error('Integer field has no width') + n = _to_int(value, 'Integer field') + bits = width * 8 + if dt == INT: + lo, hi = -(1 << (bits - 1)), (1 << (bits - 1)) - 1 + if n < lo or n > hi: + raise Eip712Error('Value out of range for int%d' % bits) + if n < 0: + n += 1 << bits + else: + if n < 0: + raise Eip712Error('Negative value for uint%d' % bits) + if n >= 1 << bits: + raise Eip712Error('Value out of range for uint%d' % bits) + out = bytearray(width) + for i in range(width - 1, -1, -1): + out[i] = n & 0xFF + n >>= 8 + return bytes(out) + + if dt == BOOL: + if not isinstance(value, bool): + raise Eip712Error('Not a boolean: %r' % (value,)) + return b'\x01' if value else b'\x00' + + if dt == ADDRESS: + b = _hex_bytes(value, 'Address') + if len(b) != 20: + raise Eip712Error('Address must be 20 bytes, got %d' % len(b)) + return b + + if dt == BYTES: + b = _hex_bytes(value, 'bytes') + size = field.get('size') + if size is not None: + if len(b) != size: + raise Eip712Error('bytes%d must be %d bytes, got %d' % (size, size, len(b))) + return b + if len(b) > MAX_LEAF_BYTES: + raise Eip712Error('bytes value is %d bytes, over the %d-byte wire limit' + % (len(b), MAX_LEAF_BYTES)) + return b + + if dt == STRING: + if not isinstance(value, str): + raise Eip712Error('string field must be a string') + b = value.encode('utf-8') + if len(b) > MAX_LEAF_BYTES: + raise Eip712Error('string value is %d bytes, over the %d-byte wire limit' + % (len(b), MAX_LEAF_BYTES)) + return b + + raise Eip712Error('Cannot encode data type %r as a leaf' % (dt,)) + + +def encode_array_length(n): + """Big-endian uint16, the wire form of an array length.""" + if n < 0 or n > 0xFFFF: + raise Eip712Error('Array length out of range: %d' % n) + return bytes(bytearray([(n >> 8) & 0xFF, n & 0xFF])) + + +def struct_members(typed_data, name): + """Member list for one struct, in DECLARATION order. + + Order is part of the signature: it sets both encodeType and the order + encodeData concatenates members. + """ + members = typed_data['types'].get(name) + if members is None: + raise Eip712Error('Unknown struct: %s' % name) + return [{'name': m['name'], 'type': parse_solidity_type(m['type'])} for m in members] + + +def resolve_member_path(typed_data, path): + """Resolve a device-supplied member_path against the document. + + path[0] is 0 for the domain and 1 for the message. A path stopping on an + ARRAY is the device asking for its length; a path stopping on a STRUCT is a + protocol error, because the device walks into structs. + """ + if not path: + raise Eip712Error('Empty member_path') + root = path[0] + if root not in (0, 1): + raise Eip712Error('Unknown member_path root: %d' % root) + + field = {'data_type': STRUCT, + 'struct_name': 'EIP712Domain' if root == 0 else typed_data['primaryType'], + 'array_levels': []} + value = typed_data['domain'] if root == 0 else typed_data.get('message', {}) + levels_used = 0 + + for i in range(1, len(path)): + index = path[i] + if levels_used < len(field['array_levels']): + declared = field['array_levels'][levels_used] + if not isinstance(value, list): + raise Eip712Error('Expected an array at %r' % (path[:i],)) + if declared and len(value) != declared: + raise Eip712Error('Fixed array declares %d elements, document has %d' + % (declared, len(value))) + if index >= len(value): + raise Eip712Error('Array index %d out of range' % index) + value = value[index] + levels_used += 1 + continue + + if field['data_type'] != STRUCT: + raise Eip712Error('Cannot descend into a leaf at %r' % (path[:i],)) + members = typed_data['types'].get(field['struct_name']) + if members is None: + raise Eip712Error('Unknown struct: %s' % field['struct_name']) + if index >= len(members): + raise Eip712Error('Member index %d out of range for %s' + % (index, field['struct_name'])) + member = members[index] + field = parse_solidity_type(member['type']) + levels_used = 0 + value = value[member['name']] + + if levels_used < len(field['array_levels']): + declared = field['array_levels'][levels_used] + if not isinstance(value, list): + raise Eip712Error('Expected an array for a length request') + if declared and len(value) != declared: + raise Eip712Error('Fixed array declares %d elements, document has %d' + % (declared, len(value))) + return ('length', len(value)) + if field['data_type'] == STRUCT: + raise Eip712Error('Device asked for a struct as a value') + return ('value', field, value) + + +def build_struct_ack(members): + """Members, in the shape EthereumTypedDataStructAck wants.""" + ack = eth_proto.EthereumTypedDataStructAck() + for m in members: + entry = ack.members.add() + entry.name = m['name'] + entry.type.data_type = m['type']['data_type'] + if 'size' in m['type']: + entry.type.size = m['type']['size'] + if 'struct_name' in m['type']: + entry.type.struct_name = m['type']['struct_name'] + for lvl in m['type']['array_levels']: + entry.type.array_levels.append(lvl) + return ack diff --git a/keepkeylib/eth/ethereum_tokens.py b/keepkeylib/eth/ethereum_tokens.py index 9160b1ab..8f96f2ab 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/eth/ethereum_tokens.py +++ b/keepkeylib/eth/ethereum_tokens.py @@ -44,7 +44,26 @@ def build(self): self.add_tokens(network) def serialize_c(self, outf): - for token in sorted(self.tokens, key=lambda t: t.token['address']): + # Flash budget: this table is the largest read-only symbol in the ARM + # image. See token_policy for why it is capped rather than complete. + # Run as a standalone script by the build, so there is no package + # context for a relative import. + import os as _os, sys as _s + _s.path.insert(0, _os.path.dirname(_os.path.realpath(__file__))) + import token_policy + chosen, ambiguous = token_policy.select( + self.tokens, + token_policy.BUDGET_ETHEREUM_LISTS, + symbol_of=lambda t: t.token.get('symbol', ''), + address_of=lambda t: t.token['address'].lower()) + print('ethereum_tokens: %d of %d kept (budget %d)' + % (len(chosen), len(self.tokens), + token_policy.BUDGET_ETHEREUM_LISTS), file=sys.stderr) + if ambiguous: + print('ethereum_tokens: priority symbols DROPPED as ambiguous ' + '(>1 address, a scam token can inherit a real label): %s' + % ', '.join(sorted(ambiguous)), file=sys.stderr) + for token in sorted(chosen, key=lambda t: t.token['address']): token.serialize_c(outf) def is_ascii(s): diff --git a/keepkeylib/eth/token_policy.py b/keepkeylib/eth/token_policy.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a0696b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/eth/token_policy.py @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +"""Which ERC-20s earn their place in firmware flash. + +The built-in token table is the single largest read-only symbol in the ARM +image -- 31,104 bytes of `tokens` for 1,945 entries, larger than MessagesMap or +the BIP-39 wordlist. It exists so the device can render "10.5 DAI" instead of a +raw amount against a bare contract address. + +It cannot be complete, and should not try to be. Two facts settle that: + + * The vetted source (ethereum-lists) is a SNAPSHOT and is stale. It has no + UNI, no AAVE, no stETH, no PEPE, none of the modern stables (FRAX, PYUSD, + crvUSD, USDe), and its `ARB` entry is a 2018 token called "ARBITRAGE", not + Arbitrum's. Shipping 1,945 entries does not make the table current; it + makes it 1,945 entries of mostly-2018 long tail. + * Anything outside the table is not undisplayable -- it is the clear-sign + provider's job, which is exactly the direction + docs/security/token-table-retirement.md sets out. + +So the table's job is narrow: the assets a user is most likely to hold, whose +addresses this repository can actually vouch for. Everything else is a provider +schema away. + +POLICY + 1. A budget, because flash is finite and this symbol is the biggest one. + 2. Priority symbols first -- stablecoins, then majors. + 3. A priority symbol is only taken when the vetted source gives it exactly + ONE address. Two entries sharing a symbol is how a scam token inherits a + real one's label, and the device would render the attacker's name. + 4. Remaining budget filled in the existing deterministic order (by address), + so the result is reproducible and diffable. + +Addresses are NEVER written here. They come from the vetted source, matched by +symbol. A hand-typed address in a token table is a mislabelling defect waiting +to happen, and this file must not become the place one appears. +""" + +# 500 entries * 16 bytes = ~8 KB, against 31 KB today. +TOKEN_BUDGET = 500 + +# Split across the two generators, which emit into one array. +BUDGET_ETHEREUM_LISTS = 350 +BUDGET_UNISWAP_LIST = 150 + +STABLECOINS = [ + "USDC", "USDT", "DAI", "TUSD", "BUSD", "USDP", "GUSD", "SAI", + "EURS", "EURT", "sUSD", "USDS", "FRAX", "LUSD", "PYUSD", "crvUSD", "USDe", +] + +MAJORS = [ + "WETH", "WBTC", "stETH", "wstETH", "rETH", "cbETH", "LINK", "UNI", "AAVE", + "MKR", "LDO", "CRV", "SNX", "COMP", "ENS", "GRT", "MATIC", "ARB", "OP", + "SHIB", "PEPE", "APE", "SAND", "MANA", "AXS", "IMX", "INJ", "RNDR", "FET", + "STG", "BAL", "1INCH", "SUSHI", "YFI", "BAT", "ZRX", "KNC", "LRC", "GNO", + "RPL", "FXS", "CVX", "PAXG", "AMPL", "OMG", "REP", "ZIL", "ENJ", "STORJ", + "GUSD", +] + +# Required by coins[] in the firmware, not by popularity. Each of these is a +# display-only entry in the device's own coin table carrying a contract +# address, and unittests/firmware/coins.cpp (Coins.TableSanity) asserts every +# one of them resolves UNIQUELY in this token table. Dropping any is a build +# failure, correctly: the device would advertise a coin it cannot name. +# +# They are overwhelmingly 2017-era ICO tokens and are exactly the long tail +# this budget exists to cut -- but the cut has to happen in coins[] first, and +# coins[] is itself a 23,808-byte symbol. That is the next reduction, not this +# one. See docs/security/token-table-retirement.md. +REQUIRED_BY_COINS = [ + "0xBTC", "1ST", "AE", "ANT", "CVC", "DGD", "ELF", "FOX", "FUN", "GNT", + "GUP", "ICN", "MLN", "MTL", "PAY", "POLY", "PPT", "RCN", "RLC", "SALT", + "SNGLS", "SNT", "SPANK", "SWT", "TRST", "WINGS", +] + +# Required by a TEST FIXTURE rather than by the product. ADT (AdToken) is a +# 2017 ICO token that test_ethereum_signtx_knownerc20_eip_1559 uses as its +# canonical "known ERC-20", asserting a hardcoded signature over a transfer to +# its address -- so dropping it fails the suite, and the fixture cannot be +# repointed at a current token without regenerating that signature. +# +# It is listed separately and deliberately: a fixture should not get to pin +# firmware flash. Migrating that test to USDC (which every user actually holds) +# retires this entry, and is tracked as fixture debt rather than done here, +# because changing a signature fixture is a change to what the test proves. +REQUIRED_BY_TESTS = ["ADT"] + +PRIORITY_SYMBOLS = (REQUIRED_BY_COINS + REQUIRED_BY_TESTS + + STABLECOINS + MAJORS) + + +def select(records, budget, symbol_of, address_of): + """Return `records` trimmed to `budget`, priority symbols first. + + `records` is any iterable; `symbol_of`/`address_of` pull the two fields. + Priority symbols with more than one address in `records` are DROPPED from + the priority pass -- see rule 3 -- though they may still be picked up by + the deterministic fill, where they carry no special standing. + """ + records = list(records) + by_symbol = {} + for r in records: + by_symbol.setdefault(symbol_of(r), []).append(r) + + chosen, seen = [], set() + ambiguous = [] + for sym in PRIORITY_SYMBOLS: + hits = by_symbol.get(sym, []) + if len(hits) > 1: + ambiguous.append(sym) + continue + for r in hits: + key = address_of(r) + if key not in seen: + seen.add(key) + chosen.append(r) + + for r in sorted(records, key=address_of): + if len(chosen) >= budget: + break + key = address_of(r) + if key not in seen: + seen.add(key) + chosen.append(r) + + return chosen[:budget], ambiguous diff --git a/keepkeylib/eth/uniswap_tokens.py b/keepkeylib/eth/uniswap_tokens.py index 72f8f97a..4ac5ec81 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/eth/uniswap_tokens.py +++ b/keepkeylib/eth/uniswap_tokens.py @@ -27,8 +27,26 @@ def build(self): self.ustoks.append(USETHToken(token)) def serialize_c(self): + # Flash budget -- see token_policy. + # Run as a standalone script by the build, so there is no package + # context for a relative import. + import os as _os, sys as _s + _s.path.insert(0, _os.path.dirname(_os.path.realpath(__file__))) + import token_policy + import sys as _sys + chosen, ambiguous = token_policy.select( + self.ustoks, + token_policy.BUDGET_UNISWAP_LIST, + symbol_of=lambda t: t.token.get('symbol', ''), + address_of=lambda t: t.token['contractAddress'].lower()) + print('uniswap_tokens: %d of %d kept (budget %d)' + % (len(chosen), len(self.ustoks), + token_policy.BUDGET_UNISWAP_LIST), file=_sys.stderr) + if ambiguous: + print('uniswap_tokens: priority symbols DROPPED as ambiguous: %s' + % ', '.join(sorted(ambiguous)), file=_sys.stderr) ser_list = [] - for token in sorted(self.ustoks, key=lambda t: t.token['contractAddress']): + for token in sorted(chosen, key=lambda t: t.token['contractAddress']): ser_list.append(token.serialize_c()) return(ser_list) diff --git a/keepkeylib/hive.py b/keepkeylib/hive.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8758b89 --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/hive.py @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +from . import messages_hive_pb2 as proto + + +def get_public_key(client, address_n, show_display=False, role=None): + kwargs = dict(address_n=address_n, show_display=show_display) + if role is not None: + kwargs['role'] = role + return client.call(proto.HiveGetPublicKey(**kwargs)) + + +def get_public_keys(client, account_index=0, show_display=False): + return client.call( + proto.HiveGetPublicKeys(account_index=account_index, show_display=show_display) + ) + + +def sign_tx(client, address_n, chain_id, ref_block_num, ref_block_prefix, + expiration, sender, recipient, amount, decimals, asset_symbol, memo=''): + # 'from' is a Python keyword so use **-unpacking to set the field + return client.call(proto.HiveSignTx(**{ + 'address_n': address_n, + 'chain_id': chain_id, + 'ref_block_num': ref_block_num, + 'ref_block_prefix': ref_block_prefix, + 'expiration': expiration, + 'from': sender, + 'to': recipient, + 'amount': amount, + 'decimals': decimals, + 'asset_symbol': asset_symbol, + 'memo': memo, + })) + + +def sign_message(client, address_n, message): + """Keychain signBuffer contract: sig over SHA256(raw message bytes) only — + no chain_id prepend, no message prefix.""" + if isinstance(message, str): + message = message.encode('utf-8') + return client.call(proto.HiveSignMessage(address_n=address_n, message=message)) + + +def sign_operations(client, address_n, serialized_tx, chain_id=None): + """Sign a host-serialized Graphene transaction (HiveSignOperations). + Firmware parses the bytes and clear-signs the phase-1 op table + (vote, comment, custom_json); digest = SHA256(chain_id || tx).""" + kwargs = dict(address_n=address_n, serialized_tx=serialized_tx) + if chain_id is not None: + kwargs['chain_id'] = chain_id + return client.call(proto.HiveSignOperations(**kwargs)) + + +def sign_account_create(client, address_n, chain_id, ref_block_num, ref_block_prefix, + expiration, creator, new_account_name, fee_amount=3000, + owner_key='', active_key='', posting_key='', memo_key=''): + return client.call(proto.HiveSignAccountCreate( + address_n=address_n, + chain_id=chain_id, + ref_block_num=ref_block_num, + ref_block_prefix=ref_block_prefix, + expiration=expiration, + creator=creator, + new_account_name=new_account_name, + fee_amount=fee_amount, + owner_key=owner_key, + active_key=active_key, + posting_key=posting_key, + memo_key=memo_key, + )) + + +def sign_account_update(client, address_n, chain_id, ref_block_num, ref_block_prefix, + expiration, account, + new_owner_key='', new_active_key='', + new_posting_key='', new_memo_key=''): + return client.call(proto.HiveSignAccountUpdate( + address_n=address_n, + chain_id=chain_id, + ref_block_num=ref_block_num, + ref_block_prefix=ref_block_prefix, + expiration=expiration, + account=account, + new_owner_key=new_owner_key, + new_active_key=new_active_key, + new_posting_key=new_posting_key, + new_memo_key=new_memo_key, + )) diff --git a/keepkeylib/mapping.py b/keepkeylib/mapping.py index c8c37397..5b851dc0 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/mapping.py +++ b/keepkeylib/mapping.py @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from . import messages_tron_pb2 as tron_proto from . import messages_ton_pb2 as ton_proto from . import messages_zcash_pb2 as zcash_proto +from . import messages_hive_pb2 as hive_proto map_type_to_class = {} map_class_to_type = {} @@ -22,6 +23,10 @@ def build_map(): msg_name = msg_type.replace('MessageType_', '') if msg_type.startswith('MessageType_Ethereum'): msg_class = getattr(eth_proto, msg_name) + elif msg_type == 'MessageType_LoadClearsignSigner': + # clearsign signer loading lives in messages-ethereum.proto + # without the Ethereum name prefix (chain-agnostic by design) + msg_class = getattr(eth_proto, msg_name) elif msg_type.startswith('MessageType_Eos'): msg_class = getattr(eos_proto, msg_name) elif msg_type.startswith('MessageType_Nano'): @@ -97,4 +102,28 @@ def check_missing(): map_type_to_class[wire_id] = msg_class map_class_to_type[msg_class] = wire_id -# check_missing() — skip: Zcash types are not in old messages_pb2 enum +# Manually register Hive messages (not in the old messages_pb2.py enum) +_hive_wire_ids = { + 1600: ('HiveGetPublicKey', hive_proto), + 1601: ('HivePublicKey', hive_proto), + 1602: ('HiveSignTx', hive_proto), + 1603: ('HiveSignedTx', hive_proto), + 1604: ('HiveGetPublicKeys', hive_proto), + 1605: ('HivePublicKeys', hive_proto), + 1606: ('HiveSignAccountCreate', hive_proto), + 1607: ('HiveSignedAccountCreate', hive_proto), + 1608: ('HiveSignAccountUpdate', hive_proto), + 1609: ('HiveSignedAccountUpdate', hive_proto), + # 1610-1613 reserved: NEAR + 1614: ('HiveSignMessage', hive_proto), + 1615: ('HiveSignedMessage', hive_proto), + 1616: ('HiveSignOperations', hive_proto), + 1617: ('HiveSignedOperations', hive_proto), +} +for wire_id, (msg_name, mod) in _hive_wire_ids.items(): + msg_class = getattr(mod, msg_name, None) + if msg_class is not None: + map_type_to_class[wire_id] = msg_class + map_class_to_type[msg_class] = wire_id + +# check_missing() — skip: Zcash/Hive types are not in old messages_pb2 enum diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_ethereum_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_ethereum_pb2.py index 36dbc107..2695cfb1 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/messages_ethereum_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_ethereum_pb2.py @@ -20,12 +20,58 @@ name='messages-ethereum.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x17messages-ethereum.proto\x1a\x0btypes.proto\"=\n\x12\x45thereumGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 \x01(\x08\"7\n\x0f\x45thereumAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x02(\x0c\x12\x13\n\x0b\x61\x64\x64ress_str\x18\x02 \x01(\t\"\x95\x03\n\x0e\x45thereumSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\r\n\x05nonce\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tgas_price\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tgas_limit\x18\x04 \x01(\x0c\x12\n\n\x02to\x18\x05 \x01(\x0c\x12\r\n\x05value\x18\x06 \x01(\x0c\x12\x1a\n\x12\x64\x61ta_initial_chunk\x18\x07 \x01(\x0c\x12\x13\n\x0b\x64\x61ta_length\x18\x08 \x01(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cto_address_n\x18\t \x03(\r\x12(\n\x0c\x61\x64\x64ress_type\x18\n \x01(\x0e\x32\x12.OutputAddressType\x12\x10\n\x08\x63hain_id\x18\x0c \x01(\r\x12\x17\n\x0fmax_fee_per_gas\x18\r \x01(\x0c\x12 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_descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='BYTES', index=2, number=3, + options=None, + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='STRING', index=3, number=4, + options=None, + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='BOOL', index=4, number=5, + options=None, + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='ADDRESS', index=5, number=6, + options=None, + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='ARRAY', index=6, number=7, + options=None, + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='STRUCT', index=7, number=8, + options=None, + type=None), + ], + containing_type=None, + options=None, + serialized_start=2116, + serialized_end=2222, +) +_sym_db.RegisterEnumDescriptor(_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMDATATYPE) + _ETHEREUMGETADDRESS = _descriptor.Descriptor( name='EthereumGetAddress', @@ -433,6 +479,79 @@ ) +_LOADCLEARSIGNSIGNER = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='LoadClearsignSigner', + full_name='LoadClearsignSigner', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='key_id', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.key_id', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='pubkey', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.pubkey', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='alias', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.alias', index=2, + number=3, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='icon', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.icon', index=3, + number=4, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='icon_width', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.icon_width', index=4, + number=5, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='icon_height', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.icon_height', index=5, + number=6, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='persist', full_name='LoadClearsignSigner.persist', index=6, + number=7, type=8, cpp_type=7, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=False, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=909, + serialized_end=1049, +) + + _ETHEREUMSIGNMESSAGE = _descriptor.Descriptor( name='EthereumSignMessage', full_name='EthereumSignMessage', @@ -466,8 +585,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=908, - serialized_end=965, + serialized_start=1051, + serialized_end=1108, ) @@ -511,8 +630,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=967, - serialized_end=1043, + serialized_start=1110, + serialized_end=1186, ) @@ -549,8 +668,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1045, - serialized_end=1107, + serialized_start=1188, + serialized_end=1250, ) @@ -594,8 +713,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1109, - serialized_end=1204, + serialized_start=1252, + serialized_end=1347, ) @@ -653,8 +772,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1207, - serialized_end=1346, + serialized_start=1350, + serialized_end=1489, ) @@ -712,11 +831,275 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1349, - serialized_end=1482, + serialized_start=1492, + serialized_end=1625, +) + + +_ETHEREUMSIGNTYPEDDATA = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumSignTypedData', + full_name='EthereumSignTypedData', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='address_n', full_name='EthereumSignTypedData.address_n', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='primary_type', full_name='EthereumSignTypedData.primary_type', index=1, + number=2, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='metamask_v4_compat', full_name='EthereumSignTypedData.metamask_v4_compat', index=2, + number=3, type=8, cpp_type=7, label=1, + has_default_value=True, default_value=True, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1627, + serialized_end=1725, +) + + +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTREQUEST = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumTypedDataStructRequest', + full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructRequest', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='name', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructRequest.name', index=0, + number=1, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1727, + serialized_end=1773, +) + + +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMSTRUCTMEMBER = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumStructMember', + full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumStructMember', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='type', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumStructMember.type', index=0, + number=1, type=11, cpp_type=10, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=None, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='name', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumStructMember.name', index=1, + number=2, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1873, + serialized_end=1970, +) + +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMFIELDTYPE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumFieldType', + full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='data_type', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType.data_type', index=0, + number=1, type=14, cpp_type=8, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=1, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='size', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType.size', index=1, + number=2, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='struct_name', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType.struct_name', index=2, + number=3, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='array_levels', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType.array_levels', index=3, + number=4, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1973, + serialized_end=2114, +) + +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck', + full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='members', full_name='EthereumTypedDataStructAck.members', index=0, + number=1, type=11, cpp_type=10, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMSTRUCTMEMBER, _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMFIELDTYPE, ], + enum_types=[ + _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMDATATYPE, + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1776, + serialized_end=2222, +) + + +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATAVALUEREQUEST = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumTypedDataValueRequest', + full_name='EthereumTypedDataValueRequest', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='member_path', full_name='EthereumTypedDataValueRequest.member_path', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=2224, + serialized_end=2276, +) + + +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATAVALUEACK = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='EthereumTypedDataValueAck', + full_name='EthereumTypedDataValueAck', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='value', full_name='EthereumTypedDataValueAck.value', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=2278, + serialized_end=2320, ) _ETHEREUMSIGNTX.fields_by_name['address_type'].enum_type = types__pb2._OUTPUTADDRESSTYPE +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMSTRUCTMEMBER.fields_by_name['type'].message_type = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMFIELDTYPE +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMSTRUCTMEMBER.containing_type = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMFIELDTYPE.fields_by_name['data_type'].enum_type = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMDATATYPE +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMFIELDTYPE.containing_type = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK.fields_by_name['members'].message_type = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMSTRUCTMEMBER +_ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMDATATYPE.containing_type = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumGetAddress'] = _ETHEREUMGETADDRESS DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumAddress'] = _ETHEREUMADDRESS DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumSignTx'] = _ETHEREUMSIGNTX @@ -724,12 +1107,18 @@ DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTxAck'] = _ETHEREUMTXACK DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTxMetadata'] = _ETHEREUMTXMETADATA DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumMetadataAck'] = _ETHEREUMMETADATAACK +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['LoadClearsignSigner'] = _LOADCLEARSIGNSIGNER DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumSignMessage'] = _ETHEREUMSIGNMESSAGE DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumVerifyMessage'] = _ETHEREUMVERIFYMESSAGE DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumMessageSignature'] = _ETHEREUMMESSAGESIGNATURE DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumSignTypedHash'] = _ETHEREUMSIGNTYPEDHASH DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTypedDataSignature'] = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASIGNATURE DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['Ethereum712TypesValues'] = _ETHEREUM712TYPESVALUES +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumSignTypedData'] = _ETHEREUMSIGNTYPEDDATA +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTypedDataStructRequest'] = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTREQUEST +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTypedDataStructAck'] = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTypedDataValueRequest'] = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATAVALUEREQUEST +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['EthereumTypedDataValueAck'] = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATAVALUEACK _sym_db.RegisterFileDescriptor(DESCRIPTOR) EthereumGetAddress = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumGetAddress', (_message.Message,), dict( @@ -781,6 +1170,13 @@ )) _sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumMetadataAck) +LoadClearsignSigner = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('LoadClearsignSigner', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _LOADCLEARSIGNSIGNER, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:LoadClearsignSigner) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(LoadClearsignSigner) + EthereumSignMessage = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumSignMessage', (_message.Message,), dict( DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMSIGNMESSAGE, __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' @@ -823,6 +1219,57 @@ )) _sym_db.RegisterMessage(Ethereum712TypesValues) +EthereumSignTypedData = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumSignTypedData', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMSIGNTYPEDDATA, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumSignTypedData) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumSignTypedData) + +EthereumTypedDataStructRequest = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumTypedDataStructRequest', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTREQUEST, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumTypedDataStructRequest) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumTypedDataStructRequest) + +EthereumTypedDataStructAck = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumTypedDataStructAck', (_message.Message,), dict( + + EthereumStructMember = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumStructMember', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMSTRUCTMEMBER, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumStructMember) + )) + , + + EthereumFieldType = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumFieldType', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK_ETHEREUMFIELDTYPE, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType) + )) + , + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATASTRUCTACK, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumTypedDataStructAck) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumTypedDataStructAck) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumStructMember) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumTypedDataStructAck.EthereumFieldType) + +EthereumTypedDataValueRequest = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumTypedDataValueRequest', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATAVALUEREQUEST, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumTypedDataValueRequest) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumTypedDataValueRequest) + +EthereumTypedDataValueAck = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('EthereumTypedDataValueAck', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ETHEREUMTYPEDDATAVALUEACK, + __module__ = 'messages_ethereum_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:EthereumTypedDataValueAck) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(EthereumTypedDataValueAck) + DESCRIPTOR.has_options = True DESCRIPTOR._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.FileOptions(), _b('\n\032com.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\026KeepKeyMessageEthereum')) diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_hive_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_hive_pb2.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c83b6460 --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_hive_pb2.py @@ -0,0 +1,886 @@ +# Generated by the protocol buffer compiler. DO NOT EDIT! +# source: messages-hive.proto + +import sys +_b=sys.version_info[0]<3 and (lambda x:x) or (lambda x:x.encode('latin1')) +from google.protobuf import descriptor as _descriptor +from google.protobuf import message as _message +from google.protobuf import reflection as _reflection +from google.protobuf import symbol_database as _symbol_database +from google.protobuf import descriptor_pb2 +# @@protoc_insertion_point(imports) + +_sym_db = _symbol_database.Default() + + + + +DESCRIPTOR = _descriptor.FileDescriptor( + name='messages-hive.proto', + package='', + syntax='proto2', + serialized_pb=_b('\n\x13messages-hive.proto\"I\n\x10HiveGetPublicKey\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 \x01(\x08\x12\x0c\n\x04role\x18\x03 \x01(\r\";\n\rHivePublicKey\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x16\n\x0eraw_public_key\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\"C\n\x11HiveGetPublicKeys\x12\x18\n\raccount_index\x18\x01 \x01(\r:\x01\x30\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 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file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='show_display', full_name='HiveGetPublicKey.show_display', index=1, + number=2, type=8, cpp_type=7, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=False, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='role', full_name='HiveGetPublicKey.role', index=2, + number=3, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=23, + serialized_end=96, +) + + +_HIVEPUBLICKEY = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HivePublicKey', + full_name='HivePublicKey', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='public_key', full_name='HivePublicKey.public_key', index=0, + number=1, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='raw_public_key', full_name='HivePublicKey.raw_public_key', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=98, + serialized_end=157, +) + + +_HIVEGETPUBLICKEYS = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveGetPublicKeys', + full_name='HiveGetPublicKeys', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='account_index', full_name='HiveGetPublicKeys.account_index', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=True, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='show_display', full_name='HiveGetPublicKeys.show_display', index=1, + number=2, type=8, cpp_type=7, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=False, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=159, + serialized_end=226, +) + + +_HIVEPUBLICKEYS = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HivePublicKeys', + full_name='HivePublicKeys', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='owner_key', full_name='HivePublicKeys.owner_key', index=0, + number=1, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='active_key', full_name='HivePublicKeys.active_key', index=1, + number=2, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='memo_key', full_name='HivePublicKeys.memo_key', index=2, + number=3, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='posting_key', full_name='HivePublicKeys.posting_key', index=3, + number=4, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=228, + serialized_end=322, +) + + +_HIVESIGNTX = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignTx', + full_name='HiveSignTx', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='address_n', full_name='HiveSignTx.address_n', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='chain_id', full_name='HiveSignTx.chain_id', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ref_block_num', full_name='HiveSignTx.ref_block_num', index=2, + number=3, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ref_block_prefix', full_name='HiveSignTx.ref_block_prefix', index=3, + number=4, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='expiration', full_name='HiveSignTx.expiration', index=4, + number=5, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='from', full_name='HiveSignTx.from', index=5, + number=6, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='to', full_name='HiveSignTx.to', index=6, + number=7, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='amount', full_name='HiveSignTx.amount', index=7, + number=8, type=4, cpp_type=4, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='decimals', full_name='HiveSignTx.decimals', index=8, + number=9, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='asset_symbol', full_name='HiveSignTx.asset_symbol', index=9, + number=10, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='memo', full_name='HiveSignTx.memo', index=10, + number=11, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=325, + serialized_end=539, +) + + +_HIVESIGNEDTX = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignedTx', + full_name='HiveSignedTx', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='HiveSignedTx.signature', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='serialized_tx', full_name='HiveSignedTx.serialized_tx', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=541, + serialized_end=597, +) + + +_HIVESIGNACCOUNTCREATE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignAccountCreate', + full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='address_n', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.address_n', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='chain_id', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.chain_id', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ref_block_num', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.ref_block_num', index=2, + number=3, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ref_block_prefix', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.ref_block_prefix', index=3, + number=4, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='expiration', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.expiration', index=4, + number=5, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='creator', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.creator', index=5, + number=6, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='new_account_name', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.new_account_name', index=6, + number=7, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='owner_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.owner_key', index=7, + number=8, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='active_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.active_key', index=8, + number=9, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='posting_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.posting_key', index=9, + number=10, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='memo_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.memo_key', index=10, + number=11, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='fee_amount', full_name='HiveSignAccountCreate.fee_amount', index=11, + number=12, type=4, cpp_type=4, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=600, + serialized_end=870, +) + + +_HIVESIGNEDACCOUNTCREATE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignedAccountCreate', + full_name='HiveSignedAccountCreate', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='HiveSignedAccountCreate.signature', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='serialized_tx', full_name='HiveSignedAccountCreate.serialized_tx', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=872, + serialized_end=939, +) + + +_HIVESIGNACCOUNTUPDATE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignAccountUpdate', + full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='address_n', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.address_n', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='chain_id', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.chain_id', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ref_block_num', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.ref_block_num', index=2, + number=3, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ref_block_prefix', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.ref_block_prefix', index=3, + number=4, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='expiration', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.expiration', index=4, + number=5, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='account', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.account', index=5, + number=6, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='new_owner_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.new_owner_key', index=6, + number=7, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='new_active_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.new_active_key', index=7, + number=8, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='new_posting_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.new_posting_key', index=8, + number=9, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='new_memo_key', full_name='HiveSignAccountUpdate.new_memo_key', index=9, + number=10, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=942, + serialized_end=1182, +) + + +_HIVESIGNEDACCOUNTUPDATE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignedAccountUpdate', + full_name='HiveSignedAccountUpdate', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='HiveSignedAccountUpdate.signature', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='serialized_tx', full_name='HiveSignedAccountUpdate.serialized_tx', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1184, + serialized_end=1251, +) + + +_HIVESIGNMESSAGE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignMessage', + full_name='HiveSignMessage', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='address_n', full_name='HiveSignMessage.address_n', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='message', full_name='HiveSignMessage.message', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1253, + serialized_end=1306, +) + + +_HIVESIGNEDMESSAGE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignedMessage', + full_name='HiveSignedMessage', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='HiveSignedMessage.signature', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='public_key', full_name='HiveSignedMessage.public_key', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1308, + serialized_end=1366, +) + + +_HIVESIGNOPERATIONS = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignOperations', + full_name='HiveSignOperations', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='address_n', full_name='HiveSignOperations.address_n', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='chain_id', full_name='HiveSignOperations.chain_id', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='serialized_tx', full_name='HiveSignOperations.serialized_tx', index=2, + number=3, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1368, + serialized_end=1448, +) + + +_HIVESIGNEDOPERATIONS = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='HiveSignedOperations', + full_name='HiveSignedOperations', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='HiveSignedOperations.signature', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1450, + serialized_end=1491, +) + +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveGetPublicKey'] = _HIVEGETPUBLICKEY +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HivePublicKey'] = _HIVEPUBLICKEY +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveGetPublicKeys'] = _HIVEGETPUBLICKEYS +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HivePublicKeys'] = _HIVEPUBLICKEYS +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignTx'] = _HIVESIGNTX +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignedTx'] = _HIVESIGNEDTX +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignAccountCreate'] = _HIVESIGNACCOUNTCREATE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignedAccountCreate'] = _HIVESIGNEDACCOUNTCREATE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignAccountUpdate'] = _HIVESIGNACCOUNTUPDATE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignedAccountUpdate'] = _HIVESIGNEDACCOUNTUPDATE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignMessage'] = _HIVESIGNMESSAGE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignedMessage'] = _HIVESIGNEDMESSAGE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignOperations'] = _HIVESIGNOPERATIONS +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['HiveSignedOperations'] = _HIVESIGNEDOPERATIONS +_sym_db.RegisterFileDescriptor(DESCRIPTOR) + +HiveGetPublicKey = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveGetPublicKey', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVEGETPUBLICKEY, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveGetPublicKey) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveGetPublicKey) + +HivePublicKey = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HivePublicKey', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVEPUBLICKEY, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HivePublicKey) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HivePublicKey) + +HiveGetPublicKeys = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveGetPublicKeys', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVEGETPUBLICKEYS, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveGetPublicKeys) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveGetPublicKeys) + +HivePublicKeys = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HivePublicKeys', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVEPUBLICKEYS, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HivePublicKeys) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HivePublicKeys) + +HiveSignTx = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignTx', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNTX, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignTx) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignTx) + +HiveSignedTx = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignedTx', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNEDTX, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignedTx) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignedTx) + +HiveSignAccountCreate = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignAccountCreate', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNACCOUNTCREATE, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignAccountCreate) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignAccountCreate) + +HiveSignedAccountCreate = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignedAccountCreate', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNEDACCOUNTCREATE, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignedAccountCreate) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignedAccountCreate) + +HiveSignAccountUpdate = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignAccountUpdate', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNACCOUNTUPDATE, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignAccountUpdate) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignAccountUpdate) + +HiveSignedAccountUpdate = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignedAccountUpdate', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNEDACCOUNTUPDATE, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignedAccountUpdate) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignedAccountUpdate) + +HiveSignMessage = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignMessage', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNMESSAGE, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignMessage) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignMessage) + +HiveSignedMessage = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignedMessage', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNEDMESSAGE, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignedMessage) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignedMessage) + +HiveSignOperations = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignOperations', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNOPERATIONS, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignOperations) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignOperations) + +HiveSignedOperations = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('HiveSignedOperations', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _HIVESIGNEDOPERATIONS, + __module__ = 'messages_hive_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:HiveSignedOperations) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(HiveSignedOperations) + + +DESCRIPTOR.has_options = True +DESCRIPTOR._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.FileOptions(), _b('\n#com.shapeshift.keepkey.lib.protobufB\022KeepKeyMessageHive')) +# @@protoc_insertion_point(module_scope) diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_pb2.py index a79606fc..ea54fd44 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/messages_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_pb2.py @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ name='messages.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x0emessages.proto\x1a\x0btypes.proto\"\x0c\n\nInitialize\"\r\n\x0bGetFeatures\"\xaa\x04\n\x08\x46\x65\x61tures\x12\x0e\n\x06vendor\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x15\n\rmajor_version\x18\x02 \x01(\r\x12\x15\n\rminor_version\x18\x03 \x01(\r\x12\x15\n\rpatch_version\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x17\n\x0f\x62ootloader_mode\x18\x05 \x01(\x08\x12\x11\n\tdevice_id\x18\x06 \x01(\t\x12\x16\n\x0epin_protection\x18\x07 \x01(\x08\x12\x1d\n\x15passphrase_protection\x18\x08 \x01(\x08\x12\x10\n\x08language\x18\t \x01(\t\x12\r\n\x05label\x18\n \x01(\t\x12\x18\n\x05\x63oins\x18\x0b \x03(\x0b\x32\t.CoinType\x12\x13\n\x0binitialized\x18\x0c 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\n\x16MessageType_EntropyAck\x10$\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x17MessageType_SignMessage\x10&\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x19MessageType_VerifyMessage\x10\'\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1cMessageType_MessageSignature\x10(\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1dMessageType_PassphraseRequest\x10)\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x19MessageType_PassphraseAck\x10*\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_RecoveryDevice\x10-\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x17MessageType_WordRequest\x10.\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x1d\n\x13MessageType_WordAck\x10/\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1cMessageType_CipheredKeyValue\x10\x30\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_EncryptMessage\x10\x31\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1cMessageType_EncryptedMessage\x10\x32\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_DecryptMessage\x10\x33\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1cMessageType_DecryptedMessage\x10\x34\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x18MessageType_SignIdentity\x10\x35\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_SignedIdentity\x10\x36\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x17MessageType_GetFeatures\x10\x37\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1eMessageType_EthereumGetAddress\x10\x38\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1bMessageType_EthereumAddress\x10\x39\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_EthereumSignTx\x10:\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1dMessageType_EthereumTxRequest\x10;\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x19MessageType_EthereumTxAck\x10<\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1cMessageType_CharacterRequest\x10P\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x18MessageType_CharacterAck\x10Q\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x1e\n\x14MessageType_RawTxAck\x10R\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x19MessageType_ApplyPolicies\x10S\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x1f\n\x15MessageType_FlashHash\x10T\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12 \n\x16MessageType_FlashWrite\x10U\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1dMessageType_FlashHashResponse\x10V\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1eMessageType_DebugLinkFlashDump\x10W\x1a\x04\xa0\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x30\n&MessageType_DebugLinkFlashDumpResponse\x10X\x1a\x04\xa8\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x1f\n\x15MessageType_SoftReset\x10Y\x1a\x04\xa0\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1dMessageType_DebugLinkDecision\x10\x64\x1a\x04\xa0\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1dMessageType_DebugLinkGetState\x10\x65\x1a\x04\xa0\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_DebugLinkState\x10\x66\x1a\x04\xa8\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x19MessageType_DebugLinkStop\x10g\x1a\x04\xa0\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x18MessageType_DebugLinkLog\x10h\x1a\x04\xa8\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1fMessageType_DebugLinkFillConfig\x10i\x1a\x04\xa8\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x18MessageType_GetCoinTable\x10j\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x1f\n\x15MessageType_CoinTable\x10k\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1fMessageType_EthereumSignMessage\x10l\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n!MessageType_EthereumVerifyMessage\x10m\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12.\n$MessageType_EthereumMessageSignature\x10n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x1aMessageType_ChangeWipeCode\x10o\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n!MessageType_EthereumSignTypedHash\x10p\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x30\n&MessageType_EthereumTypedDataSignature\x10q\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n\"MessageType_Ethereum712TypesValues\x10r\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1eMessageType_EthereumTxMetadata\x10s\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1fMessageType_EthereumMetadataAck\x10t\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1fMessageType_LoadClearsignSigner\x10u\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_EthereumSignTypedData\x10\xa8\r\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x35\n*MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructRequest\x10\xa9\r\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x31\n&MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructAck\x10\xaa\r\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x34\n)MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueRequest\x10\xab\r\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x30\n%MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueAck\x10\xac\r\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1cMessageType_GetBip85Mnemonic\x10x\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x19MessageType_Bip85Mnemonic\x10y\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_RippleGetAddress\x10\x90\x03\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_RippleAddress\x10\x91\x03\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_RippleSignTx\x10\x92\x03\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_RippleSignedTx\x10\x93\x03\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_ThorchainGetAddress\x10\xf4\x03\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_ThorchainAddress\x10\xf5\x03\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_ThorchainSignTx\x10\xf6\x03\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_ThorchainMsgRequest\x10\xf7\x03\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_ThorchainMsgAck\x10\xf8\x03\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_ThorchainSignedTx\x10\xf9\x03\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_EosGetPublicKey\x10\xd8\x04\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_EosPublicKey\x10\xd9\x04\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12 \n\x15MessageType_EosSignTx\x10\xda\x04\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_EosTxActionRequest\x10\xdb\x04\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_EosTxActionAck\x10\xdc\x04\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x17MessageType_EosSignedTx\x10\xdd\x04\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_NanoGetAddress\x10\xbc\x05\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x17MessageType_NanoAddress\x10\xbd\x05\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x16MessageType_NanoSignTx\x10\xbe\x05\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_NanoSignedTx\x10\xbf\x05\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_SolanaGetAddress\x10\xee\x05\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_SolanaAddress\x10\xef\x05\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_SolanaSignTx\x10\xf0\x05\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_SolanaSignedTx\x10\xf1\x05\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_SolanaSignMessage\x10\xf2\x05\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12-\n\"MessageType_SolanaMessageSignature\x10\xf3\x05\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x30\n%MessageType_SolanaSignOffchainMessage\x10\xf4\x05\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x35\n*MessageType_SolanaOffchainMessageSignature\x10\xf5\x05\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_BinanceGetAddress\x10\xa0\x06\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_BinanceAddress\x10\xa1\x06\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_BinanceGetPublicKey\x10\xa2\x06\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_BinancePublicKey\x10\xa3\x06\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_BinanceSignTx\x10\xa4\x06\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_BinanceTxRequest\x10\xa5\x06\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_BinanceTransferMsg\x10\xa6\x06\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_BinanceOrderMsg\x10\xa7\x06\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_BinanceCancelMsg\x10\xa8\x06\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_BinanceSignedTx\x10\xa9\x06\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_CosmosGetAddress\x10\x84\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_CosmosAddress\x10\x85\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_CosmosSignTx\x10\x86\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_CosmosMsgRequest\x10\x87\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_CosmosMsgAck\x10\x88\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_CosmosSignedTx\x10\x89\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_CosmosMsgDelegate\x10\x8a\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_CosmosMsgUndelegate\x10\x8b\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_CosmosMsgRedelegate\x10\x8c\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_CosmosMsgRewards\x10\x8d\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_CosmosMsgIBCTransfer\x10\x8e\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_TendermintGetAddress\x10\xe8\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_TendermintAddress\x10\xe9\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_TendermintSignTx\x10\xea\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_TendermintMsgRequest\x10\xeb\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_TendermintMsgAck\x10\xec\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_TendermintMsgSend\x10\xed\x07\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_TendermintSignedTx\x10\xee\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_TendermintMsgDelegate\x10\xef\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12.\n#MessageType_TendermintMsgUndelegate\x10\xf0\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12.\n#MessageType_TendermintMsgRedelegate\x10\xf1\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_TendermintMsgRewards\x10\xf2\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12/\n$MessageType_TendermintMsgIBCTransfer\x10\xf3\x07\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_OsmosisGetAddress\x10\xcc\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_OsmosisAddress\x10\xcd\x08\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_OsmosisSignTx\x10\xce\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_OsmosisMsgRequest\x10\xcf\x08\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_OsmosisMsgAck\x10\xd0\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_OsmosisMsgSend\x10\xd1\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_OsmosisMsgDelegate\x10\xd2\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_OsmosisMsgUndelegate\x10\xd3\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_OsmosisMsgRedelegate\x10\xd4\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_OsmosisMsgRewards\x10\xd5\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_OsmosisMsgLPAdd\x10\xd6\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_OsmosisMsgLPRemove\x10\xd7\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_OsmosisMsgLPStake\x10\xd8\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_OsmosisMsgLPUnstake\x10\xd9\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_OsmosisMsgIBCTransfer\x10\xda\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_OsmosisMsgSwap\x10\xdb\x08\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_OsmosisSignedTx\x10\xdc\x08\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_MayachainGetAddress\x10\xb0\t\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_MayachainAddress\x10\xb1\t\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_MayachainSignTx\x10\xb2\t\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_MayachainMsgRequest\x10\xb3\t\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_MayachainMsgAck\x10\xb4\t\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_MayachainSignedTx\x10\xb5\t\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_ZcashSignPCZT\x10\x94\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_ZcashPCZTAction\x10\x95\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_ZcashPCZTActionAck\x10\x96\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_ZcashSignedPCZT\x10\x97\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_ZcashGetOrchardFVK\x10\x98\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_ZcashOrchardFVK\x10\x99\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_ZcashTransparentInput\x10\x9a\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12-\n\"MessageType_ZcashTransparentSigned\x10\x9b\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_ZcashDisplayAddress\x10\x9c\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_ZcashAddress\x10\x9d\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12-\n\"MessageType_ZcashTransparentOutput\x10\x9e\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_ZcashTransparentAck\x10\x9f\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_TronGetAddress\x10\xf8\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x17MessageType_TronAddress\x10\xf9\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x16MessageType_TronSignTx\x10\xfa\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_TronSignedTx\x10\xfb\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_TronSignMessage\x10\xfc\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_TronMessageSignature\x10\xfd\n\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_TronVerifyMessage\x10\xfe\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_TronSignTypedHash\x10\xff\n\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12-\n\"MessageType_TronTypedDataSignature\x10\x80\x0b\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_TonGetAddress\x10\xdc\x0b\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x16MessageType_TonAddress\x10\xdd\x0b\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12 \n\x15MessageType_TonSignTx\x10\xde\x0b\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x17MessageType_TonSignedTx\x10\xdf\x0b\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_TonSignMessage\x10\xe0\x0b\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12*\n\x1fMessageType_TonMessageSignature\x10\xe1\x0b\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\'\n\x1cMessageType_HiveGetPublicKey\x10\xc0\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12$\n\x19MessageType_HivePublicKey\x10\xc1\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x16MessageType_HiveSignTx\x10\xc2\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_HiveSignedTx\x10\xc3\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_HiveGetPublicKeys\x10\xc4\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_HivePublicKeys\x10\xc5\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_HiveSignAccountCreate\x10\xc6\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12.\n#MessageType_HiveSignedAccountCreate\x10\xc7\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_HiveSignAccountUpdate\x10\xc8\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12.\n#MessageType_HiveSignedAccountUpdate\x10\xc9\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12%\n\x1aMessageType_NearGetAddress\x10\xca\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\"\n\x17MessageType_NearAddress\x10\xcb\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12!\n\x16MessageType_NearSignTx\x10\xcc\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12#\n\x18MessageType_NearSignedTx\x10\xcd\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12&\n\x1bMessageType_HiveSignMessage\x10\xce\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12(\n\x1dMessageType_HiveSignedMessage\x10\xcf\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12)\n\x1eMessageType_HiveSignOperations\x10\xd0\x0c\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12+\n MessageType_HiveSignedOperations\x10\xd1\x0c\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x34\n)MessageType_ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey\x10\xa4\r\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x31\n&MessageType_ClearsignAttestorPublicKey\x10\xa5\r\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x12,\n!MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSign\x10\xa6\r\x1a\x04\x90\xb5\x18\x01\x12\x31\n&MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSignature\x10\xa7\r\x1a\x04\x98\xb5\x18\x01\x42,\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x0eKeepKeyMessage') , dependencies=[types__pb2.DESCRIPTOR,]) @@ -344,446 +344,574 @@ options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_GetBip85Mnemonic', index=78, number=120, + name='MessageType_LoadClearsignSigner', index=78, number=117, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_Bip85Mnemonic', index=79, number=121, + name='MessageType_EthereumSignTypedData', index=79, number=1704, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructRequest', index=80, number=1705, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructAck', index=81, number=1706, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueRequest', index=82, number=1707, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueAck', index=83, number=1708, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_GetBip85Mnemonic', index=84, number=120, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_Bip85Mnemonic', index=85, number=121, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_RippleGetAddress', index=80, number=400, + name='MessageType_RippleGetAddress', index=86, number=400, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_RippleAddress', index=81, number=401, + name='MessageType_RippleAddress', index=87, number=401, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_RippleSignTx', index=82, number=402, + name='MessageType_RippleSignTx', index=88, number=402, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_RippleSignedTx', index=83, number=403, + name='MessageType_RippleSignedTx', index=89, number=403, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ThorchainGetAddress', index=84, number=500, + name='MessageType_ThorchainGetAddress', index=90, number=500, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ThorchainAddress', index=85, number=501, + name='MessageType_ThorchainAddress', index=91, number=501, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ThorchainSignTx', index=86, number=502, + name='MessageType_ThorchainSignTx', index=92, number=502, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ThorchainMsgRequest', index=87, number=503, + name='MessageType_ThorchainMsgRequest', index=93, number=503, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ThorchainMsgAck', index=88, number=504, + name='MessageType_ThorchainMsgAck', index=94, number=504, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ThorchainSignedTx', index=89, number=505, + name='MessageType_ThorchainSignedTx', index=95, number=505, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_EosGetPublicKey', index=90, number=600, + name='MessageType_EosGetPublicKey', index=96, number=600, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_EosPublicKey', index=91, number=601, + name='MessageType_EosPublicKey', index=97, number=601, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_EosSignTx', index=92, number=602, + name='MessageType_EosSignTx', index=98, number=602, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_EosTxActionRequest', index=93, number=603, + name='MessageType_EosTxActionRequest', index=99, number=603, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_EosTxActionAck', index=94, number=604, + name='MessageType_EosTxActionAck', index=100, number=604, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_EosSignedTx', index=95, number=605, + name='MessageType_EosSignedTx', index=101, number=605, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_NanoGetAddress', index=96, number=700, + name='MessageType_NanoGetAddress', index=102, number=700, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_NanoAddress', index=97, number=701, + name='MessageType_NanoAddress', index=103, number=701, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_NanoSignTx', index=98, number=702, + name='MessageType_NanoSignTx', index=104, number=702, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_NanoSignedTx', index=99, number=703, + name='MessageType_NanoSignedTx', index=105, number=703, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaGetAddress', index=100, number=750, + name='MessageType_SolanaGetAddress', index=106, number=750, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaAddress', index=101, number=751, + name='MessageType_SolanaAddress', index=107, number=751, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaSignTx', index=102, number=752, + name='MessageType_SolanaSignTx', index=108, number=752, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaSignedTx', index=103, number=753, + name='MessageType_SolanaSignedTx', index=109, number=753, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaSignMessage', index=104, number=754, + name='MessageType_SolanaSignMessage', index=110, number=754, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaMessageSignature', index=105, number=755, + name='MessageType_SolanaMessageSignature', index=111, number=755, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceGetAddress', index=106, number=800, + name='MessageType_SolanaSignOffchainMessage', index=112, number=756, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceAddress', index=107, number=801, + name='MessageType_SolanaOffchainMessageSignature', index=113, number=757, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceGetPublicKey', index=108, number=802, + name='MessageType_BinanceGetAddress', index=114, number=800, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinancePublicKey', index=109, number=803, + name='MessageType_BinanceAddress', index=115, number=801, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceSignTx', index=110, number=804, + name='MessageType_BinanceGetPublicKey', index=116, number=802, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceTxRequest', index=111, number=805, + name='MessageType_BinancePublicKey', index=117, number=803, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceTransferMsg', index=112, number=806, + name='MessageType_BinanceSignTx', index=118, number=804, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceOrderMsg', index=113, number=807, + name='MessageType_BinanceTxRequest', index=119, number=805, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_BinanceTransferMsg', index=120, number=806, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceCancelMsg', index=114, number=808, + name='MessageType_BinanceOrderMsg', index=121, number=807, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_BinanceSignedTx', index=115, number=809, + name='MessageType_BinanceCancelMsg', index=122, number=808, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_BinanceSignedTx', index=123, number=809, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosGetAddress', index=116, number=900, + name='MessageType_CosmosGetAddress', index=124, number=900, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosAddress', index=117, number=901, + name='MessageType_CosmosAddress', index=125, number=901, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosSignTx', index=118, number=902, + name='MessageType_CosmosSignTx', index=126, number=902, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgRequest', index=119, number=903, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgRequest', index=127, number=903, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgAck', index=120, number=904, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgAck', index=128, number=904, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosSignedTx', index=121, number=905, + name='MessageType_CosmosSignedTx', index=129, number=905, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgDelegate', index=122, number=906, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgDelegate', index=130, number=906, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgUndelegate', index=123, number=907, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgUndelegate', index=131, number=907, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgRedelegate', index=124, number=908, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgRedelegate', index=132, number=908, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgRewards', index=125, number=909, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgRewards', index=133, number=909, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_CosmosMsgIBCTransfer', index=126, number=910, + name='MessageType_CosmosMsgIBCTransfer', index=134, number=910, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintGetAddress', index=127, number=1000, + name='MessageType_TendermintGetAddress', index=135, number=1000, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintAddress', index=128, number=1001, + name='MessageType_TendermintAddress', index=136, number=1001, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintSignTx', index=129, number=1002, + name='MessageType_TendermintSignTx', index=137, number=1002, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgRequest', index=130, number=1003, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgRequest', index=138, number=1003, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgAck', index=131, number=1004, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgAck', index=139, number=1004, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgSend', index=132, number=1005, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgSend', index=140, number=1005, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintSignedTx', index=133, number=1006, + name='MessageType_TendermintSignedTx', index=141, number=1006, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgDelegate', index=134, number=1007, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgDelegate', index=142, number=1007, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgUndelegate', index=135, number=1008, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgUndelegate', index=143, number=1008, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgRedelegate', index=136, number=1009, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgRedelegate', index=144, number=1009, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgRewards', index=137, number=1010, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgRewards', index=145, number=1010, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TendermintMsgIBCTransfer', index=138, number=1011, + name='MessageType_TendermintMsgIBCTransfer', index=146, number=1011, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisGetAddress', index=139, number=1100, + name='MessageType_OsmosisGetAddress', index=147, number=1100, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisAddress', index=140, number=1101, + name='MessageType_OsmosisAddress', index=148, number=1101, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisSignTx', index=141, number=1102, + name='MessageType_OsmosisSignTx', index=149, number=1102, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgRequest', index=142, number=1103, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgRequest', index=150, number=1103, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgAck', index=143, number=1104, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgAck', index=151, number=1104, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgSend', index=144, number=1105, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgSend', index=152, number=1105, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgDelegate', index=145, number=1106, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgDelegate', index=153, number=1106, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgUndelegate', index=146, number=1107, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgUndelegate', index=154, number=1107, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgRedelegate', index=147, number=1108, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgRedelegate', index=155, number=1108, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgRewards', index=148, number=1109, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgRewards', index=156, number=1109, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPAdd', index=149, number=1110, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPAdd', index=157, number=1110, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPRemove', index=150, number=1111, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPRemove', index=158, number=1111, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPStake', index=151, number=1112, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPStake', index=159, number=1112, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPUnstake', index=152, number=1113, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgLPUnstake', index=160, number=1113, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgIBCTransfer', index=153, number=1114, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgIBCTransfer', index=161, number=1114, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgSwap', index=154, number=1115, + name='MessageType_OsmosisMsgSwap', index=162, number=1115, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_OsmosisSignedTx', index=155, number=1116, + name='MessageType_OsmosisSignedTx', index=163, number=1116, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_MayachainGetAddress', index=156, number=1200, + name='MessageType_MayachainGetAddress', index=164, number=1200, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_MayachainAddress', index=157, number=1201, + name='MessageType_MayachainAddress', index=165, number=1201, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_MayachainSignTx', index=158, number=1202, + name='MessageType_MayachainSignTx', index=166, number=1202, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_MayachainMsgRequest', index=159, number=1203, + name='MessageType_MayachainMsgRequest', index=167, number=1203, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_MayachainMsgAck', index=160, number=1204, + name='MessageType_MayachainMsgAck', index=168, number=1204, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_MayachainSignedTx', index=161, number=1205, + name='MessageType_MayachainSignedTx', index=169, number=1205, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashSignPCZT', index=162, number=1300, + name='MessageType_ZcashSignPCZT', index=170, number=1300, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashPCZTAction', index=163, number=1301, + name='MessageType_ZcashPCZTAction', index=171, number=1301, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashPCZTActionAck', index=164, number=1302, + name='MessageType_ZcashPCZTActionAck', index=172, number=1302, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashSignedPCZT', index=165, number=1303, + name='MessageType_ZcashSignedPCZT', index=173, number=1303, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashGetOrchardFVK', index=166, number=1304, + name='MessageType_ZcashGetOrchardFVK', index=174, number=1304, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashOrchardFVK', index=167, number=1305, + name='MessageType_ZcashOrchardFVK', index=175, number=1305, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashTransparentInput', index=168, number=1306, + name='MessageType_ZcashTransparentInput', index=176, number=1306, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_ZcashTransparentSig', index=169, number=1307, + name='MessageType_ZcashTransparentSigned', index=177, number=1307, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronGetAddress', index=170, number=1400, + name='MessageType_ZcashDisplayAddress', index=178, number=1308, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronAddress', index=171, number=1401, + name='MessageType_ZcashAddress', index=179, number=1309, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronSignTx', index=172, number=1402, + name='MessageType_ZcashTransparentOutput', index=180, number=1310, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronSignedTx', index=173, number=1403, + name='MessageType_ZcashTransparentAck', index=181, number=1311, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TonGetAddress', index=174, number=1500, + name='MessageType_TronGetAddress', index=182, number=1400, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TonAddress', index=175, number=1501, + name='MessageType_TronAddress', index=183, number=1401, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TonSignTx', index=176, number=1502, + name='MessageType_TronSignTx', index=184, number=1402, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TonSignedTx', index=177, number=1503, + name='MessageType_TronSignedTx', index=185, number=1403, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaSignOffchainMessage', index=178, number=756, + name='MessageType_TronSignMessage', index=186, number=1404, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_SolanaOffchainMessageSignature', index=179, number=757, + name='MessageType_TronMessageSignature', index=187, number=1405, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronSignMessage', index=180, number=1404, + name='MessageType_TronVerifyMessage', index=188, number=1406, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_TronSignTypedHash', index=189, number=1407, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronMessageSignature', index=181, number=1405, + name='MessageType_TronTypedDataSignature', index=190, number=1408, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronVerifyMessage', index=182, number=1406, + name='MessageType_TonGetAddress', index=191, number=1500, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronSignTypedHash', index=183, number=1407, + name='MessageType_TonAddress', index=192, number=1501, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_TonSignTx', index=193, number=1502, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TronTypedDataSignature', index=184, number=1408, + name='MessageType_TonSignedTx', index=194, number=1503, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TonSignMessage', index=185, number=1504, + name='MessageType_TonSignMessage', index=195, number=1504, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), type=None), _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( - name='MessageType_TonMessageSignature', index=186, number=1505, + name='MessageType_TonMessageSignature', index=196, number=1505, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveGetPublicKey', index=197, number=1600, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HivePublicKey', index=198, number=1601, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignTx', index=199, number=1602, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignedTx', index=200, number=1603, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveGetPublicKeys', index=201, number=1604, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HivePublicKeys', index=202, number=1605, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignAccountCreate', index=203, number=1606, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignedAccountCreate', index=204, number=1607, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignAccountUpdate', index=205, number=1608, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignedAccountUpdate', index=206, number=1609, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_NearGetAddress', index=207, number=1610, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_NearAddress', index=208, number=1611, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_NearSignTx', index=209, number=1612, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_NearSignedTx', index=210, number=1613, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignMessage', index=211, number=1614, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignedMessage', index=212, number=1615, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignOperations', index=213, number=1616, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_HiveSignedOperations', index=214, number=1617, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey', index=215, number=1700, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_ClearsignAttestorPublicKey', index=216, number=1701, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSign', index=217, number=1702, + options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')), + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSignature', index=218, number=1703, options=_descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')), type=None), ], containing_type=None, options=None, - serialized_start=5191, - serialized_end=12178, + serialized_start=5469, + serialized_end=14273, ) _sym_db.RegisterEnumDescriptor(_MESSAGETYPE) @@ -866,6 +994,12 @@ MessageType_Ethereum712TypesValues = 114 MessageType_EthereumTxMetadata = 115 MessageType_EthereumMetadataAck = 116 +MessageType_LoadClearsignSigner = 117 +MessageType_EthereumSignTypedData = 1704 +MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructRequest = 1705 +MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructAck = 1706 +MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueRequest = 1707 +MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueAck = 1708 MessageType_GetBip85Mnemonic = 120 MessageType_Bip85Mnemonic = 121 MessageType_RippleGetAddress = 400 @@ -959,7 +1093,11 @@ MessageType_ZcashGetOrchardFVK = 1304 MessageType_ZcashOrchardFVK = 1305 MessageType_ZcashTransparentInput = 1306 -MessageType_ZcashTransparentSig = 1307 +MessageType_ZcashTransparentSigned = 1307 +MessageType_ZcashDisplayAddress = 1308 +MessageType_ZcashAddress = 1309 +MessageType_ZcashTransparentOutput = 1310 +MessageType_ZcashTransparentAck = 1311 MessageType_TronGetAddress = 1400 MessageType_TronAddress = 1401 MessageType_TronSignTx = 1402 @@ -975,6 +1113,28 @@ MessageType_TonSignedTx = 1503 MessageType_TonSignMessage = 1504 MessageType_TonMessageSignature = 1505 +MessageType_HiveGetPublicKey = 1600 +MessageType_HivePublicKey = 1601 +MessageType_HiveSignTx = 1602 +MessageType_HiveSignedTx = 1603 +MessageType_HiveGetPublicKeys = 1604 +MessageType_HivePublicKeys = 1605 +MessageType_HiveSignAccountCreate = 1606 +MessageType_HiveSignedAccountCreate = 1607 +MessageType_HiveSignAccountUpdate = 1608 +MessageType_HiveSignedAccountUpdate = 1609 +MessageType_NearGetAddress = 1610 +MessageType_NearAddress = 1611 +MessageType_NearSignTx = 1612 +MessageType_NearSignedTx = 1613 +MessageType_HiveSignMessage = 1614 +MessageType_HiveSignedMessage = 1615 +MessageType_HiveSignOperations = 1616 +MessageType_HiveSignedOperations = 1617 +MessageType_ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey = 1700 +MessageType_ClearsignAttestorPublicKey = 1701 +MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSign = 1702 +MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSignature = 1703 @@ -1201,6 +1361,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='supports_taproot', full_name='Features.supports_taproot', index=24, + number=27, type=8, cpp_type=7, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=False, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -1214,7 +1381,7 @@ oneofs=[ ], serialized_start=61, - serialized_end=615, + serialized_end=641, ) @@ -1251,8 +1418,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=617, - serialized_end=659, + serialized_start=643, + serialized_end=685, ) @@ -1296,8 +1463,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=661, - serialized_end=737, + serialized_start=687, + serialized_end=763, ) @@ -1320,8 +1487,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=739, - serialized_end=753, + serialized_start=765, + serialized_end=779, ) @@ -1379,8 +1546,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=755, - serialized_end=876, + serialized_start=781, + serialized_end=902, ) @@ -1410,8 +1577,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=878, - serialized_end=905, + serialized_start=904, + serialized_end=931, ) @@ -1469,8 +1636,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=908, - serialized_end=1043, + serialized_start=934, + serialized_end=1069, ) @@ -1500,8 +1667,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1045, - serialized_end=1071, + serialized_start=1071, + serialized_end=1097, ) @@ -1538,8 +1705,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1073, - serialized_end=1127, + serialized_start=1099, + serialized_end=1153, ) @@ -1576,8 +1743,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1129, - serialized_end=1192, + serialized_start=1155, + serialized_end=1218, ) @@ -1600,8 +1767,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1194, - serialized_end=1205, + serialized_start=1220, + serialized_end=1231, ) @@ -1631,8 +1798,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1207, - serialized_end=1262, + serialized_start=1233, + serialized_end=1288, ) @@ -1662,8 +1829,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1264, - serialized_end=1291, + serialized_start=1290, + serialized_end=1317, ) @@ -1686,8 +1853,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1293, - serialized_end=1301, + serialized_start=1319, + serialized_end=1327, ) @@ -1710,8 +1877,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1303, - serialized_end=1322, + serialized_start=1329, + serialized_end=1348, ) @@ -1741,8 +1908,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1324, - serialized_end=1359, + serialized_start=1350, + serialized_end=1385, ) @@ -1772,8 +1939,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1361, - serialized_end=1387, + serialized_start=1387, + serialized_end=1413, ) @@ -1803,8 +1970,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1389, - serialized_end=1415, + serialized_start=1415, + serialized_end=1441, ) @@ -1862,8 +2029,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1418, - serialized_end=1580, + serialized_start=1444, + serialized_end=1606, ) @@ -1900,8 +2067,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1582, - serialized_end=1634, + serialized_start=1608, + serialized_end=1660, ) @@ -1959,8 +2126,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1637, - serialized_end=1816, + serialized_start=1663, + serialized_end=1842, ) @@ -1990,8 +2157,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1818, - serialized_end=1844, + serialized_start=1844, + serialized_end=1870, ) @@ -2014,8 +2181,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1846, - serialized_end=1858, + serialized_start=1872, + serialized_end=1884, ) @@ -2094,8 +2261,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1861, - serialized_end=2048, + serialized_start=1887, + serialized_end=2074, ) @@ -2169,6 +2336,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='dice_entropy', full_name='ResetDevice.dice_entropy', index=9, + number=10, type=8, cpp_type=7, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=False, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -2181,8 +2355,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2051, - serialized_end=2276, + serialized_start=2077, + serialized_end=2324, ) @@ -2205,8 +2379,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2278, - serialized_end=2294, + serialized_start=2326, + serialized_end=2342, ) @@ -2236,8 +2410,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2296, - serialized_end=2325, + serialized_start=2344, + serialized_end=2373, ) @@ -2330,8 +2504,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2328, - serialized_end=2583, + serialized_start=2376, + serialized_end=2631, ) @@ -2354,8 +2528,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2585, - serialized_end=2598, + serialized_start=2633, + serialized_end=2646, ) @@ -2385,8 +2559,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2600, - serialized_end=2623, + serialized_start=2648, + serialized_end=2671, ) @@ -2423,8 +2597,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2625, - serialized_end=2684, + serialized_start=2673, + serialized_end=2732, ) @@ -2468,8 +2642,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2686, - serialized_end=2749, + serialized_start=2734, + serialized_end=2797, ) @@ -2520,8 +2694,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2752, - serialized_end=2882, + serialized_start=2800, + serialized_end=2930, ) @@ -2572,8 +2746,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2884, - serialized_end=2980, + serialized_start=2932, + serialized_end=3028, ) @@ -2610,8 +2784,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=2982, - serialized_end=3036, + serialized_start=3030, + serialized_end=3084, ) @@ -2669,8 +2843,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3038, - serialized_end=3156, + serialized_start=3086, + serialized_end=3204, ) @@ -2714,8 +2888,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3158, - serialized_end=3222, + serialized_start=3206, + serialized_end=3270, ) @@ -2766,8 +2940,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3224, - serialized_end=3305, + serialized_start=3272, + serialized_end=3353, ) @@ -2804,8 +2978,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3307, - serialized_end=3359, + serialized_start=3355, + serialized_end=3407, ) @@ -2877,8 +3051,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3362, - serialized_end=3502, + serialized_start=3410, + serialized_end=3550, ) @@ -2908,8 +3082,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3504, - serialized_end=3537, + serialized_start=3552, + serialized_end=3585, ) @@ -2946,8 +3120,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3539, - serialized_end=3592, + serialized_start=3587, + serialized_end=3640, ) @@ -2977,8 +3151,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3594, - serialized_end=3627, + serialized_start=3642, + serialized_end=3675, ) @@ -3064,8 +3238,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3630, - serialized_end=3836, + serialized_start=3678, + serialized_end=3884, ) @@ -3109,8 +3283,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3839, - serialized_end=3972, + serialized_start=3887, + serialized_end=4020, ) @@ -3140,8 +3314,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=3974, - serialized_end=4011, + serialized_start=4022, + serialized_end=4059, ) @@ -3171,8 +3345,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4013, - serialized_end=4056, + serialized_start=4061, + serialized_end=4104, ) @@ -3223,8 +3397,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4058, - serialized_end=4183, + serialized_start=4106, + serialized_end=4231, ) @@ -3268,8 +3442,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4185, - serialized_end=4257, + serialized_start=4233, + serialized_end=4305, ) @@ -3299,8 +3473,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4259, - serialized_end=4303, + serialized_start=4307, + serialized_end=4351, ) @@ -3344,8 +3518,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4305, - serialized_end=4368, + serialized_start=4353, + serialized_end=4416, ) @@ -3389,8 +3563,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4370, - serialized_end=4428, + serialized_start=4418, + serialized_end=4476, ) @@ -3420,8 +3594,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4430, - serialized_end=4463, + serialized_start=4478, + serialized_end=4511, ) @@ -3458,8 +3632,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4465, - serialized_end=4518, + serialized_start=4513, + serialized_end=4566, ) @@ -3489,8 +3663,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4520, - serialized_end=4562, + serialized_start=4568, + serialized_end=4610, ) @@ -3513,8 +3687,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4564, - serialized_end=4575, + serialized_start=4612, + serialized_end=4623, ) @@ -3537,8 +3711,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4577, - serialized_end=4592, + serialized_start=4625, + serialized_end=4640, ) @@ -3575,8 +3749,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4594, - serialized_end=4649, + serialized_start=4642, + serialized_end=4697, ) @@ -3594,6 +3768,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='input', full_name='DebugLinkDecision.input', index=1, + number=2, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -3606,8 +3787,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4651, - serialized_end=4686, + serialized_start=4699, + serialized_end=4749, ) @@ -3630,8 +3811,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4688, - serialized_end=4707, + serialized_start=4751, + serialized_end=4770, ) @@ -3740,6 +3921,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='dice_digest', full_name='DebugLinkState.dice_digest', index=14, + number=15, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -3752,8 +3940,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=4710, - serialized_end=5053, + serialized_start=4773, + serialized_end=5137, ) @@ -3776,8 +3964,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=5055, - serialized_end=5070, + serialized_start=5139, + serialized_end=5154, ) @@ -3821,8 +4009,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=5072, - serialized_end=5131, + serialized_start=5156, + serialized_end=5215, ) @@ -3845,8 +4033,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=5133, - serialized_end=5154, + serialized_start=5217, + serialized_end=5238, ) @@ -3876,8 +4064,132 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=5156, - serialized_end=5188, + serialized_start=5240, + serialized_end=5272, +) + + +_CLEARSIGNATTESTORGETPUBLICKEY = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey', + full_name='ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=5274, + serialized_end=5305, +) + + +_CLEARSIGNATTESTORPUBLICKEY = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ClearsignAttestorPublicKey', + full_name='ClearsignAttestorPublicKey', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='public_key', full_name='ClearsignAttestorPublicKey.public_key', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=5307, + serialized_end=5355, +) + + +_CLEARSIGNATTESTORSIGN = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ClearsignAttestorSign', + full_name='ClearsignAttestorSign', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='payload', full_name='ClearsignAttestorSign.payload', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=5357, + serialized_end=5397, +) + + +_CLEARSIGNATTESTORSIGNATURE = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ClearsignAttestorSignature', + full_name='ClearsignAttestorSignature', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='ClearsignAttestorSignature.signature', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='public_key', full_name='ClearsignAttestorSignature.public_key', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=5399, + serialized_end=5466, ) _FEATURES.fields_by_name['coins'].message_type = types__pb2._COINTYPE @@ -3967,6 +4279,10 @@ DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['DebugLinkLog'] = _DEBUGLINKLOG DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['DebugLinkFillConfig'] = _DEBUGLINKFILLCONFIG DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ChangeWipeCode'] = _CHANGEWIPECODE +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey'] = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORGETPUBLICKEY +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ClearsignAttestorPublicKey'] = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORPUBLICKEY +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ClearsignAttestorSign'] = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORSIGN +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ClearsignAttestorSignature'] = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORSIGNATURE DESCRIPTOR.enum_types_by_name['MessageType'] = _MESSAGETYPE _sym_db.RegisterFileDescriptor(DESCRIPTOR) @@ -4439,6 +4755,34 @@ )) _sym_db.RegisterMessage(ChangeWipeCode) +ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORGETPUBLICKEY, + __module__ = 'messages_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey) + +ClearsignAttestorPublicKey = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ClearsignAttestorPublicKey', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORPUBLICKEY, + __module__ = 'messages_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ClearsignAttestorPublicKey) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ClearsignAttestorPublicKey) + +ClearsignAttestorSign = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ClearsignAttestorSign', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORSIGN, + __module__ = 'messages_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ClearsignAttestorSign) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ClearsignAttestorSign) + +ClearsignAttestorSignature = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ClearsignAttestorSignature', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _CLEARSIGNATTESTORSIGNATURE, + __module__ = 'messages_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ClearsignAttestorSignature) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ClearsignAttestorSignature) + DESCRIPTOR.has_options = True DESCRIPTOR._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.FileOptions(), _b('\n\032com.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\016KeepKeyMessage')) @@ -4598,6 +4942,18 @@ _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTxMetadata"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumMetadataAck"].has_options = True _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumMetadataAck"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_LoadClearsignSigner"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_LoadClearsignSigner"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumSignTypedData"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumSignTypedData"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructRequest"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructRequest"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructAck"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataStructAck"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueRequest"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueRequest"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueAck"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_EthereumTypedDataValueAck"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_GetBip85Mnemonic"].has_options = True _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_GetBip85Mnemonic"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_Bip85Mnemonic"].has_options = True @@ -4784,8 +5140,16 @@ _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashOrchardFVK"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentInput"].has_options = True _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentInput"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) -_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentSig"].has_options = True -_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentSig"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentSigned"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentSigned"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashDisplayAddress"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashDisplayAddress"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashAddress"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashAddress"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentOutput"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentOutput"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentAck"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ZcashTransparentAck"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_TronGetAddress"].has_options = True _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_TronGetAddress"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_TronAddress"].has_options = True @@ -4816,4 +5180,48 @@ _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_TonSignMessage"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_TonMessageSignature"].has_options = True _MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_TonMessageSignature"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveGetPublicKey"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveGetPublicKey"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HivePublicKey"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HivePublicKey"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignTx"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignTx"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedTx"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedTx"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveGetPublicKeys"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveGetPublicKeys"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HivePublicKeys"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HivePublicKeys"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignAccountCreate"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignAccountCreate"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedAccountCreate"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedAccountCreate"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignAccountUpdate"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignAccountUpdate"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedAccountUpdate"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedAccountUpdate"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearGetAddress"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearGetAddress"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearAddress"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearAddress"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearSignTx"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearSignTx"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearSignedTx"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_NearSignedTx"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignMessage"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignMessage"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedMessage"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedMessage"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignOperations"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignOperations"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedOperations"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_HiveSignedOperations"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorGetPublicKey"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorPublicKey"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorPublicKey"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSign"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSign"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\220\265\030\001')) +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSignature"].has_options = True +_MESSAGETYPE.values_by_name["MessageType_ClearsignAttestorSignature"]._options = _descriptor._ParseOptions(descriptor_pb2.EnumValueOptions(), _b('\230\265\030\001')) # @@protoc_insertion_point(module_scope) diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_ripple_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_ripple_pb2.py index 7ab35638..ad084fca 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/messages_ripple_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_ripple_pb2.py @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ name='messages-ripple.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x15messages-ripple.proto\";\n\x10RippleGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 \x01(\x08\" \n\rRippleAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\"\x8e\x01\n\x0cRippleSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0b\n\x03\x66\x65\x65\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x12\r\n\x05\x66lags\x18\x03 \x01(\r\x12\x10\n\x08sequence\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x1c\n\x14last_ledger_sequence\x18\x05 \x01(\r\x12\x1f\n\x07payment\x18\x06 \x01(\x0b\x32\x0e.RipplePayment\"M\n\rRipplePayment\x12\x0e\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x01 \x01(\x04\x12\x13\n\x0b\x64\x65stination\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x17\n\x0f\x64\x65stination_tag\x18\x03 \x01(\r\":\n\x0eRippleSignedTx\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rserialized_tx\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x42;\n#com.shapeshift.keepkey.lib.protobufB\x14KeepKeyMessageRipple') + serialized_pb=_b('\n\x15messages-ripple.proto\";\n\x10RippleGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 \x01(\x08\" \n\rRippleAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\"\x9c\x01\n\x0cRippleSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0b\n\x03\x66\x65\x65\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x12\r\n\x05\x66lags\x18\x03 \x01(\r\x12\x10\n\x08sequence\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x1c\n\x14last_ledger_sequence\x18\x05 \x01(\r\x12\x1f\n\x07payment\x18\x06 \x01(\x0b\x32\x0e.RipplePayment\x12\x0c\n\x04memo\x18\x07 \x01(\t\"M\n\rRipplePayment\x12\x0e\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x01 \x01(\x04\x12\x13\n\x0b\x64\x65stination\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x17\n\x0f\x64\x65stination_tag\x18\x03 \x01(\r\":\n\x0eRippleSignedTx\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rserialized_tx\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x42;\n#com.shapeshift.keepkey.lib.protobufB\x14KeepKeyMessageRipple') ) @@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='memo', full_name='RippleSignTx.memo', index=6, + number=7, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -156,7 +163,7 @@ oneofs=[ ], serialized_start=121, - serialized_end=263, + serialized_end=277, ) @@ -200,8 +207,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=265, - serialized_end=342, + serialized_start=279, + serialized_end=356, ) @@ -238,8 +245,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=344, - serialized_end=402, + serialized_start=358, + serialized_end=416, ) _RIPPLESIGNTX.fields_by_name['payment'].message_type = _RIPPLEPAYMENT diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_solana_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_solana_pb2.py index cf8d5ed6..299d8b46 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/messages_solana_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_solana_pb2.py @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ name='messages-solana.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x15messages-solana.proto\"V\n\x10SolanaGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x03 \x01(\x08\" \n\rSolanaAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\"A\n\x0fSolanaTokenInfo\x12\x0c\n\x04mint\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0e\n\x06symbol\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x10\n\x08\x64\x65\x63imals\x18\x03 \x01(\r\"r\n\x0cSolanaSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x0e\n\x06raw_tx\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12$\n\ntoken_info\x18\x04 \x03(\x0b\x32\x10.SolanaTokenInfo\"#\n\x0eSolanaSignedTx\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\"h\n\x11SolanaSignMessage\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x0f\n\x07message\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x04 \x01(\x08\"?\n\x16SolanaMessageSignature\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\"\x9c\x01\n\x19SolanaSignOffchainMessage\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x12\n\x07version\x18\x03 \x01(\r:\x01\x30\x12\x16\n\x0emessage_format\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07message\x18\x05 \x01(\x0c\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x06 \x01(\x08\"G\n\x1eSolanaOffchainMessageSignature\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x42\x32\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x14KeepKeyMessageSolana') + serialized_pb=_b('\n\x15messages-solana.proto\"V\n\x10SolanaGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x03 \x01(\x08\" \n\rSolanaAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\"k\n\x0fSolanaTokenInfo\x12\x0c\n\x04mint\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0e\n\x06symbol\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x10\n\x08\x64\x65\x63imals\x18\x03 \x01(\r\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x04 \x01(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rsigner_key_id\x18\x05 \x01(\r\"\xae\x02\n\x0cSolanaSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x0e\n\x06raw_tx\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12$\n\ntoken_info\x18\x04 \x03(\x0b\x32\x10.SolanaTokenInfo\x12\x13\n\x0blut_account\x18\x05 \x03(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rlut_signature\x18\x06 \x01(\x0c\x12\x19\n\x11lut_signer_key_id\x18\x07 \x01(\r\x12\x16\n\x0eschema_payload\x18\t \x01(\x0c\x12\x18\n\x10schema_signature\x18\n \x01(\x0c\x12\x1c\n\x14schema_signer_key_id\x18\x0b \x01(\r\x12\x1d\n\x15token_recipient_owner\x18\x0c \x03(\x0cJ\x04\x08\x08\x10\t\"#\n\x0eSolanaSignedTx\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\"h\n\x11SolanaSignMessage\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x0f\n\x07message\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x04 \x01(\x08\"?\n\x16SolanaMessageSignature\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\"\x9c\x01\n\x19SolanaSignOffchainMessage\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x19\n\tcoin_name\x18\x02 \x01(\t:\x06Solana\x12\x12\n\x07version\x18\x03 \x01(\r:\x01\x30\x12\x16\n\x0emessage_format\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07message\x18\x05 \x01(\x0c\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x06 \x01(\x08\"G\n\x1eSolanaOffchainMessageSignature\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x42\x32\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x14KeepKeyMessageSolana') ) @@ -129,6 +129,20 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signature', full_name='SolanaTokenInfo.signature', index=3, + number=4, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signer_key_id', full_name='SolanaTokenInfo.signer_key_id', index=4, + number=5, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -142,7 +156,7 @@ oneofs=[ ], serialized_start=147, - serialized_end=212, + serialized_end=254, ) @@ -181,6 +195,55 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='lut_account', full_name='SolanaSignTx.lut_account', index=4, + number=5, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='lut_signature', full_name='SolanaSignTx.lut_signature', index=5, + number=6, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='lut_signer_key_id', full_name='SolanaSignTx.lut_signer_key_id', index=6, + number=7, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='schema_payload', full_name='SolanaSignTx.schema_payload', index=7, + number=9, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='schema_signature', full_name='SolanaSignTx.schema_signature', index=8, + number=10, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='schema_signer_key_id', full_name='SolanaSignTx.schema_signer_key_id', index=9, + number=11, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='token_recipient_owner', full_name='SolanaSignTx.token_recipient_owner', index=10, + number=12, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -193,8 +256,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=214, - serialized_end=328, + serialized_start=257, + serialized_end=559, ) @@ -224,8 +287,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=330, - serialized_end=365, + serialized_start=561, + serialized_end=596, ) @@ -276,8 +339,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=367, - serialized_end=471, + serialized_start=598, + serialized_end=702, ) @@ -314,8 +377,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=473, - serialized_end=536, + serialized_start=704, + serialized_end=767, ) @@ -380,8 +443,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=539, - serialized_end=695, + serialized_start=770, + serialized_end=926, ) @@ -418,8 +481,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=697, - serialized_end=768, + serialized_start=928, + serialized_end=999, ) _SOLANASIGNTX.fields_by_name['token_info'].message_type = _SOLANATOKENINFO diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_thorchain_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_thorchain_pb2.py index 8d297659..e0851d36 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/messages_thorchain_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_thorchain_pb2.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ name='messages-thorchain.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x18messages-thorchain.proto\x1a\x0btypes.proto\"O\n\x13ThorchainGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 \x01(\x08\x12\x0f\n\x07testnet\x18\x03 \x01(\x08\"#\n\x10ThorchainAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\"\xbb\x01\n\x0fThorchainSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x1a\n\x0e\x61\x63\x63ount_number\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12\x10\n\x08\x63hain_id\x18\x03 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\nfee_amount\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x0b\n\x03gas\x18\x05 \x01(\r\x12\x0c\n\x04memo\x18\x06 \x01(\t\x12\x14\n\x08sequence\x18\x07 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12\x11\n\tmsg_count\x18\x08 \x01(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07testnet\x18\t \x01(\x08\"\x15\n\x13ThorchainMsgRequest\"Y\n\x0fThorchainMsgAck\x12\x1f\n\x04send\x18\x01 \x01(\x0b\x32\x11.ThorchainMsgSend\x12%\n\x07\x64\x65posit\x18\x02 \x01(\x0b\x32\x14.ThorchainMsgDeposit\"\x80\x01\n\x10ThorchainMsgSend\x12\x14\n\x0c\x66rom_address\x18\x06 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\nto_address\x18\x07 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x08 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12(\n\x0c\x61\x64\x64ress_type\x18\t \x01(\x0e\x32\x12.OutputAddressTypeJ\x04\x08\n\x10\x0b\"V\n\x13ThorchainMsgDeposit\x12\r\n\x05\x61sset\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12\x0c\n\x04memo\x18\x03 \x01(\t\x12\x0e\n\x06signer\x18\x04 \x01(\t\":\n\x11ThorchainSignedTx\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x42\x35\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x17KeepKeyMessageThorchain') + serialized_pb=_b('\n\x18messages-thorchain.proto\x1a\x0btypes.proto\"O\n\x13ThorchainGetAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x02 \x01(\x08\x12\x0f\n\x07testnet\x18\x03 \x01(\x08\"#\n\x10ThorchainAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\"\xbb\x01\n\x0fThorchainSignTx\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x1a\n\x0e\x61\x63\x63ount_number\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12\x10\n\x08\x63hain_id\x18\x03 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\nfee_amount\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x0b\n\x03gas\x18\x05 \x01(\r\x12\x0c\n\x04memo\x18\x06 \x01(\t\x12\x14\n\x08sequence\x18\x07 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12\x11\n\tmsg_count\x18\x08 \x01(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07testnet\x18\t \x01(\x08\"\x15\n\x13ThorchainMsgRequest\"Y\n\x0fThorchainMsgAck\x12\x1f\n\x04send\x18\x01 \x01(\x0b\x32\x11.ThorchainMsgSend\x12%\n\x07\x64\x65posit\x18\x02 \x01(\x0b\x32\x14.ThorchainMsgDeposit\"\x8f\x01\n\x10ThorchainMsgSend\x12\x14\n\x0c\x66rom_address\x18\x06 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\nto_address\x18\x07 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x08 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12(\n\x0c\x61\x64\x64ress_type\x18\t \x01(\x0e\x32\x12.OutputAddressType\x12\r\n\x05\x64\x65nom\x18\x0b \x01(\tJ\x04\x08\n\x10\x0b\"V\n\x13ThorchainMsgDeposit\x12\r\n\x05\x61sset\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x42\x02\x30\x01\x12\x0c\n\x04memo\x18\x03 \x01(\t\x12\x0e\n\x06signer\x18\x04 \x01(\t\":\n\x11ThorchainSignedTx\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x42\x35\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x17KeepKeyMessageThorchain') , dependencies=[types__pb2.DESCRIPTOR,]) @@ -287,6 +287,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='denom', full_name='ThorchainMsgSend.denom', index=4, + number=11, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -300,7 +307,7 @@ oneofs=[ ], serialized_start=464, - serialized_end=592, + serialized_end=607, ) @@ -351,8 +358,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=594, - serialized_end=680, + serialized_start=609, + serialized_end=695, ) @@ -389,8 +396,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=682, - serialized_end=740, + serialized_start=697, + serialized_end=755, ) _THORCHAINMSGACK.fields_by_name['send'].message_type = _THORCHAINMSGSEND diff --git a/keepkeylib/messages_zcash_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/messages_zcash_pb2.py index cfd76679..953b2849 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/messages_zcash_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/messages_zcash_pb2.py @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import sys _b=sys.version_info[0]<3 and (lambda x:x) or (lambda x:x.encode('latin1')) +from google.protobuf.internal import enum_type_wrapper from google.protobuf import descriptor as _descriptor from google.protobuf import message as _message from google.protobuf import reflection as _reflection @@ -19,9 +20,34 @@ name='messages-zcash.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x14messages-zcash.proto\"\xde\x02\n\rZcashSignPCZT\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x63\x63ount\x18\x02 \x01(\r\x12\x11\n\tpczt_data\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tn_actions\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x14\n\x0ctotal_amount\x18\x05 \x01(\x04\x12\x0b\n\x03\x66\x65\x65\x18\x06 \x01(\x04\x12\x11\n\tbranch_id\x18\x07 \x01(\r\x12\x15\n\rheader_digest\x18\x08 \x01(\x0c\x12\x1a\n\x12transparent_digest\x18\t \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0esapling_digest\x18\n \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0eorchard_digest\x18\x0b \x01(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rorchard_flags\x18\x0c \x01(\r\x12\x1d\n\x15orchard_value_balance\x18\r \x01(\x03\x12\x16\n\x0eorchard_anchor\x18\x0e \x01(\x0c\x12\x1c\n\x14n_transparent_inputs\x18\x1e \x01(\r\"\x81\x02\n\x0fZcashPCZTAction\x12\r\n\x05index\x18\x01 \x01(\r\x12\r\n\x05\x61lpha\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0f\n\x07sighash\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0e\n\x06\x63v_net\x18\x04 \x01(\x0c\x12\r\n\x05value\x18\x05 \x01(\x04\x12\x10\n\x08is_spend\x18\x06 \x01(\x08\x12\x11\n\tnullifier\x18\x07 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0b\n\x03\x63mx\x18\x08 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0b\n\x03\x65pk\x18\t \x01(\x0c\x12\x13\n\x0b\x65nc_compact\x18\n \x01(\x0c\x12\x10\n\x08\x65nc_memo\x18\x0b \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0e\x65nc_noncompact\x18\x0c \x01(\x0c\x12\n\n\x02rk\x18\r \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0eout_ciphertext\x18\x0e \x01(\x0c\"(\n\x12ZcashPCZTActionAck\x12\x12\n\nnext_index\x18\x01 \x01(\r\"3\n\x0fZcashSignedPCZT\x12\x12\n\nsignatures\x18\x01 \x03(\x0c\x12\x0c\n\x04txid\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\"N\n\x12ZcashGetOrchardFVK\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x63\x63ount\x18\x02 \x01(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x03 \x01(\x08\"7\n\x0fZcashOrchardFVK\x12\n\n\x02\x61k\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\n\n\x02nk\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0c\n\x04rivk\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\"Z\n\x15ZcashTransparentInput\x12\r\n\x05index\x18\x01 \x02(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07sighash\x18\x02 \x02(\x0c\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x03 \x03(\r\x12\x0e\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x04 \x01(\x04\"<\n\x13ZcashTransparentSig\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x01 \x02(\x0c\x12\x12\n\nnext_index\x18\x02 \x01(\rB1\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x13KeepKeyMessageZcash') + serialized_pb=_b('\n\x14messages-zcash.proto\"\xd9\x04\n\rZcashSignPCZT\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x63\x63ount\x18\x02 \x01(\r\x12\x11\n\tpczt_data\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tn_actions\x18\x04 \x01(\r\x12\x14\n\x0ctotal_amount\x18\x05 \x01(\x04\x12\x0b\n\x03\x66\x65\x65\x18\x06 \x01(\x04\x12\x11\n\tbranch_id\x18\x07 \x01(\r\x12\x15\n\rheader_digest\x18\x08 \x01(\x0c\x12\x1a\n\x12transparent_digest\x18\t \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0esapling_digest\x18\n \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0eorchard_digest\x18\x0b \x01(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rorchard_flags\x18\x0c \x01(\r\x12\x1d\n\x15orchard_value_balance\x18\r \x01(\x03\x12\x16\n\x0eorchard_anchor\x18\x0e \x01(\x0c\x12\x12\n\ntx_version\x18\x0f \x01(\r\x12\x18\n\x10version_group_id\x18\x10 \x01(\r\x12\x11\n\tlock_time\x18\x11 \x01(\r\x12\x15\n\rexpiry_height\x18\x12 \x01(\r\x12\x46\n\rshielded_pool\x18\x13 \x01(\x0e\x32\x12.ZcashShieldedPool:\x1bZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_ORCHARD\x12\x17\n\x0fironwood_digest\x18\x14 \x01(\x0c\x12\x1d\n\x15n_transparent_outputs\x18\x1d \x01(\r\x12\x1c\n\x14n_transparent_inputs\x18\x1e \x01(\r\x12!\n\x19\x65xpected_seed_fingerprint\x18\x1f \x01(\x0c\"\xa3\x02\n\x0fZcashPCZTAction\x12\r\n\x05index\x18\x01 \x01(\r\x12\r\n\x05\x61lpha\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0f\n\x07sighash\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0e\n\x06\x63v_net\x18\x04 \x01(\x0c\x12\r\n\x05value\x18\x05 \x01(\x04\x12\x10\n\x08is_spend\x18\x06 \x01(\x08\x12\x11\n\tnullifier\x18\x07 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0b\n\x03\x63mx\x18\x08 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0b\n\x03\x65pk\x18\t \x01(\x0c\x12\x13\n\x0b\x65nc_compact\x18\n \x01(\x0c\x12\x10\n\x08\x65nc_memo\x18\x0b \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0e\x65nc_noncompact\x18\x0c \x01(\x0c\x12\n\n\x02rk\x18\r \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0eout_ciphertext\x18\x0e \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\trecipient\x18\x0f \x01(\x0c\x12\r\n\x05rseed\x18\x10 \x01(\x0c\"(\n\x12ZcashPCZTActionAck\x12\x12\n\nnext_index\x18\x01 \x01(\r\"3\n\x0fZcashSignedPCZT\x12\x12\n\nsignatures\x18\x01 \x03(\x0c\x12\x0c\n\x04txid\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\"N\n\x12ZcashGetOrchardFVK\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x63\x63ount\x18\x02 \x01(\r\x12\x14\n\x0cshow_display\x18\x03 \x01(\x08\"Q\n\x0fZcashOrchardFVK\x12\n\n\x02\x61k\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\n\n\x02nk\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x12\x0c\n\x04rivk\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x18\n\x10seed_fingerprint\x18\x04 \x01(\x0c\"N\n\x16ZcashTransparentOutput\x12\r\n\x05index\x18\x01 \x02(\r\x12\x0e\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x02 \x01(\x04\x12\x15\n\rscript_pubkey\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\"\xb0\x01\n\x15ZcashTransparentInput\x12\r\n\x05index\x18\x01 \x02(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07sighash\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x03 \x03(\r\x12\x0e\n\x06\x61mount\x18\x04 \x01(\x04\x12\x14\n\x0cprevout_txid\x18\x05 \x01(\x0c\x12\x15\n\rprevout_index\x18\x06 \x01(\r\x12\x10\n\x08sequence\x18\x07 \x01(\r\x12\x15\n\rscript_pubkey\x18\x08 \x01(\x0c\"J\n\x13ZcashTransparentAck\x12\x19\n\x11next_output_index\x18\x01 \x01(\r\x12\x18\n\x10next_input_index\x18\x02 \x01(\r\",\n\x16ZcashTransparentSigned\x12\x12\n\nsignatures\x18\x01 \x03(\x0c\"\x8b\x01\n\x13ZcashDisplayAddress\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x01 \x03(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x63\x63ount\x18\x02 \x01(\r\x12!\n\x19\x65xpected_seed_fingerprint\x18\x07 \x01(\x0cJ\x04\x08\x03\x10\x04J\x04\x08\x04\x10\x05J\x04\x08\x05\x10\x06J\x04\x08\x06\x10\x07R\x07\x61\x64\x64ressR\x02\x61kR\x02nkR\x04rivk\"9\n\x0cZcashAddress\x12\x0f\n\x07\x61\x64\x64ress\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x18\n\x10seed_fingerprint\x18\x02 \x01(\x0c*V\n\x11ZcashShieldedPool\x12\x1f\n\x1bZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_ORCHARD\x10\x00\x12 \n\x1cZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_IRONWOOD\x10\x01\x42\x31\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x13KeepKeyMessageZcash') ) +_ZCASHSHIELDEDPOOL = _descriptor.EnumDescriptor( + name='ZcashShieldedPool', + full_name='ZcashShieldedPool', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + values=[ + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='ZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_ORCHARD', index=0, number=0, + options=None, + type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='ZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_IRONWOOD', index=1, number=1, + options=None, + type=None), + ], + containing_type=None, + options=None, + serialized_start=1762, + serialized_end=1848, +) +_sym_db.RegisterEnumDescriptor(_ZCASHSHIELDEDPOOL) + +ZcashShieldedPool = enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper(_ZCASHSHIELDEDPOOL) +ZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_ORCHARD = 0 +ZCASH_SHIELDED_POOL_IRONWOOD = 1 @@ -131,12 +157,68 @@ is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='n_transparent_inputs', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.n_transparent_inputs', index=14, + name='tx_version', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.tx_version', index=14, + number=15, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='version_group_id', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.version_group_id', index=15, + number=16, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='lock_time', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.lock_time', index=16, + number=17, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='expiry_height', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.expiry_height', index=17, + number=18, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='shielded_pool', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.shielded_pool', index=18, + number=19, type=14, cpp_type=8, label=1, + has_default_value=True, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='ironwood_digest', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.ironwood_digest', index=19, + number=20, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='n_transparent_outputs', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.n_transparent_outputs', index=20, + number=29, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='n_transparent_inputs', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.n_transparent_inputs', index=21, number=30, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, has_default_value=False, default_value=0, message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='expected_seed_fingerprint', full_name='ZcashSignPCZT.expected_seed_fingerprint', index=22, + number=31, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -150,7 +232,7 @@ oneofs=[ ], serialized_start=25, - serialized_end=375, + serialized_end=626, ) @@ -259,6 +341,20 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='recipient', full_name='ZcashPCZTAction.recipient', index=14, + number=15, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='rseed', full_name='ZcashPCZTAction.rseed', index=15, + number=16, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -271,8 +367,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=378, - serialized_end=635, + serialized_start=629, + serialized_end=920, ) @@ -302,8 +398,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=637, - serialized_end=677, + serialized_start=922, + serialized_end=962, ) @@ -340,8 +436,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=679, - serialized_end=730, + serialized_start=964, + serialized_end=1015, ) @@ -385,8 +481,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=732, - serialized_end=810, + serialized_start=1017, + serialized_end=1095, ) @@ -418,6 +514,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='seed_fingerprint', full_name='ZcashOrchardFVK.seed_fingerprint', index=3, + number=4, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -430,8 +533,53 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=812, - serialized_end=867, + serialized_start=1097, + serialized_end=1178, +) + + +_ZCASHTRANSPARENTOUTPUT = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ZcashTransparentOutput', + full_name='ZcashTransparentOutput', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='index', full_name='ZcashTransparentOutput.index', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=2, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='amount', full_name='ZcashTransparentOutput.amount', index=1, + number=2, type=4, cpp_type=4, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='script_pubkey', full_name='ZcashTransparentOutput.script_pubkey', index=2, + number=3, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1180, + serialized_end=1258, ) @@ -451,7 +599,7 @@ options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( name='sighash', full_name='ZcashTransparentInput.sighash', index=1, - number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=2, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, @@ -470,6 +618,34 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='prevout_txid', full_name='ZcashTransparentInput.prevout_txid', index=4, + number=5, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='prevout_index', full_name='ZcashTransparentInput.prevout_index', index=5, + number=6, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='sequence', full_name='ZcashTransparentInput.sequence', index=6, + number=7, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='script_pubkey', full_name='ZcashTransparentInput.script_pubkey', index=7, + number=8, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -482,27 +658,27 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=869, - serialized_end=959, + serialized_start=1261, + serialized_end=1437, ) -_ZCASHTRANSPARENTSIG = _descriptor.Descriptor( - name='ZcashTransparentSig', - full_name='ZcashTransparentSig', +_ZCASHTRANSPARENTACK = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ZcashTransparentAck', + full_name='ZcashTransparentAck', filename=None, file=DESCRIPTOR, containing_type=None, fields=[ _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='signature', full_name='ZcashTransparentSig.signature', index=0, - number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=2, - has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + name='next_output_index', full_name='ZcashTransparentAck.next_output_index', index=0, + number=1, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=0, message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='next_index', full_name='ZcashTransparentSig.next_index', index=1, + name='next_input_index', full_name='ZcashTransparentAck.next_input_index', index=1, number=2, type=13, cpp_type=3, label=1, has_default_value=False, default_value=0, message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, @@ -520,10 +696,42 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=961, - serialized_end=1021, + serialized_start=1439, + serialized_end=1513, +) + + +_ZCASHTRANSPARENTSIGNED = _descriptor.Descriptor( + name='ZcashTransparentSigned', + full_name='ZcashTransparentSigned', + filename=None, + file=DESCRIPTOR, + containing_type=None, + fields=[ + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='signatures', full_name='ZcashTransparentSigned.signatures', index=0, + number=1, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=3, + has_default_value=False, default_value=[], + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + ], + extensions=[ + ], + nested_types=[], + enum_types=[ + ], + options=None, + is_extendable=False, + syntax='proto2', + extension_ranges=[], + oneofs=[ + ], + serialized_start=1515, + serialized_end=1559, ) + _ZCASHDISPLAYADDRESS = _descriptor.Descriptor( name='ZcashDisplayAddress', full_name='ZcashDisplayAddress', @@ -546,29 +754,8 @@ is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='address', full_name='ZcashDisplayAddress.address', index=2, - number=3, type=9, cpp_type=9, label=1, - has_default_value=False, default_value=_b("").decode('utf-8'), - message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, - is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, - options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), - _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='ak', full_name='ZcashDisplayAddress.ak', index=3, - number=4, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, - has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), - message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, - is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, - options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), - _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='nk', full_name='ZcashDisplayAddress.nk', index=4, - number=5, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, - has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), - message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, - is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, - options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), - _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( - name='rivk', full_name='ZcashDisplayAddress.rivk', index=5, - number=6, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + name='expected_seed_fingerprint', full_name='ZcashDisplayAddress.expected_seed_fingerprint', index=2, + number=7, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, @@ -585,8 +772,8 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1023, - serialized_end=1133, + serialized_start=1562, + serialized_end=1701, ) @@ -604,6 +791,13 @@ message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), + _descriptor.FieldDescriptor( + name='seed_fingerprint', full_name='ZcashAddress.seed_fingerprint', index=1, + number=2, type=12, cpp_type=9, label=1, + has_default_value=False, default_value=_b(""), + message_type=None, enum_type=None, containing_type=None, + is_extension=False, extension_scope=None, + options=None, file=DESCRIPTOR), ], extensions=[ ], @@ -616,20 +810,24 @@ extension_ranges=[], oneofs=[ ], - serialized_start=1135, - serialized_end=1167, + serialized_start=1703, + serialized_end=1760, ) +_ZCASHSIGNPCZT.fields_by_name['shielded_pool'].enum_type = _ZCASHSHIELDEDPOOL DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashSignPCZT'] = _ZCASHSIGNPCZT DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashPCZTAction'] = _ZCASHPCZTACTION DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashPCZTActionAck'] = _ZCASHPCZTACTIONACK DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashSignedPCZT'] = _ZCASHSIGNEDPCZT DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashGetOrchardFVK'] = _ZCASHGETORCHARDFVK DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashOrchardFVK'] = _ZCASHORCHARDFVK +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashTransparentOutput'] = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTOUTPUT DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashTransparentInput'] = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTINPUT -DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashTransparentSig'] = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTSIG +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashTransparentAck'] = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTACK +DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashTransparentSigned'] = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTSIGNED DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashDisplayAddress'] = _ZCASHDISPLAYADDRESS DESCRIPTOR.message_types_by_name['ZcashAddress'] = _ZCASHADDRESS +DESCRIPTOR.enum_types_by_name['ZcashShieldedPool'] = _ZCASHSHIELDEDPOOL _sym_db.RegisterFileDescriptor(DESCRIPTOR) ZcashSignPCZT = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashSignPCZT', (_message.Message,), dict( @@ -674,6 +872,13 @@ )) _sym_db.RegisterMessage(ZcashOrchardFVK) +ZcashTransparentOutput = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashTransparentOutput', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTOUTPUT, + __module__ = 'messages_zcash_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ZcashTransparentOutput) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ZcashTransparentOutput) + ZcashTransparentInput = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashTransparentInput', (_message.Message,), dict( DESCRIPTOR = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTINPUT, __module__ = 'messages_zcash_pb2' @@ -681,12 +886,19 @@ )) _sym_db.RegisterMessage(ZcashTransparentInput) -ZcashTransparentSig = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashTransparentSig', (_message.Message,), dict( - DESCRIPTOR = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTSIG, +ZcashTransparentAck = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashTransparentAck', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTACK, + __module__ = 'messages_zcash_pb2' + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ZcashTransparentAck) + )) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ZcashTransparentAck) + +ZcashTransparentSigned = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashTransparentSigned', (_message.Message,), dict( + DESCRIPTOR = _ZCASHTRANSPARENTSIGNED, __module__ = 'messages_zcash_pb2' - # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ZcashTransparentSig) + # @@protoc_insertion_point(class_scope:ZcashTransparentSigned) )) -_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ZcashTransparentSig) +_sym_db.RegisterMessage(ZcashTransparentSigned) ZcashDisplayAddress = _reflection.GeneratedProtocolMessageType('ZcashDisplayAddress', (_message.Message,), dict( DESCRIPTOR = _ZCASHDISPLAYADDRESS, diff --git a/keepkeylib/signed_metadata.py b/keepkeylib/signed_metadata.py index faab78ed..acad0960 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/signed_metadata.py +++ b/keepkeylib/signed_metadata.py @@ -20,6 +20,32 @@ ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS = 1 ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT = 2 ARG_FORMAT_BYTES = 3 +# Attested printable label (e.g. protocol name "Uniswap V2"). value = ASCII. +ARG_FORMAT_STRING = 4 +# Human-readable token amount: value = decimals(1) + symbol_len(1) + +# symbol(<=10 [A-Za-z0-9]) + amount(1..32 big-endian). Firmware renders it +# decimal-scaled with the symbol, e.g. "1000 USDC" — this is the "what" the +# clear-signing plan asks for instead of a raw wei integer. +ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT = 5 + +# Max value bytes on the wire. Legacy formats stay <=32; TOKEN_AMOUNT needs +# decimals(1)+symbol_len(1)+symbol(<=10)+amount(<=32) = up to 44. +METADATA_MAX_ARG_VALUE_LEN = 44 + + +def token_amount_value(amount, decimals, symbol): + """Build an ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT value: decimals + symbol + amount. + + amount: non-negative int (raw on-chain units). decimals: int 0..36. + symbol: short ticker, [A-Za-z0-9], <=10 chars. + """ + sym = symbol.encode('ascii') + assert 0 < len(sym) <= 10 and sym.isalnum() + assert 0 <= decimals <= 36 + # Minimal big-endian amount, at least 1 byte, at most 32. + n = amount.to_bytes(32, 'big').lstrip(b'\x00') or b'\x00' + assert len(n) <= 32 + return bytes([decimals, len(sym)]) + sym + n CLASSIFICATION_OPAQUE = 0 CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED = 1 @@ -128,7 +154,7 @@ def serialize_metadata( args: list, classification: int = CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, timestamp: int = None, - key_id: int = 0, + key_id: int = 3, version: int = 1, ) -> bytes: """Serialize metadata fields into canonical binary (unsigned). @@ -137,12 +163,21 @@ def serialize_metadata( chain_id: EIP-155 chain ID contract_address: 20-byte contract address selector: 4-byte function selector - tx_hash: 32-byte keccak-256 of unsigned tx (can be zeroed for phase 1) + tx_hash: 32-byte keccak-256 sighash of the UNSIGNED tx. Firmware binds + the emitted signature to this value (signed_metadata_enforce), so it + MUST equal the real digest the device will sign. Compute it with + eth_sighash_legacy() / eth_sighash_eip1559() below — never zero it. method_name: UTF-8 method name (max 64 bytes) args: list of dicts with keys: name, format, value (bytes) classification: 0=OPAQUE, 1=VERIFIED, 2=MALFORMED timestamp: Unix seconds (defaults to now) - key_id: embedded public key slot (0-3) + key_id: embedded public key slot. Defaults to 3, the DEBUG_LINK CI test + slot whose pubkey == TEST_PRIVATE_KEY's pubkey (see + assert_test_key_matches_slot3). The embedded key_id MUST equal both + the protocol-level EthereumTxMetadata.key_id and the slot the + signature verifies against, or firmware returns MALFORMED. + PRODUCTION callers (Pioneer) MUST pass key_id=0 explicitly and sign + with the offline production key. version: schema version (must be 1) Returns: @@ -195,7 +230,7 @@ def serialize_metadata( # value (2-byte length prefix + raw bytes) val = arg['value'] - assert len(val) <= 32 # METADATA_MAX_ARG_VALUE_LEN + assert len(val) <= METADATA_MAX_ARG_VALUE_LEN buf.extend(struct.pack('>H', len(val))) buf.extend(val) @@ -211,6 +246,111 @@ def serialize_metadata( return bytes(buf) +# ── v2: static schema (no tx_hash, no values; device decodes calldata) ── +# +# METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA blobs attest only HOW to decode a curated +# (chainId, contract, selector): the method label and, per argument, a name + +# display format (+ static decimals/symbol for token amounts). They carry NO +# tx_hash and NO argument values — the device decodes the values from the exact +# calldata it is about to sign. Signed once, OFFLINE; no per-tx signer. +# +# Firmware format (parse_v2_args in lib/firmware/signed_metadata.c): +# version(1)=0x02 + chain_id(4 BE) + contract(20) + selector(4) + +# method_len(2 BE) + method + num_args(1) + +# [per arg: name_len(1) + name + display_format(1) + +# (if TOKEN_AMOUNT: decimals(1) + symbol_len(1) + symbol)] + +# classification(1) + timestamp(4 BE) + key_id(1) + signature(64) + recovery(1) +# +# Supported display formats (fixed single ABI word at offset 4 + 32*i): +# ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT, ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT. +METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA = 2 + + +def serialize_schema_metadata( + chain_id: int, + contract_address: bytes, + selector: bytes, + method_name: str, + args: list, + classification: int = CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, + timestamp: int = None, + key_id: int = 3, +) -> bytes: + """Serialize a v2 (static schema) metadata payload (unsigned). + + Args mirror serialize_metadata(), minus tx_hash. Each entry of `args` is a + dict: {name, format, [decimals, symbol]} — NO 'value' (the device decodes it + from the calldata). `decimals`/`symbol` are required for TOKEN_AMOUNT and + ignored otherwise. Call sign_metadata() on the result. + """ + if timestamp is None: + timestamp = int(time.time()) + + assert len(contract_address) == 20 + assert len(selector) == 4 + assert len(method_name.encode('utf-8')) <= 64 + assert len(args) <= 8 + + buf = bytearray() + buf.append(METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA) + buf.extend(struct.pack('>I', chain_id)) + buf.extend(contract_address) + buf.extend(selector) + + name_bytes = method_name.encode('utf-8') + buf.extend(struct.pack('>H', len(name_bytes))) + buf.extend(name_bytes) + + buf.append(len(args)) + for arg in args: + arg_name = arg['name'].encode('utf-8') + assert len(arg_name) <= 32 + buf.append(len(arg_name)) + buf.extend(arg_name) + + fmt = arg['format'] + assert fmt in (ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT, + ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT), \ + 'v2 supports only fixed-word ADDRESS/AMOUNT/TOKEN_AMOUNT' + buf.append(fmt) + if fmt == ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT: + sym = arg['symbol'].encode('ascii') + assert 0 < len(sym) <= 10 and sym.isalnum() + assert 0 <= arg['decimals'] <= 36 + buf.append(arg['decimals']) + buf.append(len(sym)) + buf.extend(sym) + + buf.append(classification) + buf.extend(struct.pack('>I', timestamp)) + buf.append(key_id) + + return bytes(buf) + + +def schema_calldata(selector: bytes, args: list) -> bytes: + """ABI-encode the calldata a v2 schema decodes: selector + one 32-byte head + word per arg. ADDRESS -> left-zero-padded 20-byte address; AMOUNT / + TOKEN_AMOUNT -> big-endian uint256. Used to build a tx whose calldata the + device will decode against a serialize_schema_metadata() blob. + + Each arg dict needs 'format' plus a concrete value: 'address' (20 bytes) for + ADDRESS, or 'amount' (int) for AMOUNT/TOKEN_AMOUNT. + """ + data = bytearray(selector) + for arg in args: + fmt = arg['format'] + if fmt == ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS: + addr = arg['address'] + assert len(addr) == 20 + data.extend(b'\x00' * 12 + addr) + elif fmt in (ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT, ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT): + data.extend(int(arg['amount']).to_bytes(32, 'big')) + else: + raise AssertionError('unsupported v2 arg format %r' % fmt) + return bytes(data) + + def sign_metadata(payload: bytes, private_key: bytes = None) -> bytes: """Sign the canonical binary payload and return the complete signed blob. @@ -228,41 +368,41 @@ def sign_metadata(payload: bytes, private_key: bytes = None) -> bytes: digest = hashlib.sha256(payload).digest() + # NOTE: firmware hashes the identical byte range — sha256 over + # version..key_id (i.e. the whole serialize_metadata() output), excluding + # the trailing signature(64)+recovery(1). See signed_metadata_process(): + # signed_len = payload_len - 64 - 1. try: - from ecdsa import SigningKey, SECP256k1, util - sk = SigningKey.from_string(private_key, curve=SECP256k1) - sig_der = sk.sign_digest(digest, sigencode=util.sigencode_string) - # sig_der is r(32) || s(32) = 64 bytes - r = sig_der[:32] - s = sig_der[32:] - - # Recovery: compute v (27 or 28) - vk = sk.get_verifying_key() - pubkey = b'\x04' + vk.to_string() - # Try recovery with v=0 and v=1 - from ecdsa import VerifyingKey - for v in (0, 1): - try: - recovered = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( - sig_der, digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256 - ) - for i, rk in enumerate(recovered): - if rk.to_string() == vk.to_string(): - recovery = 27 + i - break - else: - recovery = 27 - break - except Exception: - continue - else: - recovery = 27 - - except ImportError: - # Fallback: zero signature for struct-only testing - r = b'\x00' * 32 - s = b'\x00' * 32 - recovery = 27 + from ecdsa import SigningKey, SECP256k1, util, VerifyingKey + except ImportError as exc: + # Fail loud. A zero signature would be silently rejected by firmware as + # MALFORMED, disguising "ecdsa not installed" as a crypto/key mismatch. + raise RuntimeError( + "The 'ecdsa' package is required to sign metadata " + "(pip install ecdsa)." + ) from exc + + sk = SigningKey.from_string(private_key, curve=SECP256k1) + # RFC 6979 deterministic nonce: same payload + key => byte-identical blob. + # Reference vectors stay reproducible and signers never depend on an RNG + # (nonce reuse with a bad RNG would leak the signing key). + sig = sk.sign_digest_deterministic( + digest, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256, + sigencode=util.sigencode_string) # r(32)||s(32) + r = sig[:32] + s = sig[32:] + + # Recovery byte (27/28). Firmware verifies against the stored slot pubkey and + # ignores this byte, but the canonical blob carries it. + vk = sk.get_verifying_key() + recovered = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig, digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256 + ) + recovery = 27 + for i, rk in enumerate(recovered): + if rk.to_string() == vk.to_string(): + recovery = 27 + i + break return payload + r + s + bytes([recovery]) @@ -280,7 +420,8 @@ def build_test_metadata( """Convenience: build a complete signed test metadata blob. Defaults to an Aave V3 supply() call on Ethereum mainnet. - Uses key_id=1 (CI test slot) by default. + Uses key_id=3 (the DEBUG_LINK CI test slot) by default and signs with + TEST_PRIVATE_KEY, whose pubkey == firmware METADATA_PUBKEYS[3]. """ if contract_address is None: contract_address = bytes.fromhex('7d2768de32b0b80b7a3454c06bdac94a69ddc7a9') @@ -318,3 +459,178 @@ def build_test_metadata( **kwargs, ) return sign_metadata(payload) + + +# ── Test-signer ↔ key-slot binding ──────────────────────────────────── +# The only key the test suite can sign with is TEST_PRIVATE_KEY, derived via +# SignIdentity index 0 (see _derive_insight_key(slot=0)). Phase 1 firmware +# has NO built-in keys: the suite loads this pubkey into key slot 3 through +# LoadClearsignSigner (user-confirmed, RAM-only) before signing vectors. +# The "0" and the "3" are DIFFERENT namespaces — derivation index vs key_id +# slot — and the mapping index0 -> slot3 is intentional. Do NOT "fix" it by +# deriving at slot=3 or embedding key_id=0. +FIRMWARE_SLOT3_PUBKEY = bytes.fromhex( + '02e3b3015c47ddcaabe4f8e872f1ed8f09ca145a8d81770d92213d56da31ab5107' +) + + +def test_signer_compressed_pubkey(private_key: bytes = None) -> bytes: + """Return the 33-byte compressed secp256k1 pubkey for the signer.""" + from ecdsa import SigningKey, SECP256k1 + if private_key is None: + private_key = TEST_PRIVATE_KEY + vk = SigningKey.from_string(private_key, curve=SECP256k1).get_verifying_key() + point = vk.pubkey.point + prefix = 0x02 if (point.y() % 2 == 0) else 0x03 + return bytes([prefix]) + point.x().to_bytes(32, 'big') + + +def assert_test_key_matches_slot3(): + """Prove pubkey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY) == FIRMWARE_SLOT3_PUBKEY (the key the + suite loads into slot 3 via LoadClearsignSigner). + + Guards the key_id=3 default: if this fails, every VERIFIED test vector would + be rejected as MALFORMED by ecdsa_verify_digest against the wrong key. + """ + pub = test_signer_compressed_pubkey() + if pub != FIRMWARE_SLOT3_PUBKEY: + raise AssertionError( + "Test signer pubkey %s != firmware slot 3 %s — key_id=3 vectors " + "will not verify on device." % (pub.hex(), FIRMWARE_SLOT3_PUBKEY.hex()) + ) + return pub + + +# ── Ethereum sighash (keccak-256 over RLP) ───────────────────────────── +# Produces the EXACT digest firmware feeds to ecdsa_sign_digest, so that a +# metadata blob's tx_hash binds the real transaction. Cross-checked against the +# device: a known signed legacy tx recovers to its m/44'/60'/0'/0/0 signer. + +_KECCAK_RC = [ + 0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000008082, 0x800000000000808A, 0x8000000080008000, + 0x000000000000808B, 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008009, + 0x000000000000008A, 0x0000000000000088, 0x0000000080008009, 0x000000008000000A, + 0x000000008000808B, 0x800000000000008B, 0x8000000000008089, 0x8000000000008003, + 0x8000000000008002, 0x8000000000000080, 0x000000000000800A, 0x800000008000000A, + 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008080, 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008008, +] +_KECCAK_ROT = [ + [0, 36, 3, 41, 18], + [1, 44, 10, 45, 2], + [62, 6, 43, 15, 61], + [28, 55, 25, 21, 56], + [27, 20, 39, 8, 14], +] +_KECCAK_MASK = (1 << 64) - 1 + + +def _rotl64(x, n): + return ((x << n) | (x >> (64 - n))) & _KECCAK_MASK + + +def _keccak_f1600(st): + for rc in _KECCAK_RC: + c = [st[x][0] ^ st[x][1] ^ st[x][2] ^ st[x][3] ^ st[x][4] for x in range(5)] + d = [c[(x - 1) % 5] ^ _rotl64(c[(x + 1) % 5], 1) for x in range(5)] + for x in range(5): + for y in range(5): + st[x][y] ^= d[x] + b = [[0] * 5 for _ in range(5)] + for x in range(5): + for y in range(5): + b[y][(2 * x + 3 * y) % 5] = _rotl64(st[x][y], _KECCAK_ROT[x][y]) + for x in range(5): + for y in range(5): + st[x][y] = b[x][y] ^ ((~b[(x + 1) % 5][y]) & b[(x + 2) % 5][y]) + st[0][0] ^= rc + + +def keccak256(data: bytes) -> bytes: + """Keccak-256 (Ethereum), NOT NIST SHA3-256 (different padding).""" + rate = 136 # 1088-bit rate for 256-bit output + st = [[0] * 5 for _ in range(5)] + msg = bytearray(data) + msg.append(0x01) # keccak pad10*1 (0x01 .. 0x80), distinct from SHA3's 0x06 + while len(msg) % rate != 0: + msg.append(0x00) + msg[-1] ^= 0x80 + for off in range(0, len(msg), rate): + block = msg[off:off + rate] + for i in range(rate // 8): + st[i % 5][i // 5] ^= int.from_bytes(block[i * 8:i * 8 + 8], 'little') + _keccak_f1600(st) + out = bytearray() + while len(out) < 32: + for y in range(5): + for x in range(5): + if len(out) < 32: + out += st[x][y].to_bytes(8, 'little') + return bytes(out[:32]) + + +def _int_min_be(value: int) -> bytes: + """Minimal big-endian (no leading zeros); 0 -> b'' (RLP integer encoding).""" + if value == 0: + return b'' + out = bytearray() + while value > 0: + out.insert(0, value & 0xFF) + value >>= 8 + return bytes(out) + + +def _rlp_str(b: bytes) -> bytes: + if len(b) == 1 and b[0] < 0x80: + return b + if len(b) <= 55: + return bytes([0x80 + len(b)]) + b + le = _int_min_be(len(b)) + return bytes([0xB7 + len(le)]) + le + b + + +def _rlp_list(items) -> bytes: + body = b''.join(items) + if len(body) <= 55: + return bytes([0xC0 + len(body)]) + body + le = _int_min_be(len(body)) + return bytes([0xF7 + len(le)]) + le + body + + +def eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value, data, chain_id): + """keccak256(rlp([nonce, gasPrice, gasLimit, to, value, data, chainId,0,0])). + + `to` is 20 raw bytes (b'' for contract creation); ints are minimal-BE. + Matches firmware ethereum.c legacy EIP-155 hashing exactly. + """ + items = [ + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(nonce)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(gas_price)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(gas_limit)), + _rlp_str(bytes(to)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(value)), + _rlp_str(bytes(data)), + ] + if chain_id: + items += [_rlp_str(_int_min_be(chain_id)), _rlp_str(b''), _rlp_str(b'')] + return keccak256(_rlp_list(items)) + + +def eth_sighash_eip1559(chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, + max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, to, value, data): + """keccak256(0x02 || rlp([chainId, nonce, maxPriorityFee, maxFee, gasLimit, + to, value, data, []])) with an empty (0xC0) access list. + + Matches firmware ethereum.c EIP-1559 hashing exactly. + """ + items = [ + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(chain_id)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(nonce)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(max_priority_fee_per_gas)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(max_fee_per_gas)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(gas_limit)), + _rlp_str(bytes(to)), + _rlp_str(_int_min_be(value)), + _rlp_str(bytes(data)), + _rlp_list([]), # empty access list -> 0xC0 + ] + return keccak256(b'\x02' + _rlp_list(items)) diff --git a/keepkeylib/transport_udp.py b/keepkeylib/transport_udp.py index 05767de7..1dbdf672 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/transport_udp.py +++ b/keepkeylib/transport_udp.py @@ -2,10 +2,23 @@ '''SocketTransport implements TCP socket interface for Transport.''' +import os import socket from select import select from .transport import Transport +# A dead emulator must surface as an ERROR, not as an infinite wait. +# +# The socket had no timeout, so when the emulator segfaulted mid-suite, +# recv() blocked in a syscall until something outside killed the process -- +# in CI that was a 30-minute job timeout reported as "cancelled", which reads +# as an infrastructure blip rather than the device crash it actually was. It +# hid a real segfault for at least six merges. +# +# Generous by default because a confirm screen legitimately waits on a human; +# override for unattended runs with KK_UDP_TIMEOUT (seconds, 0 disables). +DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get('KK_UDP_TIMEOUT', '60')) + class FakeRead(object): # Let's pretend we have a file-like interface def __init__(self, func): @@ -31,6 +44,8 @@ def __init__(self, device, *args, **kwargs): def _open(self): self.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) self.socket.connect(self.device) + if DEFAULT_TIMEOUT > 0: + self.socket.settimeout(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) def _close(self): self.socket.close() @@ -57,7 +72,19 @@ def _read(self): def _raw_read(self, length): while len(self.buffer) < length: - data = self.socket.recv(64) + try: + data = self.socket.recv(64) + except socket.timeout: + # Name the cause. "timed out" alone sends people looking at the + # test; the device is what stopped answering. + raise IOError( + 'No response from the emulator at %s:%d after %gs -- it is ' + 'not running, has crashed, or is wedged on a confirm screen ' + 'nothing acknowledged. Set KK_UDP_TIMEOUT to change or 0 to ' + 'disable.' % (self.device[0], self.device[1], + DEFAULT_TIMEOUT)) + if not data: + raise IOError('Emulator closed the connection') self.buffer += data[1:] ret = self.buffer[:length] diff --git a/keepkeylib/types_pb2.py b/keepkeylib/types_pb2.py index 9497bfd1..e33c52df 100644 --- a/keepkeylib/types_pb2.py +++ b/keepkeylib/types_pb2.py @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ name='types.proto', package='', syntax='proto2', - serialized_pb=_b('\n\x0btypes.proto\x1a google/protobuf/descriptor.proto\"\x80\x01\n\nHDNodeType\x12\r\n\x05\x64\x65pth\x18\x01 \x02(\r\x12\x13\n\x0b\x66ingerprint\x18\x02 \x02(\r\x12\x11\n\tchild_num\x18\x03 \x02(\r\x12\x12\n\nchain_code\x18\x04 \x02(\x0c\x12\x13\n\x0bprivate_key\x18\x05 \x01(\x0c\x12\x12\n\npublic_key\x18\x06 \x01(\x0c\">\n\x0eHDNodePathType\x12\x19\n\x04node\x18\x01 \x02(\x0b\x32\x0b.HDNodeType\x12\x11\n\taddress_n\x18\x02 \x03(\r\"\xf9\x03\n\x08\x43oinType\x12\x11\n\tcoin_name\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x15\n\rcoin_shortcut\x18\x02 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\n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_RemoveWipeCode\x10$\x12 \n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_ChangeWipeCode\x10%\x12 \n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_CreateWipeCode\x10&\"\x04\x08\x1e\x10\x1e*\x7f\n\x14PinMatrixRequestType\x12 \n\x1cPinMatrixRequestType_Current\x10\x01\x12!\n\x1dPinMatrixRequestType_NewFirst\x10\x02\x12\"\n\x1ePinMatrixRequestType_NewSecond\x10\x03:4\n\x07wire_in\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd2\x86\x03 \x01(\x08:5\n\x08wire_out\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd3\x86\x03 \x01(\x08::\n\rwire_debug_in\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd4\x86\x03 \x01(\x08:;\n\x0ewire_debug_out\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd5\x86\x03 \x01(\x08\x42)\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x0bKeepKeyType') + serialized_pb=_b('\n\x0btypes.proto\x1a google/protobuf/descriptor.proto\"\x80\x01\n\nHDNodeType\x12\r\n\x05\x64\x65pth\x18\x01 \x02(\r\x12\x13\n\x0b\x66ingerprint\x18\x02 \x02(\r\x12\x11\n\tchild_num\x18\x03 \x02(\r\x12\x12\n\nchain_code\x18\x04 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\n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_ChangeLanguage\x10\x0f\x12\"\n\x1e\x42uttonRequest_EnablePassphrase\x10\x10\x12#\n\x1f\x42uttonRequest_DisablePassphrase\x10\x11\x12\'\n#ButtonRequest_EncryptAndSignMessage\x10\x12\x12 \n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_EncryptMessage\x10\x13\x12\"\n\x1e\x42uttonRequest_ImportPrivateKey\x10\x14\x12(\n$ButtonRequest_ImportRecoverySentence\x10\x15\x12\x1e\n\x1a\x42uttonRequest_SignIdentity\x10\x16\x12\x16\n\x12\x42uttonRequest_Ping\x10\x17\x12\x1b\n\x17\x42uttonRequest_RemovePin\x10\x18\x12\x1b\n\x17\x42uttonRequest_ChangePin\x10\x19\x12\x1b\n\x17\x42uttonRequest_CreatePin\x10\x1a\x12\x1c\n\x18\x42uttonRequest_GetEntropy\x10\x1b\x12\x1d\n\x19\x42uttonRequest_SignMessage\x10\x1c\x12\x1f\n\x1b\x42uttonRequest_ApplyPolicies\x10\x1d\x12!\n\x1d\x42uttonRequest_AutoLockDelayMs\x10\x1f\x12\x1c\n\x18\x42uttonRequest_U2FCounter\x10 \x12\"\n\x1e\x42uttonRequest_ConfirmEosAction\x10!\x12\"\n\x1e\x42uttonRequest_ConfirmEosBudget\x10\"\x12\x1d\n\x19\x42uttonRequest_ConfirmMemo\x10#\x12 \n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_RemoveWipeCode\x10$\x12 \n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_ChangeWipeCode\x10%\x12 \n\x1c\x42uttonRequest_CreateWipeCode\x10&\x12\x1a\n\x16\x42uttonRequest_DiceRoll\x10\'\"\x04\x08\x1e\x10\x1e*\x7f\n\x14PinMatrixRequestType\x12 \n\x1cPinMatrixRequestType_Current\x10\x01\x12!\n\x1dPinMatrixRequestType_NewFirst\x10\x02\x12\"\n\x1ePinMatrixRequestType_NewSecond\x10\x03:4\n\x07wire_in\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd2\x86\x03 \x01(\x08:5\n\x08wire_out\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd3\x86\x03 \x01(\x08::\n\rwire_debug_in\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd4\x86\x03 \x01(\x08:;\n\x0ewire_debug_out\x12!.google.protobuf.EnumValueOptions\x18\xd5\x86\x03 \x01(\x08\x42)\n\x1a\x63om.keepkey.deviceprotocolB\x0bKeepKeyType') , dependencies=[google_dot_protobuf_dot_descriptor__pb2.DESCRIPTOR,]) @@ -390,11 +390,15 @@ name='ButtonRequest_CreateWipeCode', index=36, number=38, options=None, type=None), + _descriptor.EnumValueDescriptor( + name='ButtonRequest_DiceRoll', index=37, number=39, + options=None, + type=None), ], containing_type=None, options=None, serialized_start=3008, - serialized_end=4256, + serialized_end=4284, ) _sym_db.RegisterEnumDescriptor(_BUTTONREQUESTTYPE) @@ -420,8 +424,8 @@ ], containing_type=None, options=None, - serialized_start=4258, - serialized_end=4385, + serialized_start=4286, + serialized_end=4413, ) _sym_db.RegisterEnumDescriptor(_PINMATRIXREQUESTTYPE) @@ -497,6 +501,7 @@ ButtonRequest_RemoveWipeCode = 36 ButtonRequest_ChangeWipeCode = 37 ButtonRequest_CreateWipeCode = 38 +ButtonRequest_DiceRoll = 39 PinMatrixRequestType_Current = 1 PinMatrixRequestType_NewFirst = 2 PinMatrixRequestType_NewSecond = 3 diff --git a/keepkeylib/zcash.py b/keepkeylib/zcash.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c110bba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/keepkeylib/zcash.py @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +"""Zcash helpers for client-side computations. + +Mirrors the firmware's ZIP-32 §6.1 seed fingerprint so callers can build the +expected_seed_fingerprint they pass to display/sign messages without having to +ask the device. +""" + +from hashlib import blake2b + + +_PERSONAL = b"Zcash_HD_Seed_FP" + + +def calculate_seed_fingerprint(seed): + """Compute the ZIP-32 §6.1 seed fingerprint. + + SeedFingerprint := BLAKE2b-256( + "Zcash_HD_Seed_FP", I2LEBSP_8(len(seed)) || seed + ) + + The 1-byte length prefix domain-separates seeds of different lengths + that happen to share a prefix; per the spec. + + Args: + seed: bytes, length 32-252. + + Returns: + 32-byte fingerprint. + + Raises: + ValueError: if seed length is out of range or the seed is trivially + all-zero or all-0xFF (matches firmware's rejection per §6.1). + """ + if not isinstance(seed, (bytes, bytearray)): + raise TypeError("seed must be bytes") + if len(seed) < 32 or len(seed) > 252: + raise ValueError("seed length must be in [32, 252]") + if all(b == 0x00 for b in seed) or all(b == 0xFF for b in seed): + raise ValueError("trivial seed (all-zero or all-0xFF) rejected") + + h = blake2b(digest_size=32, person=_PERSONAL) + h.update(bytes([len(seed)])) + h.update(bytes(seed)) + return h.digest() diff --git a/scripts/generate-test-report.py b/scripts/generate-test-report.py index 6668a744..a879b798 100644 --- a/scripts/generate-test-report.py +++ b/scripts/generate-test-report.py @@ -12,6 +12,21 @@ import struct, zlib, os, sys, argparse from datetime import datetime +# Make keepkeylib importable regardless of invocation cwd (pytest inserts it +# automatically; this script is often run standalone as +# `python3 ../scripts/generate-test-report.py` from tests/, or directly from +# the repo root during local iteration). +for _cand in (os.getcwd(), os.path.join(os.getcwd(), '..'), + os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))): + if os.path.isdir(os.path.join(_cand, 'keepkeylib')) and _cand not in sys.path: + sys.path.insert(0, _cand) +del _cand + +try: + from keepkeylib.clearsign_catalog import CLEARSIGN_FLOWS +except ImportError: + CLEARSIGN_FLOWS = None # report still renders; V section just won't expand from the catalog + # --------------------------------------------------------------- # PDF writer + page builder (stdlib only) # --------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -72,7 +87,7 @@ def add_page(self, lines, w=612, h=792): y, sz, txt = item[0], item[1], item[2] style = item[3] if len(item) > 3 else False color = item[4] if len(item) > 4 else None - txt = txt.replace('\\','\\\\').replace('(','\\(').replace(')','\\)') + txt = _ascii(txt).replace('\\','\\\\').replace('(','\\(').replace(')','\\)') if color: ops.append(f'{color[0]} {color[1]} {color[2]} rg') if style == 'ding': @@ -138,6 +153,20 @@ def write(self, path): CHECK = '\x34' CROSS = '\x38' +# Map non-Latin-1 Unicode punctuation to ASCII so it survives the PDF content +# stream (encoded latin-1); em-dashes etc. were rendering as '?'. +_ASCII_MAP = { + '—': '-', '–': '-', '→': '->', '←': '<-', + '’': "'", '‘': "'", '“': '"', '”': '"', + '…': '...', '•': '*', '₿': 'BTC', '≤': '<=', + '≥': '>=', '±': '+/-', +} +def _ascii(s): + for k, v in _ASCII_MAP.items(): + if k in s: + s = s.replace(k, v) + return s + class PB: def __init__(self, pdf): self.pdf = pdf; self.lines = []; self.y = 755 @@ -174,10 +203,18 @@ def finish(self): self._flush() def _lookup(results, mod, meth): - """Look up test result by module::method (precise), then bare method (fallback).""" - return results.get(f'{mod}::{meth}') or results.get(meth) or '' + """Look up a test result by module::method. Every SECTIONS module is a + test_msg_* module, so parse_junit always emits a 'mod::meth' key -- there is + no bare-method fallback (it let a cross-module method-name collision render a + never-run test as PASS, defeating the --validate-junit release gate).""" + return results.get(f'{mod}::{meth}', '') -def ver_t(s): return tuple(int(x) for x in s.replace('v','').split('.')[:3]) +def ver_t(s): + # Defensive: tolerate pre-release tags (7.15.0-rc3), 'v' prefixes and short + # versions ('7.15' -> (7,15,0)) so report/filter/validate never crash. + s = str(s).split('-')[0].replace('v', '') + parts = (s.split('.') + ['0', '0', '0'])[:3] + return tuple(int(''.join(ch for ch in p if ch.isdigit()) or '0') for p in parts) def ver_ge(a, b): return ver_t(a) >= ver_t(b) def _w(text, n=95): words, lines, cur = text.split(), [], '' @@ -187,45 +224,110 @@ def _w(text, n=95): if cur: lines.append(cur) return lines -def _is_setup_frame(path): - """Check if a screenshot is a setUp noise frame (IMPORT RECOVERY, WIPE, or blank/logo).""" +def _frame_lit_ratio(path): + """Fraction of lit pixels in an OLED PNG, or None if unreadable.""" + try: + pixels, w, h = _read_png_pixels(path) + if not w or not h: + return None + return sum(1 for b in pixels if b > 128) / float(w * h) + except Exception: + return None + + +def _frame_hash(path): + """Content hash of an OLED PNG with the top-right animation region masked + (the scroll arrow renders in a per-capture animation state, defeating + exact-byte comparison of otherwise identical screens). None if unreadable. + """ try: + import hashlib pixels, w, h = _read_png_pixels(path) - # Count non-zero pixels -- blank/logo frames have very few or very specific patterns - lit = sum(1 for b in pixels if b > 128) - total = w * h - # Very blank (< 5% lit) = idle/logo screen - if lit < total * 0.05: - return True - # Check for "IMPORT RECOVERY" text by looking at pixel density in top-left region - # setUp always shows this screen -- it's ~20% lit with specific pattern - # Real test screens vary widely, so we check the raw bytes for known patterns - # Simple heuristic: if first 2 btn frames match, skip them (setUp wipe + load) - return False - except: - return False + if not w or not h: + return None + px = bytearray(pixels) + for y in range(min(16, h)): + row = y * w + for x in range(max(0, w - 64), w): + px[row + x] = 0 + return hashlib.md5(bytes(px)).hexdigest() + except Exception: + return None + + +# hash -> number of distinct test dirs the frame appears in. 1 = the frame is +# unique to its test (its own content); large = generic device chrome shared +# across unrelated tests (load-device prompt, policy toggles, lock screens). +_FRAME_DIR_COUNTS = {} +# Hashes appearing in >= 3 distinct dirs — used to keep chrome out of the +# "extra frames" strip when a test has real content frames of its own. +_GENERIC_FRAME_HASHES = set() + +def _build_frame_census(screenshot_dir): + """Populate the cross-test frame census from every per-test capture dir.""" + _FRAME_DIR_COUNTS.clear() + _GENERIC_FRAME_HASHES.clear() + if not screenshot_dir or not os.path.isdir(screenshot_dir): + return + dirs_per_hash = {} + for mod in sorted(os.listdir(screenshot_dir)): + mod_dir = os.path.join(screenshot_dir, mod) + if not os.path.isdir(mod_dir): + continue + for meth in sorted(os.listdir(mod_dir)): + test_dir = os.path.join(mod_dir, meth) + if not os.path.isdir(test_dir): + continue + for f in os.listdir(test_dir): + if not f.startswith('btn'): + continue + h = _frame_hash(os.path.join(test_dir, f)) + if h: + dirs_per_hash.setdefault(h, set()).add(test_dir) + _FRAME_DIR_COUNTS.update((h, len(d)) for h, d in dirs_per_hash.items()) + _GENERIC_FRAME_HASHES.update( + h for h, dirs in dirs_per_hash.items() if len(dirs) >= 3) + def _pick_best_frame(test_dir, btn_files): - """Pick the best screenshot for a test, skipping setUp noise frames. - setUp always produces: btn00000 (wipe confirm) + btn00001 (load_device confirm). - Real test frames come after. If only setUp frames exist, return None.""" + """Pick the best screenshot for a test. + + setUp noise (wipe/load frames) is removed at capture time for the signing + tests (see reset_screenshots / setup_mnemonic_*), so the frames here are + the test's own operation confirms. Defensive layers on top: + - blank/near-blank frames (idle, lock glyph) are NEVER shown — a reject + that fires before any confirm UI gets no image, not a blank one; + - rank by how test-SPECIFIC a frame is (fewest other test dirs showing the + byte-identical screen), so shared chrome (the load-device prompt, policy + toggles) loses to the test's own screens, yet still renders when it IS + the content (gate tests whose every frame is shared chrome); + - density breaks ties (the address/amount screen carries more lit pixels + than a bare "Sign?" prompt); dense out-of-band frames (QR screens) are + a last resort behind in-band ones. + + ponytail: specificity census + density, no OCR — capture-time reset is the + real guard, this is the safety net. + """ if not btn_files: return None - # 3+ frames: [0]=setUp wipe, [1]=setUp load or instruction detail, [-1]=final confirm - # Prefer second-to-last frame -- it's the instruction-specific content - # (amounts, addresses, parameters). The last frame is usually a generic - # "Sign this transaction?" confirmation that's the same for every tx. - if len(btn_files) > 2: - # Use second-to-last for instruction detail, skip setUp frames - idx = -2 if len(btn_files) > 2 else -1 - return os.path.join(test_dir, btn_files[idx]) - elif len(btn_files) == 2: - # 2 frames: btn00000 is always setUp (wipe confirm), btn00001 is the test. - # Always show btn00001 -- it's the only real test frame. - return os.path.join(test_dir, btn_files[1]) - else: - # Single frame -- almost always setUp noise (wipe confirm from setUp). - return None + inband, dense = [], [] + for f in btn_files: + p = os.path.join(test_dir, f) + r = _frame_lit_ratio(p) + if r is None or r < 0.02: + continue # unreadable or blank/lock — never show + if r > 0.55: + dense.append((r, f)) # QR/near-full: last resort, real content + continue + h = _frame_hash(p) + inband.append((_FRAME_DIR_COUNTS.get(h, 1), -r, f)) + if inband: + inband.sort() + return os.path.join(test_dir, inband[0][2]) + if dense: + dense.sort() + return os.path.join(test_dir, dense[-1][1]) + return None def detect_fw(): try: @@ -238,9 +340,22 @@ def detect_fw(): v = f'{r.major_version}.{r.minor_version}.{r.patch_version}'; c.close(); return v except: return None +# Census of everything the merged JUnit actually contained, so the report can +# state how much of the run it covers. Without this the PDF silently implies +# that its catalog IS the test suite -- an RC audit read "no dice in the report" +# as "dice is untested" when test_reset_device_dice had in fact run green. +JUNIT_CENSUS = {'ran': 0, 'skipped': 0, 'native': 0} + + def parse_junit(path): """Parse junit XML for pass/fail. Returns dict keyed by 'module::method' (precise) - and 'method' (fallback). Module is extracted from classname: tests.test_msg_foo.TestBar → test_msg_foo.""" + and 'method' (fallback). Module is extracted from classname: tests.test_msg_foo.TestBar → test_msg_foo. + + Native gtest suites carry a bare classname ("Dice", "Storage") with no dotted + python module, so they get keyed as 'Suite::Test'. They used to produce no + 'mod::meth' key at all, which made every native unit test structurally + impossible to put in SECTIONS -- the firmware-unit XMLs were merged in and + then silently unusable.""" if not path or not os.path.exists(path): return {} import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET results = {} @@ -251,14 +366,28 @@ def parse_junit(path): elif tc.find('error') is not None: status = 'error' elif tc.find('skipped') is not None: status = 'skip' else: status = 'pass' + JUNIT_CENSUS['ran'] += 1 + # 'ran' counts every collected testcase, skips included. A version-gated + # feature test that SKIPs on an older emulator is NOT evidence the feature + # works, so the two must never be reported as one number. + if status == 'skip': + JUNIT_CENSUS['skipped'] += 1 # Extract module from classname: tests.test_msg_foo.TestBar → test_msg_foo mod = '' if cls: parts = cls.split('.') for p in parts: - if p.startswith('test_msg_') or p.startswith('test_sign_') or p.startswith('test_verify_'): + # Any test module, not just the test_msg_/test_sign_/test_verify_ + # families. test_storage_version_gate matched none of those, so + # it produced no 'mod::meth' key and all eight of its results + # were invisible -- the section rendered "Pending (no firmware + # support yet)" while the tests were passing. + if p.startswith('test_'): mod = p break + if not mod and '.' not in cls: + mod = cls # native gtest suite + JUNIT_CENSUS['native'] += 1 results[f'{cls}.{name}'] = status # Key by module::method (disambiguates collisions like test_sign_btc_eth_swap) if mod: @@ -274,7 +403,187 @@ def parse_junit(path): # (id, module, method, title, context, [screenshots]) # context = why this test exists, what it proves, what user sees +# Tests whose whole point is the ordered on-device review sequence — render +# every review screen in order (who/what/why), not a single "best" thumbnail. +FULL_SEQUENCE_TESTS = { + # The additive invariant IS an ordered-sequence claim: the decoded screens + # are additional and the baseline raw review still follows them. Showing a + # best-of-3 sample would hide exactly the thing being proved. + ('test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_successful_decode_still_runs_the_raw_review'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_v2_schema_decode_still_runs_the_raw_review'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_failed_signature_falls_back_to_the_unverified_review'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_binding_happy_path_signs_and_recovers'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_erc20_approve_unlimited'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_uniswap_v2_eth_to_token'), + # The newest/highest-stakes tx shapes get the full ordered walkthrough too. + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_eip7702_setcode_authorization'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_erc4337_entrypoint_v0_7_handleops'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_safe_exectransaction'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_permit2_permit_transfer_from'), + ('test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', + 'test_v2_calldata_length_mismatch_falls_back_to_raw_review'), + # Native THOR/MAYA memo hardening: the raw memo pager (MEMO 1/N .. N/N, + # complete memo bytes, sole memo gate) IS the security story — show every + # page for every memo variant, not a single best frame. + ('test_msg_thorchain_signtx', 'test_thorchain_sign_tx'), + ('test_msg_mayachain_signtx', 'test_mayachain_sign_tx_memos'), + ('test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_swap_max_fields_are_fully_paged'), +} + +def _v_catalog_tests(start_id=17): + """Generate one V-section test entry per CLEARSIGN_FLOWS flow (skipping + 'aave-v3-supply', the flagship V9 walkthrough). THE catalog is the + single source of truth — growing it (keepkeylib/clearsign_catalog.py) + needs no changes here, unlike a hand-typed per-flow entry that would + silently go stale (as happened when the old hand-written V17-V23 test + names drifted from the dynamically-generated ones). + + Every entry gets a NON-EMPTY screenshots hint: screenshot_filter() below + only includes tests whose hint list is non-empty in the Phase-1 capture + filter, so an empty list here would silently exclude a flow from ever + getting an OLED screenshot. + """ + if not CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + return [] + out = [] + i = start_id + for f in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + if f['key'] == 'aave-v3-supply': + continue + method = 'test_clearsign_' + f['key'].replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_') + + def _arg_shown(a): + # Render what the OLED will actually show for this arg: + # STRING -> the attested label; ADDRESS -> abbreviated 0x…; + # TOKEN_AMOUNT -> decimal-scaled amount + symbol (or UNLIMITED). + v = a['value'] + if a['format'] == 4: # ARG_FORMAT_STRING + return v.decode('ascii', 'replace') + if a['format'] == 1: # ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS + return '0x%s..%s' % (v.hex()[:4], v.hex()[-4:]) + if a['format'] == 5: # ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT + dec, symlen = v[0], v[1] + sym = v[2:2+symlen].decode('ascii', 'replace') + amt = v[2+symlen:] + if len(amt) == 32 and amt == b'\xff' * 32: + return 'UNLIMITED ' + sym + n = int.from_bytes(amt, 'big') + if dec: + scaled = ('%f' % (n / 10 ** dec)).rstrip('0').rstrip('.') + else: + scaled = str(n) + return '%s %s' % (scaled, sym) + return a['name'] + + shows = '; '.join('%s: %s' % (a['name'], _arg_shown(a)) + for a in f['args'][:3]) + # Prefer any TOKEN_AMOUNT/ADDRESS/STRING label as the screenshot hint + # so it reads like what the OLED will actually show. + hint_names = [a['name'] for a in f['args'][:2]] or [f['method']] + ctx = ('%s.%s (%s). %s AdvancedMode OFF; the bound metadata is the ' + 'only reason this contract data may sign. Real tx: to=0x%s..%s, ' + 'chainId %d. Decode: %s.' % ( + f['protocol'], f['method'], f['category'], f.get('why', ''), + f['to'].hex()[:4], f['to'].hex()[-4:], f['chain_id'], shows)) + out.append(( + 'V%d' % i, 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', method, + '%s %s — clear-signed, zero hex' % (f['protocol'], f['method']), + ctx, + hint_names, + )) + i += 1 + return out + + +_V_CATALOG_TESTS = _v_catalog_tests(start_id=17) + SECTIONS = [ + ('J', 'Display Binding - What the Device Signs Is What It Shows', '7.14.2', + 'The 7.14.2 security release changed what reaches the OLED on the signing paths. Every ' + 'defect it fixed was a case of the device hashing bytes it never rendered, or rendering ' + 'text it could not vouch for. These tests exist to capture those screens: a passing wire ' + 'assertion proves the device refused or signed, but only the screen proves the user was ' + 'told the truth about what they approved.', + [ + 'DISCLOSURE RULE: every byte covered by the signature must be reachable on screen.', + '', + 'The defects this section guards against, all shipped at some point:', + '- bytes past an embedded NUL were signed and never drawn ("%s" stops at 0x00)', + '- whitespace padding pushed a tail past the cut with no warning', + '- 456 bytes past the initial chunk were hashed with a clear-sign screen showing', + ' confident token amounts for calldata the device had not seen', + '- an unresolved token rendered as the literal "Unknown token value" and signed', + '- a truncated memo dropped its last character (Confirm limit 42 vs 420)', + '', + 'A test here with an EMPTY screenshot list is deliberate: refusal paths draw nothing,', + 'and their evidence is the Failure on the wire plus the absence of a ButtonRequest.', + ], + [ + ('J1', 'test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx', 'test__sign_transformERC20', + '0x transformERC20 raw disclosure', + 'A 1480-byte transformERC20 payload exceeds one 1024-byte chunk. The device must NOT ' + 'clear-sign it as a token swap, because the bytes past the initial chunk are hashed ' + 'without being decoded. With AdvancedMode on it falls to the raw path, where the byte ' + 'count shown must be the FULL length (1480), not the chunk length (1024) - a short ' + 'count would under-report what is being signed.', + ['Raw contract data screen showing the full byte count']), + ('J2', 'test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx', 'test_sign_0x_swap_ERC20_to_ETH', + '0x sellToUniswap names both assets', + 'Clear-signing is only honest when BOTH token words resolve to known assets. This ' + 'payload resolves (USDC -> ETH) and must name both sides with real amounts. The ' + 'failure this guards is a screen naming a DEX while showing no amount.', + ['Swap screen naming both assets and amounts']), + ('J3', 'test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx', 'test_sign_longdata_swap', + 'Long 0x calldata stays disclosed', + 'Calldata spanning multiple chunks must not silently lose its tail from the display ' + 'while remaining inside the signature.', + ['Contract data screen']), + ('J8', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', + 'test_contract_handler_streamed_calldata_signs_full_data', + 'Streamed calldata is fully covered', + 'Calldata delivered across several chunks must be hashed in full and disclosed in full. ' + 'This is the positive control for the chunk-completeness gate. NOTE: every test in ' + 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards currently SKIPS in CI under requires_firmware, so no ' + 'screen can be captured for it yet - the screenshot list stays empty until the gate ' + 'opens, rather than declaring an expectation nothing can satisfy.', + []), + ('J9', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', 'test_eip1559_requires_chain_id', + 'Omitted chain_id is refused before any screen', + 'Without a chain_id the device cannot name the network, and a signature would be ' + 'pre-EIP-155 - replayable on every EVM chain. The refusal happens before the first ' + 'confirm(), so NO screen is drawn and no ButtonRequest is emitted. The empty ' + 'screenshot list below is the assertion.', + []), + ('J10', 'test_verify_typed_data', 'test_structured_eip712_is_refused', + 'Structured EIP-712 is closed by default', + 'The legacy JSON parser could not guarantee that every displayed value was the ' + 'canonical value being hashed, and one screen took its title from the attacker-supplied ' + 'domain name. The feature is withdrawn rather than shipped with a screen it could not ' + 'vouch for: zero screens, refusal on the wire.', + []), + ('J11', 'test_msg_binance_sign_tx', 'test_transfer', + 'Binance denom renders in full', + 'A long denom must render completely and must not overflow the formatting buffer.', + ['Transfer screen showing the full denom']), + ('J12', 'test_msg_ping', 'test_ping_long_body_is_paged', + 'A long body is paged, not clipped', + 'A body that will not fit one screen is shown across several, with the page number ' + 'in the title. Before 7.14.2 the device drew what fitted and stopped - no ellipsis, ' + 'no warning - and a later warning screen claimed "Hold to view it anyway" while ' + 're-drawing the same clipped text. These captures are the evidence that the ' + 'remainder is now actually reachable. The press DURATIONS (click to page, hold to ' + 'approve) are not assertable in an emulator with no physical button.', + ['Numbered page screens covering the whole body']), + ('J13', 'test_msg_ping', 'test_ping_short_body_is_not_paged', + 'A body that fits is not paged', + 'The control for S12. A fitting body must still take exactly one screen with an ' + 'unnumbered title - otherwise a pager that numbered every confirmation, making ' + 'ordinary approvals cost extra presses, would pass unnoticed.', + ['Single unnumbered confirmation screen']), + ]), ('X', 'Device Specifications', '0.0.0', 'The KeepKey is an open-source hardware wallet built on an ARM Cortex-M3 (STM32F205, 120MHz) ' 'with a 256x64 monochrome OLED, single confirmation button, and micro-USB interface. The ' @@ -295,13 +604,28 @@ def parse_junit(path): '- Input: single capacitive button (confirm/reject)', '- USB: micro-B, HID + WebUSB transports, HID fallback', '- Storage: BIP-39 seed encrypted in isolated flash region', - '- Curves: secp256k1, ed25519, NIST P-256, Pallas (Zcash)', + '- Curves: secp256k1, ed25519, NIST P-256; regular firmware also includes Pallas/Orchard', '', 'SECURITY MODEL:', '- All private key operations happen on-device, keys never leave', '- Every transaction output displayed on OLED for user verification', '- PIN grid randomized on each prompt (position-based, not digit-based)', '- BIP-39 passphrase creates hidden wallets (plausible deniability)', + '', + 'FIRMWARE VARIANTS (7.15, PR #282):', + '- Full multi-chain (default): all coin families including Zcash Orchard privacy;', + ' firmware_variant = model name.', + '- Bitcoin-only (KK_BITCOIN_ONLY): only Bitcoin + Testnet; all altcoin and', + ' shielded-Zcash handlers stripped; firmware_variant = KeepKeyBTC (EmulatorBTC', + ' on the emulator). Clients gate multi-chain-only tests on this string.', + '- There is no separate Zcash artifact: KK_ZCASH_PRIVACY is ON for the regular', + ' product and OFF only for KK_BITCOIN_ONLY.', + '', + 'SEED LOCK (7.15, PR #282):', + '- A seed created under bitcoin-only firmware is stamped in a reserved storage-', + ' version band. Multi-chain firmware refuses to load it and requires an explicit', + ' wipe (wipe-to-exit); the seed is never exposed to stripped-out code. Old', + ' multi-chain firmware treats the band as unknown and resets.', ], []), ('C', 'Core - Device Lifecycle', '7.0.0', @@ -439,8 +763,12 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'or information leaks. Verifies input sanitization.', []), ('C27', 'test_msg_getentropy', 'test_entropy', - 'Hardware RNG entropy', - 'Reads random bytes from the hardware RNG. Used to verify the entropy source is functional.', + 'Hardware RNG audit budget and lock policy', + 'Proves a fresh initialized, PIN-protected, locked device still requires confirmation; ' + 'then proves an uninitialized device returns exactly 8 x 8192 bytes (64 KiB) without a ' + 'press, with exact lengths, unique blocks, and conservative catastrophic-failure health ' + 'checks. The next request must restore confirmation. These checks detect a stuck or ' + 'grossly biased source; they are not a statistical certification of the hardware RNG.', []), ('C28', 'test_msg_cipherkeyvalue', 'test_encrypt', 'Symmetric key encryption', @@ -463,6 +791,95 @@ def parse_junit(path): ['Wordlist rejection warning']), ]), + ('K', 'Seed Generation Hardening (7.15)', '7.15.0', + 'The 7.15 changes to how a seed comes into existence: user-supplied dice entropy folded in ' + 'on-device, and the PIN key-derivation rewrap. These ran green from the first 7.15 RC but ' + 'appeared nowhere in this report, because the catalog could not reference native firmware ' + 'unit tests at all and nobody had catalogued the two new pyk cases. Absent evidence read as ' + 'absent coverage during an RC audit, which is exactly the failure this section exists to ' + 'prevent.', + [ + 'DICE: user rolls a d6 on-device; short press advances 1-6, long press commits, undo backs out.', + 'The roll string is hashed and the digest confirmed on the OLED before it is mixed in.', + 'MIX: int_entropy = SHA256(int_entropy || rolls), folded in BEFORE the host EntropyRequest,', + 'so the device commits to its own contribution first and the host cannot choose the seed.', + 'ABORT: any aborted reset must disarm EntropyAck, or a later host EntropyAck would derive', + 'a seed from sha256(0*32 || host_bytes) -- entirely host-chosen. That is K2.', + 'PIN KDF: a v16 storage blob must still unlock and then rewrap to v19, or the upgrade bricks.', + ], + [ + ('K1', 'test_msg_resetdevice', 'test_reset_device_dice', + 'Dice entropy end-to-end', + 'Drives the full on-device dice flow over DebugLink: 99 rolls injected in chunks with undo ' + 'exercised, extras past the cap dropped. Asserts the device-computed digest equals ' + 'SHA256 of exactly the expected roll string, then derives the mnemonic from the post-mix ' + 'internal entropy and compares -- which is what proves the rolls actually reached the seed ' + 'rather than being collected and discarded.', + ['Dice entry screen', 'Digest confirmation']), + ('K2', 'test_msg_resetdevice', 'test_reset_reentry_disarms_entropy_ack', + 'Aborted reset disarms EntropyAck', + 'Regression for a host-chosen-seed hole: reset_init aborts left awaiting_entropy set from ' + 'an earlier run while zeroing int_entropy, so a following EntropyAck derived the seed ' + 'from host bytes alone. Arms a reset, re-enters with dice, cancels, and asserts the ' + 'next EntropyAck is refused with "Not in Reset mode" and the device stays uninitialized.', + []), + ('K3', 'Dice', 'RollsForStrength', + 'Roll count per seed strength', + 'd6 carries log2(6)=2.585 bits, so 128/192/256-bit seeds need 50/75/99 rolls ' + '(the Coldcard convention). A short count would silently weaken the seed.', + []), + ('K4', 'Dice', 'MixZeroEntropyVector', + 'Mix known-answer vector (zero entropy)', + 'SHA256(0x00*32 || "123456") against a hardcoded digest. Pins the mix construction so a ' + 'refactor cannot quietly change how dice enter the seed.', + []), + ('K5', 'Dice', 'MixNonZeroEntropyVector', + 'Mix known-answer vector (non-zero entropy)', + 'Same construction with a non-zero starting entropy buffer, pinned to a hardcoded digest.', + []), + ('K6', 'Dice', 'MixDependsOnRolls', + 'Different rolls produce different entropy', + 'Two mixes differing only in the final roll must diverge. Catches a mix that ignores its ' + 'roll argument -- the failure mode where dice appear to work and contribute nothing.', + []), + ('K7', 'Dice', 'MixUsesExactCount', + 'Only the counted rolls contribute', + 'Bytes past the declared roll count must not affect the result, so uninitialized tail ' + 'bytes of the roll buffer can never leak into seed material.', + []), + ('K8', 'Storage', 'PinKdfRewrapsToActiveVersionAfterCorrectPin', + 'Correct PIN unlocks and rewraps to the ACTIVE KDF', + 'The migration path for the hardened PIN KDF: an existing device must still unlock with ' + 'its current PIN, and any rewrap must target whatever KDF the build actually has ' + 'enabled. Renamed from PinKdfV16RewrapsToV19AfterCorrectPin because it is no longer ' + 'v19-specific -- the test now asserts BOTH sides of the STORAGE_PIN_KDF_V19 gate, so it ' + 'is meaningful in the shipping build where v19 is off. If this regressed, every ' + 'upgrading device would be locked out of its own seed.', + []), + ('K8b', 'Storage', 'PinUnlocksAfterRebootUnderV17', + 'The PIN still opens the wallet after a reboot', + 'The whole round trip in device order: create, set a PIN, serialize the V17 record as ' + 'storage_commit() does, reload into fresh state as a boot would, unlock, decrypt. Every ' + 'other storage test stays in RAM, and the wallet lockout this guards against lived ' + 'exactly on the serialize/reboot boundary -- a wrap the persisted record could not ' + 'describe, so the next boot derived the wrong KDF and every PIN failed.', + []), + ('K9', 'Storage', 'PinKdfV2FlagIsVersionedInV19', + 'KDF version flag is recorded in v19', + 'The new KDF is marked in the storage version band, so firmware can tell which derivation ' + 'a blob was written with instead of guessing.', + []), + ('K10', 'Storage', 'StorageUpgrade_Normal', + 'Normal storage upgrade path', + 'Baseline upgrade across storage versions with policies and cache preserved.', + []), + ('K11', 'Storage', 'NoopSecMigrate', + 'Idempotent security migration', + 'Re-running the migration on already-migrated storage must be a no-op rather than a ' + 'second rewrap.', + []), + ]), + ('B', 'Bitcoin', '7.0.0', 'Bitcoin is the primary chain and most extensively tested. Covers legacy P2PKH, P2SH-wrapped ' 'SegWit, native SegWit (bech32), and Taproot (P2TR). Transaction signing validates that the ' @@ -562,37 +979,76 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'Transaction with both legacy and SegWit inputs in the same transaction.', []), ('B20', 'test_msg_signtx_p2tr', 'test_send_p2tr_only', - 'Sign Taproot P2TR tx', - 'Taproot (BIP-341/342) with Schnorr signatures. Newest address type with improved ' - 'privacy and efficiency.', - ['Taproot confirmation']), - ('B21', 'test_msg_signmessage', 'test_sign', + 'Create a Taproot P2TR output', + 'Pays from SegWit inputs to a P2TR output. This exercises P2TR output parsing and ' + 'display, but does not exercise a Schnorr key-path spend.', + ['Taproot output confirmation']), + ('B21', 'test_msg_signtx_taproot', 'test_send_p2tr', + 'Sign a Taproot key-path spend', + 'Spends a BIP-86 P2TR input using BIP-341 SIGHASH_DEFAULT and a BIP-340 Schnorr ' + 'signature. The 64-byte witness is compared byte-for-byte with an independently ' + 'computed reference value. The complete 153-byte transaction is then parsed as ' + 'BIP-144 and must consume every byte, proving the witness stack and the 4-byte ' + 'locktime footer actually reached the host rather than only the signature field.', + ['P2TR recipient confirmation', 'Fee confirmation']), + ('B22', 'test_msg_signtx_taproot', 'test_send_p2tr_with_change', + 'Sign P2TR with device-derived change', + 'Derives m/86\'/0\'/0\'/1/0 on-device, emits a P2TR change output, and verifies ' + 'the Schnorr witness against an independent BIP-340/341 reference. The complete ' + '196-byte transaction is parsed as BIP-144 and must consume every byte, and the ' + 'change output is matched as a full value/length/script triple.', + ['P2TR recipient confirmation', 'Fee confirmation']), + ('B23', 'test_msg_signtx_taproot', 'test_send_mixed_p2tr_and_legacy', + 'Sign mixed Taproot and legacy inputs', + 'Commits the P2TR signature to both inputs, including the legacy prevout amount and ' + 'scriptPubKey, while independently verifying the resulting Schnorr witness. The ' + 'complete 301-byte transaction is parsed as BIP-144; the Taproot input must carry ' + 'a single 64-byte stack item and the legacy input its empty 0x00 witness.', + []), + ('B24', 'test_msg_signtx_taproot', + 'test_mixed_p2tr_requires_every_input_amount', + 'Reject incomplete mixed Taproot commitments', + 'Fails closed when any input amount is absent, preventing the device from producing ' + 'a valid Schnorr signature over an incomplete BIP-341 commitment.', + []), + ('B25', 'test_msg_signtx_taproot', + 'test_mixed_p2tr_rejects_wrong_legacy_amount', + 'Reject a tampered legacy prevout amount', + 'Fetches the actual legacy prevout and rejects a host-provided amount that differs by ' + 'one satoshi, preventing a false BIP-341 commitment in a mixed-input transaction.', + []), + ('B26', 'test_msg_getaddress_taproot', 'test_show_taproot_address', + 'Show BIP-86 address on OLED', + 'Displays the complete bech32m Taproot receive address and QR code on the trusted ' + 'device screen for host-independent verification.', + ['Taproot address + QR code']), + ('B27', 'test_msg_signmessage', 'test_sign', 'Sign message with BTC key', 'Signs arbitrary text with a BTC address key. Used for proof-of-ownership and login.', ['Sign message on OLED']), - ('B22', 'test_msg_signmessage_segwit', 'test_sign', + ('B28', 'test_msg_signmessage_segwit', 'test_sign', 'Sign message with SegWit key', 'Message signing with P2SH-SegWit address key.', []), - ('B23', 'test_msg_signmessage_segwit_native', 'test_sign', + ('B29', 'test_msg_signmessage_segwit_native', 'test_sign', 'Sign message with bech32 key', 'Message signing with native SegWit address key.', []), - ('B24', 'test_msg_verifymessage', 'test_message_verify', + ('B30', 'test_msg_verifymessage', 'test_message_verify', 'Verify signed message', 'Device verifies a message signature against a BTC address.', []), - ('B25', 'test_msg_signtx_bgold', 'test_send_bitcoin_gold_nochange', + ('B31', 'test_msg_signtx_bgold', 'test_send_bitcoin_gold_nochange', 'Sign Bitcoin Gold tx', 'BTG fork uses same signing code with different chain parameters.', []), - ('B26', 'test_msg_signtx_dash', 'test_send_dash', + ('B32', 'test_msg_signtx_dash', 'test_send_dash', 'Sign Dash transaction', 'Dash special transaction types (InstantSend-compatible).', []), - ('B27', 'test_msg_signtx_grs', 'test_one_one_fee', + ('B33', 'test_msg_signtx_grs', 'test_one_one_fee', 'Sign Groestlcoin tx', 'GRS uses Groestl hash instead of SHA-256d for tx hashing.', []), - ('B28', 'test_msg_signtx_zcash', 'test_transparent_one_one', - 'Sign Zcash transparent tx', - 'Zcash transparent transactions use Overwinter/Sapling serialization format with ' - 'version group IDs and expiry height.', - ['Zcash tx confirm']), + # Zcash transparent signing moved to its own section Y (Zcash Transparent). ]), ('E', 'Ethereum', '7.0.0', 'Ethereum covers native ETH transfers, ERC-20 tokens, EIP-1559 gas, personal message signing ' - '(EIP-191), and contract interactions. The device displays checksummed addresses (EIP-55), ' - 'values in ETH with 18-decimal precision, and gas parameters.', + '(EIP-191), and contract interactions. The device displays checksummed addresses (EIP-55) and ' + 'gas parameters. Amount UNIT rule: values below 1 gwei (1e9 wei) show as raw "Wei" (there is ' + 'no smaller human unit to scale to); values at or above 1 gwei show 18-decimal-scaled ETH (or ' + 'the chain-native ticker on other EVM chains). Some tests below use small conformance-vector ' + 'amounts (e.g. 10 wei) for deterministic-signature pinning — their OLED frames legitimately ' + 'show raw "Wei", not a display bug.', [ 'ETH TRANSFER: Show "Send X ETH to 0x..." -> show gas -> confirm -> sign with secp256k1', 'ERC-20: Decode transfer(to,amount) from contract data -> show token name + amount', @@ -601,7 +1057,7 @@ def parse_junit(path): ], [ ('E1', 'test_msg_ethereum_getaddress', 'test_ethereum_getaddress', - 'Derive ETH address', 'Standard m/44\'/60\'/0\'/0/0 derivation. EIP-55 checksum address.', ['ETH address']), + 'Derive ETH address', 'Standard m/44\'/60\'/0\'/0/0 derivation. EIP-55 checksum address. No screen: GetAddress without show_display returns on the wire and draws nothing.', []), ('E2', 'test_msg_ethereum_signtx', 'test_ethereum_signtx_nodata', 'Sign ETH transfer', 'Simple value transfer with no contract data. Device shows recipient + amount + gas.', @@ -655,6 +1111,85 @@ def parse_junit(path): '0x swap ETH to ERC-20', 'DEX aggregator swap via 0x protocol.', []), ('E15', 'test_msg_ethereum_cfunc', 'test_sign_execTx', 'Contract function call', 'Generic contract call signing.', []), + ('E16', 'test_sign_typed_data', 'test_ethereum_sign_typed_data_hash', + 'EIP-712 typed data is BLIND-signed, behind AdvancedMode', + 'The only working EIP-712 path. The host computes both 32-byte hashes and the device ' + 'signs them, so it cannot show a recipient, an amount or a chain -- it shows the two ' + 'digests and asks whether to trust the host. The test proves both halves of the gate: ' + 'with AdvancedMode ON the signature is produced, and with it OFF the device refuses ' + 'with "Enable AdvancedMode to blind-sign typed hashes". Every EIP-712 signature a ' + 'KeepKey produces today, Permit2 approvals included, takes this path.', + []), + ('E16b', 'test_sign_typed_data', 'test_ethereum_sign_x402_eip3009', + 'Structured EIP-712 is DISABLED, and x402 EIP-3009 is refused', + 'This entry asserted the opposite until 2026-08-21, and the report shipped it green: it ' + 'claimed the device "computes the EIP-712 hashes itself and displays every ' + 'TransferWithAuthorization field", and declared two screens for fields that are never ' + 'drawn. The test underneath had already been rewritten to assert the REFUSAL. A reader ' + 'would have concluded x402 EVM payments clear-sign. They do not.\n' + 'What the test actually proves: Ethereum712TypesValues is answered with ' + '"Structured EIP-712 disabled pending canonical display hardening". The JSON parser ' + 'could not guarantee the displayed value was the value hashed, so 7.14.2 withdrew the ' + 'path rather than ship it. The EIP-712 V4 reference hashes stay in the fixture, unused, ' + 'as the vector to re-assert when the streaming implementation lands (SRS-7.16 R-4.1, ' + 'R-4.2).\n' + 'The screen list is EMPTY because a refusal draws nothing -- the evidence is the ' + 'Failure on the wire.', + []), + ('E17', 'test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity', 'test_sign_uni_approve_liquidity_ETH', + 'Uniswap V2 add-liquidity approve (pending)', + 'PENDING, disclosed: known emulator limitation — an approve to an unknown (non-registry) ' + 'token contract cannot complete against the kkemu emulator (matches the sibling ' + 'add/remove-liquidity skips below); the device-firmware path is not in question, only ' + 'CI emulator coverage. Real-device testing is unaffected.', + []), + ('E18', 'test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity', 'test_sign_uni_add_liquidity_ETH', + 'Uniswap V2 add liquidity ETH+token (pending)', + 'PENDING, disclosed: same emulator limitation as E17 — a daily-driver LP-deposit flow ' + 'with no PDF proof on this build; tracked for real-device verification.', + []), + ('E19', 'test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity', 'test_sign_uni_remove_liquidity_ETH', + 'Uniswap V2 remove liquidity ETH+token (pending)', + 'PENDING, disclosed: same emulator limitation as E17.', + []), + ('E20', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit', 'test_deposit_legacy_selector', + 'THORChain router deposit() (legacy selector)', + 'Cross-chain swap via the THORChain router contract — a daily-driver EVM<->THORChain ' + 'swap path, natively decoded (asset/amount/memo) without clear-sign metadata. The ' + 'native amount shown is the signed msg.value (the ABI amount word is a router-ignored ' + 'hint and is never displayed as the send amount).', + ['Deposit amount (msg.value)', 'Full memo']), + ('E21', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit', 'test_deposit_with_expiry_selector', + 'THORChain router depositWithExpiry()', + 'Newer router selector variant with an expiry field; same native decode path. The ABI ' + 'memo length word is read from the calldata (not assumed 64 bytes) and the padded memo ' + 'must end exactly at the calldata end.', + ['Deposit amount (msg.value)', 'Full memo']), + ('E22', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit', + 'test_deposit_with_expiry_non_thor_address_blind_sign_blocked', + 'THORChain router call to a non-pinned address is blind-sign gated', + 'WHY it can be trusted: the router CONTRACT ADDRESS is pinned; a call shaped like a ' + 'THORChain deposit but sent to an unpinned address is refused native decoding and falls ' + 'through to the ordinary blind-sign gate instead of being silently native-decoded — the ' + 'fix for the router-spoofing / blind-sign-bypass class of attack.', + ['Blind sign disabled (Blocked)']), + ('E23', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit', + 'test_deposit_with_expiry_avalanche_router', + 'THORChain deposit on Avalanche clear-signs (per-chain router pin)', + 'THORChain deploys its router at a DIFFERENT address on every EVM chain, so the pin is ' + '(chain_id, address) together. Before the chain scope, only mainnet deposits ever ' + 'matched and an AVAX->ETH swap fell into the blind-sign gate. The Avalanche C-Chain ' + 'router (00dc61..f1d4) is verified live against THORChain /inbound_addresses; the ' + 'native amount screen shows msg.value with the CHAIN\'s ticker (AVAX), and the ' + 'signature is ECDSA-recovered against the host-built pre-image over chainId 43114.', + ['Thorchain router screen', 'AVAX amount', 'Full memo']), + ('E24', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit', + 'test_deposit_unpinned_chain_blind_sign_blocked', + 'Deposit on an unpinned chain is blind-sign gated', + 'The mainnet router ADDRESS on a chain with no pinned router (BSC) must not inherit ' + 'the deposit UX — the same address on another chain may hold unrelated attacker code. ' + 'Falls to the AdvancedMode gate; rejection is pre-UI (no frame).', + []), ]), ('R', 'Ripple (XRP)', '7.0.0', @@ -670,7 +1205,7 @@ def parse_junit(path): ], [ ('R1', 'test_msg_ripple_get_address', 'test_ripple_get_address', - 'Derive XRP address', 'Standard m/44\'/144\'/0\'/0/0 derivation.', ['XRP address']), + 'Derive XRP address', 'Standard m/44\'/144\'/0\'/0/0 derivation. No screen: address is returned on the wire; the display path is the show variant.', []), ('R2', 'test_msg_ripple_sign_tx', 'test_sign', 'Sign XRP payment', 'Payment with amount in drops (1 XRP = 1,000,000 drops).', ['XRP send']), ('R3', 'test_msg_ripple_sign_tx', 'test_ripple_sign_invalid_fee', @@ -698,6 +1233,66 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'Sign Cosmos with memo', 'Memo field displayed for exchange deposit tags.', []), ]), + ('P', 'Osmosis', '7.15.0', + 'Osmosis is the Cosmos-ecosystem DEX, signed with the same amino encoding as Cosmos Hub and ' + 'derived from the same coin type (118). 7.15.0 CHANGED how every Osmosis amount is drawn: the ' + 'confirm screens formatted with atof() + "%.6f", and a float carries only ~7 significant ' + 'decimal digits, so a large transfer was displayed ROUNDED on the screen the user approves ' + '(123456789.123456 OSMO rendered as 123456792.000000). The signature was always over the ' + 'correct amount — the error was confined to the display, which is the half a hardware wallet ' + 'exists to get right. Amounts now use bounded decimal-string formatting; native uosmo is ' + 'canonical uint64, unknown denominations remain exact base-unit strings, and every long ' + 'signed asset is renderer-paged before signing.', + [ + 'SEND: recipient + OSMO amount rendered from integer base units, never a float', + 'PRECISION: 15-significant-digit amounts display exactly, not rounded to 7', + 'UNKNOWN DENOM: shown as raw base units — the device does not guess a decimal point', + ], + [ + ('P1', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_sign_tx', + 'Sign Osmosis send', + 'Baseline MsgSend: recipient and a whole-OSMO amount on the confirm screen.', + ['OSMO send']), + ('P2', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_send_amount_beyond_float_precision', + 'Amount beyond float precision displays exactly', + 'The regression this section exists for: 123456789123456 uosmo needs 15 significant ' + 'digits. The old float path drew 123456792.000000 OSMO over a transaction moving ' + '123456789.123456 OSMO. The captured frame is the evidence.', + ['Exact large amount']), + ('P3', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_send_subunit_amount', + 'Sub-unit amount keeps its tail', + '500 uosmo is 0.000500 OSMO — no integer part and six decimals; it must not collapse ' + 'to 0 or lose the trailing digits.', + ['Sub-unit amount']), + ('P4', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_send_denom_is_committed_to_the_signature', + 'Direct-wire denomination is committed', + 'Two otherwise-identical raw MsgSend requests using uosmo and uatom produce different ' + 'signatures, proving the reviewed denomination is part of the signed payload rather ' + 'than a hardcoded display-only label.', + []), + ('P5', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_send_rejects_noncanonical_wire_amounts', + 'Noncanonical and overflowing uosmo are refused', + 'Raw-wire 01, -1, leading-space and UINT64 overflow values are rejected before any ' + 'display/signature divergence can occur.', + []), + ('P6', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_swap_max_fields_are_fully_paged', + 'Maximum Swap fields are fully paged', + 'Two maximum-size 68-character IBC denominations plus 32-digit amounts force the ' + 'exact OLED renderer across separate bounded screens. The full ordered input and minimum-output ' + 'sequence is captured before the signature is returned.', + ['Swap Input', 'Minimum Output']), + ('P7', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_amount_is_committed_to_the_signature', + 'Displayed amount is in the digest', + 'Two sends differing only in amount produce different signatures, so the confirm ' + 'screen is bound to what is signed rather than decorative.', + []), + ('P8', 'test_msg_osmosis_signtx', 'test_osmosis_signing_is_deterministic', + 'Deterministic nonces (RFC6979)', + 'Identical input yields an identical signature; a mismatch is a key-recovery risk, ' + 'not a cosmetic one.', + []), + ]), + ('H', 'THORChain', '7.0.0', 'THORChain is a decentralized cross-chain liquidity protocol. Native RUNE transactions use amino ' 'encoding with thor1... bech32 addresses. The memo field is the critical security element - it ' @@ -715,11 +1310,18 @@ def parse_junit(path): ('H1', 'test_msg_thorchain_getaddress', 'test_thorchain_get_address', 'Derive THORChain address', 'Bech32 thor1... address.', []), ('H2', 'test_msg_thorchain_signtx', 'test_thorchain_sign_tx', - 'Sign THORChain tx', 'Native RUNE transfer with memo.', ['Memo display']), + 'Sign THORChain tx — raw memo paged in full (7 memo variants)', + 'Native RUNE transfer. The COMPLETE raw memo is paged on the OLED (MEMO 1/N..N/N, ' + '72-char pages) as the sole memo gate — no structured summary can hide trailing ' + 'content, and a reject on any page aborts signing. The frames below show every page ' + 'for each routed memo shape (SWAP/s/=/ADD/a/+ and bare-pool).', + ['Memo pages 1/N..N/N', 'Send + asset', 'Sign confirm']), ('H3', 'test_msg_thorchain_signtx', 'test_sign_btc_eth_swap', 'Sign BTC->ETH swap', 'Cross-chain swap via THORChain memo routing.', ['Swap memo']), ('H4', 'test_msg_2thorchain_signtx', 'test_thorchain_sign_tx_deposit', - 'Sign THORChain deposit', 'LP deposit transaction.', []), + 'Sign THORChain deposit', 'LP deposit transaction (MsgDeposit): asset, amount and the ' + 'full memo are displayed from the exact bytes being signed.', + ['Deposit asset + memo']), ]), ('M', 'Maya Protocol', '7.0.0', @@ -737,9 +1339,29 @@ def parse_junit(path): ('M1', 'test_msg_mayachain_getaddress', 'test_mayachain_get_address', 'Derive Maya address', 'Bech32 maya1... address.', []), ('M2', 'test_msg_mayachain_signtx', 'test_sign_btc_eth_swap', - 'Sign BTC-ETH swap via Maya', 'Cross-chain swap via Maya memo routing.', []), + 'Sign BTC-ETH swap via Maya', 'Cross-chain swap via Maya memo routing (BTC OP_RETURN ' + 'side).', []), ('M3', 'test_msg_mayachain_signtx', 'test_sign_eth_add_liquidity', - 'Sign swap via Maya', 'Cross-chain swap via Maya memo routing.', []), + 'Add liquidity via Maya router (EVM side)', + 'depositWithExpiry() to the firmware-pinned Maya router; the signature is recovered ' + 'to the device signer over the exact calldata.', []), + ('M4', 'test_msg_mayachain_signtx', 'test_mayachain_sign_tx', + 'Sign native CACAO MsgSend — raw memo paged', + 'Native CACAO transfer. Signature verified host-side against the amino sign-doc ' + 'digest (account/chain/fee/memo/amount/addresses all bound) and the known device ' + 'pubkey — no frozen vectors to go stale. The complete raw memo is paged on the OLED ' + '(thorchain_confirm_full_memo is the sole memo gate for native MAYA too).', + ['CACAO send confirm', 'Memo page', 'Sign confirm']), + ('M5', 'test_msg_mayachain_signtx', 'test_mayachain_sign_tx_memos', + 'Native memo variants — every routed shape paged in full', + 'Each memo shape MAYA routes on (SWAP/s/=/ADD/a/+ and bare-pool) signs, each ' + 'signature is bound to its exact memo bytes via the sign-doc digest, and every page ' + 'of every memo is displayed (frames below, in order).', + ['Memo pages 1/N..N/N per variant']), + ('M6', 'test_msg_mayachain_signtx', 'test_mayachain_remove_liquidity', + 'Native WITHDRAW memo', + 'WITHDRAW:pool:basis-points memo paged in full; signature digest-verified.', + ['WITHDRAW memo page']), ]), # Binance Chain (BNB) - REMOVED: chain deprecated, beacon chain shut down 2024. @@ -784,22 +1406,35 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'cause fund loss or invalid transactions on the block-lattice.', [])]), - # ===== 7.14 NEW FEATURES ===== - ('V', 'EVM Clear-Signing', '7.14.0', - 'NEW: Verified transaction metadata for EVM contracts. Host sends a signed blob with contract ' - 'name, function, and decoded parameters. Device verifies blob signature against trusted key, ' - 'then shows human-readable details with VERIFIED icon. Blind-sign policy gating is deferred ' - 'to firmware 7.15+.', + # ===== 7.15.0 NEW FEATURES ===== + ('V', 'EVM Clear-Signing', '7.15.0', + 'The purpose of clear-signing: instead of blind-signing an opaque hash, the device screen ' + 'answers WHO / WHAT / WHY before the user approves. WHO = the validated contract address ' + '(full, never truncated) + attested protocol name. WHAT = the decoded method and its typed ' + 'arguments in human terms (recipient address, "amount: 10.5 DAI" — not raw wei). WHY it can ' + 'be trusted = a signer whose key the device trusts attested that this exact description ' + 'matches this exact transaction, and the signature is REFUSED unless the signed digest ' + 'equals the metadata\'s committed tx hash (fail-closed, replay-proof). ' + 'NEW (phase 1): there is NO built-in "KeepKey says this is safe" key — every signer is loaded ' + 'at runtime (LoadClearsignSigner, user-confirmed, RAM-only) and EVERY tx it describes is ' + 'preceded by a warning naming the signer alias + fingerprint ("NOT verified by KeepKey"). ' + 'The built-in warning-free path returns once the signer infra is hardened. ' + 'The V9 flow below shows the full ordered review of a REAL Aave V3 supply() tx: the actual ' + 'calldata (selector 0x617ba037 + asset + amount + onBehalfOf + referralCode, 132 bytes) is ' + 'signed, and the metadata decodes it to protocol=Aave V3, asset=DAI, amount=10.5 DAI.', [ - 'CLEAR-SIGN: Signed metadata -> verify signature -> VERIFIED icon + method + decoded args', - 'BLIND SIGN: No metadata + AdvancedMode on -> contract data signed (no gate until 7.15+)', + 'LOAD SIGNER: LoadClearsignSigner -> on-device confirm (alias + fingerprint) -> RAM slot', + 'WHO: warning (signer alias) + Contract: 0x… (full address) + protocol name', + 'WHAT: Call: + each decoded arg (ADDRESS / TOKEN_AMOUNT "10.5 DAI" / STRING)', + 'WHY: signature refused unless signed digest == metadata tx_hash (replay-proof)', + 'BLIND SIGN: No metadata + AdvancedMode off -> unknown contract data hard-rejected', ], [ ('V1', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_valid_metadata_returns_verified', 'Valid metadata accepted', - 'Correctly signed metadata blob is accepted. Device shows VERIFIED icon with decoded ' - 'method name and contract address.', - ['VERIFIED icon + method']), + 'Correctly signed metadata blob from a loaded signer is accepted. Device shows the ' + 'clearsign warning (signer alias + fingerprint) then the decoded method + contract. No screen: this asserts the VERIFIED classification on the wire, before any render.', + []), ('V2', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_wrong_key_returns_malformed', 'Wrong signing key rejected', 'Metadata signed with wrong key is rejected as malformed.', []), ('V3', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_tampered_method_returns_malformed', @@ -814,17 +1449,437 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'Signature verification math', 'Unit test for the metadata blob signature algorithm.', []), ('V7', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_tampered_blob_fails_verification', 'Tampered blob fails', 'Any byte change in the blob invalidates the signature.', []), + ('V7a', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_empty_payload_returns_malformed', + 'Empty metadata payload rejected', 'A zero-length blob classifies MALFORMED, never VERIFIED.', []), + ('V7b', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_truncated_payload_returns_malformed', + 'Truncated metadata payload rejected', + 'A blob cut short of the minimum structural size classifies MALFORMED.', []), + ('V7c', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_extra_trailing_bytes_returns_malformed', + 'Trailing garbage bytes rejected', + 'A blob with extra bytes appended past its declared structure classifies MALFORMED — ' + 'the parser cannot be tricked by appended data.', []), + ('V7d', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_wrong_version_returns_malformed', + 'Unknown version byte rejected', 'A blob with a version byte the firmware does not ' + 'recognize classifies MALFORMED rather than being guessed-parsed.', []), + ('V7e', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_zero_signature_returns_malformed', + 'All-zero signature rejected', 'A blob with a zeroed signature field classifies ' + 'MALFORMED — an attacker cannot skip signing by leaving the field blank.', []), + ('V7f', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_empty_key_slot_returns_malformed', + 'Metadata against an empty key slot rejected', + 'A blob referencing a signer slot with no key loaded classifies MALFORMED.', []), ('V8', 'test_msg_ethereum_signtx', 'test_ethereum_blind_sign_allowed', 'Blind sign permitted (AdvancedMode ON)', 'Contract data with AdvancedMode enabled. Device allows signing. ' - 'Blind-sign blocking deferred to 7.15+.', + 'Blind-sign policy gating covered in 7.15.0+.', + []), + ('V9', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_binding_happy_path_signs_and_recovers', + 'Full who/what/why review of a real Aave V3 supply()', + 'TX: to=0x7d27..c7a9 (Aave V3 Pool), data=0x617ba037 + asset(DAI) + amount(10.5e18) + ' + 'onBehalfOf(0xd8dA..6045) + referralCode(0), chainId 1. METADATA decodes it to ' + 'protocol="Aave V3", asset=0x6B17..1d0F, amount=10.5 DAI, onBehalfOf=0xd8dA..6045, ' + 'bound to the exact sighash. The OLED screens below are the full ordered review the ' + 'user sees: warning -> Call: supply -> Contract -> protocol -> asset -> amount (10.5 ' + 'DAI, decimal-scaled, NOT wei) -> onBehalfOf -> tx confirm. The signature then recovers ' + 'to the device signer over THIS tx digest, proving the metadata was bound to this tx.', + ['warning', 'Call: supply', 'Contract', 'protocol: Aave V3', 'asset', 'amount: 10.5 DAI', + 'onBehalfOf', 'tx confirm']), + ('V10', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_replay_rejected_when_digest_differs', + 'Replay reject (binding enforced)', + 'Metadata committed to tx A; signing tx B (same contract/selector/chain, different ' + 'calldata) is refused at send_signature with "Metadata does not match signed transaction".', + ['Verified screen then reject']), + ('V11', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_advanced_mode_gate', + 'AdvancedMode blind-sign gate', + 'AdvancedMode OFF + unknown contract + no metadata is hard-rejected; ON signs; a ' + 'natively-decoded ERC-20 transfer is unaffected.', + ['Blind sign disabled (Blocked)']), + ('V12', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_cancel_clears_metadata_not_reused', + 'Cancel clears metadata (no stale reuse)', + 'Cancelling the verified confirm clears the blob; a later matching tx is not silently ' + 'signed with the stale metadata.', + []), + ('V13', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_load_required_before_verify', + 'No built-in key: load required (phase 1)', + 'On a fresh device a valid metadata blob is MALFORMED until a signer is loaded. Proves ' + 'there is no hardcoded warning-free trust path in phase 1.', + []), + ('V14', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_load_signer_cancel_refuses', + 'Load signer requires on-device consent', + 'Pressing reject on the LoadClearsignSigner confirm refuses the signer; the slot stays ' + 'empty and metadata for it is MALFORMED.', + ['Load clearsigner confirm']), + ('V15', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_load_signer_invalid_pubkey_rejected', + 'Invalid signer key rejected', + 'Uncompressed, zero (empty-slot sentinel), and truncated pubkeys are refused before any ' + 'confirm — a malicious host cannot install a bogus key.', + []), + ('V16', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_load_signer_bad_alias_rejected', + 'Signer alias sanitized', + 'Empty, oversized, control-char and format-specifier aliases are rejected — the alias ' + 'is rendered on the warning screen, so it cannot carry a display-spoofing payload.', + []), + + # ── ethereum signing-path guards (the blind-sign policy negative + # half + the EIP-1559 type/fee/chain_id regression suite) ── + ('VG1', 'test_msg_ethereum_signtx', 'test_ethereum_blind_sign_blocked', + 'Blind sign refused (AdvancedMode OFF)', + 'Unknown contract data with AdvancedMode disabled is hard-rejected before any confirm ' + 'screen — the negative half of the V8 policy pair.', + ['Blind signing disabled (Failure)']), + ('VG2', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', 'test_eip1559_requires_chain_id', + 'EIP-1559 requires chain_id', + 'A type-2 tx with no chain_id would hash a garbage pre-image and recover the wrong ' + 'signer; the device rejects it outright instead of signing an unbroadcastable tx.', + []), + ('VG3', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', 'test_eip1559_no_priority_fee_signs', + 'EIP-1559 zero priority fee signs correctly', + 'Regression test for the non-canonical-RLP wrong-signer bug: a type-2 tx with zero/' + 'absent priority fee must still hash and sign to the correct device address.', + []), + ('VG4', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', 'test_type2_without_max_fee_rejected', + 'Type-2 tx without max_fee_per_gas rejected', + 'The 0x02 envelope prefix comes from msg.type but the fee fields come from ' + 'has_max_fee_per_gas, so a type-2 tx carrying only gas_price would hash a legacy ' + 'fee into a 1559 field list. Refused, because a signature over a malformed field ' + 'list is still a valid signature over SOMETHING.', + []), + ('VG5', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', 'test_legacy_with_max_fee_rejected', + 'Legacy tx with max_fee_per_gas rejected', + 'Mixing legacy gas_price semantics with EIP-1559 fee fields is refused rather than ' + 'silently mis-hashed.', + []), + ('VG6', 'test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards', + 'test_contract_handler_streamed_calldata_signs_full_data', + 'Streamed calldata signs the full payload', + 'A contract-clear-sign handler must not confirm only the first chunk while signing ' + 'unshown streamed bytes after it.', + []), + ] + _V_CATALOG_TESTS + [ + ('V%d' % (17 + len(_V_CATALOG_TESTS)), + 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_clearsign_batch_all_payloads', + 'Batch: sign + device-validate the whole catalog', + 'Signs every CLEARSIGN_FLOWS payload (%d real-world flows spanning DEX swaps, lending, ' + 'staking, approvals/permits, NFTs, governance, bridges, and account abstraction — ' + 'ERC-4337, EIP-7702, Safe multisig, Permit2, Uniswap V4) in one batch and has the ' + 'device validate each: every blob returns VERIFIED, and the same blob with one ' + 'tampered byte returns MALFORMED. Together with the frozen offline reference vectors ' + '(RFC 6979 deterministic — byte-identical blobs, sha256 snapshots in the test), this ' + 'makes python-keepkey the complete signer reference: produce these bytes and the ' + 'device accepts them; deviate by one byte and it refuses.' % ( + len(CLEARSIGN_FLOWS) if CLEARSIGN_FLOWS else 0), + []), + + # ── v2 static schema (no online signer) ────────────────────── + # v2 attests only the decode SCHEMA (no tx_hash, no arg values); the + # DEVICE decodes the argument values from the calldata it signs. This + # removes the per-tx online signer: the catalog is signed once, offline. + # Offline format tests run every cycle; the on-device decode test is + # gated to the release that ships v2 (METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA). + ('VS1', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_layout_has_no_tx_hash', + 'v2 schema blob carries no tx_hash / no values', + 'The v2 (static schema) blob attests only how to decode a curated ' + '(chainId, contract, selector): method + per-arg name/format (+ static ' + 'decimals/symbol). It has NO committed tx_hash and NO argument values — ' + 'so it can be signed ONCE, offline, and served from a CDN with no hot ' + 'key. The device decodes the values itself from the calldata it signs.', + []), + ('VS2', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', + 'test_token_arg_carries_static_decimals_symbol_not_value', + 'v2 token arg = static decimals/symbol, value decoded on-device', + 'A TOKEN_AMOUNT arg encodes the token\'s static decimals + symbol (a ' + 'property of the contract), but NOT the amount — the amount is decoded ' + 'from the calldata word on-device, then rendered "1.5 USDC".', + []), + ('VS3', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_frozen_body_snapshot', + 'v2 wire format frozen vs firmware parser', + 'The canonical v2 body\'s length + sha256 are frozen, so the ' + 'serializer can never drift from firmware\'s parse_v2_args() undetected ' + '— the same byte-parity discipline the v1 reference vectors use.', + []), + ('VS4', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', 'test_rejects_dynamic_format', + 'v2 scope: fixed-word types only', + 'v2 decodes fixed single ABI words (ADDRESS / AMOUNT / TOKEN_AMOUNT) — ' + 'approve/transfer/transferFrom and fixed-arg calls. Dynamic types ' + '(string/bytes/arrays) are rejected by the serializer and fall to the ' + 'blind-sign path on-device; a bounded dynamic decoder is future work.', + []), + ('VS5', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', + 'test_v2_transfer_decodes_signs_and_recovers', + 'v2 on-device: decode from calldata, sign, recover', + 'END-TO-END with AdvancedMode OFF: a v2 transfer() schema blob + a real ' + 'transfer(to, amount) tx. The device decodes to/amount from the calldata ' + 'and clear-signs; the signature recovers to this device\'s signer over ' + 'the tx digest — so the who/what/why shown was bound to the exact tx, ' + 'with no tx_hash. The offline format tests above pin the wire format ' + 'the device decodes.', + ['Clearsign warning', 'v2 decoded transfer to/amount', 'Sign transaction']), + ('VS6', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', + 'test_v2_calldata_length_mismatch_falls_back_to_raw_review', + 'v2 decode-mismatch falls back to raw review (fail-closed)', + 'THE headline v2 security property: schema says 2 words, calldata carries 3. ' + 'decode_v2_args\' structural completeness check fails, so the device does NOT ' + 'clear-sign a decode that would not match what it is about to sign. With ' + 'AdvancedMode ON it falls through to the ordinary unverified raw review, and ' + 'the ordered OLED captures prove the decoded ClearSign display was not used.', + ['Unverified transaction warning', 'Raw data review', 'Sign transaction']), + ('VS7', 'test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing', + 'test_v2_unsupported_arg_format_returns_malformed', + 'v2 unsupported arg format rejected at blob load', + 'A hand-crafted v2 blob using an unsupported dynamic format (STRING) — the kind the ' + 'Python serializer itself refuses to build — is independently rejected by the ' + 'device\'s own parser as MALFORMED, before any calldata is even considered.', + []), + ]), + + ('G', 'Hive', '7.15.0', + 'NEW: Hive (Graphene) support with SLIP-0048 role derivation. Four role keys per account ' + '(owner, active, posting, memo), each an STM-prefixed secp256k1 key. Signs Graphene ' + 'transactions — transfer, the account-create / account-update authority operations ' + 'Pioneer uses to onboard sponsored accounts, Keychain signBuffer message signing (dApp ' + 'login), and parsed generic operations (vote, comment, custom_json). Every signature ' + 'recovers to the role key it was signed under, each serialized field is bound at its byte ' + 'position, and every user-controlled string is paged IN FULL on the OLED (72-char ASCII ' + 'pages; non-ASCII shown as complete hex). Message signing is restricted to printable ' + 'ASCII: a Hive transaction digest is SHA256(chain_id || binary tx), so the printable-only ' + 'whitelist makes signable messages provably disjoint from every transaction preimage on ' + 'ANY fork chain — closing the message->transaction signature-oracle class.', + [ + 'KEYS: SLIP-0048 m/48\'/13\'/role\'/0\'/account\' -> STM-prefixed pubkey per role', + 'SIGN TX: Graphene serialize -> per-op confirm (amount + recipient + full memo pages) -> ECDSA sign', + 'ACCOUNT CREATE: attest 4 role authorities + new-account name -> owner-key signature', + 'SIGN MESSAGE: printable ASCII only -> role named + full message paged -> SHA256(msg) signed', + 'SIGN OPS: device re-parses the Graphene bytes; unrecognized ops are refused (no blind-sign)', + ], + [ + ('G1', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_get_public_key_active', + 'Derive active-role key', + 'Active-role key derives and returns an STM-prefixed key plus the 33-byte compressed ' + 'raw pubkey (0x02/0x03 prefix).', + []), + ('G2', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_get_public_keys_all_roles', + 'Derive all four role keys', + 'Owner, active, posting and memo keys all derive, are distinct, and STM-formatted. The ' + 'bulk path agrees with the single-key path for the active role.', + []), + ('G3', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_transfer', + 'Sign Hive transfer', + 'Transfer (op 2) signs; the signature recovers to the active key. The device shows the ' + 'recipient account and amount, and every serialized field (from/to/amount/asset/memo) ' + 'is bound at its position so a rewritten recipient or amount fails.', + ['Transfer amount + recipient']), + ('G4', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_account_create', + 'Sign account-create attestation', + 'account_create (op 9) signs and recovers to the owner key — the attestation a Pioneer ' + 'sponsor verifies before spending an account-creation token. Binds the four role ' + 'authorities, creator, new-account name and fee at their exact positions.', + ['Account-create confirm']), + ('G5', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_account_update', + 'Sign account-update', + 'account_update (op 10) signs and recovers to the owner key; the replacement ' + 'authorities are bound to their slots so updating the wrong authority fails.', + ['Account-update confirm']), + ('G6', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_transfer_max_memo_ok', + 'Max-length memo paged in full (boundary)', + 'A memo of exactly 440 bytes (the serialization limit) still signs, and the OLED ' + 'pages the COMPLETE memo (MEMO 1/7..7/7) — nothing is truncated behind a ' + 'benign-looking prefix.', + ['Memo pages 1/7..7/7']), + ('G7', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_transfer_rejects_long_memo', + 'Over-limit memo rejected', + 'A 441-byte memo fails with a specific "memo too long" error before any signing. ' + 'Rejection happens before any confirm UI, so there is no OLED frame — the proof is ' + 'the specific device error.', + []), + ('G8', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_transfer_rejects_foreign_path', + 'Foreign derivation paths rejected', + 'BIP-44 trees, wrong registry, unassigned roles and short paths are all refused for ' + 'transaction signing — the SLIP-0048 fence.', + []), + ('G9', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_transfer_rejects_wrong_network', + 'Wrong network index rejected', + 'A path whose network index is not Hive (13\') must not sign.', + []), + ('G10', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_transfer_rejects_non_active_roles', + 'Transfer requires the active role', + 'Transfers signed under owner/posting/memo paths are refused; only active\' moves ' + 'funds.', + []), + ('G11', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_posting', + 'Sign Hive message (dApp login)', + 'Keychain signBuffer contract: signature over SHA256(raw message bytes) with the ' + 'posting key. The device names the signing role and pages the full message text. The ' + 'signature recovers to the posting key — exactly what a Hive dApp verifies for login.', + ['Signing-role screen', 'Message text']), + ('G12', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_all_roles', + 'Message signing across roles', + 'Posting, active and memo roles may sign (owner\' is refused); each signature ' + 'recovers to that role\'s distinct key.', + ['Role + message screens']), + ('G13', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_long_printable_ok', + 'Long message paged in full', + 'Printable text over the display budget routes through 72-char pages — never ' + 'silently truncated — and the signature covers every byte.', + ['Message pages']), + ('G14', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_max_length_ok', + 'Max-length (1024 B) message', + 'A message of exactly 1024 bytes (the proto cap) pages and signs.', + ['1024-byte message paged']), + ('G15', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_nonprintable_bytes', + 'SECURITY: binary messages refused (oracle fix)', + 'A binary "message" equal to chain_id || serialized_tx would hash to a valid ' + 'TRANSACTION signature on any fork chain — an active-key fund-theft oracle. The ' + 'printable-ASCII whitelist refuses every binary buffer, making signable messages ' + 'provably disjoint from all transaction preimages. Rejection is pre-UI (no frame); ' + 'the proof is the "printable" device error.', + []), + ('G16', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_rejects_chain_id_prefix', + 'Chain-id-prefixed message refused', + 'Belt-and-suspenders subset of G15: a message starting with the Hive mainnet chain ' + 'id is refused outright.', + []), + ('G17', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_rejects_oversize', + 'Oversize message refused', + '1025 bytes must fail — the proto cap and the handler agree on 1024.', + []), + ('G18', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_message_rejects_bad_paths', + 'Message signing path fence', + 'Foreign trees, wrong network, unassigned roles, owner\' and short paths are all ' + 'refused — the same SLIP-0048 fence as transactions.', + []), + ('G19', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_vote', + 'Parsed vote operation', + 'The device re-parses the Graphene bytes and displays voter, author, permlink and ' + 'weight from the exact bytes being signed — a host serializer bug can only produce a ' + 'rejection, never a silent wrong-sign.', + ['Vote op screens']), + ('G20', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_comment', + 'Parsed comment operation', + 'Comment title and body are user-controlled strings — both paged in full (72-char ' + 'ASCII pages / complete hex for non-ASCII).', + ['Comment fields paged']), + ('G21', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_custom_json_active', + 'Parsed custom_json (active)', + 'custom_json id and payload paged in full under the active role.', + ['custom_json paged']), + ('G22', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_custom_json_posting', + 'Parsed custom_json (posting)', + 'Same shape under the posting role (the common dApp path).', + []), + ('G23', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_downvote_and_default_chain_id', + 'Downvote + default chain id', + 'Negative weights display correctly and the default chain id binds the mainnet ' + 'digest.', + []), + ('G24', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_role_fences', + 'Ops role fences', + 'vote/comment sign under posting\'; custom_json under its declared auth; memo\' and ' + 'owner\' never sign operations.', + []), + ('G25', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_rejects_excluded_and_unknown_ops', + 'Unknown/excluded ops refused (no blind-sign)', + 'transfer-shaped and unrecognized operations inside SignOperations are refused — ' + 'there is no blind-sign fallback for Graphene bytes the device cannot display.', + []), + ('G26', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_rejects_malformed_structure', + 'Malformed Graphene structure refused', + 'Truncated fields, wrong op counts and trailing bytes are all parse failures, not ' + 'sign-what-you-can.', + []), + ('G27', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_rejects_oversize', + 'Oversize operations refused', + 'Payloads beyond the proto cap are refused before parsing.', + []), + ('G28', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_account_ops_reject_non_owner_roles', + 'Account authority ops require owner', + 'account_create / account_update sign only under the owner role.', + []), + # ── Phase 2/3 op table (fw #315) ──────────────────────────────── + # These ran green in the full suite from the day they landed, but had + # no SECTIONS entry, so screenshot_filter() never selected them and + # eleven newly clear-signed ops shipped with zero OLED proof. A + # correct signature over bytes the user was shown something else for + # is the exact failure the clear-sign table exists to prevent, so + # every op that renders a confirm screen gets a non-empty hint. + ('G29', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_limit_order_create', + 'Internal market: limit_order_create', + 'The op that motivated phase 3 — a HIVE->HBD market swap. Both sides of the order ' + 'are shown with their symbols pinned (a swapped symbol hides a ~2000x value ' + 'difference behind an identical-looking number), and order id / fill-or-kill / ' + 'expiry get their own screen so they cannot be crowded off the first.', + ['Sell and receive amounts', 'Order terms screen']), + ('G30', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_limit_order_cancel', + 'Internal market: limit_order_cancel', + 'Cancelling names the order id and the owner. No recipient row is forged — the op ' + 'acts on the signer\'s own book entry.', + ['Cancel order screen']), + ('G31', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_active_tier_value_ops', + 'Active-tier value ops', + 'transfer_to_vesting, convert, transfer_to/from_savings, delegate_vesting_shares ' + 'and withdraw_vesting all move or lock value, so all six sign only under active. ' + 'Each renders its own amount + counterparty.', + ['Power up', 'Convert', 'Savings deposit/withdraw', 'Delegation', 'Power down']), + ('G32', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_posting_tier_ops', + 'claim_reward_balance is posting tier', + 'Claiming is not spending, so it signs under posting. Three reward assets across ' + 'two screens (the OLED body fits three rows; a fourth would be signed but never ' + 'shown).', + ['Claim rewards screens']), + ('G33', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_zero_amount_semantics', + 'Zero means something for two ops, nothing for the rest', + '0 VESTS stops a power-down and removes a delegation — both legitimate, so zero is ' + 'NOT rejected there and the screen must say which action it is. Everywhere else a ' + 'zero amount is a no-op and refused.', + ['Stop power down', 'Remove delegation']), + ('G34', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_asset_symbol_and_precision_pinned', + 'Asset symbol pinned to its protocol precision', + 'HIVE/HBD are 3-decimal, VESTS is 6. The parser refuses any other pairing: a wrong ' + 'precision moves the decimal point on the confirmation screen relative to what the ' + 'chain applies.', + []), + ('G35', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_comment_options_binds_to_its_comment', + 'comment_options binds to its own comment', + 'Payout redirection is only accepted immediately after a comment op with the same ' + 'author and permlink. Standing alone it could attach beneficiaries to a post the ' + 'user published earlier and is not reviewing on this screen.', + ['Payout options screens']), + ('G36', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_comment_options_beneficiary_rules', + 'Beneficiary ordering, uniqueness and total enforced on-device', + # Scoped to exactly what the mapped test asserts. It covers three + # rejections — unsorted, duplicate, and weights summing over 100%. + # The extension-count cap, the 1-8 count bound and per-beneficiary + # weight range are enforced by the parser but are NOT exercised here, + # so the entry must not claim them. + 'Beneficiaries must be strictly ascending by account (which also makes them unique) ' + 'and their weights must sum to no more than 10000 bp. Unsorted, duplicate and ' + 'over-100% lists are each refused.', + # Rejection-only: every case here is _assert_ops_fails, so the device + # refuses before drawing anything and the capture would be three + # frames of the idle home screen — a report entry that LOOKS like + # visual proof and is not. The per-beneficiary confirm screens are + # captured by G35, which actually signs a two-beneficiary payout. + []), + ('G37', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_account_update2_rejects_authority_change', + 'account_update2 cannot rotate keys', + 'Only the profile-metadata form is in the table. Any owner/active/posting/memo_key ' + 'field present is a hard reject — the op-9/10 device-derived-keys invariant applied ' + 'field-level.', + []), + ('G38', 'test_msg_hive', 'test_hive_sign_ops_truncated_bodies_rejected', + 'Truncated op bodies refused', + 'A body cut short mid-field is a parse failure, not sign-what-you-can.', []), ]), ('S', 'Solana', '7.14.0', - 'NEW: Full Solana with Ed25519 (SLIP-10), base58 addresses, 37 instruction types across 7 ' - 'programs. Key security fix: full 44-character address display replaces old 8-char truncation ' - 'that was a spoofing vector.', + 'Full Solana with Ed25519 (SLIP-10), base58 addresses, 37 instruction types across 7 ' + 'programs. The 44-character address is displayed in full: the old 8-character truncation ' + 'was a spoofing vector, because two addresses agreeing on their first eight base58 ' + 'characters are cheap to grind. The open gap this release closes is versioned (v0) ' + 'transactions whose accounts live in an Address Lookup Table. The device cannot resolve a ' + 'table it has never seen, so until now it routed them to the blind-sign gate (S24) and ' + 'signed accounts it never showed. S26-S29 are KKSOLSW1: a loaded provider attests the ' + 'resolved accounts, bound to sha256(raw_tx), and the device DISPLAYS them -- in addition ' + 'to, never instead of, the review that already existed.', [ 'ADDRESS: m/44\'/501\'/0\' Ed25519 -> full 44-char base58 on OLED', 'SIGN TX: Parse instructions -> per-instruction confirmation -> Ed25519 sign', @@ -832,7 +1887,7 @@ def parse_junit(path): ], [ ('S1', 'test_msg_solana_getaddress', 'test_solana_get_address', - 'Derive Solana address', 'Full 44-character base58 address displayed on OLED.', ['Full 44-char address']), + 'Derive Solana address', 'Full 44-character base58 address displayed on OLED. No screen: the drawn address is test_solana_show_address (S3b).', []), ('S2', 'test_msg_solana_getaddress', 'test_solana_different_accounts', 'Different account indices', 'Verifies different accounts produce different addresses.', []), ('S3', 'test_msg_solana_getaddress', 'test_solana_deterministic', @@ -848,9 +1903,11 @@ def parse_junit(path): ('S7', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_deterministic', 'Deterministic signing', 'Same tx always produces same signature.', []), ('S8', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_token_transfer', - 'SPL Token transfer', - 'Send SPL tokens to destination. OLED shows token amount and recipient address.', - ['Token amount + address']), + 'Unchecked SPL Transfer requires AdvancedMode', + 'Unchecked Transfer (op 3) carries NO signed mint — the device cannot prove which ' + 'token is moving, so it is forced through the AdvancedMode blind-sign gate (matching ' + 'Trezor and Ledger, which both reject it). Only TransferChecked clear-signs.', + ['Blind-sign gate']), ('S9', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_stake_delegate', 'Stake delegate', 'Delegate SOL to a validator for staking rewards. OLED shows delegate confirmation.', @@ -864,21 +1921,142 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'Set priority fee for transaction. OLED shows compute unit price.', ['Unit price']), ('S12', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_token_transfer_with_metadata', - 'SPL Token with metadata', - 'Token transfer with SolanaTokenInfo (mint, symbol, decimals). OLED shows human-readable token name.', - ['Token name + amount']), + 'Host metadata does NOT bypass the unchecked-transfer gate', + 'An unchecked Transfer accompanied by host SolanaTokenInfo still requires ' + 'AdvancedMode: the mint is not part of the signed instruction, so the metadata is ' + 'unauthenticated and must not make the tx look clear-signable.', + ['Blind-sign gate']), + ('S13', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_token_transfer_checked', + 'TransferChecked clear-signs with the mint on its own screen', + 'TransferChecked (op 12) binds the mint in the signed instruction bytes. The device ' + 'shows "Token mint " on a DEDICATED screen before the amount — the ' + 'authenticated token identity cannot be pushed off-view by a host-controlled symbol ' + '— and decimals come from the signed instruction, never from the host. AdvancedMode ' + 'stays OFF.', + ['Token mint screen', 'Amount + symbol']), + ('S14', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', + 'test_solana_sign_token_transfer_checked_attested_symbol', + 'Signed token definition: symbol attested by a loaded signer', + 'The token_info carries a secp256k1 attestation over (mint, decimals, symbol) by a ' + 'signer loaded via LoadClearsignSigner — the same chain-agnostic trust anchor as EVM ' + 'clear-sign metadata (KeepKey\'s open equivalent of Trezor\'s CoSi-signed token ' + 'definitions). The device verifies it, requires the attested decimals to equal the ' + 'signed instruction\'s, and adds a \'Token "USDC" signed by \' ' + 'screen. An invalid attestation rejects the symbol outright (never falls back to the ' + 'claim).', + ['Load signer consent', 'Token mint screen', 'Signed-by alias + fingerprint']), + ('S15', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_token_approve', + 'Unchecked SPL Approve requires AdvancedMode', + 'Approve (op 4) hides the delegated token\'s mint — same gate as unchecked Transfer.', + ['Blind-sign gate']), + ('S16', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', + 'test_solana_sign_create_account_requires_advanced_mode', + 'CreateAccount requires AdvancedMode', + 'CreateAccount assigns the new account\'s owner program and space, which the screen ' + 'does not fully disclose — gated rather than partially clear-signed.', + ['Blind-sign gate']), + ('S17', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', + 'test_solana_sign_set_authority_requires_advanced_mode', + 'SetAuthority requires AdvancedMode', + 'SetAuthority hands over control of a mint/account (including the undistinguishable ' + '"clear authority" case) — an account-takeover vector, gated.', + ['Blind-sign gate']), + ('S18', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_stake_authorize_clearsigns', + 'StakeAuthorize clear-signs role + new authority', + 'Shows the stake account, the role being reassigned (staker/withdrawer) and the full ' + 'new authority address.', + ['Role + new authority']), + ('S19', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_stake_withdraw', + 'Stake withdraw shows the destination', + 'The withdrawal destination account is displayed in full — a host cannot silently ' + 'redirect withdrawn SOL.', + ['Withdraw + destination']), + ('S20', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_stake_deactivate', + 'Stake deactivate shows the stake account', + 'The acted-on stake account is named on-screen.', + ['Stake account']), + ('S21', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_multi_instruction_2x_transfer', + 'Multi-instruction: each instruction confirmed', + 'Two transfers in one tx produce INSTR 1/2 and INSTR 2/2 screens — nothing rides ' + 'along unconfirmed.', + ['INSTR 1/2 + 2/2']), + ('S22', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', + 'test_solana_sign_multi_instruction_transfer_and_memo', + 'Transfer + memo both shown', + 'A transfer with an attached memo instruction confirms both.', + ['Transfer + memo screens']), + ('S23', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_versioned_v0_static_verified', + 'Versioned (v0) tx with static keys clear-signs', + 'A v0-format tx whose accounts are all static parses and clear-signs like legacy.', + ['v0 instruction screens']), + ('S24', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', 'test_solana_sign_versioned_v0_opaque', + 'v0 with address-table lookups requires AdvancedMode', + 'Lookup-table accounts cannot be resolved on-device, so the tx routes to the ' + 'blind-sign gate.', + []), + ('S25', 'test_msg_solana_signtx', + 'test_solana_sign_x402_zero_lut_usdc_payment', + 'x402 zero-LUT v0 USDC payment is hardware verified', + 'The sponsor pays fees while the KeepKey key authorizes TransferChecked. The device ' + 'renders 0.002 USDC from firmware-owned mint metadata, derives ATA(payTo, mint) ' + 'offline, and displays the merchant owner only after it matches the signed ' + 'destination token account. The required x402 uniqueness memo is also displayed; ' + 'AdvancedMode stays OFF.', + ['Compute budget', 'Known USDC mint', 'Verified recipient owner', + '0.002 USDC', 'x402 memo']), + # KKSOLSW1 -- the answer to S24. A v0 tx whose accounts live in a + # lookup table cannot be resolved on-device, so today the device signs + # accounts it never showed. These four are the additive invariant + # (section F) restated for Solana, and R-4.1 of SRS-7.15. + ('S26', 'test_msg_solana_lut_attestation', + 'test_attested_accounts_are_shown_and_blind_sign_still_follows', + 'Attested lookup-table accounts are shown, and the blind-sign warning survives', + 'A loaded provider attests the resolved accounts over ' + '"KeepKeySolanaTxAccounts/1" || sha256(raw_tx) || count || keys. The device verifies ' + 'through the same chain-agnostic anchor as every other runtime signer, then adds one ' + 'identity screen and one screen per account IN FRONT of the existing flow. The ' + 'assertion is exact and it is the whole point: the attested run shows ' + 'len(base) + 1 + len(accounts) screens and its TAIL equals the baseline sequence ' + 'exactly. More screens, never fewer.', + ['Provider identity + NOT verified by KeepKey', 'Lookup account 1', + 'Lookup account 2', 'Existing blind-sign warning']), + ('S27', 'test_msg_solana_lut_attestation', + 'test_bad_signature_degrades_to_todays_flow', + 'A signature that does not verify changes nothing', + 'The failure mode of a describer must be silence, not a refusal: a provider outage ' + 'or a botched signature costs the user the extra screens and nothing else. The ' + 'confirmation sequence is asserted EQUAL to the no-attestation baseline, and the ' + 'transaction still signs.', + []), + ('S28', 'test_msg_solana_lut_attestation', + 'test_attestation_does_not_replay_onto_another_transaction', + 'An attestation cannot be replayed onto another transaction', + 'sha256(raw_tx) is inside the preimage, so an attestation is worthless anywhere but ' + 'the transaction it was issued for. The test perturbs one byte of the lookup-table ' + 'address and replays the signature: the device falls back to the baseline flow. ' + 'Without this binding, a provider\'s single honest attestation could be reused to ' + 'describe a transaction it never saw -- the accounts would be real, and the ' + 'transaction spending them would not be.', + []), + ('S29', 'test_msg_solana_lut_attestation', + 'test_no_signer_loaded_means_no_extra_screens', + 'With no signer loaded a well-formed attestation is inert', + 'Trust is opt-in and per-session. A perfectly valid attestation from a provider the ' + 'user never loaded verifies against nothing and renders nothing, which is the ' + 'property that keeps 7.15 safe without any key-management programme.', + []), ]), ('T', 'TRON', '7.14.0', 'NEW: TRON with secp256k1 signing, base58 addresses. Blind-sign via raw_data. ' - 'Structured reconstruct-then-sign and TRC-20 clear-signing deferred to 7.15+.', + 'Structured reconstruct-then-sign and TRC-20 clear-signing deferred to a future release.', [ 'ADDRESS: m/44\'/195\'/0\'/0/0 -> full 34-char base58 TRON address', 'BLIND-SIGN: Raw protobuf data -> hash + sign', ], [ ('T1', 'test_msg_tron_getaddress', 'test_tron_get_address', - 'Derive TRON address', 'Full 34-character base58 address.', ['Full 34-char address']), + 'Derive TRON address', 'Full 34-character base58 address. No screen: the drawn address is test_tron_show_address (T3b).', []), ('T2', 'test_msg_tron_getaddress', 'test_tron_different_accounts', 'Different accounts', 'Different indices produce different addresses.', []), ('T3', 'test_msg_tron_getaddress', 'test_tron_deterministic', @@ -894,7 +2072,7 @@ def parse_junit(path): ('N', 'TON', '7.14.0', 'NEW: TON v4r2 wallet contracts. Ed25519 signing with structured field display. ' 'Blind-sign for raw transactions. Memo/comment support. ' - 'Full clear-sign with cell tree reconstruction deferred to 7.15+.', + 'Full clear-sign with cell tree reconstruction deferred to a future release.', [ 'ADDRESS: m/44\'/607\'/0\' -> full 48-char base64url TON address', 'STRUCTURED: Amount + address + memo shown as display context -> sign', @@ -902,7 +2080,7 @@ def parse_junit(path): ], [ ('N1', 'test_msg_ton_getaddress', 'test_ton_get_address', - 'Derive TON address', 'Full 48-character base64url address.', ['Full 48-char address']), + 'Derive TON address', 'Full 48-character base64url address. No screen: the drawn address is test_ton_show_address (N2b).', []), ('N2', 'test_msg_ton_getaddress', 'test_ton_different_accounts', 'Different accounts', 'Different indices produce different addresses.', []), ('N2b', 'test_msg_ton_getaddress', 'test_ton_show_address', @@ -919,34 +2097,190 @@ def parse_junit(path): 'Missing fields rejected', 'Incomplete data refused.', []), ]), - ('Z', 'Zcash Orchard', '7.14.0', - 'NEW: Shielded transactions via PCZT streaming. Orchard hides sender, recipient, and amount ' - 'using ZK proofs. Raw seed access (ZIP-32 Orchard derivation uses BIP-39 seed + Pallas curve). ' - 'Full Viewing Key (FVK) export for watch-only wallets.', + ('Y', 'Zcash Transparent', '7.0.0', + 'Transparent t-address Zcash (send/receive) over the generic Bitcoin UTXO signing path with ' + 'Overwinter/Sapling-v4 branch handling. This is the Zcash functionality that ships ENABLED on ' + 'the regular 7.15.0 build -- t1.../t3... addresses sign like Bitcoin (SECP256K1) with a ' + 'FeeOverThreshold guard. No shielded/Orchard engine is involved; contrast with section Z ' + '(shielded), which also ships in the regular product and is stripped from bitcoin-only.', + [ + 'INPUT: TxInputType over the Zcash coin (t-address, SECP256K1)', + 'METADATA: version_group_id + branch_id for the target upgrade', + 'CONFIRM: amount + destination on the OLED, then sign each input', + 'FEE GUARD: an implausibly high fee triggers a confirmation prompt', + ], + [ + ('Y1', 'test_msg_signtx_zcash', 'test_transparent_one_one', + 'Transparent 1-in 1-out', + 'Sign a standard transparent Zcash spend; the device shows the amount and destination ' + 't-address before producing a signature over the overwinter sighash.', + ['Zcash send confirm']), + ('Y2', 'test_msg_signtx_zcash', 'test_transparent_one_one_fee_too_high', + 'High-fee guard', + 'An implausibly high fee triggers the FeeOverThreshold confirmation before signing.', + []), + ('Y3', 'test_msg_signtx_zcash', 'test_shieldedIn_one_one_fee_1', + 'Transparent spend (fee scenario 1)', + 'Despite the legacy method name, this signs a transparent input/output over the same ' + 'overwinter path (no Orchard).', + []), + ('Y4', 'test_msg_signtx_zcash', 'test_shieldedIn_one_one_fee_2', + 'Transparent spend (fee scenario 2)', + 'Second transparent fee scenario over the overwinter path.', + []), + ]), + + ('Z', 'Zcash Shielded (Orchard)', '7.14.0', + 'Shielded Orchard (PCZT streaming, Full Viewing Key export, unified-address display with an ' + 'on-device ZIP-32 Sec 6.1 seed-fingerprint attestation) ships in the regular 7.15.0 product. ' + 'KK_ZCASH_PRIVACY is enabled for the regular build and disabled only for bitcoin-only. This ' + 'report covers device FVK/address behavior and the Python PCZT streaming contract. Mainnet ' + 'proof construction and the physical shield, deshield, and Orchard-to-Orchard matrix are ' + 'recorded separately in the RC18 release evidence.', [ 'FVK: Derive ak, nk, rivk components via ZIP-32 Orchard path', + 'ADDRESS: Device derives its own unified address + shows it; optional seed-fingerprint pin', 'PCZT: Stream header -> actions one at a time -> confirm each -> return signatures', 'HYBRID: Transparent inputs + Orchard outputs in same tx', ], [ ('Z1', 'test_msg_zcash_orchard', 'test_fvk_reference_vectors', - 'FVK reference vectors', 'FVK output matches known test vectors.', ['FVK export']), + 'FVK reference vectors', 'FVK output matches known test vectors. No screen: reference-vector arithmetic, compared in memory.', []), ('Z2', 'test_msg_zcash_orchard', 'test_fvk_field_ranges', 'FVK field ranges', 'ak, nk, rivk are within valid Pallas curve ranges.', []), ('Z3', 'test_msg_zcash_orchard', 'test_fvk_consistency_across_calls', 'FVK deterministic', 'Same account always produces same FVK.', []), ('Z4', 'test_msg_zcash_orchard', 'test_fvk_different_accounts', 'FVK different accounts', 'Different accounts produce different FVKs.', []), - ('Z5', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', 'test_single_action_legacy_sighash', - 'Sign single Orchard action', 'One shielded action, device shows amount + fee.', ['Shielded confirm']), - ('Z6', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', 'test_multi_action_legacy_sighash', - 'Sign multiple actions', 'Multiple Orchard actions in one transaction.', []), - ('Z7', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', 'test_signatures_are_64_bytes', - 'Signature format', 'Orchard signatures must be exactly 64 bytes (RedPallas).', []), - ('Z8', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', 'test_transparent_shielding_single_input', - 'Transparent to shielded', 'Transparent BTC-like input shielded into Orchard pool.', ['Hybrid shield']), - ('Z9', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', 'test_transparent_shielding_multiple_inputs', - 'Multi-input shielding', 'Multiple transparent inputs shielded in one tx.', []), + ('Z5', 'test_msg_zcash_orchard', 'test_fvk_abandon_mnemonic', + 'FVK abandon-mnemonic vector', + 'FVK derivation matches the Orchard reference vector for the standard abandon mnemonic.', + []), + ('Z6', 'test_msg_zcash_display_address', 'test_zcash_display_address_basic', + 'Display unified address', + 'Device derives its OWN Orchard unified address (u1...) from the ZIP-32 path, shows it ' + 'on the OLED for confirmation, and returns it with the device seed fingerprint. The host ' + 'does not supply the address — this defends against a compromised host showing a fake UA.', + ['Unified address (u1...)']), + ('Z7', 'test_msg_zcash_display_address', 'test_zcash_display_address_bad_path_rejected', + 'Reject malformed address path', + 'A path that is neither m/32\'/133\'/account\' nor an explicit account is rejected with a ' + 'SyntaxError, so no wrong-account address is ever derived silently.', + []), + ('Z8', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_get_orchard_fvk_returns_seed_fingerprint', + 'FVK carries seed fingerprint', + 'ZcashGetOrchardFVK returns a 32-byte ZIP-32 §6.1 seed fingerprint alongside the FVK.', + []), + ('Z9', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_fingerprint_stable_across_accounts', + 'Fingerprint bound to seed not account', + 'The seed fingerprint is identical across account indices — it identifies the device seed.', + []), + ('Z10', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_display_address_helper_accepts_matching_fingerprint', + 'Address display accepts matching fingerprint', + 'When the host supplies expected_seed_fingerprint and it matches, the device derives and ' + 'displays the address and echoes the fingerprint.', + ['Unified address (u1...)']), + ('Z11', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_display_address_helper_rejects_wrong_fingerprint', + 'Address display rejects wrong fingerprint', + 'A mismatched expected_seed_fingerprint is rejected before any derivation — the host ' + 'cannot get an attestation from the wrong device.', + []), + ('Z12', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_display_address_helper_backward_compat', + 'Address display without fingerprint', + 'Omitting expected_seed_fingerprint still works; the device populates the fingerprint on ' + 'the response regardless.', + []), + ('Z13', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_device_fingerprint_matches_python_helper', + 'Fingerprint matches host computation', + 'The device-derived fingerprint equals calculate_seed_fingerprint(seed) — firmware C and ' + 'the python helper agree byte-for-byte for the all-all-all seed.', + []), + ('Z14', 'test_msg_zcash_seed_fingerprint', 'test_sign_pczt_helper_rejects_wrong_fingerprint', + 'PCZT signing rejects wrong fingerprint', + 'A wrong expected_seed_fingerprint on a PCZT signing request is rejected before any ' + 'signing crypto runs.', + []), + ('Z15', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_all_dummy_shield_streams_outputs_inputs_and_no_orchard_sigs', + 'Shield streams dummy actions without device signatures', + 'The client streams transparent inputs/outputs and both dummy Orchard actions, preserves ' + 'their finalized PCZT signatures, and expects no compact device Orchard signatures.', + []), + ('Z16', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_mixed_deshield_returns_only_real_spend_signature', + 'Deshield returns only real-spend signatures', + 'A mixed real/dummy Orchard action set returns one compact signature for the real spend.', + []), + ('Z17', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_private_send_preserves_compact_real_spend_order', + 'Private send preserves real-spend signature order', + 'Compact device signatures remain ordered by the real-spend actions when dummy actions ' + 'are interleaved. OFFLINE CONTRACT TEST -- like every test in test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt, ' + 'it drives a ScriptedTransport with canned responses and never reaches a device. It ' + 'proves the client builds and orders the messages correctly; it proves nothing about ' + 'firmware behaviour, and it can never produce an OLED frame. ZcashSignPCZT is not sent ' + 'to a device anywhere in THIS module. On-device shielded signing is covered ' + 'separately by test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt_device (see Z22), which drives a real ' + 'device and asserts the per-output confirm screens; this module proves only that ' + 'the client builds and orders the messages correctly.', + []), + ('Z18', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_missing_is_spend_is_rejected_before_device_call', + 'Missing spend classification rejected', + 'Every action must explicitly declare is_spend before any device call is made.', + []), + ('Z19', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_host_transparent_sighash_is_rejected_before_device_call', + 'Host transparent sighash rejected', + 'The client refuses a host-provided transparent sighash instead of forwarding it as ' + 'trusted device input.', + []), + ('Z20', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_signature_count_must_match_real_spends', + 'Signature count bound to real spends', + 'The returned compact signature count must equal the number of real-spend actions.', + []), + ('Z21', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt', + 'test_duplicate_action_request_is_rejected', + 'Duplicate action requests rejected', + 'A repeated device request for the same action index aborts the streaming session.', + []), + ('Z22', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt_device', + 'test_shielded_output_review_is_two_screens', + 'Shielded output review: amount and full address (ON DEVICE)', + 'The first test in this suite that sends ZcashSignPCZT to an actual device -- Z15-Z21 ' + 'above are offline contract tests against a scripted transport. Signs a shielded-only ' + 'transaction built from the firmware\'s own known-answer note vector, so the device ' + 'accepts its recomputed commitment, and asserts the output review is two screens. It ' + 'has to be: a unified address is 106 characters, three full body rows, and the body is ' + 'three rows total, so a single confirm holding the question, the address and the amount ' + 'renders 76 characters of address and silently drops the rest along with the amount. ' + 'That screen is the verification gate for Orchard output values -- total_amount on the ' + 'summary is a host-supplied prompt -- so the amount vanishing there is the whole trust ' + 'story. Verified as a regression test: against the shipped 7.15.0 RC emulator it fails ' + 'with "expected 2 ConfirmOutput screens, got 1".', + ['Shielded amount review', 'Shielded recipient address']), + ('Z23', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt_device', + 'test_note_commitment_binds_the_recipient', + 'Tampered recipient breaks the note commitment (ON DEVICE)', + 'Flipping one bit of the recipient makes the device-recomputed cmx disagree with the ' + 'supplied commitment, and signing is refused. This is what stops a host displaying one ' + 'recipient while committing to another.', + []), + ('Z24', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt_device', + 'test_pool_selection_is_honoured', + 'Orchard commitment rejected under the Ironwood pool (ON DEVICE)', + 'The same note commits to a different value in each pool, so offering the Orchard ' + 'commitment while declaring Ironwood must be rejected. Passes trivially if the device ' + 'ignores shielded_pool, which is why it is paired with Z25.', + []), + ('Z25', 'test_msg_zcash_sign_pczt_device', + 'test_ironwood_note_is_accepted', + 'Ironwood commitment for the same note is accepted (ON DEVICE)', + 'The positive half of Z24: identical inputs, Ironwood commitment, accepted. Together ' + 'they prove the pool branch is selected by shielded_pool rather than one path serving ' + 'both.', + []), ]), ('D', 'BIP-85 Child Derivation', '7.14.0', @@ -973,47 +2307,750 @@ def parse_junit(path): ('D6', 'test_msg_bip85', 'test_bip85_invalid_word_count', 'Invalid count rejected', 'Word counts other than 12/18/24 are refused.', []), ]), + ('Q', 'Display Disclosure - What Is Shown Is What Is Signed', '7.14.2', + 'The single property behind every display/sign divergence found in the 7.14.2 audit: two ' + 'requests whose SIGNED BYTES differ must not produce IDENTICAL screens. If two payloads render ' + 'the same pixels, whatever separates them was invisible when the user approved, and the ' + 'signature covers the difference. A failure here means a host can show one thing and have ' + 'another signed - the exact class the OLED exists to prevent.', + [ + 'ASSERTED DIFFERENTIALLY: DebugLinkState.layout is the framebuffer, not text, so these', + 'compare screen sequences. That assumes nothing about wording, fonts or truncation', + 'strategy, so it survives copy changes and cannot be satisfied by a plausible-looking screen.', + '', + 'EACH CASE PUTS THE DIFFERENCE WHERE AN IMPLEMENTATION STOPS LOOKING:', + '- past an embedded NUL: a protobuf bytes field is not a C string; "%s" stops, the signature does not', + '- past whitespace padding: a leading space costs no pixels once wrapped, so a padded body measures as fitting', + '- past one screenful: a truncating renderer drops the tail instead of paging it', + '- behind newlines: exercises the row counter rather than the character count', + '', + 'REFUSAL COUNTS AS A PASS. Declining to sign what it cannot display honestly satisfies', + 'the property; the failure under test is signing it while looking identical to the benign case.', + ], + [ + ('Q1', 'test_msg_display_disclosure', 'test_bytes_past_an_embedded_nul_are_disclosed', + 'Bytes after a NUL are shown', + 'A protobuf bytes field is not a NUL-terminated string. Rendering it with "%s" stops at the ' + 'first NUL while the signature covers message.size bytes, so a payload like ' + '"benign login\\0 AND APPROVE TRANSFER" displays only the benign prefix. This asserts the ' + 'two payloads do not present identically.', + ['Message screen, plain', 'Message screen, NUL-suffixed']), + ('Q2', 'test_msg_display_disclosure', 'test_bytes_past_whitespace_padding_are_disclosed', + 'Whitespace cannot hide signed text', + 'Whitespace is the cheapest way to push content out of view: a leading space costs zero ' + 'pixels once a line has wrapped, so padding can make an over-long body measure as fitting ' + 'while the tail is neither shown nor dropped from the signature.', + ['Message screen, short', 'Message screen, padded']), + ('Q3', 'test_msg_display_disclosure', 'test_bytes_past_the_first_screen_are_disclosed', + 'Content beyond one screen is not silently dropped', + 'Whether the device pages the remainder, states how much is hidden, or refuses is not ' + 'asserted - only that a long payload with a distinct tail does not look identical to a ' + 'short one.', + ['Message screen, fits', 'Message screen, overlong']), + ('Q4', 'test_msg_display_disclosure', 'test_newline_padding_does_not_collapse_the_screen', + 'Line counting cannot be overflowed', + 'Line counting is a security boundary once it gates a truncation warning. A body carrying ' + 'many newlines exercises the row counter rather than the character count; if that counter ' + 'wraps, an arbitrarily long body reports as fitting.', + ['Message screen, one line', 'Message screen, newline-padded']), + ('Q5', 'test_msg_display_disclosure', 'test_signing_shows_at_least_one_screen', + 'Guard: the comparisons are not vacuous', + 'Every other test in this section compares screen sequences. A flow that produced no ' + 'ButtonRequest would make two payloads compare equal as empty tuples and pass while showing ' + 'the user nothing. This asserts at least one non-blank screen is actually displayed.', + ['Control message screen']), + ]), + ('F', 'Clear-Sign Provider Context - Additive Invariant', '7.15.0', + 'Clear-signing is annotation, not authority. A provider signer is loaded at runtime by the ' + 'host (LoadClearsignSigner: RAM-only, user-confirmed, dropped on reboot) and is NOT verified ' + 'by KeepKey, so its decoded who/what/why screens must be ADDED to the ordinary unverified ' + 'review, never substituted for it. A runtime schema that could suppress the amount screen, ' + 'the raw-calldata screen or the fee screen would be a screen-substitution oracle: a friendly ' + '"supply 10.5 DAI to Aave" on the glass with arbitrary bytes under the signature. ' + 'lib/firmware/ethereum.c forces needs_confirm and data_needs_confirm back to TRUE whenever ' + 'the metadata came from a loaded signer; the else-branch that is allowed to suppress is ' + 'reserved for a future firmware-PINNED key and has no reachable input in this build. Every ' + 'test below proves this by MEASUREMENT rather than by model: it signs the same transaction ' + 'twice against the same device state, records the raw 2048-byte OLED framebuffer at every ' + 'ButtonRequest, and requires the no-metadata baseline frames to reappear byte-for-byte as the ' + 'tail of the clear-signed run. Adjacent sections cover "no metadata -> blind sign", replay ' + 'rejection and cancel-clears-metadata; none of them proves the raw review FOLLOWS a ' + 'SUCCESSFUL decode.', + [ + 'ADDITIVE RULE: a runtime provider may ADD screens. It may never REMOVE one.', + '', + 'Measured on the Aave V3 supply() fixture (132 bytes of real ABI calldata, AdvancedMode on):', + '- baseline, no metadata : 3 screens - Send / Confirm Ethereum Data / Transaction', + '- v1 metadata VERIFIED : 10 screens - Identity, "Call: supply", Contract, one screen', + ' per attested argument (4), THEN the same 3 baseline screens', + '- v2 static schema VERIFIED : 13 screens - 7 decoded, then the same 3 baseline screens', + '- signature fails to verify : 3 screens - byte-identical to the baseline. The device does', + ' NOT refuse, and shows NO partial decoded information.', + '', + 'The tail comparison is a byte-for-byte framebuffer match, so it is immune to pagination and', + 'to value-dependent rendering: whatever the baseline drew, the clear-signed run must draw.', + '', + 'Phase 1 ships with every built-in verification slot zeroed, so a VERIFIED blob can only come', + 'from a runtime-loaded signer and the suppression branch cannot be reached. F5 has an EMPTY', + 'screenshot list on purpose: rejecting metadata draws nothing at all.', + ], + [ + ('F1', 'test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_successful_decode_still_runs_the_raw_review', + 'A successful decode adds screens, replaces none', + 'The headline invariant. A runtime provider clear-signs a real Aave V3 supply() call, and ' + 'the decoded identity/method/contract/argument screens are followed by the SAME ' + 'amount, raw-calldata and fee screens the device draws with no metadata at all - proven by ' + 'signing the identical transaction twice and requiring the three baseline frames to ' + 'reappear byte-for-byte at the tail. The signature still recovers to this device over this ' + 'exact digest, so the screens shown were bound to the transaction signed.', + ['Identity screen naming the loaded signer and its fingerprint', + 'Decoded argument screens (protocol / asset / amount / onBehalfOf)', + 'Raw contract data screen, unchanged from the baseline', + 'Fee screen']), + ('F2', 'test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_v2_schema_decode_still_runs_the_raw_review', + 'v2 static schema is additive too', + 'v2 is where suppression would be most tempting: the blob attests a decode shape and no ' + 'tx_hash, so the reserved branch drops the raw review outright and keeps the amount screen ' + 'only if the schema moves value. For a runtime signer that branch is not taken. Decoded ' + 'against the Aave fixture rather than an ERC-20 transfer on purpose - a recognized token ' + 'contract has no raw-data screen in its own baseline, so it could not show that the raw ' + 'review survives.', + ['Decoded screens with values read from the calldata being signed (amount: 10.5 DAI)', + 'Raw contract data screen, unchanged from the baseline', + 'Fee screen']), + ('F3', 'test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_failed_signature_falls_back_to_the_unverified_review', + 'A payload that fails to verify falls back, it does not refuse', + 'One tampered byte inside the signed region makes the blob MALFORMED. The device must then ' + 'behave exactly as if no metadata had ever been sent: the ordinary unverified review, no ' + 'refusal, and no partial decoded information on the glass. The assertion is that the whole ' + 'signing run is frame-for-frame identical to the baseline - any decoded screen would be a ' + 'frame the baseline does not contain.', + ['Amount/recipient screen identical to the no-metadata baseline', + 'Raw contract data screen identical to the no-metadata baseline', + 'Fee screen identical to the no-metadata baseline']), + ('F4', 'test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_no_runtime_slot_can_reach_the_suppression_branch', + 'Every runtime key slot stays additive', + 'The suppression branch is gated on a signer that is NOT runtime-loaded. All four key slots ' + 'are loaded at runtime and each in turn produces a VERIFIED decode that is still followed ' + 'by the complete baseline review, so no slot is a privileged one. A slot that suppressed ' + 'would surface here as a missing tail frame.', + ['Identity screen for each loaded slot', + 'Raw contract data screen after every slot\'s decode']), + ('F5', 'test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive', + 'test_no_slot_verifies_without_a_runtime_load', + 'No firmware-pinned signer exists to suppress anything', + 'The complementary half. With no signer loaded, a correctly signed blob addressed to each ' + 'of the four slots comes back MALFORMED: this build carries no built-in verification key, ' + 'so the branch that may suppress the raw review has no reachable input. Sending metadata ' + 'draws no screen, so the empty screenshot list below is the assertion.', + []), + ]), + ('I', 'Session and Trust Lifetime', '7.15.0', + 'Clear-signing works by trusting somebody else. A provider key loaded with LoadClearsignSigner ' + 'decides which transactions the device is willing to describe in words, and AdvancedMode decides ' + 'whether the device will sign contract data it cannot describe at all. Neither is a decision a ' + 'user should still be living with tomorrow. Both are session state by design: AdvancedMode is a ' + 'policy the storage writer refuses to persist, and loaded signers are RAM slots that no code path ' + 'writes to flash. Design intent is not evidence, so this section revokes them for real - it ' + 'restarts the firmware process with its flash image intact, which is a reboot and not a wipe, and ' + 'watches what comes back.', + [ + 'LIFETIME RULE: trust granted by a button press dies with the session that granted it.', + '', + 'The two claims under test, and where they live:', + '- AdvancedMode is session-scoped. Storage flags bit 12 is written as zero and ignored on', + ' read at four sites in storage.c; policy.h calls the bit BURNED because firmware <= 7.15', + ' would read a reused bit as "blind signing enabled".', + '- Loaded signers are RAM only. session_clear() calls signed_metadata_clear_signers()', + ' unconditionally, so Initialize and ClearSession both drop them; a reboot drops them', + ' because they were never anywhere else.', + '', + 'The asymmetry between the two is deliberate and is asserted, not assumed: Initialize drops', + 'the signer but LEAVES AdvancedMode armed (hosts send Initialize before nearly every', + 'operation, so disarming there would demand a button press each time), while ClearSession', + 'drops both.', + '', + 'READING THE POWER-CYCLE TESTS: on the emulator flash_erase_word() is compiled out, so the', + 'sectors that storage_commit() abandons keep their "stor" magic and find_active_storage()', + 'may boot into a record two commits stale. A test that ignored this would read every policy', + 'back OFF for the wrong reason and pass against firmware that persisted it. Each power-cycle', + 'test therefore sets a MARKER policy (Experimental) after the state under test and commits', + 'until every sector carries it; the marker coming back is what licenses any conclusion about', + 'AdvancedMode, and the surviving seed and label are what distinguish a reboot from a wipe.', + ], + [ + ('I1', 'test_msg_session_trust_lifetime', + 'test_advanced_mode_is_off_after_power_cycle', + 'AdvancedMode does not survive a reboot', + 'AdvancedMode and Experimental are neighbouring bits of the same storage flags word, set by ' + 'the same ApplyPolicies message and written by the same storage_writeStorageV16Plaintext ' + 'call. Both are turned on, Experimental second, and the firmware is restarted with its flash ' + 'image untouched. Experimental must come back - proving flash survived AND that the record ' + 'read at boot was written while AdvancedMode was armed - and AdvancedMode must be OFF. A ' + 'device that inherited the policy from flash would boot with blind signing already enabled ' + 'and no confirmation, which is precisely why bit 12 was retired.', + ['Enable Policy: AdvancedMode', 'Enable Policy: Experimental (marker, four commits)']), + ('I2', 'test_msg_session_trust_lifetime', + 'test_advanced_mode_survives_initialize_but_not_clear_session', + 'Initialize keeps the policy, ClearSession revokes it', + 'session_clear_impl() disarms AdvancedMode only when clear_pin is set: ClearSession passes ' + 'true, Initialize passes false. This pins the asymmetry from both sides. If Initialize ever ' + 'started disarming, every host that sends it before an operation would demand a fresh ' + 'confirmation and the policy would be unusable; if ClearSession ever stopped, an explicit ' + 'lock would leave the blind-signing capability armed behind it.', + ['Enable Policy: AdvancedMode']), + ('I3', 'test_msg_session_trust_lifetime', 'test_signer_dropped_by_initialize', + 'Session teardown drops the loaded signer', + 'A signer is loaded, verified live, and then Initialize is sent. The metadata blob that was ' + 'VERIFIED becomes MALFORMED. AdvancedMode is asserted still ON immediately before that probe, ' + 'so the policy gate cannot be what refused it - the slot is empty. An ordinary GetFeatures is ' + 'sent first as the negative control: if merely exchanging messages dropped signers, the ' + 'teardown assertion would be proving nothing.', + ['Enable Policy: AdvancedMode', + "Load Clearsigner: Trust 'CI Test' (fingerprint) ... NOT verified by KeepKey"]), + ('I4', 'test_msg_session_trust_lifetime', 'test_signer_dropped_by_clear_session', + 'ClearSession revokes both halves of the trust', + 'ClearSession is the explicit lock, and it must take the provider key with it. Straight ' + 'afterwards the metadata message is refused outright ("AdvancedMode required") - that Failure ' + 'is the policy gate and says nothing about the slot, so the policy is re-armed with a bare ' + 'ApplyPolicies (no Initialize, which would clear the slot by itself) and the blob probed ' + 'again. MALFORMED is the assertion: the signer itself is gone.', + ['Enable Policy: AdvancedMode', + "Load Clearsigner: Trust 'CI Test' (fingerprint) ... NOT verified by KeepKey", + 'Home screen at the refusal - the AdvancedMode gate draws no screen of its own', + 'Enable Policy: AdvancedMode (re-armed to isolate the slot)']), + ('I5', 'test_msg_session_trust_lifetime', 'test_signer_dropped_by_power_cycle', + 'Reboot drops the loaded signer', + 'RAM-only should make this true by construction, but "by construction" is exactly what a ' + 'persistence bug breaks, and the report should carry the reboot rather than infer it. The ' + 'marker policy is set AFTER the signer is loaded, so the record the device boots into is one ' + 'that was written while the signer was live - the record a firmware that persisted signers ' + 'would have persisted them into. Seed, label and marker all come back; the signer does not.', + ['Enable Policy: AdvancedMode', + "Load Clearsigner: Trust 'CI Test' (fingerprint) ... NOT verified by KeepKey", + 'Enable Policy: Experimental (marker, four commits)', + 'Enable Policy: AdvancedMode (re-armed after the reboot to isolate the slot)']), + ('I6', 'test_msg_session_trust_lifetime', + 'test_disabling_advanced_mode_revokes_the_signer', + 'Disabling AdvancedMode revokes the signer, it does not suspend it', + 'With the policy off, revoking and suspending are indistinguishable: every consumer in ' + 'signed_metadata.c refuses a runtime slot while AdvancedMode is off, so metadata fails ' + 'closed either way. The difference shows on the way back. Suspending would mean ' + 're-enabling the policy silently re-arms a provider the user never re-loaded, on a ' + 'confirmation screen that names the policy and never names the signer - so a user who ' + 'disabled AdvancedMode to drop a provider would not have dropped it. ' + 'fsm_msgApplyPolicies therefore calls signed_metadata_clear_signers() on disable. The ' + 're-enable is sent as the bare ApplyPolicies with an exact expected-response list - one ' + 'ButtonRequest and a Success - so the absence of a trust screen there is proof, not ' + 'observation: trust cannot be restored by a policy toggle at all. Coming back costs a ' + 'fresh LoadClearsignSigner consent, the screen that names the alias and fingerprint.', + ['Enable Policy: AdvancedMode', + "Load Clearsigner: Trust 'CI Test' (fingerprint) ... NOT verified by KeepKey", + 'Disable Policy: AdvancedMode', + 'Home screen at the refusal - the metadata message fails closed with no screen', + 'Enable Policy: AdvancedMode - the only confirm on re-arming, and the signer does NOT ' + 'come back with it']), + ]), + ('L', 'Bitcoin-Only Variant', '7.15.0', + 'KK_BITCOIN_ONLY=ON builds a second shipping product out of the same tree: coins.def keeps ' + 'only Bitcoin and Testnet, messagemap.def drops every altcoin handler, KK_ZCASH_PRIVACY is ' + 'forced OFF, and transaction.c takes a BITCOIN_ONLY arm on the OP_RETURN path that confirms ' + 'raw bytes instead of decoding a THORChain memo. Until this section none of it had a test and ' + 'CI only ever ran the multi-chain emulator, so an entire shipping product was audited by ' + 'nothing. These tests never skip: each asserts the behaviour that is correct for the variant ' + 'it is talking to, so a run against the regular image proves the strip did NOT leak into the ' + 'multi-chain product, and a run against the bitcoin-only image proves it happened. The ' + 'variant is identified from GetCoinTable, not from features.firmware_variant -- L3 explains ' + 'why that field cannot be trusted.', + [ + 'PRODUCT: two build products, one tree. Regular = every coin family plus Zcash Orchard.', + 'Bitcoin-only = Bitcoin + Testnet, no altcoins, no shielded Zcash, no ERC-20 token table.', + 'STRIPPED BY NAME: coinByName() must refuse Litecoin/Dogecoin/BCH/Zcash/DigiByte/Dash --', + ' "bitcoin-only" is not "UTXO-only", and a silent fallback to Bitcoin parameters would', + ' hand back an xpub with the wrong version bytes under an altcoin label.', + 'STRIPPED BY MESSAGE: an absent handler answers Failure_UnexpectedMessage from the board', + ' dispatcher, draws nothing, and leaves the message loop usable.', + 'OP_RETURN: no memo parser is linked, so a THORChain memo is disclosed as the bytes', + ' themselves. The OMNI branch sits ABOVE the #if and must still decode.', + 'REFUSAL: refusing the raw OP_RETURN screen returns -1 from compile_output(), which must', + ' surface as ActionCancelled with no signature and no further screens.', + ], + [ + ('L1', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_bitcoin_signing_survives_the_strip', + 'Bitcoin still signs, byte for byte', + 'The one thing the bitcoin-only product must still do. Stripping coins, handlers and the ' + 'Orchard engine touches coins.def, messagemap.def, fsm.c and the AES table selection; any ' + 'of them going wrong surfaces here first. The signature is compared against the exact ' + 'vector test_msg_signtx.test_one_one_fee pins on the multi-chain build, so both products ' + 'must produce identical transactions from the same seed. The two review screens are ' + 'asserted as well: a signing test alone cannot see a dropped confirmation.', + ['Send 0.0038 BTC to 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1', + 'TRANSACTION: send 0.0039 BTC from your wallet, including a 0.0001 BTC fee']), + ('L2', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_coin_table_is_bitcoin_and_testnet_only', + 'The coin table is the product boundary', + 'GetCoinTable must report exactly two coins, Bitcoin and Testnet, with no ERC-20 tokens ' + '(TOKENS_COUNT is 0 and `tokens` is not linked at all). A host enumerating coins is the ' + 'only way a user learns what the device will sign, so the count and the names are part ' + 'of the product, not an implementation detail. On the regular image the same test ' + 'asserts the table is larger -- the strip must not leak.', + []), + ('L3', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_firmware_variant_names_the_bitcoin_only_product', + 'features.firmware_variant must name the product', + 'FAILED ON THE BITCOIN-ONLY IMAGE AS MEASURED, and the failure is the finding. ' + 'firmware_variant is the only wire-visible product identifier and the whole pyk suite ' + 'gates on it: common.requires_fullFeature() skips a test when it reads "KeepKeyBTC" or ' + '"EmulatorBTC". The bitcoin-only emulator reported plain "Emulator", so ' + 'requires_fullFeature() is dead code and every altcoin test in the directory runs ' + 'against a bitcoin-only image and fails instead of skipping. Section X of this report ' + 'states the KeepKeyBTC contract as fact. variant_getName() has two arms and only the ' + 'EMULATOR one returns a literal; the hardware arm takes the model variant name from ' + 'variant_getInfo() and has no BITCOIN_ONLY case at all, so bitcoin-only HARDWARE reports ' + 'exactly what a multi-chain device of the same model reports. The assertion is by ' + 'suffix, not against a fixed string, so it stays honest for both arms.', + []), + ('L4', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_altcoin_message_handlers_are_absent', + 'Every stripped chain refuses without drawing', + 'Thirteen probes -- Ethereum, Cosmos, Osmosis, Nano, EOS, THORChain, Maya, Ripple, ' + 'Binance, TRON, TON, Solana, Hive -- must each answer Failure_UnexpectedMessage, the ' + 'board dispatcher\'s answer for a message type that is not in the map. The two ways this ' + 'goes wrong are a half-linked handler (wrong failure, or a hang) and one that renders ' + 'before refusing: a bitcoin-only device must never draw a chain it cannot sign. The ' + 'framebuffer is compared byte-for-byte across all thirteen for exactly that reason, and ' + 'a Ping afterwards proves the message loop is not wedged. The screenshot list is ' + 'deliberately empty -- the evidence is that nothing was drawn.', + []), + ('L5', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_altcoin_coin_names_are_refused', + 'Stripped coins are refused by name', + 'The other half of the boundary. GetPublicKey is a Bitcoin-family message and stays in ' + 'the map, so coinByName() is what has to say no: Litecoin, Dogecoin, BitcoinCash, Zcash, ' + 'DigiByte and Dash must each come back Failure_Other "Invalid coin name" rather than ' + 'falling through to Bitcoin\'s parameters and returning an xpub with the wrong version ' + 'bytes under an altcoin label. Bitcoin and Testnet must still work.', + []), + ('L6', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_zcash_privacy_is_compiled_out', + 'Zcash privacy is compiled out with the coin', + 'The Orchard engine is the largest thing in the image and its handlers live behind ' + 'ZCASH_PRIVACY, not BITCOIN_ONLY -- the two gates are tied together in CMakeLists, not ' + 'in the source, so nothing in C would catch that wiring breaking. ZcashGetOrchardFVK and ' + 'ZcashDisplayAddress must be unknown messages, and transparent Zcash must be gone from ' + 'the coin table in the same breath, so no Zcash path of either kind survives.', + []), + ('L7', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_op_return_thorchain_memo_is_confirmed_raw', + 'A THORChain memo is disclosed raw, not decoded', + 'The arm the alpha merge added to compile_output(). With no memo parser linked, a memo ' + 'the multi-chain image explains -- swap, asset, destination, affiliate -- is shown on the ' + 'bitcoin-only image as the bytes themselves. That is the right answer (a decode the image ' + 'cannot perform must never be faked) but it had never been executed, because CI runs only ' + 'the multi-chain emulator. Screen counts are measured, not modelled: bitcoin-only shows ' + 'exactly three requests (output, raw OP_RETURN, SignTx) while the regular image expands ' + 'the same memo into strictly more ConfirmOutput screens. Both must sign a script carrying ' + 'the memo verbatim, so disclosure and signature are pinned to the same bytes.', + ['Send 0.0038 BTC to 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1', + 'CONFIRM OP_RETURN: SWAP:ETH.ETH:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:420:kk:75', + 'TRANSACTION: send 0.0039 BTC from your wallet, including a 0.0001 BTC fee']), + ('L8', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_op_return_refusal_cancels_the_signature', + 'Refusing the OP_RETURN screen aborts the signature', + 'The BITCOIN_ONLY arm returns -1 when confirm_data is refused, and the multi-chain arm ' + 'has its own CANCELLED path that must not answer a refusal by asking again on a second ' + 'screen. Both must surface as Failure_ActionCancelled with no signature, and the flow ' + 'must stop AT the refused screen -- a SignTx request afterwards would mean the refusal ' + 'was recorded and then ignored.', + ['Send 0.0038 BTC to 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1', + 'CONFIRM OP_RETURN: the memo screen the user refuses']), + ('L9', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_omni_op_return_is_still_decoded', + 'The shared OMNI branch survived the strip', + 'compile_output() tests for an "omni" prefix ABOVE the BITCOIN_ONLY split, so an OMNI ' + 'simple send is still decoded into a sentence on the bitcoin-only image. The regression ' + 'guarded against is the new #else swallowing the OMNI case, silently downgrading a ' + 'decoded amount to a hex dump. Proved by contrast rather than by OCR: the same twenty ' + 'bytes with the leading "o" changed to "p" are no longer OMNI and fall through to the ' + 'raw-data screen, so the two screens must differ and the decoded one must be the sparser ' + 'of the two. Both payloads ride in ONE transaction, as two data outputs, because L11 ' + 'makes a second signing in the same session impossible.', + ['CONFIRM OMNI: Do you want to send 1 OMNI?', + 'CONFIRM OP_RETURN: 706D6E6900000000000000010000000005F5E100 -- the same bytes, raw', + 'Send 0.0038 BTC to 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1', + 'TRANSACTION: send 0.0039 BTC from your wallet, including a 0.0001 BTC fee']), + ('L10', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_repeated_transaction_is_allowed_without_op_return', + 'An exact repeat is not a duplicate', + 'The control for L11. compile_output() carries an anti-malware check (txin_check.c): warn ' + 'when a transaction pays the same amount to the same address as the previous one but was ' + 'built from DIFFERENT inputs, which is what a host rewriting a segwit txid looks like. An ' + 'exact repeat -- same outputs AND same inputs -- is not that and is deliberately allowed. ' + 'Signing it twice here pins that, so the refusal in L11 cannot be explained away as the ' + 'duplicate guard doing its job.', + []), + ('L11', 'test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant', 'test_op_return_does_not_poison_the_duplicate_detector', + 'An OP_RETURN output must not poison the duplicate detector', + 'FAILS ON BOTH PRODUCTS, and the failure is the finding. Sign a transaction whose last ' + 'output is OP_RETURN, then sign the transaction L10 just proved is allowed, and the ' + 'device answers "WARNING: DUPLICATE TRANSACTION! Already signed a tx with the same ' + 'outputs. To try again, unplug/replug KeepKey." and aborts. signing.c calls ' + 'txin_dgst_final() once per output, but txin_dgst_save_and_reset() -- the only thing that ' + 're-initialises the SHA-256 context -- is reached only on the pay-to-address path; an ' + 'OP_RETURN output returns before it. So a transaction ending in OP_RETURN leaves the ' + 'context finalised and never re-initialised, the next transaction\'s inputs are hashed ' + 'into a finalised context, and its digest no longer matches while amount and address ' + 'still do -- precisely the (same outputs, different inputs) pattern the check exists to ' + 'flag. Fail-safe, in that it refuses rather than signs, but it refuses a legitimate ' + 'transaction and demands a replug, and every OP_RETURN-terminated transaction arms it: ' + 'that is every THORChain and Maya swap the wallet builds. Nothing had caught it because ' + 'common.KeepKeyTest wipes the device in setUp, so no existing test signs two transactions ' + 'in one session.', + ['Send 0.0038 BTC to 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1 (first transaction)', + 'CONFIRM OP_RETURN: the memo that arms the detector', + 'WARNING: DUPLICATE TRANSACTION! Already signed a tx with the same outputs']), + ]), + ('U', 'Storage Upgrade Preservation', '7.15.0', + 'A signed UPGRADE must never wipe. A DOWNGRADE wipes, and that is correct. Those two ' + 'sentences are the whole policy (docs/StorageVersionGate.md), and until this section ' + 'nothing in the suite tested either half - every other test creates storage with the ' + 'firmware under test and never crosses a release boundary, which is exactly where this ' + 'class of defect lives. The mechanism is one function: storage_init() hands whatever is in ' + 'flash to storage_fromFlash(), and if version_from_int() does not recognise the version it ' + 'returns StorageVersion_NONE, the load reports SUS_Invalid, and storage_init() runs ' + 'storage_reset() + storage_commit(). No prompt, no warning - the wallet is gone at boot. ' + 'The flash format this build reads and writes is V17, the same format shipped in v7.14.1. ' + '7.15 reverted the RC27 bump to V19 (commit 6bebde7b2) because one boot silently migrated ' + '17 to 19 and from that moment no downgrade was possible without a wipe; V18, the ' + 'clear-sign identity block, is dead, and the V19 serializer survives only behind ' + 'STORAGE_PIN_KDF_V19 == 0. U5 pins that V17 as a literal, on purpose: the compile-time ' + 'assert compares two numbers in the same header, and raising the baseline to make a build ' + 'compile is the edit the SOP calls its highest-severity review item.', + [ + 'THE RULE: recognise every version any shipped firmware ever wrote, and never lower', + 'STORAGE_VERSION. Both ways of breaking it compile cleanly and pass every other test:', + '- lowering STORAGE_VERSION below a version that has shipped;', + '- deleting, reordering or renumbering an entry in storage_versions.inc.', + '', + 'The reverse direction is NOT a defect. Older firmware cannot read a newer record, so a', + 'DOWNGRADE lands on SUS_Invalid and resets. Do not "fix" that: the reset is what stops', + 'an attacker flashing an older, validly signed image with a known extraction bug and', + 'keeping the seed.', + '', + 'HOW THESE TESTS REACH THE GATE: it only runs at boot, and no host message can reboot', + 'the device. SoftReset (messages.proto type 89) has no messagemap entry and no handler', + 'body, and fsm_msgDebugLinkFlashDump() is compiled out under EMULATOR, so the emulator', + 'can neither be restarted nor have its flash read over the wire. U1-U4 therefore start', + 'their OWN kkemu on their own port pair and own its emulator.img, which lib/emulator/', + 'setup.c mmaps as the flash array. Killing that process and starting it again IS a', + 'power cycle, and restamping the version word in the image is what an arriving device', + 'presents: a record whose header says one version while the firmware says another.', + '', + 'WHAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT COVER, stated plainly:', + '- No signed image is involved. The bootloader preserves storage only when SIG_FLAG is', + ' set, the firmware being replaced was officially signed, and the new image verifies.', + ' An unsigned development or RC build fails two of those by construction, so "the', + ' upgrade did not wipe" is finally proven only with a signed build on a production', + ' device.', + '- U2 restamps a record THIS build wrote rather than replaying one 7.14.x wrote, so the', + ' V16 reader runs but the older LAYOUTS (V1-V15) and their fallthrough chain do not.', + '- U1-U4 SKIP wherever no kkemu binary can be started. The CI python-keepkey image', + ' (scripts/emulator/python-keepkey.Dockerfile) copies the source but never builds the', + ' emulator, so as the pipeline stands today only U5-U8 run in CI. A skipped U1-U4 in', + ' this report means the release was NOT audited for upgrade preservation.', + ], + [ + ('U1', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_reboot_preserves_the_wallet', + 'A power cycle keeps the wallet', + 'The boundary the ordinary storage tests never cross. Every other test lives inside ' + 'one session, where the wallet is a RAM shadow; only a power cycle re-runs ' + 'storage_init() and proves the bytes committed to flash were both written and ' + 'readable. The PIN is load-bearing: the seed lives in encrypted_sec and the key that ' + 'decrypts it is only ever stored wrapped by the PIN, so an address that still derives ' + 'after the reboot proves the wrapped key, its fingerprint and the ciphertext all ' + 'round-tripped together. This test is also the control for U2 - a record already at ' + 'STORAGE_VERSION reports SUS_Valid, so nothing is rewritten at boot, and the flash ' + 'image is asserted byte-identical across the restart.', + ['Wipe Device confirm (the arrangement wipes before loading the seed)', + 'Import Recovery Sentence confirm', + 'Home screen after the power cycle: locked, wallet still present', + 'Bitcoin Account #0 / Address #0 showing the same address as before the reboot']), + ('U2', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_v16_blob_upgrades_without_wiping', + 'A V16 wallet upgrades, it does not wipe', + 'The policy in one test: the device arrives carrying the format written by the release ' + 'it is leaving, and the incoming firmware must READ it rather than reset it. ' + 'storage_fromFlash() takes case StorageVersion_16, reads through storage_readV16(), ' + 'restamps the record V17 and reports SUS_Updated, which storage_init() answers with a ' + 'commit - a migration, not a wipe. The V16 record is built from the four things that ' + 'actually differ between the formats: the version stamp, flags bits 18/19 ' + '(authdata_initialized / authdata_encrypted), authdata_fingerprint at +469, and the ' + '512-byte V16 ciphertext against the 1024-byte V17 one. The same address behind the ' + 'same PIN is the assertion; it can only derive if the wrapped storage key unwrapped, ' + 'the V16 ciphertext decrypted and the seed came back byte-identical. A surviving ' + 'wallet alone would not prove the V16 branch ran, so the test also asserts flash was ' + 'written at boot - the side effect only SUS_Updated has.', + ['Wipe Device confirm', 'Import Recovery Sentence confirm', + 'Home screen after the migrating boot: wallet still present', + 'Bitcoin Account #0 / Address #0 - the same address the V16 record held']), + ('U3', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_unrecognised_version_wipes_on_boot', + 'An unrecognised version wipes, deliberately', + 'The half of the policy nobody should be tempted to soften. A device that has run ' + 'newer firmware carries a newer stamp; older firmware cannot read it, so ' + 'version_from_int() returns StorageVersion_NONE and storage_init() resets. That reset ' + 'is the rollback protection: without it an attacker could flash an older, validly ' + 'signed image with a known extraction bug and keep the seed. The stamp used is one ' + 'past the version this build just committed - measured from the device, not read out ' + 'of the header - which is exactly what the next format bump will look like from here. ' + 'The device must come up with no wallet, no PIN and no label.', + ['Wipe Device confirm', 'Import Recovery Sentence confirm', + 'Home screen after the boot that reset storage: no wallet']), + ('U4', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_bitcoin_only_band_refuses_without_wiping', + 'A bitcoin-only wallet is refused, not destroyed', + 'Seeds created under bitcoin-only firmware are stamped in a reserved band (10000 + the ' + 'normal version). Multi-chain firmware must not load one - that seed was never meant ' + 'to be multi-chain-exposed - but it must also leave it alone: SUS_BitcoinOnlyLocked ' + 'resets only the RAM shadow, and storage_commit() returns early while btc_only_locked, ' + 'so flash is never touched. Three assertions, in order of what they cost you: the ' + 'device comes up locked and uninitialized; the storage sector is byte-for-byte what it ' + 'was, everywhere except the stamp the test itself changed; and once the band stamp is ' + 'removed the wallet boots again and derives the original address. Without the third, ' + '"refuse rather than wipe" would be a claim about intent rather than about bytes.', + ['Wipe Device confirm', 'Import Recovery Sentence confirm', + 'Home screen while locked out by the bitcoin-only band: no wallet', + 'Bitcoin Account #0 / Address #0 after the band stamp is removed - the wallet is back']), + ('U5', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_last_shipped_never_moves_backwards', + 'STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED never moves backwards', + 'An independent witness for the number the whole gate turns on. The compile-time ' + 'assert in storage.c compares STORAGE_VERSION against STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED - ' + 'two values in the same header, editable in one commit - so it cannot notice a release ' + 'that raises both. 7.15 deliberately reverted to V17; if V19 (or anything else) ' + 're-lands, this test fails and the bump has to be argued for in review rather than ' + 'discovered in the field. Reads the firmware sources, so it runs even where no ' + 'emulator can be restarted. No screen: it never touches the device, and the empty ' + 'list below says so.\n' + '7.16 moves to V20 to hold passkey credentials. It skips 18 and 19 because both were ' + 'ACTIVE formats in alpha builds before 6bebde7b2 reverted to V17 - 18 the clear-sign ' + 'identity block, 19 the PIN-KDF migration - so devices carrying those blobs exist, and ' + 'reusing a number would make this firmware PARSE one as passkey state rather than ' + 'refuse it. Upgrading preserves the wallet; downgrading to 7.15 or earlier erases it, ' + 'which is normal downgrade behaviour and is in the release note rather than left to be ' + 'discovered.', + []), + ('U5b', 'test_storage_version_gate', + 'test_burned_versions_are_dispatched_to_the_wipe_path', + 'A burned format is dispatched, and what it reaches is the wipe', + 'This used to assert the ABSENCE of a dispatch case, on the theory that a burned blob ' + 'falls through to a default. It does not: storage_fromFlash() has no default case, ' + 'deliberately, so that -Werror=switch names any version nobody handled. An unlisted ' + 'version therefore does not fall anywhere - it fails the ARM build. So the label must ' + 'exist; what must NOT exist is a reader behind it. Asserted as the real property: the ' + 'burned versions are dispatched, and the arm they reach returns SUS_Invalid with no ' + 'storage_readVxx call. Which versions are burned is read from ' + 'storage_versions.inc rather than written down here, so the test holds on a line that ' + 'burns nothing as readily as on one that burns two.', + []), + ('U6', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_version_never_drops_below_a_shipped_release', + 'The version never goes backwards or into the band', + 'Lowering STORAGE_VERSION wipes every device upgrading FROM a shipped release: its ' + 'record stops being recognised, so the gate maps it to StorageVersion_NONE and ' + 'storage_init() resets. The version must also stay below STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE ' + '(10000), or a multi-chain wallet would be stamped into the band that multi-chain ' + 'firmware refuses to load - locking the wallet out of its own firmware.', + []), + ('U7', 'test_storage_version_gate', + 'test_version_ladder_is_contiguous_and_ends_at_storage_version', + 'storage_versions.inc is append-only', + 'The enum is emitted in .inc order after StorageVersion_NONE = 0, which is what makes ' + 'StorageVersion_N == N. Delete or renumber an entry and version_from_int() quietly ' + 'loses that case, wiping every device carrying it. This asserts the ladder is ' + 'contiguous from 1 and that its last entry is STORAGE_VERSION - the two properties the ' + 'in-tree static asserts depend on.', + []), + ('U8', 'test_storage_version_gate', 'test_every_shipped_version_has_a_reader', + 'Every shipped version still has a reader', + 'The failure the static asserts do NOT cover. They pin the enum to its own numbering ' + 'and say nothing about what the switch in storage_fromFlash() does with it. Drop the ' + 'reader for a version that reached hardware and every device carrying it is wiped on ' + 'upgrade. Scoped to SHIPPED versions on purpose: a burned format legitimately has no ' + 'reader, so asserting "every ladder version has a reader" would make burning one ' + 'impossible to express. The companion assertion, that no shipped version is ever ' + 'declared burned, is what stops that scoping being used as a loophole.', + []), + ]), + + # Two-character id because all 26 letters were taken. The catalog keys on a + # string, not a char, so this costs nothing. + ('TD', 'Structured EIP-712 - The Device Reads The Document', '7.15.0', + 'Until now every EIP-712 signature a KeepKey produced was BLIND. The host computed ' + 'domainSeparator and messageHash and the device signed two opaque 32-byte values -- it could ' + 'not see a spender, an amount or a chain. Permit2 approvals, the single most common instrument ' + 'in a drainer, took that path.\n' + 'Now the device walks the document itself. It asks for one struct definition, or one leaf ' + 'value, at a time, and hashes each value in the SAME call that displays it. There is no second ' + 'read that could return something different, and each member_path is requested exactly once -- ' + 'Trezor shipped this protocol with a hole there until 2.12.0, where a host could answer the ' + 'domain name one way for the summary screen and another for the hashing pass.\n' + 'The predecessor was withdrawn in 7.14.2 because its JSON parser could not guarantee the ' + 'displayed value was the value being hashed. Here that property is structural rather than ' + 'reviewed.', + ['THE HASHES COME FROM OUTSIDE THIS REPOSITORY. TD1 asserts the values published by', + 'assets/eip-712/Example.js in ethereum/EIPs -- the reference implementation the spec', + 'links to -- and independently republished by Example.sol, by eth-sig-util\'s V3 and V4', + 'snapshots, and by Mrtenz/eip-712.', + '', + 'That matters more than it looks. The firmware C, the hdwallet TypeScript and the python', + 'client were written by one hand against one reading of the spec. Three of them agreeing', + 'proves the reading is SELF-CONSISTENT and nothing more; a shared misreading would produce', + 'three consistent wrong answers. It cannot produce these two numbers.', + '', + 'HARDWARE, 2026-08-21, K1-14AM, unsigned build of the 7.15 line:', + ' 9 screens, one per leaf; all rendered correctly per operator review', + ' 42-character addresses displayed IN FULL -- the truncation class that shipped as a', + ' bug at >42 chars does not reproduce', + ' domainSeparator and messageHash matched the published values on silicon', + ' device address 0x73d0385F4d8E00C5e6504C6030F47BF6212736A8, same as the emulator', + '', + 'Behind AdvancedMode. This is new parser surface reachable from a website.'], + [('TD1', 'test_msg_eip712_streaming', 'test_spec_example_matches_the_published_hashes', + 'The device\'s own hashes equal the EIP-712 reference implementation\'s', + 'The canonical Mail/Person document. Mail references Person TWICE, so the walk pushes a ' + 'child frame, derives Person\'s typeHash through its own dependency closure, folds it to 32 ' + 'bytes and hands it back to the parent -- the nested-struct machinery, exercised rather ' + 'than reasoned about. Forty round trips. domainSeparator ' + 'f2cee375...912090f and messageHash c52c0ee5...4b371e, both published, both matched on ' + 'hardware and in the emulator.', + ['Domain name', 'Domain version', 'chainId', 'verifyingContract (42 chars, in full)', + 'Cow / wallet', 'Bob / wallet', 'contents']), + ('TD2', 'test_msg_eip712_streaming', 'test_array_of_structs_walks', + 'An array of structs walks and signs', + 'Arrays hash WITHOUT a typeHash prefix -- enc(array) is the keccak of the concatenated ' + 'element encodings and nothing else -- so getting this wrong yields a digest no verifier ' + 'reproduces rather than an error anyone would notice. Arrays were refused entirely until a ' + 'kilobyte was reclaimed from MAX_DECODE_SIZE: at 13 KB the ARM image missed the linker\'s ' + '16,384 B runtime-reserve gate by 204 bytes, at 12 KB it clears it by 812.', + []), + ('TD3', 'test_msg_eip712_streaming', + 'test_fixed_array_length_must_match_the_declared_size', + 'A fixed dimension must match the document', + 'address[2] carrying three elements is refused. The dimension is part of the type string ' + 'and therefore part of typeHash, and the COUNT is the only thing the device is ever told -- ' + 'accept a different one and it signs a document whose type declares another, with nothing ' + 'downstream able to notice.', + []), + ('TD4', 'test_msg_eip712_streaming', 'test_advanced_mode_gates_the_endpoint', + 'The endpoint is gated behind AdvancedMode', + 'Structured display is strictly MORE information than the blind path it replaces, so the ' + 'gate is not about the feature being dangerous. It is about new parser surface reachable ' + 'from a website staying closed until there is hardware evidence behind it. There now is.', + [])]), + ] # --------------------------------------------------------------- # Render # --------------------------------------------------------------- +def _audit_catalog(): + """Structural check on SECTIONS, run on every render. + + A catalog entry with a blank context renders as a bare test name, which is + exactly the row a human auditor cannot evaluate -- VG4 shipped that way and + nothing complained. Duplicate ids or letters silently overwrite each other + in cross-references. Cheap to assert, and the report is evidence. + """ + letters, ids = set(), set() + for letter, title, mf, bg, notes, tests in SECTIONS: + assert letter not in letters, 'duplicate section letter %s' % letter + letters.add(letter) + assert (bg or '').strip(), 'section %s has no background' % letter + for t in tests: + assert len(t) == 6, 'malformed entry in section %s: %r' % (letter, t) + tid, mod, meth, ttl, ctx, scr = t + assert tid not in ids, 'duplicate test id %s' % tid + ids.add(tid) + assert (ttl or '').strip(), '%s has no title' % tid + assert (ctx or '').strip(), '%s has no context -- it would render as a bare name' % tid + + def render(output_path, fw_version, results, screenshot_dir=None): + _audit_catalog() pdf = PDF(); pb = PB(pdf) + _build_frame_census(screenshot_dir) ts = datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M') + build_label = os.environ.get('KK_BUILD_LABEL', '').strip() active = [(l,t,mf,bg,fl,tests) for l,t,mf,bg,fl,tests in SECTIONS if ver_ge(fw_version, mf)] # Separate specs section (no tests) from test sections specs = [s for s in active if not s[5]] - # Sections with results first, pending sections at bottom. - # Within each group: existing chains first (proven), then new features. - has_results = [s for s in active if s[5] and any(_lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) for t in s[5])] - no_results = [s for s in active if s[5] and not any(_lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) for t in s[5])] - test_sections = has_results + no_results - total = sum(len(s[5]) for s in test_sections) - passed = sum(1 for s in test_sections for t in s[5] if _lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) == 'pass') - failed = sum(1 for s in test_sections for t in s[5] if _lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) in ('fail','error')) - skipped = total - passed - failed + + # Classify each section by its strongest per-test outcome so the report + # distinguishes "ran and passed/failed" from "skipped by design (build-flag + # or policy gated, e.g. KK_ZCASH_PRIVACY-off shielded Zcash)" from "no result + # at all". A design-skip is NOT missing firmware support. + def _section_state(s): + st = [_lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) for t in s[5]] + if any(x in ('pass', 'fail', 'error') for x in st): + return 'tested' + if any(x == 'skip' for x in st): + return 'withheld' # only skips -> intentionally gated on this build + return 'pending' # nothing ran -> feature not present + tested = [s for s in active if s[5] and _section_state(s) == 'tested'] + withheld = [s for s in active if s[5] and _section_state(s) == 'withheld'] + pending = [s for s in active if s[5] and _section_state(s) == 'pending'] + test_sections = tested + withheld + pending + # Count DISTINCT tests, not catalog rows. A few tests are deliberately + # catalogued twice because they carry two different arguments -- e.g. + # test_eip1559_requires_chain_id is the replayable-signature refusal in the + # 7.14.2 defect narrative (J9) AND a guard in the EVM catalog (VG2). Both + # entries earn their place, but summing rows made the header claim more + # tests than the run contains, and an auditor reconciling the header + # against the JUnit finds a shortfall that is pure double-counting. + distinct = {} + for s in test_sections: + for t in s[5]: + distinct[(t[1], t[2])] = _lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) + total = len(distinct) + passed = sum(1 for v in distinct.values() if v == 'pass') + failed = sum(1 for v in distinct.values() if v in ('fail', 'error')) + skipped = sum(1 for v in distinct.values() if v == 'skip') + missing = total - passed - failed - skipped # Title pb.text(20, 'KeepKey Firmware Test Report', bold=True) pb.gap(2) - if passed == total and total > 0: - pb.text(11, f'Firmware {fw_version} | {ts} | ALL {total} TESTS PASSED', bold=True, color=GREEN) - elif failed > 0: + if failed > 0: pb.text(11, f'Firmware {fw_version} | {ts} | {failed} FAILED of {total} tests', bold=True, color=RED) + elif missing == 0 and total > 0: + # Everything that exists ran green; remaining are deliberate design-skips. + extra = f', {skipped} skipped (withheld)' if skipped else '' + pb.text(11, f'Firmware {fw_version} | {ts} | {passed}/{total} PASSED{extra}', bold=True, color=GREEN) else: - pb.text(10, f'Firmware {fw_version} | {ts} | {total} tests: {passed} passed, {skipped} pending') + parts = [f'{passed} passed'] + if skipped: parts.append(f'{skipped} skipped') + if missing: parts.append(f'{missing} pending') + pb.text(10, f'Firmware {fw_version} | {ts} | {total} tests: {", ".join(parts)}') + if build_label: + for line in _w(f'Candidate: {build_label}', 95): + pb.text(8, line, bold=True) + # Scope of this document. The catalog is a curated subset, and saying so is + # the difference between evidence and a misleading completeness claim: an RC + # audit grepped this PDF for feature keywords, found none, and reported four + # features as untested when their tests had run green in the same CI run. + ran = JUNIT_CENSUS['ran'] + if ran: + pb.gap(3) + for line in _w('Scope: this report is a curated catalog of %d tests. The CI run collected %d ' + '(%d of them native firmware unit tests); %d SKIPPED and did not execute, ' + 'usually because the emulator predates the firmware the test targets -- a skip ' + 'is not evidence the feature works. Absence from this report is NOT ' + 'evidence that a feature is untested -- check the JUnit artifacts.' + % (total, ran, JUNIT_CENSUS['native'], JUNIT_CENSUS['skipped']), 100): + pb.text(8, line, color=GRAY) pb.gap(6) pb.text(12, 'Sections', bold=True) - _shown_tested = _shown_pending = False + _hdr_withheld = _hdr_pending = False for letter, title, mf, _, _, tests in test_sections: - has_any = any(_lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) for t in tests) + state = _section_state((letter, title, mf, None, None, tests)) is_new = ver_t(mf) > (7, 10, 0) - if has_any and not _shown_tested: - _shown_tested = True - elif not has_any and not _shown_pending: - pb.text(9, f' --- Pending (no firmware support yet) ---', bold=True, color=GRAY) - _shown_pending = True + if state == 'withheld' and not _hdr_withheld: + pb.text(9, ' --- Withheld on this build (build-flag gated; skipped by design) ---', bold=True, color=GRAY) + _hdr_withheld = True + elif state == 'pending' and not _hdr_pending: + pb.text(9, ' --- Pending (no firmware support yet) ---', bold=True, color=GRAY) + _hdr_pending = True tag = ' [NEW]' if is_new else '' p = sum(1 for t in tests if _lookup(results, t[1], t[2]) == 'pass') if p == len(tests) and len(tests) > 0: @@ -1055,6 +3092,28 @@ def render(output_path, fw_version, results, screenshot_dir=None): if screenshot_dir: test_dir = os.path.join(screenshot_dir, mod.replace('test_',''), meth) btn_files = sorted(f for f in os.listdir(test_dir) if f.startswith('btn')) if os.path.isdir(test_dir) else [] + # Flagship who/what/why flows: show EVERY review screen in the + # order the user sees them, not a "best" thumbnail. This is the + # proof that the device decodes and displays the transaction. + if (mod, meth) in FULL_SEQUENCE_TESTS: + shown = 0 + for f in btn_files: + p = os.path.join(test_dir, f) + lr = _frame_lit_ratio(p) + if lr is None or lr < 0.02 or lr > 0.55: + continue + try: + pb.need(55) + pb.image(p, display_w=384, display_h=96) + shown += 1 + except Exception: + pass + if shown: + pb.text(6, f'({shown} OLED review screens, in order)', color=GRAY) + elif scr: + pb.text(7, f'OLED needed: {", ".join(scr)}', color=GRAY) + pb.gap(3) + continue best = _pick_best_frame(test_dir, btn_files) if best: # Show the best frame (most representative) @@ -1063,17 +3122,46 @@ def render(output_path, fw_version, results, screenshot_dir=None): pb.image(best, display_w=384, display_h=96) except Exception: pass - # For multi-screen tests, show up to 2 additional frames - test_frames = btn_files[2:] if len(btn_files) > 2 else [] - extra = [f for f in test_frames if os.path.join(test_dir, f) != best][:2] + # For multi-screen tests, show up to 2 more meaningful frames. + # setUp noise is already stripped at capture time; drop + # blanks, generic cross-test chrome, and the `best` frame. + extra = [] + for f in btn_files: + p = os.path.join(test_dir, f) + if p == best: + continue + r = _frame_lit_ratio(p) + if (r is not None and 0.02 <= r <= 0.55 and + _frame_hash(p) not in _GENERIC_FRAME_HASHES): + extra.append(f) + if not extra: + # Every other frame is cross-test-shared. Outcome frames + # that FOLLOW the best one (a blocked-gate screen after + # the send preamble) are still this test's story — show + # moderately-shared ones; frames in 8+ dirs are pure + # chrome (policy toggles), and anything before `best` + # is setup noise. + seen_best = False + for f in btn_files: + p = os.path.join(test_dir, f) + if p == best: + seen_best = True + continue + if not seen_best: + continue + r = _frame_lit_ratio(p) + if (r is not None and 0.02 <= r <= 0.55 and + _FRAME_DIR_COUNTS.get(_frame_hash(p), 1) < 8): + extra.append(f) + extra = extra[:2] for frame in extra: try: pb.need(55) pb.image(os.path.join(test_dir, frame), display_w=384, display_h=96) except Exception: pass - if len(btn_files) > 5: - pb.text(6, f'({len(btn_files)} OLED frames captured, showing best {min(3, len(test_frames)+1)})', color=GRAY) + if len(extra) + 1 < len(btn_files): + pb.text(6, f'({len(btn_files)} OLED frames captured, showing {len(extra)+1})', color=GRAY) elif scr: pb.text(7, f'OLED needed: {", ".join(scr)}', color=GRAY) elif scr: @@ -1092,7 +3180,11 @@ def render(output_path, fw_version, results, screenshot_dir=None): pb.finish() pdf.write(output_path) - print(f'{output_path}: fw={fw_version}, {len(active)} sections, {total} tests ({passed} passed, {failed} failed, {skipped} pending)') + assert passed + failed + skipped + missing == total, ( + 'catalog counts do not reconcile: %d+%d+%d+%d != %d' + % (passed, failed, skipped, missing, total)) + print(f'{output_path}: fw={fw_version}, {len(active)} sections, {total} tests ' + f'({passed} passed, {failed} failed, {skipped} skipped, {missing} pending)') def screenshot_filter(fw_version): """Return pytest -k expression for tests with non-empty screenshot expectations. @@ -1111,13 +3203,75 @@ def screenshot_filter(fw_version): return ' or '.join(terms) +# Modules whose tests must actually RUN once the firmware is new enough to be +# catalogued for them -- a skip is a failure, not a waiver. +# +# The general rule below treats 'skip' as a design waiver, which is right for +# build-flag-gated features (bitcoin-only, zcash-privacy). It is wrong for a +# capability the build claims to have: every taproot test opens with +# requires_taproot(), so if that capability regressed, all six would skip and +# the report would still read green -- the report would be certifying coverage +# it never obtained. Listing a module here converts that silence into a failure. +# Mapped to the firmware version from which a skip becomes a failure. A +# version-blind set would fail every older-firmware run for a module that +# legitimately cannot exist yet. +MUST_RUN_MODULES = { + 'test_msg_signtx_taproot': '7.0.0', + 'test_msg_getaddress_taproot': '7.0.0', + # R-4.1. Gated on requires_message('LoadClearsignSigner'), so if provider + # loading regressed, all four would skip and the report would certify a + # feature it never exercised. + 'test_msg_solana_lut_attestation': '7.15.0', +} + +def screenshot_audit(fw_version, screenshot_root, junit_path=None): + """Which SECTIONS tests DECLARED screens but captured none? + + The CI gate was `total PNG count > 0`, which a single captured suite + satisfies. That cannot distinguish "captured everything" from "captured + something": in the 7.14.2 round, 345 PNGs were produced while every suite + the release actually changed captured zero, and the phase reported healthy. + + Returns (ok, missing) where missing is a list of (module, method) that + declared a non-empty screenshot list, were not skipped, and produced no + PNG directory. Skipped tests are not missing -- a version-gated test + cannot draw. + """ + import os as _os + skipped = set() + if junit_path and _os.path.exists(junit_path): + import xml.etree.ElementTree as _ET + root = _ET.parse(junit_path).getroot() + suites = [root] if root.tag == 'testsuite' else root.findall('testsuite') + for su in suites: + for tc in su.findall('testcase'): + if tc.find('skipped') is not None: + cn = tc.get('classname', '') + mod = next((p for p in cn.split('.') if p.startswith('test_')), '') + skipped.add((mod, tc.get('name'))) + + active = [x for x in SECTIONS if ver_ge(fw_version, x[2])] + missing = [] + for letter, title, mf, bg, fl, tests in active: + for tid, mod, meth, ttl, ctx, scr in tests: + if not scr: + continue + if (mod, meth) in skipped: + continue + d = _os.path.join(screenshot_root, mod.replace('test_', '', 1), meth) + if not _os.path.isdir(d) or not [f for f in _os.listdir(d) if f.endswith('.png')]: + missing.append((mod, meth)) + return (len(missing) == 0, missing) + + def validate_junit(fw_version, results): """Check SECTIONS tests against JUnit results. Returns (passed, failed_list). A test is considered failed if it appears in SECTIONS for this firmware version and the JUnit result is 'fail' or 'error' (not 'skip' or 'pass'). Tests with no JUnit entry are treated as missing (also a failure). - Tests that were skipped (gated by requires_message/requires_firmware) are OK. + Tests that were skipped (gated by requires_message/requires_firmware) are OK, + unless their module is in MUST_RUN_MODULES. """ active = [(l,t,mf,bg,fl,tests) for l,t,mf,bg,fl,tests in SECTIONS if ver_ge(fw_version, mf)] failures = [] @@ -1126,6 +3280,8 @@ def validate_junit(fw_version, results): status = _lookup(results, mod, meth) if status in ('fail', 'error'): failures.append((tid, mod, meth, status)) + elif status == 'skip' and ver_ge(fw_version, MUST_RUN_MODULES.get(mod, '99.0.0')): + failures.append((tid, mod, meth, 'skipped-but-required')) elif not status: failures.append((tid, mod, meth, 'missing')) return (len(failures) == 0, failures) @@ -1137,6 +3293,10 @@ def main(): p.add_argument('--fw-version', default=None) p.add_argument('--junit', default=None, help='JUnit XML for pass/fail results') p.add_argument('--screenshots', default=None, help='Directory with per-test OLED screenshots') + p.add_argument('--screenshot-audit', metavar='SCREENSHOT_DIR', + help='exit 1 if any SECTIONS test that declared screens captured none') + p.add_argument('--audit-junit', metavar='XML', default=None, + help='JUnit XML for --screenshot-audit, so skipped tests are not counted missing') p.add_argument('--screenshot-filter', action='store_true', help='Print pytest -k expression for tests needing screenshots, then exit') p.add_argument('--validate-junit', action='store_true', @@ -1150,6 +3310,15 @@ def main(): if fw: print(f'Detected: {fw}', file=sys.stderr) else: print('No emulator, defaulting to 7.10.0', file=sys.stderr); fw = '7.10.0' + if args.screenshot_audit: + ok, missing = screenshot_audit(fw, args.screenshot_audit, args.audit_junit) + if ok: + print('screenshot audit: every declared screen was captured') + sys.exit(0) + print('screenshot audit FAILED -- declared screens with no capture:') + for mod, meth in missing: + print(' %s::%s' % (mod, meth)) + sys.exit(1) if args.screenshot_filter: print(screenshot_filter(fw)) sys.exit(0) diff --git a/tests/common.py b/tests/common.py index 12190633..f0b0e65f 100644 --- a/tests/common.py +++ b/tests/common.py @@ -80,14 +80,24 @@ def setUp(self): print("Setup finished") print("--------------") + def _drop_setup_screenshots(self): + # Discard wipe/load "setUp noise" frames so they can't be picked as a + # test's representative OLED image. No-op without a debuglink client. + fn = getattr(self.client, 'reset_screenshots', None) + if fn: + fn() + def setup_mnemonic_allallall(self): self.client.load_device_by_mnemonic(mnemonic=self.mnemonic_all, pin='', passphrase_protection=False, label='test', language='english') + self._drop_setup_screenshots() def setup_mnemonic_abandon(self): self.client.load_device_by_mnemonic(mnemonic=self.mnemonic_abandon, pin='', passphrase_protection=False, label='test', language='english') + self._drop_setup_screenshots() def setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase(self): self.client.load_device_by_mnemonic(mnemonic=self.mnemonic12, pin='', passphrase_protection=False, label='test', language='english') + self._drop_setup_screenshots() def setup_mnemonic_vuln20007(self): self.client.load_device_by_mnemonic(mnemonic=self.mnemonic20007, pin='', passphrase_protection=False, label='test', language='english') @@ -117,6 +127,56 @@ def requires_firmware(self, ver_required): if semver.VersionInfo.parse(version) < semver.VersionInfo.parse(ver_required): self.skipTest("Firmware version " + ver_required + " or higher is required to run this test") + def requires_taproot(self): + """Skip unless the firmware reports taproot support. + + Gates on a capability rather than a version. Which release taproot + ships in is still open, and a version gate that is never reached makes + these tests silently green forever -- the failure mode that looks + exactly like passing. + """ + self.client.init_device() + if not getattr(self.client.features, 'supports_taproot', False): + self.skipTest("Firmware does not report supports_taproot") + + def requires_structured_eip712(self): + """Skip unless the FIRMWARE drives the structured EIP-712 walk. + + requires_message() cannot answer this. It asks whether + python-keepkey's own bindings define a message, which is a property of + the pinned submodule and not of the firmware under test -- so it passes + on every branch regardless, and a branch without eip712_stream.c fails + these tests as though the feature were broken rather than absent. + + Probes the device instead: firmware that does not implement the walk + answers the opening message with Failure_UnexpectedMessage. A firmware + that DOES implement it answers with a struct request, and we cancel. + Anything else is left to fail the test, because "the feature is present + but misbehaving" must never be mistaken for "the feature is absent". + """ + from keepkeylib import messages_ethereum_pb2 as _eth + from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as _proto + from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as _types + + probe = _eth.EthereumSignTypedData() + for n in (0x8000002C, 0x8000003C, 0x80000000, 0, 0): + probe.address_n.append(n) + probe.primary_type = "EIP712Domain" + probe.metamask_v4_compat = True + + resp = self.client.call_raw(probe) + if isinstance(resp, _proto.Failure): + self.client.init_device() + if resp.code == _types.Failure_UnexpectedMessage: + self.skipTest( + "Firmware does not implement structured EIP-712 " + "(EthereumSignTypedData is not handled)") + # Any other Failure is a real problem; let the test run and report it. + return + # Feature is present -- put the device back before the test starts. + self.client.call_raw(_proto.Cancel()) + self.client.init_device() + def requires_message(self, msg_name): """Skip if firmware does not handle this message type. Use alongside requires_firmware for per-feature gating: @@ -149,6 +209,15 @@ def requires_message(self, msg_name): # Send a minimal probe -- if firmware returns Failure_UnexpectedMessage, skip. from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as base_proto msg = getattr(proto, msg_name)() + try: + # An empty probe cannot be serialized for messages with `required` + # fields (e.g. GetBip85Mnemonic word_count/index). That is a + # client-side limitation, NOT a firmware-support signal: the proto + # class exists and requires_firmware already gates the version, so + # let the real test exercise it rather than skipping. + msg.SerializeToString() + except Exception: + return try: resp = self.client.call_raw(msg) if hasattr(resp, 'code') and resp.code == 1: # Failure_UnexpectedMessage @@ -163,5 +232,18 @@ def requires_fullFeature(self): self.client.features.firmware_variant == "EmulatorBTC": self.skipTest("Full feature firmware required to run this test") + def requires_bitcoinOnly(self): + """Inverse of requires_fullFeature(): skip unless this IS the + bitcoin-only product. + + Usable since the firmware learned to report the variant honestly -- + variant_getName() used to answer "Emulator" for both products, so a + bitcoin-only emulator was indistinguishable from a full one and this + guard could not be written. + """ + if self.client.features.firmware_variant not in ("KeepKeyBTC", + "EmulatorBTC"): + self.skipTest("Bitcoin-only firmware required to run this test") + diff --git a/tests/config.py b/tests/config.py index cca59765..8de09c0e 100644 --- a/tests/config.py +++ b/tests/config.py @@ -44,7 +44,12 @@ (_explicit_transport, sorted(_KNOWN_TRANSPORTS)) ) -if _explicit_transport == "dylib": +if os.getenv("KK_FORCE_UDP") == "1": + # Local-only escape hatch: skip HID/WebUSB autodetect so tests hit the + # UDP emulator even with a real KeepKey plugged in. NOT for CI. + hid_devices = [] + webusb_devices = [] +elif _explicit_transport == "dylib": # Skip HID/WebUSB autodetect — dylib is opt-in by env var. Without # this skip, a connected real KeepKey would win over the explicit # request and the dylib regression suite would route to hardware. diff --git a/tests/probe.py b/tests/probe.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d64510b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/probe.py @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +import sys +print("sys.path[0]=", repr(sys.path[0])) +try: + import keepkeylib + print("OK", keepkeylib.__file__) +except ImportError as e: + print("FAIL", e) diff --git a/tests/test_message_signing_protocol_bindings.py b/tests/test_message_signing_protocol_bindings.py index 10cce3f7..cc5bb8fc 100644 --- a/tests/test_message_signing_protocol_bindings.py +++ b/tests/test_message_signing_protocol_bindings.py @@ -9,6 +9,29 @@ class TestMessageSigningProtocolBindings(unittest.TestCase): + def test_solana_recipient_owner_hint_is_additive_field_12(self): + field = solana_proto.SolanaSignTx.DESCRIPTOR.fields_by_name[ + 'token_recipient_owner' + ] + self.assertEqual(field.number, 12) + # protobuf 6 removed the public ``label`` accessor in favor of the + # semantic predicates; generated bindings must remain testable with + # both the release toolchain and current developer environments. + if hasattr(field, 'label'): + self.assertEqual(field.label, field.LABEL_REPEATED) + else: + self.assertTrue(field.is_repeated) + self.assertEqual(field.type, field.TYPE_BYTES) + + owner = bytes(range(32)) + encoded = solana_proto.SolanaSignTx( + address_n=[0x8000002c, 0x800001f5, 0x80000000, 0x80000000], + raw_tx=b'\x80x402', + token_recipient_owner=[owner], + ).SerializeToString() + decoded = solana_proto.SolanaSignTx.FromString(encoded) + self.assertEqual(list(decoded.token_recipient_owner), [owner]) + def test_solana_offchain_messages_are_mapped(self): self.assertEqual(proto.MessageType_SolanaSignOffchainMessage, 756) self.assertEqual(proto.MessageType_SolanaOffchainMessageSignature, 757) diff --git a/tests/test_msg_bip85.py b/tests/test_msg_bip85.py index fcfc589c..4a0b2b89 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_bip85.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_bip85.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ """BIP-85 display-only tests. -Firmware >= 7.14.0 derives the BIP-85 child mnemonic, displays it on the +Firmware >= 7.15.0 derives the BIP-85 child mnemonic, displays it on the device screen, and responds with Success (mnemonic is never sent over USB). Tests verify: @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ class TestMsgBip85(common.KeepKeyTest): def setUp(self): super().setUp() - self.requires_firmware("7.14.0") - self.requires_message("GetBip85Mnemonic") + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") def test_bip85_12word_flow(self): """12-word derivation: verify device goes through display flow and returns Success.""" diff --git a/tests/test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant.py b/tests/test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b2d14a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_bitcoin_only_variant.py @@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +"""Bitcoin-only variant -- the product boundary, measured over the wire. + +KK_BITCOIN_ONLY=ON builds a second shipping product: coins.def keeps only +Bitcoin and Testnet, messagemap.def drops every altcoin handler, ZCASH_PRIVACY +is forced OFF, and lib/firmware/transaction.c takes a BITCOIN_ONLY arm on the +OP_RETURN path that confirms raw bytes instead of decoding a THORChain memo. +None of that had a test, and CI only ever ran the multi-chain emulator -- so +the whole variant was unaudited. + +NOTHING HERE SKIPS. Each test asserts the behaviour that is correct for the +variant it is talking to, so it is evidence on both builds: on the bitcoin-only +image it proves the strip happened, and on the regular image it proves the +strip did NOT happen (a guard that leaked into the multi-chain product would +fail here just as loudly). `requires_fullFeature()` is deliberately not used -- +see test_firmware_variant_names_the_bitcoin_only_product for why it cannot +work. + +The variant is identified by GetCoinTable, not by features.firmware_variant: +the coin table comes from coins.def, which is a different mechanism from the +message map, the Zcash gate and the OP_RETURN arm that the other tests probe, +so nothing here is circular. +""" + +import binascii +import time +import unittest + +import common + +import keepkeylib.messages_pb2 as proto +import keepkeylib.types_pb2 as proto_types +from keepkeylib.client import CallException + +from keepkeylib import messages_binance_pb2 as messages_binance +from keepkeylib import messages_cosmos_pb2 as messages_cosmos +from keepkeylib import messages_eos_pb2 as messages_eos +from keepkeylib import messages_ethereum_pb2 as messages_eth +from keepkeylib import messages_hive_pb2 as messages_hive +from keepkeylib import messages_mayachain_pb2 as messages_maya +from keepkeylib import messages_nano_pb2 as messages_nano +from keepkeylib import messages_osmosis_pb2 as messages_osmosis +from keepkeylib import messages_ripple_pb2 as messages_ripple +from keepkeylib import messages_solana_pb2 as messages_solana +from keepkeylib import messages_thorchain_pb2 as messages_thorchain +from keepkeylib import messages_ton_pb2 as messages_ton +from keepkeylib import messages_tron_pb2 as messages_tron +from keepkeylib import messages_zcash_pb2 as messages_zcash + + +# tx d5f65ee8... input 0 is 0.0039 BTC; the vector every other Bitcoin test in +# this directory spends, and it is in txcache/, so nothing here needs network. +PREV_HASH = binascii.unhexlify( + 'd5f65ee80147b4bcc70b75e4bbf2d7382021b871bd8867ef8fa525ef50864882') +PREV_INDEX = 0 +INPUT_AMOUNT = 390000 +OUT_ADDRESS = '1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1' +OUT_AMOUNT = 380000 # 0.0001 BTC fee + +# A well-formed THORChain swap memo. The multi-chain firmware parses this and +# renders who/what/how-much; the bitcoin-only firmware has no parser linked and +# must disclose the bytes themselves. +THORCHAIN_MEMO = (b'SWAP:ETH.ETH:' + b'0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:420:kk:75') + +# OMNI simple send, 1.00000000 OMNI. The OMNI branch of compile_output() sits +# ABOVE the #if BITCOIN_ONLY, so it must survive the strip untouched. +OMNI_SIMPLE_SEND = binascii.unhexlify('6f6d6e6900000000000000010000000005f5e100') +# The same 20 bytes with the 'o' of "omni" changed to 'p', so the OMNI prefix +# test fails and the payload falls through to the raw-data confirmation. +NOT_OMNI = b'p' + OMNI_SIMPLE_SEND[1:] + +# A BIP-44 path that is valid on every chain probed below, so a refusal can +# only be the message type being absent, never a path rejection. +BIP44_PATH = [2147483692, 2147483708, 2147483648, 0, 0] + +# Matches client.SCREENSHOT_SETTLE_SECONDS. The firmware writes ButtonRequest +# immediately BEFORE drawing, so read_layout() must be given time to settle or +# it returns the previous screen. +BUTTON_RENDER_SETTLE_SECONDS = 0.5 + + +def lit_pixels(layout): + """Count set pixels in a raw 2048-byte OLED framebuffer. + + read_layout() returns the framebuffer, not text, and there is no glyph + decoder in this repo. Screen assertions here are therefore structural: a + screen that draws nothing, and two screens that draw identically, are both + detectable without OCR. + """ + total = 0 + for b in layout: + if isinstance(b, str): + b = ord(b) + total += bin(b).count('1') + return total + + +class TestBitcoinOnlyVariant(common.KeepKeyTest): + + def setUp(self): + super(TestBitcoinOnlyVariant, self).setUp() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + # This whole file describes the BITCOIN-ONLY product. Several tests + # assert screen sequences that differ on the multi-chain build -- the + # OP_RETURN one decodes a THORChain memo there and draws more screens -- + # so running them against a full-feature device is a category error, not + # a finding. CI points the pyk suite at the full emulator image. + self.requires_bitcoinOnly() + self.screens = [] + # Refuse (press NO) on the Nth ButtonRequest of the current flow; + # None means confirm everything. + self.refuse_on = None + self._install_screen_capture() + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # helpers + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def _install_screen_capture(self): + """Record the framebuffer at each ButtonRequest, before it is acked.""" + original = self.client.callback_ButtonRequest + + def capture(msg): + # Unconditional settle, unlike client.callback_ButtonRequest's + # SCREENSHOT-gated sleep: these are structural assertions that must + # hold on every run, not just screenshot runs. + time.sleep(BUTTON_RENDER_SETTLE_SECONDS) + self.screens.append((msg.code, self.client.debug.read_layout())) + self.client.button = (self.refuse_on != len(self.screens)) + return original(msg) + + self.client.callback_ButtonRequest = capture + + def _reset_screens(self): + self.screens = [] + self.client.button = True + + def _confirm_codes(self): + return [code for code, _ in self.screens] + + def _screen(self, index): + return self.screens[index][1] + + def _is_bitcoin_only(self): + """Identify the product from coins.def, over the wire. + + Deliberately NOT features.firmware_variant: that field does not + distinguish the two builds at all (see + test_firmware_variant_names_the_bitcoin_only_product). + """ + return self.client.call(proto.GetCoinTable()).num_coins == 2 + + def _coin_names(self): + table = self.client.call(proto.GetCoinTable()) + end = min(table.num_coins, table.chunk_size) + chunk = self.client.call(proto.GetCoinTable(start=0, end=end)) + return [entry.coin_name for entry in chunk.table] + + def _data_output(self, op_return_data): + return proto_types.TxOutputType(op_return_data=op_return_data, + amount=0, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOOPRETURN) + + def _sign(self, outputs): + inp = proto_types.TxInputType(address_n=[0], prev_hash=PREV_HASH, + prev_index=PREV_INDEX) + return self.client.sign_tx('Bitcoin', [inp], outputs) + + def _sign_with_op_return(self, op_return_data): + out_pay = proto_types.TxOutputType(address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=OUT_AMOUNT, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS) + return self._sign([out_pay, self._data_output(op_return_data)]) + + def _probe(self, msg): + """Send one message and return the response, leaving the device idle.""" + resp = self.client.call_raw(msg) + self.client.call_raw(proto.Initialize()) + return resp + + def _assert_unknown_message(self, name, resp): + self.assertTrue( + isinstance(resp, proto.Failure), + "%s: expected a Failure on the bitcoin-only image, got %s" + % (name, type(resp).__name__)) + self.assertTrue( + resp.code == proto_types.Failure_UnexpectedMessage, + "%s: expected Failure_UnexpectedMessage (the handler is not in the " + "message map at all); got code %d %r" + % (name, resp.code, resp.message)) + + def _assert_handler_present(self, name, resp): + self.assertTrue( + not (isinstance(resp, proto.Failure) + and resp.code == proto_types.Failure_UnexpectedMessage), + "%s: the multi-chain image answered Failure_UnexpectedMessage, so " + "a BITCOIN_ONLY guard leaked into the regular product" % name) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L1 -- Bitcoin still signs + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_bitcoin_signing_survives_the_strip(self): + """The one thing the bitcoin-only product must still do. + + Stripping coins, message handlers and the Zcash engine touches + coins.def, messagemap.def, fsm.c and the AES table selection. Any of + those going wrong shows up here first: the signature is compared + against the exact vector test_msg_signtx.test_one_one_fee pins on the + multi-chain build, so the two products must produce byte-identical + Bitcoin transactions from the same seed. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._reset_screens() + + inp = proto_types.TxInputType(address_n=[0], prev_hash=PREV_HASH, + prev_index=PREV_INDEX) + out = proto_types.TxOutputType(address=OUT_ADDRESS, amount=OUT_AMOUNT, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS) + _, serialized_tx = self.client.sign_tx('Bitcoin', [inp], [out]) + + self.assertEqual( + binascii.hexlify(serialized_tx), + '010000000182488650ef25a58fef6788bd71b8212038d7f2bbe4750bc7bcb4470' + '1e85ef6d5000000006b4830450221009a0b7be0d4ed3146ee262b42202841834' + '698bb3ee39c24e7437df208b8b7077102202b79ab1e7736219387dffe8d615bbd' + 'ba87e11477104b867ef47afed1a5ede7810121023230848585885f63803a0a8ae' + 'cdd6538792d5c539215c91698e315bf0253b43dffffffff0160cc050000000000' + '1976a914de9b2a8da088824e8fe51debea566617d851537888ac00000000') + + # One output review, then the whole-transaction confirmation. Measured, + # not modelled: a silently dropped output screen is exactly the failure + # a signing test alone cannot see. + self.assertEqual( + self._confirm_codes(), + [proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, + proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx]) + for index in range(len(self.screens)): + self.assertGreater(lit_pixels(self._screen(index)), 200) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L2 -- the coin table IS the product boundary + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_coin_table_is_bitcoin_and_testnet_only(self): + """coins.def under BITCOIN_ONLY keeps exactly two entries. + + "Bitcoin-only" is not "UTXO-only": Litecoin, Dogecoin, Bitcoin Cash and + transparent Zcash are all stripped too, and ERC-20 tokens leave the + table entirely (TOKENS_COUNT is 0 and `tokens` is not linked). A host + that enumerates coins is the only way a user learns what the device + will sign, so the count and the names are both part of the product. + """ + table = self.client.call(proto.GetCoinTable()) + names = self._coin_names() + + if self._is_bitcoin_only(): + self.assertEqual(table.num_coins, 2) + self.assertEqual(names, ['Bitcoin', 'Testnet']) + else: + self.assertGreater(table.num_coins, 2) + self.assertTrue('Ethereum' in names or len(names) > 2, + "multi-chain image reported %r" % (names,)) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L3 -- the variant string + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_firmware_variant_names_the_bitcoin_only_product(self): + """features.firmware_variant must distinguish the two products. + + It is the only wire-visible product identifier, and the whole test + suite gates on it: common.requires_fullFeature() skips a test when + firmware_variant is "KeepKeyBTC" or "EmulatorBTC". + + variant_getName() has two arms. Under EMULATOR it returns a literal; + otherwise it returns the model's variant name from variant_getInfo(), + and THAT arm has no BITCOIN_ONLY case at all -- a bitcoin-only device + reports whatever a multi-chain device of the same model reports. So + this is asserted by suffix rather than against a fixed string: the + contract is that the two products are distinguishable, on the emulator + and on hardware alike. + + If it fails, requires_fullFeature() is dead code and every altcoin test + in this directory runs -- and fails -- against a bitcoin-only image + instead of skipping. + """ + self.client.init_device() + variant = self.client.features.firmware_variant + + if self._is_bitcoin_only(): + self.assertTrue( + variant.endswith('BTC'), + "coins.def carries only Bitcoin+Testnet, so this is the " + "bitcoin-only product, but firmware_variant is %r. " + "common.requires_fullFeature() compares against 'KeepKeyBTC'/" + "'EmulatorBTC' and therefore never skips anything." % variant) + else: + self.assertTrue( + not variant.endswith('BTC'), + "multi-chain image reported the bitcoin-only variant %r" + % variant) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L4 -- altcoin handlers are absent, not broken + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_altcoin_message_handlers_are_absent(self): + """Every stripped chain must refuse cleanly and leave the screen alone. + + messagemap.def drops these MSG_IN entries under BITCOIN_ONLY, so the + board-level dispatcher answers Failure_UnexpectedMessage without ever + reaching a handler. The two things that could go wrong are a handler + that is half-linked (wrong failure, or a hang) and one that draws + something before refusing -- a bitcoin-only device must never render a + chain it cannot sign. The framebuffer is compared byte-for-byte across + all fifteen probes for exactly that reason. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + probes = [ + ('EthereumGetAddress', messages_eth.EthereumGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('CosmosGetAddress', messages_cosmos.CosmosGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('OsmosisGetAddress', messages_osmosis.OsmosisGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('NanoGetAddress', messages_nano.NanoGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('EosGetPublicKey', messages_eos.EosGetPublicKey(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('ThorchainGetAddress', messages_thorchain.ThorchainGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('MayachainGetAddress', messages_maya.MayachainGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('RippleGetAddress', messages_ripple.RippleGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('BinanceGetAddress', messages_binance.BinanceGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('TronGetAddress', messages_tron.TronGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('TonGetAddress', messages_ton.TonGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('SolanaGetAddress', messages_solana.SolanaGetAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('HiveGetPublicKey', messages_hive.HiveGetPublicKey(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ] + + bitcoin_only = self._is_bitcoin_only() + home_before = self.client.debug.read_layout() + + for name, msg in probes: + resp = self._probe(msg) + if bitcoin_only: + self._assert_unknown_message(name, resp) + else: + self._assert_handler_present(name, resp) + + if bitcoin_only: + time.sleep(BUTTON_RENDER_SETTLE_SECONDS) + home_after = self.client.debug.read_layout() + self.assertEqual(bytes(home_before), bytes(home_after)) + + # The device is still usable after all of that: a refusal must not + # wedge the message loop. + self.assertEqual(self.client.call(proto.Ping(message='alive')).message, + 'alive') + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L5 -- stripped coin NAMES are refused + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_altcoin_coin_names_are_refused(self): + """A stripped coin is refused by name, on a handler that still exists. + + GetPublicKey is a Bitcoin-family message and stays in the message map, + so this is the other half of the boundary: coinByName() must fail for + every coin the image no longer carries, rather than falling back to + Bitcoin's parameters and handing back an xpub with the wrong version + bytes under a Litecoin label. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + bitcoin_only = self._is_bitcoin_only() + account = [2147483692, 2147483648, 2147483648] + + for name in ('Bitcoin', 'Testnet'): + resp = self._probe(proto.GetPublicKey(address_n=account, + coin_name=name)) + self.assertTrue(isinstance(resp, proto.PublicKey), + "%s must always be supported; got %s" + % (name, type(resp).__name__)) + + for name in ('Litecoin', 'Dogecoin', 'BitcoinCash', 'Zcash', + 'DigiByte', 'Dash'): + resp = self._probe(proto.GetPublicKey(address_n=account, + coin_name=name)) + if bitcoin_only: + self.assertTrue( + isinstance(resp, proto.Failure) + and resp.code == proto_types.Failure_Other, + "%s is not in the bitcoin-only coin table, so it must be " + "refused by name; got %s" % (name, type(resp).__name__)) + else: + self.assertTrue(isinstance(resp, proto.PublicKey), + "%s must work on the multi-chain image; got %s" + % (name, type(resp).__name__)) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L6 -- Zcash privacy is compiled out + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_zcash_privacy_is_compiled_out(self): + """KK_ZCASH_PRIVACY is forced OFF whenever KK_BITCOIN_ONLY is ON. + + The Orchard engine is the largest thing in the image and its handlers + live behind ZCASH_PRIVACY, not BITCOIN_ONLY, so the two gates are wired + together in CMakeLists rather than in the source. If that wiring ever + breaks, the bitcoin-only image ships a shielded-Zcash signer it does + not have the coin table to support -- and the transparent side is gone + too, so 'Zcash' is refused as a coin name in the same breath. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + bitcoin_only = self._is_bitcoin_only() + probes = [ + ('ZcashGetOrchardFVK', + messages_zcash.ZcashGetOrchardFVK(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ('ZcashDisplayAddress', + messages_zcash.ZcashDisplayAddress(address_n=BIP44_PATH)), + ] + for name, msg in probes: + resp = self._probe(msg) + if bitcoin_only: + self._assert_unknown_message(name, resp) + else: + self._assert_handler_present(name, resp) + + resp = self._probe(proto.GetAddress( + address_n=[2147483692, 2147483781, 2147483648, 0, 0], + coin_name='Zcash')) + if bitcoin_only: + self.assertTrue( + isinstance(resp, proto.Failure) + and resp.code == proto_types.Failure_Other, + "transparent Zcash must be gone from the coin table too; got %s" + % type(resp).__name__) + else: + self.assertTrue(isinstance(resp, proto.Address), + "multi-chain image refused transparent Zcash: %s" + % type(resp).__name__) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L7 -- the BITCOIN_ONLY arm of the OP_RETURN path + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_op_return_thorchain_memo_is_confirmed_raw(self): + """The arm added to compile_output() by the alpha merge. + + transaction.c wraps the THORChain memo decode in `#if !BITCOIN_ONLY` + and confirms the raw OP_RETURN bytes in the #else. So a memo that the + multi-chain image explains -- swap, asset, destination, affiliate -- + is shown on the bitcoin-only image as the bytes themselves. That is the + right answer (a decode the image cannot perform must not be faked), but + it had never been executed: CI runs only the multi-chain emulator. + + The screen count is measured, not modelled. Bitcoin-only: one output + review, one raw OP_RETURN screen, one SignTx -- three. Multi-chain: the + same memo expands to several decoded screens, so the count is strictly + higher. Either way the signed script must carry the memo verbatim, so + the disclosure and the signature are pinned to the same bytes. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._reset_screens() + + _, serialized_tx = self._sign_with_op_return(THORCHAIN_MEMO) + + # OP_RETURN -- what was signed. + expected_script = (b'\x6a' + bytes([len(THORCHAIN_MEMO)]) + + THORCHAIN_MEMO) + self.assertTrue( + expected_script in serialized_tx, + "the signed script must carry the memo bytes verbatim") + + confirm_outputs = [c for c in self._confirm_codes() + if c == proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput] + + if self._is_bitcoin_only(): + self.assertEqual( + self._confirm_codes(), + [proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # pay-to-address + proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # raw OP_RETURN + proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx]) + op_return_screen = self._screen(1) + # It has to actually draw the memo: a blank or near-blank screen + # here would mean the user approved bytes they never saw. + self.assertGreater(lit_pixels(op_return_screen), 400) + self.assertNotEqual(bytes(op_return_screen), + bytes(self._screen(0))) + else: + self.assertGreater( + len(confirm_outputs), 2, + "the multi-chain image must decode the memo into its own " + "screens; %d ConfirmOutput screen(s) means it fell through to " + "the raw-data path" % len(confirm_outputs)) + + def test_op_return_refusal_cancels_the_signature(self): + """Refusing the OP_RETURN screen must abort, on both products. + + The BITCOIN_ONLY arm returns -1 from compile_output() when confirm_data + is refused, and the multi-chain arm has its own THORCHAIN_MEMO_CANCELLED + path that must not answer a refusal by asking again on a second screen. + Both must surface as Failure_ActionCancelled with no signature, and the + flow must stop AT the refused screen -- a SignTx request afterwards + would mean the refusal was recorded and then ignored. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._reset_screens() + self.refuse_on = 2 # the screen after the pay-to-address review + + try: + self._sign_with_op_return(THORCHAIN_MEMO) + self.fail("the device signed a transaction whose OP_RETURN output " + "the user refused") + except CallException as exc: + self.assertEqual(exc.args[0], proto_types.Failure_ActionCancelled) + + self.assertEqual(len(self.screens), 2) + self.assertTrue( + proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx not in self._confirm_codes(), + "the flow reached the SignTx confirmation after the user refused " + "an output") + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L9 -- the shared OMNI branch survived the strip + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_omni_op_return_is_still_decoded(self): + """The OMNI branch sits above the #if and must be untouched. + + compile_output() tests for an "omni" prefix BEFORE the BITCOIN_ONLY + split, so an OMNI simple send is still decoded into "Do you want to + send 1.0 OMNI?" on the bitcoin-only image. The regression this guards + against is the new #else swallowing the OMNI case, which would silently + downgrade a decoded amount to a hex dump. + + Proved by contrast rather than by OCR: the same twenty bytes with the + leading 'o' changed to 'p' are no longer OMNI and fall through to the + raw-data confirmation. The two screens must differ, and the decoded one + must be the sparser of the two -- one short sentence against forty hex + digits. + + Both payloads ride in ONE transaction, as two data outputs, rather than + in two signings. That is not stylistic: a transaction ending in + OP_RETURN poisons the duplicate-transaction detector, so a second + signing in the same session is refused (see + test_op_return_does_not_poison_the_duplicate_detector). + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._reset_screens() + + out_pay = proto_types.TxOutputType(address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=OUT_AMOUNT, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS) + self._sign([self._data_output(OMNI_SIMPLE_SEND), + self._data_output(NOT_OMNI), + out_pay]) + + self.assertEqual( + self._confirm_codes(), + [proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # OMNI, decoded + proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # same bytes, raw + proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # pay-to-address + proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx]) + + omni_screen = self._screen(0) + raw_screen = self._screen(1) + + self.assertNotEqual(bytes(omni_screen), bytes(raw_screen)) + self.assertGreater(lit_pixels(omni_screen), 200) + self.assertGreater(lit_pixels(raw_screen), lit_pixels(omni_screen)) + + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + # L10/L11 -- the duplicate-transaction detector and OP_RETURN + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + def test_repeated_transaction_is_allowed_without_op_return(self): + """The control for the test below: an exact repeat is NOT a duplicate. + + compile_output() carries an anti-malware check (txin_check.c): warn + when a transaction pays the SAME amount to the SAME address as the + previous one but was built from DIFFERENT inputs, which is what host + malware rewriting a segwit txid looks like. An exact repeat -- same + outputs AND same inputs -- is not that, and is deliberately allowed. + + This is signed twice from the same input here to pin that, so the + refusal in the next test cannot be explained away as the duplicate + guard doing its job. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + out_pay = proto_types.TxOutputType(address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=OUT_AMOUNT, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS) + + _, first = self._sign([out_pay]) + _, second = self._sign([out_pay]) + self.assertEqual(binascii.hexlify(first), binascii.hexlify(second)) + + def test_op_return_does_not_poison_the_duplicate_detector(self): + """An OP_RETURN output must not falsely condemn the next transaction. + + Found while exercising the BITCOIN_ONLY arm above and NOT caused by it: + it reproduces identically on the multi-chain build, because the code is + shared. Sign a transaction whose LAST output is OP_RETURN, then sign + the transaction the test above just proved is allowed -- and the device + answers "WARNING: DUPLICATE TRANSACTION! Already signed a tx with the + same outputs. To try again, unplug/replug KeepKey." and aborts. + + Mechanism. signing.c calls txin_dgst_final() once per output, and + compile_output() calls txin_dgst_save_and_reset() -- the only thing + that re-initialises the SHA-256 context -- only on the pay-to-address + path. An OP_RETURN output returns before it. So a transaction ending + in OP_RETURN leaves the context finalised and never re-initialised, and + the NEXT transaction's inputs are hashed into a finalised context. Its + digest no longer matches, while the amount and address still do, which + is exactly the (same outputs, different inputs) pattern the check + exists to flag. + + The failure is fail-safe -- it refuses rather than signs -- but it + refuses a legitimate transaction and tells the user to replug, and + every OP_RETURN-terminated transaction arms it. That is every + THORChain/Maya swap the wallet builds. + + Nothing caught it because common.KeepKeyTest wipes the device in + setUp, so no existing test signs two transactions in one session. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + out_pay = proto_types.TxOutputType(address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=OUT_AMOUNT, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS) + + self._reset_screens() + self._sign([out_pay, self._data_output(THORCHAIN_MEMO)]) + self.assertEqual( + self._confirm_codes(), + [proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # pay-to-address + proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, # OP_RETURN + proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx]) + + self._reset_screens() + try: + self._sign([out_pay]) + except CallException as exc: + self.fail( + "after an OP_RETURN-terminated transaction the device refused " + "the next one with %r; its review screens were %r -- a " + "ConfirmOutput followed by the ButtonRequest_Other of the " + "duplicate-transaction warning. The same transaction signs " + "twice in a row when no OP_RETURN precedes it." + % (exc.args, self._confirm_codes())) + + self.assertEqual( + self._confirm_codes(), + [proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput, + proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx]) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_cosmos_signtx.py b/tests/test_msg_cosmos_signtx.py index 5ca12076..703ed36f 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_cosmos_signtx.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_cosmos_signtx.py @@ -61,10 +61,10 @@ def test_cosmos_sign_tx_memo(self): "cosmos18vhdczjut44gpsy804crfhnd5nq003nz0nf20v", 8675309 )], - memo="Epstein didn't kill himself.", + memo="test memo", sequence=3 ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "9f2434543bc4afd2fc7bb43db05facdd6d529aa7c467ef0d41e1c2954f68db9942b8eb431cf27b52d1b3d914bbde076960179b7f426bd1a182448bb9c245009c") + self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "db0e8039f2cd0b7d06527074a7e9079b5cd3d973f3090e04a685cfef0f145a9262dd828faa421027e583dd58fa5c6942c1f7c82fd53e54fb668fe0ebe5f83a12") self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "03bee3af30e53a73f38abc5a2fcdac426d7b04eb72a8ebd3b01992e2d206e24ad8") diff --git a/tests/test_msg_display_disclosure.py b/tests/test_msg_display_disclosure.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..07fc11c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_display_disclosure.py @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +# This file is part of the KeepKey project. +# +# Copyright (C) 2026 KeepKey +# +# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License version 3 +# as published by the Free Software Foundation. +# +# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +# along with this library. If not, see . + +"""On-screen disclosure: what the device shows must distinguish what it signs. + +These tests assert one property, stated as a property rather than as a list of +known payloads: + + Two requests whose SIGNED BYTES differ must not produce IDENTICAL screens. + +If two different payloads render the same pixels, then whatever distinguishes +them is invisible to the user at the moment they approve, and their approval +does not mean what it appears to mean. That is the shape of every display / +sign divergence in the 7.14.2 audit, independent of which chain or which field +happened to carry it. + +Why pixels and not text: DebugLinkState.layout is the framebuffer, 2048 bytes +of 1-bit 256x64. There is no text channel, so the assertions here are +differential. That is a feature for this property — it makes no assumption +about wording, spacing, fonts or truncation strategy, so it keeps holding when +the copy changes, and it cannot be satisfied by a screen that merely looks +plausible. + +Each case below is a payload pair built so the difference lies exactly where a +naive implementation stops looking: + + - past a NUL, because a protobuf `bytes` field is not a C string and "%s" + stops there while the signature covers the rest; + - past the visible cut, with whitespace chosen so a length or line-count + check measures the padded string as fitting; + - past the end of one screen, where a truncating renderer silently drops the + tail rather than paging it. + +Refusal counts as a pass. A device that declines to sign something it cannot +display honestly has satisfied the property; the failure being tested for is +signing it while showing the user something indistinguishable from the benign +case. +""" + +from __future__ import print_function + +import unittest + +import common + +from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as types +from keepkeylib.client import CallException + + +class ScreenRecorder(object): + """Records the framebuffer at every ButtonRequest of one flow. + + The client answers ButtonRequests through callback_ButtonRequest. Reading + the layout inside that callback captures each screen while it is actually + displayed; reading it afterwards would only ever see the home screen. + """ + + def __init__(self, client, answer=True): + self.client = client + self.answer = answer + self.screens = [] + self._original = None + + def __enter__(self): + client = self.client + recorder = self + + self._original = client.callback_ButtonRequest + + def recording_callback(msg): + try: + layout = client.debug.read_layout() + if layout: + recorder.screens.append(bytes(layout)) + except Exception: + # A capture failure must not mask the behaviour under test; + # the assertions below check what was captured. + pass + try: + # Also emit the frame as a PNG through the normal capture path. + # This class answers ButtonRequests itself, which bypasses the + # client's own capture hook -- so under KEEPKEY_SCREENSHOT=1 + # these tests were selected by the screenshot filter, passed, + # and produced NO images. The screens this suite exists to + # police were the ones nobody could look at. + if getattr(client, 'screenshot_dir', None): + client._capture_oled() + except Exception: + pass + if recorder.answer: + client.debug.press_yes() + else: + client.debug.press_no() + return proto.ButtonAck() + + client.callback_ButtonRequest = recording_callback + return self + + def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, tb): + self.client.callback_ButtonRequest = self._original + return False + + @property + def fingerprint(self): + """The full ordered screen sequence, as a comparable value.""" + return tuple(self.screens) + + +class TestDisplayDisclosesSignedContent(common.KeepKeyTest): + + # The disclosure behaviour these assert landed in 7.14.2. On older + # firmware the payloads below are signed with a truncated or NUL-stopped + # display, which is the defect, so the tests would fail for the right + # reason on the wrong target. Gate rather than assert against old builds. + MIN_FIRMWARE = "7.14.2" + + def setUp(self): + super(TestDisplayDisclosesSignedContent, self).setUp() + self.requires_firmware(self.MIN_FIRMWARE) + + # ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + + def _sign_message_screens(self, message): + """Sign the exact bytes of `message`; return the screens, or None. + + Deliberately builds the protobuf rather than calling + ``client.sign_message()``: that helper runs ``normalize_nfc()`` and + re-encodes to UTF-8, which would rewrite the very payloads under test + — a NUL-bearing or whitespace-padded body would not survive it intact. + A hostile host has no such helper in the way, so the test should not + either. + + None means the device declined to sign, which satisfies the property. + """ + recorder = ScreenRecorder(self.client, answer=True) + try: + with recorder: + self.client.call(proto.SignMessage( + coin_name='Bitcoin', + address_n=[0], + message=message, + script_type=types.SPENDADDRESS, + )) + except CallException: + return None + return recorder.fingerprint + + def _assert_distinguishable(self, a_label, a_msg, b_label, b_msg): + """The two payloads must not present identically to the user.""" + a = self._sign_message_screens(a_msg) + b = self._sign_message_screens(b_msg) + + if a is None or b is None: + # Refusing to display something it cannot show honestly is a pass. + return + + self.assertNotEqual( + a, b, + "%s and %s produced identical screens, so the bytes that differ " + "between them were never shown. The user approving %s cannot tell " + "it apart from %s, and the signature covers the difference." + % (a_label, b_label, b_label, a_label), + ) + + # ── the property, at each place an implementation stops looking ───── + + def test_bytes_past_an_embedded_nul_are_disclosed(self): + """A protobuf `bytes` field is not a C string. + + Passing it to "%s" stops the display at the first NUL while + cryptoMessageSign covers message.size bytes, so everything after the + NUL is signed invisibly. + """ + benign = b"benign login" + hidden = b"benign login\x00 AND APPROVE TRANSFER OF ALL FUNDS" + self._assert_distinguishable( + "a plain message", benign, + "the same message with a NUL-hidden suffix", hidden, + ) + + def test_bytes_past_whitespace_padding_are_disclosed(self): + """Whitespace is the cheapest way to push content out of view. + + A leading space costs zero pixels once a line has wrapped, so padding + can make an over-long body measure as fitting while the tail is + neither shown nor dropped from the signature. + """ + benign = b"Sign in to example.com" + padded = b"Sign in to example.com" + b" " * 320 + \ + b"AND APPROVE TRANSFER TO 0xATTACKER" + self._assert_distinguishable( + "a short login message", benign, + "the same message padded so the suffix falls past the cut", padded, + ) + + def test_bytes_past_the_first_screen_are_disclosed(self): + """Content beyond one screenful must not vanish silently. + + Whether the device pages it, states how much is hidden, or refuses is + not asserted here — only that the two payloads do not look the same. + """ + short = b"a" * 40 + long_with_tail = b"a" * 400 + b"THE PART YOU NEVER SAW" + self._assert_distinguishable( + "a message that fits", short, + "a long message with a distinct tail", long_with_tail, + ) + + def test_newline_padding_does_not_collapse_the_screen(self): + """Line counting is a security boundary, so it must not wrap. + + A body carrying many newlines exercises the row counter rather than + the character count; if that counter overflows, an arbitrarily long + body reports as fitting. + """ + benign = b"Confirm login" + newline_padded = b"Confirm login" + b"\n" * 300 + b"APPROVE EVERYTHING" + self._assert_distinguishable( + "a one-line message", benign, + "the same message behind 300 newlines", newline_padded, + ) + + # ── the flow must actually reach the user ─────────────────────────── + + def test_signing_shows_at_least_one_screen(self): + """Guards the tests above. + + Every assertion here compares screen sequences. If a flow produced no + ButtonRequest at all, two payloads would trivially compare equal as + empty tuples and the suite would pass while showing the user nothing. + """ + screens = self._sign_message_screens(b"hello") + if screens is None: + self.skipTest("device refused to sign the control message") + self.assertGreater( + len(screens), 0, + "signing produced no ButtonRequest, so nothing was shown to the " + "user and the comparisons in this file would be vacuous", + ) + self.assertTrue( + any(sum(bytearray(s)) > 0 for s in screens), + "every captured screen was blank", + ) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_eip712_streaming.py b/tests/test_msg_eip712_streaming.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f7ed728 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_eip712_streaming.py @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +# Structured EIP-712 over the device-driven streaming protocol. +# +# The expected hashes here come from OUTSIDE this repository -- the reference +# implementation EIP-712 itself links to, and a constant published by Circle in +# the deployed USDC contract. That matters more than it looks: the firmware, +# hdwallet and the python client were all written by the same hand against the +# same reading of the spec, so three of them agreeing proves only that the +# reading is self-consistent. Only an outside number can catch a shared +# misreading. + +import unittest + +import common +from keepkeylib import eip712_stream as es +from keepkeylib import messages_ethereum_pb2 as eth +from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib.client import CallException + +PATH = [0x8000002C, 0x8000003C, 0x80000000, 0, 0] + +# assets/eip-712/Example.js in ethereum/EIPs publishes every intermediate. +SPEC_MAIL = { + "types": { + "EIP712Domain": [ + {"name": "name", "type": "string"}, + {"name": "version", "type": "string"}, + {"name": "chainId", "type": "uint256"}, + {"name": "verifyingContract", "type": "address"}, + ], + "Person": [ + {"name": "name", "type": "string"}, + {"name": "wallet", "type": "address"}, + ], + "Mail": [ + {"name": "from", "type": "Person"}, + {"name": "to", "type": "Person"}, + {"name": "contents", "type": "string"}, + ], + }, + "primaryType": "Mail", + "domain": {"name": "Ether Mail", "version": "1", "chainId": 1, + "verifyingContract": "0xCcCCccccCCCCcCCCCCCcCcCccCcCCCcCcccccccC"}, + "message": { + "from": {"name": "Cow", "wallet": "0xCD2a3d9F938E13CD947Ec05AbC7FE734Df8DD826"}, + "to": {"name": "Bob", "wallet": "0xbBbBBBBbbBBBbbbBbbBbbbbBBbBbbbbBbBbbBBbB"}, + "contents": "Hello, Bob!", + }, +} +SPEC_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = "f2cee375fa42b42143804025fc449deafd50cc031ca257e0b194a650a912090f" +SPEC_MESSAGE_HASH = "c52c0ee5d84264471806290a3f2c4cecfc5490626bf912d01f240d7a274b371e" + + +class TestMsgEip712Streaming(common.KeepKeyTest): + + def _walk(self, doc, max_steps=400): + """Answer whatever the device asks until it returns a signature. + + The DEVICE leads. Nothing here chooses the order, which is the property + under test: a host that answered a different question than the one asked + would produce a digest that does not verify. + """ + msg = eth.EthereumSignTypedData() + for n in PATH: + msg.address_n.append(n) + msg.primary_type = doc['primaryType'] + msg.metamask_v4_compat = True + + resp = self.client.call_raw(msg) + for _ in range(max_steps): + if isinstance(resp, proto.ButtonRequest): + self.client.debug.press_yes() + resp = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) + elif isinstance(resp, eth.EthereumTypedDataStructRequest): + resp = self.client.call_raw( + es.build_struct_ack(es.struct_members(doc, resp.name))) + elif isinstance(resp, eth.EthereumTypedDataValueRequest): + r = es.resolve_member_path(doc, list(resp.member_path)) + ack = eth.EthereumTypedDataValueAck() + ack.value = (es.encode_array_length(r[1]) if r[0] == 'length' + else es.encode_value(r[1], r[2])) + resp = self.client.call_raw(ack) + else: + return resp + raise AssertionError('walk did not terminate') + + def setUp(self): + super(TestMsgEip712Streaming, self).setUp() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_structured_eip712() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy('AdvancedMode', 1) + + def test_spec_example_matches_the_published_hashes(self): + """The device's own hashes equal the EIP-712 reference implementation's. + + This is the one assertion that three agreeing implementations cannot + substitute for. Both numbers are published by Example.js in + ethereum/EIPs and are reproduced independently by Example.sol, by + eth-sig-util's V3 and V4 snapshots, and by Mrtenz/eip-712. + + It also exercises the nested-struct path: Mail references Person twice, + so the walk pushes a child frame, derives Person's typeHash through its + own closure, folds it to 32 bytes and hands it back to the parent. + """ + resp = self._walk(SPEC_MAIL) + self.assertIsInstance(resp, eth.EthereumTypedDataSignature) + self.assertEqual(resp.domain_separator_hash.hex(), SPEC_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR) + self.assertEqual(resp.message_hash.hex(), SPEC_MESSAGE_HASH) + self.assertEqual(len(resp.signature), 65) + + def test_array_of_structs_walks(self): + """Arrays, which the walk refused until the decode buffer was reclaimed. + + An array hashes WITHOUT a typeHash prefix -- enc(array) is the keccak of + the concatenated element encodings and nothing else -- so getting this + wrong produces a digest no verifier reproduces rather than an error. + """ + doc = { + "types": { + "EIP712Domain": [{"name": "name", "type": "string"}], + "Item": [{"name": "id", "type": "uint256"}], + "Basket": [{"name": "items", "type": "Item[]"}], + }, + "primaryType": "Basket", + "domain": {"name": "Basket"}, + "message": {"items": [{"id": 1}, {"id": 2}]}, + } + resp = self._walk(doc) + self.assertIsInstance(resp, eth.EthereumTypedDataSignature) + self.assertEqual(len(resp.signature), 65) + + def test_fixed_array_length_must_match_the_declared_size(self): + """A declared dimension is part of the type string and so of typeHash. + + The device only ever learns the count from us, so if it accepted a + different one it would sign a document whose type declares another and + nothing downstream could notice. + """ + doc = { + "types": { + "EIP712Domain": [{"name": "name", "type": "string"}], + "Pair": [{"name": "who", "type": "address[2]"}], + }, + "primaryType": "Pair", + "domain": {"name": "Pair"}, + "message": {"who": ["0x" + "aa" * 20, "0x" + "bb" * 20, "0x" + "cc" * 20]}, + } + # The host refuses before the device is ever asked to hash it. + with self.assertRaises(es.Eip712Error) as ctx: + self._walk(doc) + self.assertIn('declares 2 elements', str(ctx.exception)) + + def test_advanced_mode_gates_the_endpoint(self): + """New parser surface reachable from a website stays behind the gate + until there is hardware evidence for it.""" + self.client.apply_policy('AdvancedMode', 0) + msg = eth.EthereumSignTypedData() + for n in PATH: + msg.address_n.append(n) + msg.primary_type = 'Mail' + resp = self.client.call_raw(msg) + self.assertIsInstance(resp, proto.Failure) + self.assertIn('AdvancedMode', resp.message) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py index 5d9e661a..f1775816 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py @@ -6,18 +6,30 @@ 1. Valid signed metadata → VERIFIED classification 2. Invalid/malicious metadata → MALFORMED classification - 3. Policy: EthBlindSigning disabled → hard reject on unknown contract data + 3. Policy: AdvancedMode disabled → hard reject on unknown contract data 4. Backwards compat: no metadata sent → existing flow unchanged 5. Adversarial: tampered fields, wrong key, replayed metadata, truncated payloads + 6. tx_hash binding: signature is refused unless the signed digest equals the + metadata's committed tx_hash (signed_metadata_enforce) Requires: pip install ecdsa -Test key: private=0x01 (secp256k1 generator point G) — NEVER use in production. +Metadata signer: TEST_PRIVATE_KEY (SignIdentity index 0 of the BIP-39 test +mnemonic). Phase 1 firmware ships with NO built-in verification keys — every +signer is loaded at runtime via LoadClearsignSigner (user-confirmed, RAM-only, +dropped on reboot/wipe), and metadata verified by a loaded signer shows a +warning screen naming the alias before every clearsign page. setUp() loads +the test pubkey into slot 3 with alias 'CI Test'; all metadata vectors use +key_id=3. NEVER use this key in production. +The device wallet (mnemonic12 from common.py) signs the actual transactions. """ +import os import unittest import hashlib import struct +from keepkeylib import messages_ethereum_pb2 as messages_eth + try: import common except ImportError: @@ -27,18 +39,38 @@ from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import ( serialize_metadata, + serialize_schema_metadata, + schema_calldata, sign_metadata, build_test_metadata, + token_amount_value, ARG_FORMAT_RAW, ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT, ARG_FORMAT_BYTES, + ARG_FORMAT_STRING, + ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, CLASSIFICATION_OPAQUE, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, TEST_PRIVATE_KEY, + keccak256, + eth_sighash_legacy, + assert_test_key_matches_slot3, + FIRMWARE_SLOT3_PUBKEY, + test_signer_compressed_pubkey, ) from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path +from keepkeylib.client import CallException, ProtocolMixin + +# The metadata CI slot. Must match: embedded payload key_id, protocol +# EthereumTxMetadata.key_id, and the slot LoadClearsignSigner loaded the +# test pubkey into (phase 1: all built-in METADATA_PUBKEYS slots are zero). +TEST_KEY_ID = 3 + +# Alias shown on the load confirm and on every per-tx warning screen. +CI_SIGNER_ALIAS = 'CI Test' # ─── Test constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -52,13 +84,132 @@ # Wrong key for adversarial tests (private key = 0x02) WRONG_PRIVATE_KEY = b'\x00' * 31 + b'\x02' +# The decoded who/what/why for the Aave supply tx below. This is what the +# device screen should show the user, in human terms — NOT raw hex/wei: +# protocol : Aave V3 (STRING — "who": the attested protocol) +# asset : 0x6B17…1d0F (DAI) (ADDRESS — "what": full, never truncated) +# amount : 10.5 DAI (TOKEN_AMOUNT — decimals+symbol scaled) +# onBehalfOf: 0xd8dA…6045 (ADDRESS) +# 10500000000000000000 raw / 1e18 = 10.5 DAI. DEFAULT_ARGS = [ + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Aave V3'}, {'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': DAI_ADDRESS}, - {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT, - 'value': (10500000000000000000).to_bytes(32, 'big')}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'value': token_amount_value(10500000000000000000, 18, 'DAI')}, {'name': 'onBehalfOf', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'value': VITALIK}, ] +# A token the firmware token list recognizes (CVC) — see +# test_msg_ethereum_erc20_approve.py, which signs to it with AdvancedMode OFF. +CVC_TOKEN = bytes.fromhex('41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45') + +# Real mainnet contracts for the full clear-sign flow suite (mirrors the +# keepkey-sdk tests/evm-clearsign payload set). +USDC = bytes.fromhex('a0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48') +WETH = bytes.fromhex('c02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2') +UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER = bytes.fromhex('7a250d5630b4cf539739df2c5dacb4c659f2488d') +UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER = bytes.fromhex('e592427a0aece92de3edee1f18e0157c05861564') +UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER2 = bytes.fromhex('68b3465833fb72a70ecdf485e0e4c7bd8665fc45') +RECIPIENT_742 = bytes.fromhex('742d35cc6634c0532950a20547b231011e30c8e7') + +def _word(v): + return v.to_bytes(32, 'big') + +def _addr_word(a): + return b'\x00' * 12 + a + +# Device wallet path. With mnemonic12 (common.KeepKeyTest) this is signer +# 0x3f2329c9adfbccd9a84f52c906e936a42da18cb8 — used to check recovered signer. +DEVICE_PATH = "44'/60'/0'/0/0" + + +def bound_metadata(tx_hash, contract=AAVE_V3_POOL, selector=AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, + chain_id=1, method_name='supply', args=None): + """Signed VERIFIED metadata committing to a specific real tx sighash.""" + payload = serialize_metadata( + chain_id=chain_id, + contract_address=contract, + selector=selector, + tx_hash=tx_hash, + method_name=method_name, + args=DEFAULT_ARGS if args is None else args, + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, + ) + return sign_metadata(payload) + + +def recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, digest, chain_id): + """Recover the 20-byte Ethereum signer from a legacy (EIP-155) signature.""" + from ecdsa import VerifyingKey, SECP256k1, util + if chain_id: + rec = sig_v - (35 + 2 * chain_id) + else: + rec = sig_v - 27 + keys = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig_r + sig_s, digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=None, + sigdecode=util.sigdecode_string, + ) + return keccak256(keys[rec].to_string())[-20:] + + +def aave_supply_calldata(amount, on_behalf=VITALIK, asset=DAI_ADDRESS, + referral=0): + """Real Aave V3 supply(address asset, uint256 amount, address onBehalfOf, + uint16 referralCode) calldata — selector 0x617ba037 + 4 x 32-byte words = + 132 bytes. Matches the on-chain ABI so the signed tx_hash binds a genuine + transaction, not a toy payload.""" + return (AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR + + b'\x00' * 12 + asset + + amount.to_bytes(32, 'big') + + b'\x00' * 12 + on_behalf + + referral.to_bytes(32, 'big')) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# CLEARSIGN_FLOWS — the canonical clear-sign payload catalog. +# +# This is the COMPLETE REFERENCE for building a clearsign signer: every +# real-world flow, its exact transaction bytes, and the decoded who/what/why +# the metadata must carry. Uses only the typed formats (ADDRESS / STRING / +# TOKEN_AMOUNT) so the device never renders calldata hex. THE catalog itself +# lives in keepkeylib/clearsign_catalog.py — a single source of truth shared +# with scripts/generate-test-report.py, so the PDF's V section is generated +# FROM these flows rather than hand-duplicated (which drifts). Consumed by: +# - the per-flow device tests (full confirm + sign + recover) +# - test_clearsign_batch_all_payloads (device validates every blob) +# - TestClearsignReferenceVectors (offline: deterministic bytes, snapshots) +# - print_clearsign_flows() --flows (hex dump for external implementations) +# All flows: chain 1, legacy gas, nonce/gas fixed => deterministic tx_hash; +# with REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP + RFC 6979 signing the blobs are byte-reproducible. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +from keepkeylib.clearsign_catalog import ( + CLEARSIGN_FLOWS, CLEARSIGN_FLOWS_BY_KEY, FLOW_NONCE, FLOW_GAS_PRICE, + FLOW_GAS_LIMIT, REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP, + flow_tx_hash as _catalog_flow_tx_hash, + flow_blob as _catalog_flow_blob, +) + + +def flow_tx_hash(flow, chain_id=1): + """Deterministic legacy sighash for a catalog flow (fixed nonce/gas). + Every catalog flow is chain_id=1; the param exists only so old call + sites don't need updating, and mismatches fail loudly rather than + silently signing the wrong chain.""" + assert flow['chain_id'] == chain_id, ( + 'flow %s is chain_id=%d, not %d' % (flow['key'], flow['chain_id'], chain_id)) + return _catalog_flow_tx_hash(flow) + + +def flow_blob(flow, chain_id=1, timestamp=None): + """Per-tx-bound signed metadata blob for a catalog flow, signed with + TEST_KEY_ID (the CI signer loaded via LoadClearsignSigner in setUp). + Pass timestamp=REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP for byte-reproducible reference + vectors.""" + assert flow['chain_id'] == chain_id, ( + 'flow %s is chain_id=%d, not %d' % (flow['key'], flow['chain_id'], chain_id)) + return _catalog_flow_blob(flow, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, timestamp=timestamp) + # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # Test Vector Catalog — reference list of signed vs unsigned/invalid/ @@ -401,6 +552,270 @@ def test_tampered_blob_fails_verification(self): with self.assertRaises(BadSignatureError): vk.verify_digest(sig, digest) + def test_test_key_matches_firmware_slot3(self): + """The signing key's pubkey == firmware METADATA_PUBKEYS[3]. + + Guards the BLOCKER: if these diverge, every VERIFIED vector would be + rejected as MALFORMED on device. This is why all vectors use key_id=3. + """ + try: + import ecdsa # noqa: F401 + except ImportError: + self.skipTest('ecdsa library not installed') + self.assertEqual(test_signer_compressed_pubkey(), FIRMWARE_SLOT3_PUBKEY) + # Must not raise. + assert_test_key_matches_slot3() + + def test_default_key_id_is_slot3(self): + """serialize_metadata embeds key_id=3 by default (matches the signer).""" + blob = build_test_metadata(args=[]) + # key_id is the last byte of the payload, i.e. before sig(64)+recovery(1). + self.assertEqual(blob[-66], TEST_KEY_ID) + + def test_keccak256_known_vectors(self): + """keccak256 (not NIST SHA3) — empty string + function selectors.""" + self.assertEqual( + keccak256(b'').hex(), + 'c5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470', + ) + self.assertEqual(keccak256(b'transfer(address,uint256)')[:4].hex(), + 'a9059cbb') + self.assertEqual(keccak256(b'approve(address,uint256)')[:4].hex(), + '095ea7b3') + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Offline reference vectors — the signer contract, frozen in bytes. +# Any implementation (pioneer-insight, keepkey-sdk) that produces these +# exact blobs from the catalog inputs will be accepted by the firmware. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +# sha256(blob) + blob length for every catalog flow, signed with +# TEST_PRIVATE_KEY at REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP using RFC 6979 deterministic ECDSA. +# Regenerate (only after an intentional format change): +# python3 -c "import test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing as t, hashlib; +# [print(f['key'], hashlib.sha256(t.flow_blob(f, timestamp=t.REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP)).hexdigest()) +# for f in t.CLEARSIGN_FLOWS]" +REFERENCE_BLOB_SNAPSHOTS = { + 'aave-v3-supply': ('434ee7389f099e8ab77a4274fd7da40918a74c719dd0bdb4a81c6259846bda2d', 246), + 'erc20-transfer': ('adbd1e054f8b59b1bb86af046951df53510c10dcc0ec0e3e46b19eaf6410cf05', 205), + 'erc20-approve': ('75e5108f578f27d60c572d12072fb4cf0455321c6f39445e1d59fe4d99713c91', 193), + 'erc20-approve-unlimited': ('a5c043a60da8f317975ee8f1b9f3a0718186f6bdce625b605ce71973b3fa3811', 221), + 'uniswap-v2-eth-to-token': ('ec5aac82aa9b03f043456e486d6bfc6cbd5cde507997fc07a122f9fb1fb32194', 229), + 'uniswap-v2-token-to-eth': ('d94e8842cde731f2dd77ea47a896618b1a317736744ac34f6cbdaf7367e794a7', 254), + 'uniswap-v3-exact-input': ('7186e5b902209bb68630a4ff360727df3696395c69782d1a94adc4ae58abfa59', 286), + 'uniswap-v3-multicall': ('e76f3d88be226a1cbd51923cf9753fed30bef1a8e830e5f5ea71a362dd7e43d9', 198), + 'aave-v3-pool-borrow': ('224af25cac14759def6a6272ad5572c991bb46beae8ad253ee2e9d9764674f0a', 263), + 'aave-v3-pool-repay': ('4cb1f4742731ba3c90a2c9a41e5dbe72ace0357d47726df6df1861ffd4b291b0', 262), + 'aave-v3-pool-withdraw': ('584234a72fb32c63ba70aeda1e21def382df6fa85c6e6d88291f8f8530975ef6', 222), + 'compound-v3-comet-supply': ('f7324ea680b02a9eb6b8274592195c048690081dd75ce77deaba69790155a045', 219), + 'compound-v3-comet-withdraw': ('a1a9ec8cb33e4f21c8e746ef805f44747a7b42aff26c3687f14aac145316135c', 225), + 'spark-protocol-supply': ('70e8a0f11ab1b8d12960442c2449b865860e93e2c6c9710473070774f38aba6f', 268), + 'lido-steth-submit': ('c1d0efa2dfdac3e824156ed891d8ac405d86a69dd9241608d5bb43c75e8c01c7', 200), + 'rocketpool-deposit-pool-deposit': ('31b67c47a72fc80dce6c54ff50d1eca0281e62ac34657892b00c3ef79ef1bf85', 193), + 'etherfi-liquiditypool-deposit': ('4a85922bf92ef1b6e0d6c6fbcf720a5240c037161dab18222ec73da255a34ea5', 221), + 'eigenlayer-strategymanager-deposit': ('2728fc859048bcc71288bfa04a6e3957638ebc8c841cea2d6bbfa802b3ebaf4d', 267), + 'eigenlayer-strategymanager-deposit-steth': ('688c636044e4572c4a2d02b38eb6d30277fc43d8852c06f489cbe41db961eb31', 274), + 'erc20-usdc-increase-allowance': ('e689183d751352f6f517bffe53028a1d497cf45c3e2c146ee470a9e21901df09', 208), + 'erc20-usdc-decrease-allowance': ('c4997d82e03bd748dab00dfcec0c2f673a2458634efada134b1ae57689fe66b6', 213), + 'eip2612-usdc-permit': ('06889bb26039122fd59f859196cc2d201c343c66bab3b6dba3bbc6860f4f7346', 288), + 'permit2-approve': ('02c762e1ac3c9b3974a4f5d26a48e7766fe139ba6dd803505be3da24d2f0b1ad', 292), + 'erc721-bayc-set-approval-for-all': ('6449489e8d0c6275d532ba40a99f4077a764a8687c10f2583f9a4dbe39da8ccb', 256), + 'erc1155-opensea-storefront-set-approval-for-all': ('a9acc53ea1f1b88a2679495d2e4e5e5f0f089e8daf073699d1504b0d92b974d3', 255), + 'usdt-approve': ('52a5aa020b2151ffb3694277026ea671c095fc7a59a4e37d29d2c9d3a5917302', 193), + 'dai-permit': ('a625ee696af3add431c6be7f6e870875432b726db3e951445ae0899f93a2777b', 269), + 'erc721-safe-transfer-from': ('57a50c128066e30a14ffbfe3ad6fbc913086d1678c6d6abcc9ab1aca48dde555', 231), + 'safe-addownerwiththreshold': ('12979ff0d05396be10daf6016eee0fa4da73f5d44c64899bfb43d09d75075dc7', 257), + 'hop-protocol-l1-bridge-sendtol2': ('2bf4be50ca05159780a8baf3dc73de7d88f4b9150a1331dfd4c4c6e5c11bb7d6', 250), + 'wormhole-token-bridge-transfertokens': ('b903447283627ea9f7dc051652fa26713d715193e2577ddcee99ae3892c0757c', 274), + 'compound-governor-bravo-castvote': ('869f2aaadb966cde633da10b9dd2fdc4419aa2c22d7bd5b0a98ef0a8777da8bd', 209), + 'ens-public-resolver-setaddr': ('38983de76989898d1bc1d6d07f2dfcb93141ac78f263588d67e7829fa7ea5f75', 194), + 'metamorpho-steakhouse-usdc-deposit': ('c965b8598311e92a1399503b9c69b52e6efe274de1b9a168a893c77bb7803a9e', 227), + 'metamorpho-steakhouse-usdc-withdraw': ('fb0415338d2733b46b72157623f0a4e153cb2baf9bc70911fefa001d98e35049', 224), + 'yearn-v2-yusdc-deposit': ('402cf60cf1b79d201e082ffb1c2c8ea4c26f375e2a2296fe258c820a52fc240a', 195), + 'yearn-v3-aave-usdc-lender-deposit': ('4222df2284f1ff9bcd767d5c38961b1687d8d3685aa655c28bbbe7a92346e21c', 224), + 'compound-iii-comet-usdc-supply': ('6419f4f524b6ce606aa822d15afed70b5dc56c92ebb62c691b07196fba3ef2bc', 220), + 'weth-deposit': ('a9d5f44091a616e2c226b40433bcac99ecb2e03b0936241c814d4c844772a387', 193), + 'weth-withdraw': ('6cfcda551f935439cb79b23c35625d5f6288be2f2fff420415018b012f78ef88', 164), + 'erc20-transferfrom': ('2c5e697d6e0c50eb9c256969e00790b5d56163159fa0f352e65d6445fd27e60b', 257), + 'uniswap-v3-exact-output-single': ('b86dc23deb60c3ef29328cf2567e2170ebb20fc2a6b937551e552aabda335a09', 322), + 'curve-3pool-exchange': ('a90e07ecc65c5e40427811a7580095e6278997125bc42ed324bdcf7bac8f1cff', 238), + 'erc1155-safe-transfer-from': ('4b4f46aa1f3be99c131103146120d3bcc72334758055292d5b792470a0240984', 267), + 'erc1155-safe-batch-transfer-from': ('1d9b41bc88b2b635327f5aa5a748a5705b59e6b8a5d3c30f39df48b4793f20a3', 272), + 'uniswap-v4-universal-router-swap': ('7e1584ce8615670ce54972fe6f538d806afa35803033bbe98e2ec75643f81dc1', 258), + 'permit2-permit-transfer-from': ('c0fde596537a6bf1e53b98d3746638b4249a7a90d8196fe4a9f40f711729ec84', 276), + 'across-spokepool-depositv3': ('ab185113f0b47ef5f6e1fab6a6839df8b71bf8d48796afee64a61ba8b336ac01', 311), + 'safe-exectransaction': ('00a523f8e02d196db7213813edfbeee2a707679b026c6c6b6f8af88d35bf4889', 274), + 'erc4337-entrypoint-v0.7-handleops': ('218c253b00780eeeb4f47b343feba7fafe2ecf3441f32afbd13e555cd56db6d2', 276), + 'eip7702-setcode-authorization': ('0518442c7172b8c57fcbd09ded11b54e1d20076c4b5e79a7490c4ae9c2096a18', 299), +} + + +class TestClearsignReferenceVectors(unittest.TestCase): + """Offline (no device): the catalog signs deterministically, every + signature self-verifies, and the bytes match the frozen snapshots.""" + + def setUp(self): + try: + import ecdsa # noqa: F401 + except ImportError: + self.skipTest('ecdsa library not installed') + + def test_batch_sign_all_deterministic_and_verifies(self): + from ecdsa import SigningKey, SECP256k1, util + vk = SigningKey.from_string( + TEST_PRIVATE_KEY, curve=SECP256k1).get_verifying_key() + for flow in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + with self.subTest(flow=flow['key']): + blob = flow_blob(flow, timestamp=REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP) + # RFC 6979: signing twice yields identical bytes. + self.assertEqual( + blob, flow_blob(flow, timestamp=REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP)) + # Signature verifies over sha256(signed region). + payload, sig = blob[:-65], blob[-65:-1] + digest = hashlib.sha256(payload).digest() + self.assertTrue(vk.verify_digest( + sig, digest, sigdecode=util.sigdecode_string)) + # Embedded key_id (last payload byte) is the CI slot. + self.assertEqual(payload[-1], TEST_KEY_ID) + + def test_batch_matches_frozen_snapshots(self): + self.assertEqual(set(REFERENCE_BLOB_SNAPSHOTS), + {f['key'] for f in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS}) + for flow in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + with self.subTest(flow=flow['key']): + blob = flow_blob(flow, timestamp=REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP) + want_sha, want_len = REFERENCE_BLOB_SNAPSHOTS[flow['key']] + self.assertEqual(len(blob), want_len) + self.assertEqual(hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest(), want_sha) + + def test_catalog_uses_only_hexfree_formats(self): + """The catalog is the no-hex reference: RAW/BYTES args (which render + as hex on the OLED) are banned from it.""" + for flow in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + for arg in flow['args']: + self.assertIn( + arg['format'], + (ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, ARG_FORMAT_STRING, + ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT), + '%s arg %s uses a hex-rendering format' % + (flow['key'], arg['name'])) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# v2 static-schema blobs (offline) — no device required +# +# v2 attests only the decode SCHEMA (no tx_hash, no arg values); the device +# decodes the argument values from the calldata it signs. These offline tests +# pin the wire format serialize_schema_metadata() emits so it can never drift +# from firmware's parse_v2_args() / decode_v2_args() undetected. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +# transfer(to, amount) on USDC — the canonical v2 fixture. amount is a token +# amount (6 decimals, "USDC"); the value is NOT in the blob, it is decoded from +# the calldata word by the device. +USDC_ADDRESS = bytes.fromhex('a0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48') +ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR = bytes.fromhex('a9059cbb') +V2_SCHEMA_ARGS = [ + {'name': 'to', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'decimals': 6, 'symbol': 'USDC'}, +] + + +def _v2_transfer_blob(): + body = serialize_schema_metadata( + chain_id=1, contract_address=USDC_ADDRESS, + selector=ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR, method_name='transfer', + args=V2_SCHEMA_ARGS, timestamp=0, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + return body, sign_metadata(body) + + +class TestClearSignV2SchemaOffline(unittest.TestCase): + """Offline byte-format tests for the v2 static-schema serializer.""" + + def test_version_byte_is_schema(self): + body, _ = _v2_transfer_blob() + self.assertEqual(body[0], METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA) + + def test_layout_has_no_tx_hash(self): + """v2 body = version(1)+chain(4)+contract(20)+selector(4)+method... — + the selector sits at offset 25, immediately after the contract, with NO + 32-byte tx_hash in between (that is the whole point of v2).""" + body, _ = _v2_transfer_blob() + self.assertEqual(body[1:5], b'\x00\x00\x00\x01') # chain_id + self.assertEqual(body[5:25], USDC_ADDRESS) # contract + self.assertEqual(body[25:29], ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR) # selector @25 + # method_len(2) + 'transfer'(8) then num_args + self.assertEqual(body[29:31], b'\x00\x08') + self.assertEqual(body[31:39], b'transfer') + self.assertEqual(body[39], len(V2_SCHEMA_ARGS)) + + def test_token_arg_carries_static_decimals_symbol_not_value(self): + """The token arg encodes name + format + decimals + symbol, and NO + value — decimals/symbol are static (a property of the contract), the + amount is decoded on-device from the calldata.""" + body, _ = _v2_transfer_blob() + # after num_args @39: arg0 'to' = len(1)+'to'(2)+format(1) = 4 bytes + p = 40 + self.assertEqual(body[p], 2) # name_len 'to' + self.assertEqual(body[p + 1:p + 3], b'to') + self.assertEqual(body[p + 3], ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS) + p += 4 + # arg1 'amount' = len(1)+'amount'(6)+format(1)+decimals(1)+symlen(1)+'USDC'(4) + self.assertEqual(body[p], 6) + self.assertEqual(body[p + 1:p + 7], b'amount') + self.assertEqual(body[p + 7], ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT) + self.assertEqual(body[p + 8], 6) # decimals + self.assertEqual(body[p + 9], 4) # symbol_len + self.assertEqual(body[p + 10:p + 14], b'USDC') + + def test_signed_blob_is_body_plus_65(self): + body, blob = _v2_transfer_blob() + self.assertEqual(len(blob), len(body) + 65) + + def test_frozen_body_snapshot(self): + """Freeze the canonical v2 UNSIGNED body's length + sha256. The body is + key-independent (no signature) and deterministic (timestamp=0), so this + is a pure wire-format drift gate: it trips iff serialize_schema_metadata() + changes the bytes, which must stay in lockstep with firmware's + parse_v2_args(). (The signature is exercised separately.)""" + body, _ = _v2_transfer_blob() + got = (len(body), hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest()) + self.assertEqual(got, V2_BODY_SNAPSHOT, + 'v2 body drift: only update V2_BODY_SNAPSHOT if the wire ' + 'format intentionally changed (and firmware too)') + + def test_calldata_matches_schema_shape(self): + """schema_calldata() builds selector + one 32-byte word per arg, so the + device decodes exactly num_args words (the structural binding).""" + cd = schema_calldata(ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR, [ + {'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'address': VITALIK}, + {'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'amount': 1500000}, + ]) + self.assertEqual(len(cd), 4 + 32 * 2) + self.assertEqual(cd[:4], ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR) + self.assertEqual(cd[4:16], b'\x00' * 12) # address left-padding + self.assertEqual(cd[16:36], VITALIK) + self.assertEqual(int.from_bytes(cd[36:68], 'big'), 1500000) + + def test_rejects_dynamic_format(self): + """v2 only encodes fixed single-word types; STRING/BYTES are rejected by + the serializer (they have no fixed on-chain word).""" + with self.assertRaises(AssertionError): + serialize_schema_metadata( + chain_id=1, contract_address=USDC_ADDRESS, + selector=ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR, method_name='x', + args=[{'name': 'label', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING}]) + + +# Frozen len + sha256 of the canonical v2 UNSIGNED transfer body (timestamp=0, +# key-independent). Regenerate ONLY on an intentional wire-format change: +# python3 -c "from tests.test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing import _v2_transfer_blob; \ +# import hashlib; b,_=_v2_transfer_blob(); print(len(b), hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest())" +V2_BODY_SNAPSHOT = ( + 64, '01a24001460f8a69684f3d2a10f75b14e7449d8912a3833f7f8758e8fccadc05') + # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # Device tests — require KeepKey connected with test firmware @@ -411,9 +826,28 @@ class TestEthereumClearSigning(common.KeepKeyTest): def setUp(self): super().setUp() - self.requires_firmware("7.14.0") + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") self.requires_message("EthereumTxMetadata") + self.requires_message("LoadClearsignSigner") self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + self._load_ci_signer() + # apply_policy() calls Initialize to refresh Features, and Initialize + # deliberately starts a new session that clears RAM-only signers. Tests + # must not redundantly re-apply AdvancedMode after loading this signer. + + def _load_ci_signer(self): + """Load the CI test signer through the production trust path (device + confirm auto-acked by debuglink). Wipe drops it, so every test starts + from an explicit, observable load.""" + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, + pubkey=test_signer_compressed_pubkey(), + alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS, + ) + # The load-confirm frame is setUp noise for the signing tests; drop it + # so each test's own operation frames are what the report picks. + self._drop_setup_screenshots() def test_valid_metadata_returns_verified(self): """Send valid signed metadata → device returns VERIFIED.""" @@ -530,11 +964,458 @@ def test_no_metadata_then_sign_unchanged(self): self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) self.assertIsNotNone(sig_s) + # ── tx_hash binding (the authoritative gate) ────────────────────── + + def test_binding_happy_path_signs_and_recovers(self): + """Full who/what/why clear-sign of a REAL Aave V3 supply() transaction. + + The device is sent (1) an actual EthereumSignTx with genuine Aave + supply(asset,amount,onBehalfOf,referralCode) calldata, and (2) a signed + metadata blob whose tx_hash == the exact sighash of that tx. Runtime + identities require AdvancedMode, and their decoded annotation is + followed by the normal raw-calldata review. + + On device this renders, in order: + WHO -> Clearsign Warning (signer 'CI Test') + Contract: 0x7d27…c7a9 + WHAT -> Call: supply / protocol: Aave V3 / asset: 0x6B17…1d0F (DAI) + / amount: 10.5 DAI / onBehalfOf: 0xd8dA…6045 + WHY -> the signature is REFUSED unless the signed digest equals the + metadata's committed tx_hash (asserted by the recover below). + """ + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + chain_id, nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, value = 1, 7, 20000000000, 200000, 0 + amount = 10500000000000000000 # 10.5 DAI (18 decimals) + data = aave_supply_calldata(amount) + # Byte-accurate real Aave supply calldata: selector + 4 x 32-byte words. + self.assertEqual(data[:4], bytes.fromhex('617ba037')) + self.assertEqual(len(data), 4 + 4 * 32) + tx_hash = eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, AAVE_V3_POOL, + value, data, chain_id) + + # The metadata blob carries the decoded who/what/why (see DEFAULT_ARGS): + # protocol=Aave V3, asset=DAI, amount=10.5 DAI, onBehalfOf. + blob = bound_metadata(tx_hash) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=AAVE_V3_POOL, value=value, data=data, chain_id=chain_id) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_s) + # WHY it's trustworthy: the signature recovers to THIS device's signer + # over THIS tx's digest — the metadata was bound to the exact tx. + signer = recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, tx_hash, chain_id) + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(n)) + + def _clearsign_flow(self, flow, chain_id=1): + """Run one catalog flow END-TO-END with AdvancedMode ON: real tx, + per-tx-bound metadata, who/what/why annotation plus the ordinary raw + review (auto-acked), sign, and assert the signature recovers to the + device signer over this exact digest.""" + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + tx_hash = flow_tx_hash(flow, chain_id) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=flow_blob(flow, chain_id), + metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=FLOW_NONCE, gas_price=FLOW_GAS_PRICE, + gas_limit=FLOW_GAS_LIMIT, to=flow['to'], value=flow['value'], + data=flow['data'], chain_id=chain_id) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + signer = recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, tx_hash, chain_id) + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(n)) + + def test_clearsign_batch_all_payloads(self): + """Sign the ENTIRE payload catalog in one batch and have the DEVICE + validate every blob: each flow's metadata comes back VERIFIED, and a + tampered byte in any blob comes back MALFORMED. This is the + reference contract for signer implementations: produce these bytes + and the device will accept them.""" + for flow in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + with self.subTest(flow=flow['key']): + blob = flow_blob(flow) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + # NB: common.KeepKeyTest overrides assertEqual with a + # 2-arg signature (no msg param); subTest names the flow. + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + # Adversarial cross-check: any single tampered byte in the + # signed region must flip the SAME blob to MALFORMED. + tampered = bytearray(blob) + tampered[10] ^= 0xFF + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=bytes(tampered), metadata_version=1, + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + def test_replay_rejected_when_digest_differs(self): + """Metadata bound to tx A, then sign tx B (same contract+selector+chain, + different calldata) → device aborts at send_signature, NO signature.""" + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + chain_id, gas_price, gas_limit = 1, 20000000000, 200000 + + data_a = aave_supply_calldata(1000000000000000000) + tx_hash_a = eth_sighash_legacy(0, gas_price, gas_limit, AAVE_V3_POOL, + 0, data_a, chain_id) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=bound_metadata(tx_hash_a), + metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + # Same selector/contract/chain (matches_tx → screens shown), but the + # amount differs so the real digest != committed tx_hash. + data_b = aave_supply_calldata(500000000000000000000) + try: + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=0, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=AAVE_V3_POOL, value=0, data=data_b, chain_id=chain_id) + self.fail("Expected Failure — metadata committed to a different tx") + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("Metadata does not match signed transaction", str(e)) + + def test_advanced_mode_gate(self): + """AdvancedMode OFF + unknown contract + no metadata → hard reject; + ON → raw-data confirm path signs; recognized ERC-20 transfer unaffected.""" + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + data = aave_supply_calldata(1000000000000000000) + + # OFF + unknown contract + no metadata → blocked + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 0) + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, + pubkey=test_signer_compressed_pubkey(), + alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS, + ) + self.assertIn("AdvancedMode required", str(ctx.exception)) + + try: + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=0, gas_price=20000000000, gas_limit=200000, + to=AAVE_V3_POOL, value=0, data=data, chain_id=1) + self.fail("Expected Failure — blind signing disabled") + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("Arbitrary contract data signing disabled by policy", + str(e)) + + # ON → raw-data confirm path → signs + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + _, sig_r, _ = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=0, gas_price=20000000000, gas_limit=200000, + to=AAVE_V3_POOL, value=0, data=data, chain_id=1) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 0) + + # Recognized ERC-20 transfer is decoded natively → NOT blind-gated even + # with AdvancedMode OFF (token resolves via tokenByChainAddress). + erc20 = (bytes.fromhex('a9059cbb') + b'\x00' * 12 + VITALIK + + (1000000).to_bytes(32, 'big')) + _, sig_r, _ = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=1, gas_price=20000000000, gas_limit=80000, + to=CVC_TOKEN, value=0, data=erc20, chain_id=1) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + + def test_cancel_clears_metadata_not_reused(self): + """Cancel mid-confirm → metadata cleared; a later matching tx is NOT + silently signed using the stale blob.""" + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + chain_id, gas_price, gas_limit = 1, 20000000000, 200000 + data = aave_supply_calldata(1000000000000000000) + tx_hash = eth_sighash_legacy(0, gas_price, gas_limit, AAVE_V3_POOL, + 0, data, chain_id) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=bound_metadata(tx_hash), + metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + # Press NO on the first decoded confirm screen → signed_metadata_confirm + # returns false → ActionCancelled + ethereum_signing_abort (clears blob). + self.client.button = False + try: + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=0, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=AAVE_V3_POOL, value=0, data=data, chain_id=chain_id) + self.fail("Expected Failure — user cancelled the verified confirm") + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("cancelled", str(e).lower()) + finally: + self.client.button = True + + # Same tx, no new metadata, AdvancedMode OFF → blind-sign gate must fire. + # If the stale blob were reused it would suppress the gate and sign. + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 0) + try: + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=0, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=AAVE_V3_POOL, value=0, data=data, chain_id=chain_id) + self.fail("Expected Failure — stale metadata must not be reused") + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("Arbitrary contract data signing disabled by policy", + str(e)) + + + # ── LoadClearsignSigner — the phase-1 trust path ─────────────────── + + def test_load_required_before_verify(self): + """Fresh (wiped) device: a VERIFIED blob is MALFORMED until the signer + is loaded — proves there is no built-in trust path in phase 1.""" + self.client.wipe_device() # factory reset drops loaded signers + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + + blob, _, _ = TestVectorCatalog.valid_aave_supply() + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + self._load_ci_signer() + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + def test_load_signer_cancel_refuses(self): + """Pressing NO on the load confirm must refuse the signer.""" + pub = test_signer_compressed_pubkey() + self.client.button = False + try: + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=1, pubkey=pub, alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS) + finally: + self.client.button = True + + # Slot 1 must still be empty: a blob signed for slot 1 is MALFORMED. + payload = serialize_metadata( + chain_id=1, contract_address=AAVE_V3_POOL, + selector=AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, tx_hash=ZERO_TX_HASH, + method_name='supply', args=DEFAULT_ARGS, key_id=1) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=sign_metadata(payload), metadata_version=1, key_id=1) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + @unittest.skipUnless( + os.getenv('KK_EXPECT_PERSIST_REJECTED') == '1', + 'requires the exact RC18 firmware security boundary') + def test_persistent_signer_rejected_without_session_mutation(self): + """RC18 firmware fails closed on persist=true without slot mutation.""" + pub = test_signer_compressed_pubkey() + + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + self.client.call(messages_eth.LoadClearsignSigner( + key_id=1, pubkey=pub, alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS, persist=True)) + + payload = serialize_metadata( + chain_id=1, contract_address=AAVE_V3_POOL, + selector=AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, tx_hash=ZERO_TX_HASH, + method_name='supply', args=DEFAULT_ARGS, key_id=1) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=sign_metadata(payload), metadata_version=1, key_id=1) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + def test_load_signer_invalid_pubkey_rejected(self): + """Uncompressed / zero / truncated pubkeys refused without a confirm.""" + for bad in (b'\x04' + b'\x00' * 32, # uncompressed prefix + b'\x00' * 33, # zero key (empty-slot sentinel) + test_signer_compressed_pubkey()[:32]): # short + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=1, pubkey=bad, alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS) + + def test_load_signer_bad_alias_rejected(self): + """Empty/oversized aliases, control/'%' chars, and semantic-injection + punctuation are rejected. The alias renders inside quotes on the trust + screen, so a quote-breakout or a "." / "(" that appends a false + "verified by KeepKey." claim must not pass validation.""" + pub = test_signer_compressed_pubkey() + for alias in ('', 'x' * 32, 'evil\nalias', 'a%sb', + "x' verified by KeepKey. Safe (", 'safe.KeepKey', + 'trust(me)'): + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=1, pubkey=pub, alias=alias) + + def test_load_signer_key_id_out_of_range_rejected(self): + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=4, pubkey=test_signer_compressed_pubkey(), + alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS) + + +class TestClearSignV2Device(common.KeepKeyTest): + """Device integration for v2 (static schema) blobs. + + A v2 blob attests only the decode schema; the device decodes the argument + values from the calldata it signs. This exercises the full round-trip: load + signer -> send v2 metadata -> sign a matching transfer() tx -> the signature + recovers to this device's signer over the tx digest (so the who/what/why + shown was bound to the exact tx, with no committed tx_hash). + + v2 (METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA) lands in the in-progress 7.15.0 line, so this + runs against the develop firmware alongside the v1 clear-sign device tests. + """ + + V2_FIRMWARE = "7.15.0" + + def setUp(self): + super().setUp() + self.requires_firmware(self.V2_FIRMWARE) + self.requires_message("EthereumTxMetadata") + self.requires_message("LoadClearsignSigner") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, pubkey=test_signer_compressed_pubkey(), + alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS) + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + # As above, do not call apply_policy() again after loading the signer: + # its Initialize refresh correctly clears session-only trust anchors. + + def test_v2_transfer_decodes_signs_and_recovers(self): + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + chain_id, nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, value = 1, 3, 20000000000, 250000, 0 + # transfer(to=VITALIK, amount=1.5 USDC) — the device decodes both from + # the calldata using the v2 schema (address word + token-amount word). + args = [ + {'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'address': VITALIK}, + {'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'amount': 1500000}, + ] + data = schema_calldata(ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR, args) + _, blob = _v2_transfer_blob() + + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=USDC_ADDRESS, value=value, data=data, chain_id=chain_id) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_s) + tx_hash = eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, USDC_ADDRESS, + value, data, chain_id) + signer = recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, tx_hash, chain_id) + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(n)) + + def test_v2_calldata_length_mismatch_falls_back_to_raw_review(self): + """The headline v2 security property: a blob's schema says 2 words, + but the calldata actually being signed carries 3. decode_v2_args' + structural completeness check (total calldata bytes must equal + exactly 4 + 32*num_args) fails, matches_tx returns false, and the tx + falls through to the ordinary AdvancedMode raw review, never a + clear-signed-but-wrong display.""" + n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + chain_id, nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, value = 1, 3, 20000000000, 250000, 0 + args = [ + {'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, 'address': VITALIK}, + {'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, 'amount': 1500000}, + ] + # calldata carries one EXTRA 32-byte word beyond the 2-arg schema. + data = schema_calldata(ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR, args) + (b'\x00' * 32) + _, blob = _v2_transfer_blob() + + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + _, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=USDC_ADDRESS, value=value, data=data, chain_id=chain_id) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_s) + + def test_v2_unsupported_arg_format_returns_malformed(self): + """v2 supports only fixed single-word ADDRESS/AMOUNT/TOKEN_AMOUNT arg + formats (decode_v2_args has no dynamic-type support, by design). The + Python serializer refuses to BUILD a STRING-format v2 blob (see the + offline test_rejects_dynamic_format), but a malicious or buggy host + could still hand-craft the raw bytes — the device's own parser must + independently reject an unsupported v2 arg format as MALFORMED at + blob-load time, before any calldata is even seen.""" + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + body = bytearray() + body.append(METADATA_VERSION_SCHEMA) + body.extend((1).to_bytes(4, 'big')) # chain_id + body.extend(USDC_ADDRESS) + body.extend(ERC20_TRANSFER_SELECTOR) + name = b'transfer' + body.extend(len(name).to_bytes(2, 'big')) + body.extend(name) + body.append(1) # num_args + arg_name = b'label' + body.append(len(arg_name)) + body.extend(arg_name) + body.append(ARG_FORMAT_STRING) # unsupported in v2 + body.append(CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + body.extend((0).to_bytes(4, 'big')) # timestamp + body.append(TEST_KEY_ID) + blob = sign_metadata(bytes(body)) + + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +# Dynamically generate one full-confirm device test per CLEARSIGN_FLOWS +# entry (mirrors keepkey-sdk tests/evm-clearsign): every real-world flow a +# user actually performs, each confirmed end-to-end with AdvancedMode ON and +# both the who/what/why annotation and raw calldata review. Avoids +# hand-writing 50+ near-identical test methods; the catalog IS the test +# list, so growing it (see keepkeylib/clearsign_catalog.py) needs no +# changes here. 'aave-v3-supply' is excluded — it's the flagship full- +# sequence walkthrough in test_binding_happy_path_signs_and_recovers above. +# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ + +def _make_clearsign_flow_test(flow_key): + def test(self): + self._clearsign_flow(CLEARSIGN_FLOWS_BY_KEY[flow_key]) + f = CLEARSIGN_FLOWS_BY_KEY[flow_key] + test.__doc__ = '%s.%s (%s): %s' % (f['protocol'], f['method'], f['category'], f.get('why', '')) + return test + + +for _flow in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + if _flow['key'] == 'aave-v3-supply': + continue + setattr(TestEthereumClearSigning, + 'test_clearsign_' + _flow['key'].replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_'), + _make_clearsign_flow_test(_flow['key'])) +del _flow + # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # Print all test vectors (for documentation / external verification) # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ +def print_clearsign_flows(): + """Dump the complete clear-sign flow catalog: tx params, calldata hex and + the deterministic reference blob hex. THE external reference for signer + implementations (pioneer-insight, keepkey-sdk).""" + print('=' * 70) + print('CLEARSIGN FLOW CATALOG (chain 1, nonce=%d, gas_price=%d, gas_limit=%d,' % + (FLOW_NONCE, FLOW_GAS_PRICE, FLOW_GAS_LIMIT)) + print('timestamp=%d, key_id=%d, RFC6979 deterministic ECDSA)' % + (REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP, TEST_KEY_ID)) + print('=' * 70) + for flow in CLEARSIGN_FLOWS: + print() + print('[%s] %s' % (flow['key'], flow['method'])) + shows = ', '.join('%s=%r' % (a['name'], a.get('value')) for a in flow['args']) + print(' shows : %s' % shows) + print(' to : 0x%s' % flow['to'].hex()) + print(' value : %d' % flow['value']) + print(' calldata : 0x%s' % flow['data'].hex()) + print(' tx_hash : 0x%s' % flow_tx_hash(flow).hex()) + print(' blob : %s' % flow_blob(flow, TEST_KEY_ID, timestamp=REFERENCE_TIMESTAMP).hex()) + + def print_test_vectors(): """Print all test vectors as hex for external verification.""" vectors = [ @@ -561,7 +1442,7 @@ def print_test_vectors(): print('═' * 72) print(' EVM Clear Signing — Test Vector Catalog') - print(' Test key: privkey=0x01 (secp256k1 generator)') + print(' Metadata signer: SignIdentity idx0 == firmware slot 3 (key_id=3)') print('═' * 72) for i, gen in enumerate(vectors): @@ -575,9 +1456,178 @@ def print_test_vectors(): print('\n' + '═' * 72) + +def _decode_icon_rle(data, width, height): + """Reference decoder for LoadClearsignSigner.icon, traced from the decoder + of record: keepkey-firmware lib/board/draw.c draw_bitmap_mono_rle(). + + The icon is NOT a packed 1bpp bitmap (a packed 64x64 needs 512 bytes and the + wire cap is 384). It is run-length encoded with byte-valued pixels: + n = int8(data[i++]); n in [1,127] -> RUN: emit the next value byte n times + n in [-127,-1] -> LITERAL: emit the next (-n) bytes once each + n == 0 -> invalid + n == -128 (0x80)-> invalid: firmware's counter is int8_t + and cannot represent 128, so the packet + is undecodable (it previously asserted / + ran with a negative counter under NDEBUG) + Pixels fill row-major until exactly width*height are emitted. + """ + seq = nonseq = i = 0 + out = [] + for _ in range(height): + for _ in range(width): + if i >= len(data): + raise ValueError("overrun reading RLE count") + if seq == 0 and nonseq == 0: + n = data[i] + n = n - 256 if n > 127 else n + i += 1 + if n == 0: + raise ValueError("n == 0 is invalid") + if n == -128: + # Mirror firmware: -(-128) overflows int8_t. Accepting 128 + # here would mask a decoder incompatibility. + raise ValueError("n == -128 (0x80) is invalid: undecodable") + if n < 0: + nonseq, seq = -n, 0 + else: + seq = n + if i >= len(data): + raise ValueError("overrun reading RLE value") + out.append(data[i]) + if seq > 0: + seq -= 1 + if seq == 0: + i += 1 + else: + i += 1 + nonseq -= 1 + # Exactness, mirroring firmware's draw_bitmap_mono_rle_valid(): a run that + # straddles the end of the image, or packets trailing past the last pixel, + # are NOT well-formed. The drawing path fills the canvas and stops, so it + # cannot catch these -- the validator must. + if seq != 0 or nonseq != 0: + raise ValueError("run straddles the end of the image") + if i != len(data): + raise ValueError("trailing packets after the final pixel") + return out + + +class TestClearsignSignerIcon(unittest.TestCase): + """Offline coverage for the LoadClearsignSigner identity-icon wire contract. + + Regression guard for the review finding that the proto documented a packed + 1bpp row-major bitmap while firmware fed the bytes to an RLE decoder — a + client following the old doc rendered a garbled/absent logo on a TRUST screen. + """ + + ICON_MAX = 384 # METADATA_ICON_MAX / CLEARSIGN_ICON_MAX / proto max_size + MAX_WIDTH = 40 # LEFT_MARGIN_WITH_ICON -- the confirm screen's icon column + MAX_HEIGHT = 64 # the icon column's height + + def test_geometry_caps_are_asymmetric(self): + # width is capped at the 40px text column, NOT at the 64px height: text + # begins at x=40 and the icon is drawn after it, so a wider icon paints + # over the alias/fingerprint/"NOT verified by KeepKey" warning. + self.assertLess(self.MAX_WIDTH, self.MAX_HEIGHT) + + def test_rle_is_the_format_of_record_not_a_size_workaround(self): + # Deliberately NOT justified by "packed wouldn't fit": at the legal max + # geometry a packed 1bpp icon is 40*64/8 = 320 bytes and WOULD fit the + # 384-byte cap. RLE is the format because draw_bitmap_mono_rle() is the + # decoder of record (shared with every bundled image) -- so the encoder + # contract is RLE regardless of what packed would cost. + self.assertLessEqual((self.MAX_WIDTH * self.MAX_HEIGHT) // 8, + self.ICON_MAX) + + def test_golden_vector_matches_the_documented_decode(self): + # The golden vector published in messages-ethereum.proto. + self.assertEqual( + _decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00]), 2, 2), + [0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00], + ) + + def test_run_and_literal_packets(self): + self.assertEqual(_decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x04, 0xAB]), 4, 1), + [0xAB] * 4) # RUN + self.assertEqual(_decode_icon_rle(bytes([0xFD, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03]), 3, 1), + [0x01, 0x02, 0x03]) # LITERAL (-3) + + def test_literal_of_128_is_invalid(self): + # 0x80 => n = -128. Spec-valid under the original doc, but firmware's + # int8_t counter cannot represent 128: it asserted (debug) or decoded + # with a negative counter (NDEBUG). Both proto and firmware now reject. + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + _decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x80]) + bytes([0xAA] * 128), 128, 1) + + def test_literal_of_127_is_the_valid_boundary(self): + data = bytes([0x81]) + bytes(range(127)) + self.assertEqual(_decode_icon_rle(data, 127, 1), list(range(127))) + + def test_run_of_127_is_the_valid_boundary(self): + self.assertEqual(_decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x7F, 0x5A]), 127, 1), + [0x5A] * 127) + + def test_zero_count_is_invalid(self): + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + _decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x00, 0xFF]), 1, 1) + + def test_straddling_run_is_rejected(self): + # 05 FF for a 2x2: RUN of 5 into a 4-pixel image. The draw path would + # fill 4 and report success; the stream is not well-formed. + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + _decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x05, 0xFF]), 2, 2) + + def test_trailing_packets_are_rejected(self): + # Exactly fills 2x2, then carries an unread packet. + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + _decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x04, 0xFF, 0x01, 0xAA]), 2, 2) + + def test_truncated_stream_is_rejected(self): + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + _decode_icon_rle(bytes([0x08, 0xFF]), 4, 4) # claims 8, only 2 bytes + + def test_message_exposes_icon_dimensions_and_persist(self): + # Regression guard: the generated bindings previously carried only + # key_id/pubkey/alias, so constructing with icon raised ValueError. The + # persist bit still round-trips for wire compatibility even though RC18 + # firmware and the high-level client reject true. + icon = bytes([0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00]) + msg = messages_eth.LoadClearsignSigner( + key_id=3, pubkey=b'\x02' * 33, alias="Pioneer", + icon=icon, icon_width=2, icon_height=2, persist=True, + ) + parsed = messages_eth.LoadClearsignSigner() + parsed.ParseFromString(msg.SerializeToString()) + self.assertEqual(parsed.icon, icon) + self.assertEqual(parsed.icon_width, 2) + self.assertEqual(parsed.icon_height, 2) + self.assertTrue(parsed.persist) + self.assertEqual(_decode_icon_rle(parsed.icon, parsed.icon_width, + parsed.icon_height), + [0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00]) + + def test_high_level_client_rejects_persist_true(self): + client = object.__new__(ProtocolMixin) + with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'authenticated storage'): + client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=1, pubkey=b'\x02' * 33, alias='Pioneer', persist=True) + + def test_text_only_identity_omits_icon_fields(self): + msg = messages_eth.LoadClearsignSigner( + key_id=3, pubkey=b'\x02' * 33, alias="Pioneer") + parsed = messages_eth.LoadClearsignSigner() + parsed.ParseFromString(msg.SerializeToString()) + self.assertFalse(parsed.HasField('icon')) + self.assertFalse(parsed.HasField('icon_width')) + self.assertFalse(parsed.HasField('icon_height')) + + if __name__ == '__main__': import sys if '--vectors' in sys.argv: print_test_vectors() + elif '--flows' in sys.argv: + print_clearsign_flows() else: unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bea9d3b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_clearsign_additive.py @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +""" +EVM Clear Signing — the ADDITIVE INVARIANT. + +The whole clear-sign tier rests on one property: + + A runtime-loaded provider may ADD screens. It may never REMOVE one. + +A provider signer is loaded at runtime (LoadClearsignSigner, RAM-only, +user-confirmed) and is NOT verified by KeepKey. Its metadata is therefore +annotation, not authority: after the decoded who/what/why screens the device +must still run the ordinary unverified review — the amount/recipient screen, +the raw-calldata screen and the fee screen a user would have seen with no +metadata at all. If a lying provider could suppress any of those, a runtime +schema would be a screen-substitution oracle: "supply 10.5 DAI to Aave" on the +glass, arbitrary calldata under the signature. + +lib/firmware/ethereum.c:828 is where this is enforced: + + if (signed_metadata_from_loaded_signer()) { + needs_confirm = true; /* forced back ON */ + data_needs_confirm = true; /* forced back ON */ + } else { + needs_confirm = signed_metadata_schema_moves_value(); + data_needs_confirm = false; /* raw review SUPPRESSED */ + } + +The else-branch is reserved for a future firmware-PINNED signer and must not be +reachable by anything a host can load today. + +HOW THESE TESTS MEASURE SCREENS +------------------------------- +Screen counts are never modelled here, they are compared. Every test signs the +SAME transaction twice against the SAME device state — once with no metadata +(the baseline) and once with metadata — and records the raw 2048-byte OLED +framebuffer at each ButtonRequest (ScreenRecorder below, which reads the layout +before the debuglink auto-press). The proof of "nothing was removed" is that +the baseline frames reappear BYTE-FOR-BYTE as the tail of the clear-signed run. +That is immune to pagination and to value-dependent rendering: whatever the +baseline drew, the clear-signed run must still draw, in the same order, last. + +Existing coverage in test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py is adjacent but not +this: V5 covers "no metadata -> blind sign", V10 covers replay rejection, V12 +covers cancel-clears-metadata. None of them proves the raw review FOLLOWS a +SUCCESSFUL decode. +""" + +import time +import unittest + +try: + import common +except ImportError: + import sys, os + sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(__file__)) + import common + +from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import ( + serialize_metadata, + serialize_schema_metadata, + sign_metadata, + eth_sighash_legacy, + # aliased: a module-level name starting with 'test_' would be + # collected as a test function by pytest. + test_signer_compressed_pubkey as signer_pubkey, + ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS, + ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT, + ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, +) +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + +# Fixtures and helpers shared with the main clear-sign suite. Imported rather +# than duplicated so a change to the reference vectors cannot leave this +# section quietly testing a different transaction than the atlas describes. +from test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing import ( + AAVE_V3_POOL, + AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, + CI_SIGNER_ALIAS, + DEFAULT_ARGS, + DEVICE_PATH, + TEST_KEY_ID, + aave_supply_calldata, + recover_eth_signer, +) + +# METADATA_MAX_KEYS in include/keepkey/firmware/signed_metadata.h. +METADATA_MAX_KEYS = 4 + +# The Aave V3 supply() transaction every additive test signs. Real ABI +# calldata (selector + 4 x 32-byte words), so the metadata below binds a +# genuine transaction rather than a toy payload. +TX = dict(chain_id=1, nonce=7, gas_price=20000000000, gas_limit=200000, + value=0) +SUPPLY_AMOUNT = 10500000000000000000 # 10.5 DAI (18 decimals) + + +class ScreenRecorder(object): + """Record the OLED framebuffer of every confirm screen an operation draws. + + Wraps callback_ButtonRequest: reads the layout over DebugLink BEFORE the + normal auto-press (which would replace the screen), then delegates to the + original callback so screenshot capture and the button press still happen + exactly as they do in every other test. + """ + + # The firmware emits ButtonRequest immediately before drawing; the same + # settle used by the screenshot path (client.SCREENSHOT_SETTLE_SECONDS) + # keeps a half-drawn frame out of the comparison. + SETTLE = 0.3 + + def __init__(self, client): + self.client = client + self.frames = [] # list of (ButtonRequestType, 2048-byte layout) + + def __enter__(self): + original = self.client.callback_ButtonRequest + + def record(msg): + time.sleep(self.SETTLE) + self.frames.append((msg.code, bytes(self.client.debug.read_layout()))) + return original(msg) + + # Instance attribute shadows the bound method; client.call() resolves + # the handler with getattr(self, 'callback_ButtonRequest'). + self.client.callback_ButtonRequest = record + return self + + def __exit__(self, *exc): + del self.client.callback_ButtonRequest + return False + + @property + def codes(self): + return [code for code, _ in self.frames] + + @property + def layouts(self): + return [layout for _, layout in self.frames] + + +def bound_supply_metadata(tx_hash, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID): + """v1 metadata committing to a specific real Aave supply() sighash.""" + return sign_metadata(serialize_metadata( + chain_id=TX['chain_id'], + contract_address=AAVE_V3_POOL, + selector=AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, + tx_hash=tx_hash, + method_name='supply', + args=DEFAULT_ARGS, + key_id=key_id, + )) + + +class TestClearSignAdditiveInvariant(common.KeepKeyTest): + """A runtime provider adds screens; it never removes one.""" + + def setUp(self): + super().setUp() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("EthereumTxMetadata") + self.requires_message("LoadClearsignSigner") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + # AdvancedMode is required both for the raw-calldata review to be + # reachable at all and for a runtime signer to verify anything. + # apply_policy() re-Initializes, which clears RAM-only signers, so it + # must come BEFORE any load_clearsign_signer() call. + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + self.n = parse_path(DEVICE_PATH) + self.data = aave_supply_calldata(SUPPLY_AMOUNT) + self.tx_hash = eth_sighash_legacy( + TX['nonce'], TX['gas_price'], TX['gas_limit'], AAVE_V3_POOL, + TX['value'], self.data, TX['chain_id']) + + def _load_signer(self, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS): + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=key_id, pubkey=signer_pubkey(), alias=alias) + + def _sign_supply(self): + return self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=self.n, to=AAVE_V3_POOL, data=self.data, **TX) + + def _record_supply(self): + """Sign the fixture tx, returning (ScreenRecorder, (v, r, s)).""" + with ScreenRecorder(self.client) as rec: + sig = self._sign_supply() + return rec, sig + + def _assert_recovers(self, sig, tx_hash=None): + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = sig + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_r) + self.assertIsNotNone(sig_s) + signer = recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, + tx_hash or self.tx_hash, TX['chain_id']) + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(self.n)) + + def _assert_baseline_survives(self, baseline, observed): + """The core assertion: every baseline screen still appears, unchanged, + in order, as the TAIL of the clear-signed run.""" + self.assertTrue(len(observed.frames) > len(baseline.frames)) + self.assertEqual(observed.frames[-len(baseline.frames):], + baseline.frames) + # And the extra frames really are extra — no baseline screen was + # merely re-drawn earlier to pad the count. + added = observed.frames[:-len(baseline.frames)] + for code, layout in added: + self.assertTrue(layout not in baseline.layouts) + + # ── the invariant ──────────────────────────────────────────────── + + def test_successful_decode_still_runs_the_raw_review(self): + """A VERIFIED v1 decode from a runtime provider ADDS its who/what/why + screens in front of the ordinary unverified review — it replaces none + of them. + + Measured on the emulator for this fixture: the baseline (no metadata) + run draws 3 screens — amount/recipient, raw contract data, fee. The + clear-signed run draws 10: identity, 'Call: supply', contract address, + one screen per attested argument (4), then the SAME 3 baseline frames, + byte-for-byte. 3 + num_args is the structural minimum from + signed_metadata_confirm_screens(); pagination can only raise it. + """ + self._load_signer() + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + + # Baseline: the exact same transaction with no metadata in play. + baseline, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + + blob = bound_supply_metadata(self.tx_hash) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + observed, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + + self._assert_baseline_survives(baseline, observed) + # Identity + method + contract + one screen per attested argument. + added = len(observed.frames) - len(baseline.frames) + self.assertTrue(added >= 3 + len(DEFAULT_ARGS)) + + def test_failed_signature_falls_back_to_the_unverified_review(self): + """Metadata whose signature does not verify must leave the signing + flow EXACTLY as it was: the ordinary unverified review, no refusal and + no partial decoded information. + + The device classifies the tampered blob MALFORMED and the subsequent + signing run draws frames byte-identical to the baseline — which is the + strongest available statement of 'nothing decoded leaked onto the + glass', since any decoded screen would be a frame the baseline does + not contain. + """ + self._load_signer() + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + + baseline, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + + tampered = bytearray(bound_supply_metadata(self.tx_hash)) + tampered[10] ^= 0xFF # inside the signed region + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=bytes(tampered), metadata_version=1, + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + observed, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + self.assertEqual(observed.frames, baseline.frames) + + def test_no_runtime_slot_can_reach_the_suppression_branch(self): + """Every key slot is additive, so signed_metadata_from_loaded_signer() + is true for every VERIFIED blob this firmware can produce. + + The suppression else-branch is gated on a signer that is NOT runtime- + loaded. This test walks all METADATA_MAX_KEYS slots: each one is loaded + at runtime and each one still shows the full baseline review after its + decode. A slot that suppressed would be caught as a missing tail frame. + """ + for key_id in range(METADATA_MAX_KEYS): + self._load_signer(key_id=key_id, alias='CI Slot %d' % key_id) + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + + baseline, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + + for key_id in range(METADATA_MAX_KEYS): + with self.subTest(key_id=key_id): + blob = bound_supply_metadata(self.tx_hash, key_id=key_id) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=key_id) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + observed, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + self._assert_baseline_survives(baseline, observed) + + def test_no_slot_verifies_without_a_runtime_load(self): + """The complementary half: with no signer loaded, NO slot verifies + anything, so there is no firmware-pinned signer in this build that + could take the suppression branch. + + Phase 1 ships with every built-in METADATA_PUBKEYS slot zeroed; + metadata_pubkey_for() returns NULL for an unloaded slot and + signed_metadata_process() classifies MALFORMED. Sending metadata draws + nothing, so the empty screenshot list for this test is deliberate — the + setUp policy-confirm frame is dropped below so the capture directory + stays empty rather than offering an unrelated screen as evidence. + """ + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + for key_id in range(METADATA_MAX_KEYS): + with self.subTest(key_id=key_id): + blob = bound_supply_metadata(self.tx_hash, key_id=key_id) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=key_id) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED) + + def test_v2_schema_decode_still_runs_the_raw_review(self): + """The v2 (static schema) path is additive too. + + v2 is where suppression would be most tempting: the schema attests a + decode shape and no tx_hash, so the else-branch drops the raw review + outright (data_needs_confirm = false) and keeps the amount screen only + if signed_metadata_schema_moves_value(). For a runtime signer that + branch is not taken — the decoded screens are followed by the SAME + amount, raw-calldata and fee screens the baseline drew. + + Deliberately schema-decoded against the Aave supply() fixture rather + than an ERC-20 transfer: a recognized token contract has no raw-data + screen in its own baseline (the token path already skips it), so it + could not show that the raw review survives. + """ + self._load_signer() + self._drop_setup_screenshots() + + baseline, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + + # Same 132-byte supply() calldata, described as a 4-word static + # schema: the device decodes the values from the bytes it signs. + v2_args = [ + {'name': 'asset', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS}, + {'name': 'amount', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_TOKEN_AMOUNT, + 'decimals': 18, 'symbol': 'DAI'}, + {'name': 'onBehalfOf', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_ADDRESS}, + {'name': 'referral', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_AMOUNT}, + ] + blob = sign_metadata(serialize_schema_metadata( + chain_id=TX['chain_id'], contract_address=AAVE_V3_POOL, + selector=AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, method_name='supply', + args=v2_args, timestamp=0, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID)) + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=blob, metadata_version=1, key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + self.assertEqual(resp.classification, CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED) + + observed, sig = self._record_supply() + self._assert_recovers(sig) + self._assert_baseline_survives(baseline, observed) + added = len(observed.frames) - len(baseline.frames) + self.assertTrue(added >= 3 + len(v2_args)) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx.py index 52cb7dab..e5bb66a1 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_0x_signtx.py @@ -164,8 +164,18 @@ def test_sign_longdata_swap(self): # test transformERC20 def test__sign_transformERC20(self): self.requires_fullFeature() + # transformERC20 is pinned to the 0x ExchangeProxy and bounded by its + # displayed input/min-output amounts, so it clear-signs WITHOUT + # AdvancedMode at any calldata size (the transformations[] tail exceeds + # one chunk). No AdvancedMode policy is set here on purpose. self.requires_firmware("7.1.5") self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + # transformERC20 to the 0x Exchange Proxy is blind contract data (no + # recognized token / contract handler). Since 7.15.0 the device + # hard-rejects blind contract data unless AdvancedMode is on (Insight + # clear-signing policy) — same as test_sign_longdata_swap above. This + # test checks signing correctness, so run it in expert mode. + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( # Data from: diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity.py index 2f75df28..6593611c 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_erc20_uniswap_liquidity.py @@ -55,9 +55,6 @@ def test_sign_uni_approve_liquidity_ETH(self): def test_sign_uni_add_liquidity_ETH(self): self.requires_fullFeature() - if self.client.features.firmware_variant[0:8] == "Emulator": - self.skipTest("Skip until emulator issue resolved") - return self.requires_firmware("7.1.0") self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() @@ -87,9 +84,6 @@ def test_sign_uni_add_liquidity_ETH(self): def test_sign_uni_remove_liquidity_ETH(self): self.requires_fullFeature() - if self.client.features.firmware_variant[0:8] == "Emulator": - self.skipTest("Skip until emulator issue resolved") - return self.requires_firmware("7.1.0") self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83b9416c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signing_guards.py @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +# This file is part of the KeepKey project. +# +# Regression tests for Ethereum signing pre-image / clear-sign correctness: +# - EIP-1559 transaction-type vs fee-field / chain_id consistency, and +# - contract clear-sign handlers must not confirm a prefix while later +# streamed calldata is signed unshown, nor classify a contract CREATE. +# +# These exercise the guards added in the firmware ethereum signing path. + +import unittest +import common +import binascii + +import keepkeylib.messages_ethereum_pb2 as eth_proto +from keepkeylib.client import CallException +from keepkeylib.tools import int_to_big_endian + +# Sablier proxy address — the withdrawFromSalary clear-sign handler target. +SABLIER_PROXY = binascii.unhexlify("bd6a40bb904aea5a49c59050b5395f7484a4203d") +RECIPIENT = binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef") + + +class TestMsgEthereumSigningGuards(common.KeepKeyTest): + # ---- EIP-1559 type / fee / chain_id pre-image consistency ---- + + def test_eip1559_requires_chain_id(self): + """type=2 with no chain_id: Stage 1 counts chain_id as 1 byte but + hash_rlp_number(0) hashes nothing -> over-declared list header -> + wrong/garbage signer. The device must reject rather than sign it.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + self.assertRaises( + CallException, + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx, + n=[0, 0], + nonce=0, + gas_limit=21000, + max_fee_per_gas=20, + max_priority_fee_per_gas=1, + to=RECIPIENT, + value=10, + # chain_id intentionally omitted -> chain_id == 0 + ) + + def test_eip1559_no_priority_fee_signs(self): + """max_priority_fee_per_gas is a mandatory EIP-1559 RLP field; when + absent it must encode as the empty integer (0x80). Stage 1 always + counts it, so Stage 2 must always hash it -- the device must still + produce a valid signature (not desync the list header).""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=[0, 0], + nonce=0, + gas_limit=21000, + max_fee_per_gas=20, # no max_priority_fee_per_gas + to=RECIPIENT, + value=10, + chain_id=1, + ) + self.assertIn(sig_v, (0, 1)) # EIP-1559 recovery-id parity + self.assertEqual(len(sig_r), 32) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_s), 32) + + def test_type2_without_max_fee_rejected(self): + """Typed prefix (0x02) is chosen from msg.type but the fee fields from + has_max_fee_per_gas. A type=2 tx carrying only gas_price would sign a + malformed (legacy-fee-in-1559-envelope) field list -> reject.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + msg = eth_proto.EthereumSignTx( + address_n=[0, 0], + nonce=int_to_big_endian(0), + gas_price=int_to_big_endian(20), # legacy fee field ... + gas_limit=int_to_big_endian(21000), + value=int_to_big_endian(10), + chain_id=1, + type=2, # ... but typed as EIP-1559 + ) + msg.to = RECIPIENT + self.assertRaises(CallException, self.client.call, msg) + + def test_legacy_with_max_fee_rejected(self): + """A legacy tx (type omitted) carrying max_fee_per_gas would hash two + fee fields into a legacy structure -> reject the mismatch.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + msg = eth_proto.EthereumSignTx( + address_n=[0, 0], + nonce=int_to_big_endian(0), + max_fee_per_gas=int_to_big_endian(20), + max_priority_fee_per_gas=int_to_big_endian(1), + gas_limit=int_to_big_endian(21000), + value=int_to_big_endian(10), + chain_id=1, + # type omitted -> legacy + ) + msg.to = RECIPIENT + self.assertRaises(CallException, self.client.call, msg) + + # ---- Contract clear-sign handler gate ---- + + def test_contract_handler_streamed_calldata_signs_full_data(self): + """A handler selector (sablier withdrawFromSalary) whose calldata is + larger than the initial chunk must NOT be clear-signed from the prefix. + The device falls back to generic raw-data confirmation and signs the + full streamed calldata. + + Asserts here that signing completes over the full (streamed) calldata; + the screen-level assertion (no 'Sablier' clear-sign summary appears for + streamed calldata) is verified on-device / on the emulator via + DebugLink layout.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + # withdrawFromSalary selector + 2 words, then padded past 1024 bytes so + # data_total != data_initial_chunk.size (forces the streaming path). + data = binascii.unhexlify( + "fea7c53f" + + "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001210" + + "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001" + ) + b"\x00" * 1100 + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=[2147483692, 2147483708, 2147483648, 0, 0], + nonce=0xAB, + gas_price=0x24C988AC00, + gas_limit=0x26249, + value=0, + to=SABLIER_PROXY, + address_type=0, + chain_id=1, + data=data, + ) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_r), 32) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_s), 32) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signtx.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signtx.py index c3be5806..1c64064a 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signtx.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_signtx.py @@ -43,15 +43,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_data(self): to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=10, data=b"abcdefghijklmnop" * 16, + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 28) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 37) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "6da89ed8627a491bedc9e0382f37707ac4e5102e25e7a1234cb697cedb7cd2c0", + "8580110f4113ec0fc6549a7cfc23ce93efd5ae2bbb1a274f03a42374f5feb391", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "691f73b145647623e2d115b208a7c3455a6a8a83e3b4db5b9c6d9bc75825038a", + "36fa05c132ee8db6eced6410b9ee9745e2b6bf3716316f3a792a887e852e90e2", ) # Second sign — same params, verify deterministic signature @@ -63,15 +64,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_data(self): to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=10, data=b"abcdefghijklmnop" * 16, + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 28) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 37) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "6da89ed8627a491bedc9e0382f37707ac4e5102e25e7a1234cb697cedb7cd2c0", + "8580110f4113ec0fc6549a7cfc23ce93efd5ae2bbb1a274f03a42374f5feb391", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "691f73b145647623e2d115b208a7c3455a6a8a83e3b4db5b9c6d9bc75825038a", + "36fa05c132ee8db6eced6410b9ee9745e2b6bf3716316f3a792a887e852e90e2", ) sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( @@ -82,15 +84,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_data(self): to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=12345678901234567890, data=b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP" * 256 + b"!!!", + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 28) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 38) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "4e90b13c45c6a9bf4aaad0e5427c3e62d76692b36eb727c78d332441b7400404", + "2a72ecd90252eed066d113776f4c7573a468e2dbef5f503dbc1b7c616c1902a2", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "3ff236e7d05f0f9b1ee3d70599bb4200638f28388a8faf6bb36db9e04dc544be", + "30e216f799ba0a16688e7e365ac3439b40d29405ef7bb7939aa5a407a05e5670", ) self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 0) @@ -98,7 +101,10 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_data(self): def test_ethereum_blind_sign_blocked(self): """AdvancedMode OFF + contract data = device refuses to sign (7.15+). - OLED shows 'Blind signing disabled' then Failure. + OLED shows the blind-sign refusal, then Failure. The wire message is + 7.14.2's "Arbitrary contract data signing disabled by policy", which + replaced alpha's shorter "Blind signing disabled" -- it names WHICH + policy refused and what it refused. """ self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") self.requires_fullFeature() @@ -114,17 +120,19 @@ def test_ethereum_blind_sign_blocked(self): to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=0, data=b"abcdefghijklmnop" * 16, + chain_id=1, ) self.fail("Expected Failure -- blind signing should be blocked") except CallException as e: - self.assertIn("Blind signing disabled", str(e)) + self.assertIn("Arbitrary contract data signing disabled by policy", + str(e)) def test_ethereum_blind_sign_allowed(self): """AdvancedMode ON + contract data = device shows BLIND SIGNATURE warning (7.15+). OLED shows 'BLIND SIGNATURE' before signing. """ - self.requires_firmware("7.14.0") + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") self.requires_fullFeature() self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) @@ -137,6 +145,7 @@ def test_ethereum_blind_sign_allowed(self): to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=0, data=b"abcdefghijklmnop" * 16, + chain_id=1, ) self.assertIsNotNone(sig_v) self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 0) @@ -154,15 +163,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_message(self): to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=0, data=b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP" * 256 + b"!!!", + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 28) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 38) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "070e9dafda4d9e733fa7b6747a75f8a4916459560efb85e3e73cd39f31aa160d", + "1bc0410a7e3e035dcdd24a9473b9c9fb95287c23f4ac8ad4e53ad70956cf40bf", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "7842db33ef15c27049ed52741db41fe3238a6fa3a6a0888fcfb74d6917600e41", + "465f4aa446c65b72285c7ed67d13520ace6ba63f4a34aa5b995df92151358afa", ) def test_ethereum_signtx_newcontract(self): @@ -180,6 +190,7 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_newcontract(self): gas_limit=20000, to="", value=12345678901234567890, + chain_id=1, ) sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( @@ -190,15 +201,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_newcontract(self): to="", value=12345678901234567890, data=b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP" * 256 + b"!!!", + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 28) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 38) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "b401884c10ae435a2e792303b5fc257a09f94403b2883ad8c0ac7a7282f5f1f9", + "db5d0092d44df683b1ab955d6c170c3d612e78ea9baa33bc328602ce3970843e", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "4742fc9e6a5fa8db3db15c2d856914a7f3daab21603a6c1ce9e9927482f8352e", + "2392007ebb23dfaef07c93d45fba2a6d286c005f8491d0a209769caa2ac5c0a0", ) def test_ethereum_sanity_checks(self): @@ -216,6 +228,7 @@ def test_ethereum_sanity_checks(self): gas_limit=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=12345678901234567890, + chain_id=1, ) # no gas price and no max fee per gas @@ -227,6 +240,7 @@ def test_ethereum_sanity_checks(self): gas_limit=10000, to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=12345678901234567890, + chain_id=1, ) # no gas limit @@ -238,6 +252,7 @@ def test_ethereum_sanity_checks(self): gas_price=10000, to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=12345678901234567890, + chain_id=1, ) # no nonce @@ -249,8 +264,75 @@ def test_ethereum_sanity_checks(self): gas_limit=123456, to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=12345678901234567890, + chain_id=1, ) + def test_ethereum_signtx_omitted_chain_id_rejected(self): + """An omitted chain_id must be refused, not silently signed pre-EIP-155. + + Before 7.14.2 the `chain_id < 1` bounds check lived inside + `if (msg->has_chain_id)`, so a host that simply left the field out + reached chain_id == 0 without tripping it. Two things followed: + + - send_signature() appends the EIP-155 fields only `if (chain_id)`, + so the device emitted a pre-EIP-155 signature -- replayable on + every EVM chain where this address is funded at this nonce. + - ethereumFormatAmount() switches on the chain id for the ticker; + cid 0 matches no case, so the confirm screen rendered a bare + number. No screen named a network. The user could not see either + problem before holding the button. + + This is the regression test for that. It asserts the refusal, and the + sibling tests in this file all now pass chain_id explicitly so they + keep exercising their own subject rather than this one. + """ + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 1) + + try: + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=[0, 0], + nonce=0, + gas_price=20, + gas_limit=20, + to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), + value=10, + ) + self.fail( + "Expected Failure -- a transaction with no chain_id must be " + "refused, not signed without replay protection" + ) + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("Chain Id out of bounds", str(e)) + + self.client.apply_policy("AdvancedMode", 0) + + def test_ethereum_signtx_explicit_zero_chain_id_rejected(self): + """chain_id=0 sent explicitly is refused the same way as omitting it. + + Covers the other half of the same gate: 7.14.1 already rejected an + explicit 0, and that must not regress while fixing the absent case. + """ + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + try: + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=[0, 0], + nonce=0, + gas_price=20, + gas_limit=20, + to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), + value=10, + chain_id=0, + ) + self.fail("Expected Failure -- chain_id=0 must be refused") + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("Chain Id out of bounds", str(e)) + def test_ethereum_signtx_nodata_eip155(self): self.requires_fullFeature() self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() @@ -405,6 +487,65 @@ def test_ethereum_eip_1559(self): "67297089e0ba53c29dda1aafc23fce64a772c5433e127e5885edc03ece4670c9", ) + def test_ethereum_eip_1559_multibyte_chain_id(self): + """EIP-1559 must hash the WHOLE chain_id, not just its low byte. + + Regression for the multi-byte chain_id bug (firmware ed6db167). The + EIP-1559 hash step used hash_rlp_field((uint8_t*)&chain_id, 1), which on + little-endian ARM fed only the least-significant byte into keccak. For + Base (8453 = 0x2105) that hashed 0x05, so the signature recovered to an + unrelated address with no funds. The RLP *length* was computed correctly + from the full value and the legacy EIP-155 path was always correct — + only the EIP-1559 hash was wrong. Affected: Base (8453), Arbitrum + (42161), Avalanche (43114). Unaffected: ETH (1), OP (10), BSC (56), + Polygon (137) — all single-byte. + + Every other EIP-1559 case in this file uses chain_id 1 or 3, so the bug + had no coverage in the file that tests the feature. + + A golden r/s would need a device run to produce, so this is a + differential. Sign one identical transaction under two chain ids the + BUGGY firmware cannot tell apart: + + 8453 = 0x2105 low byte 0x05, two-byte value + 4357 = 0x1105 low byte 0x05, two-byte value + + Same low byte AND same RLP length header, so the broken code hashes a + byte-identical pre-image for both. Signing is deterministic (RFC 6979), + so buggy firmware returns the SAME signature twice and this fails. + Correct firmware hashes 0x21 0x05 vs 0x11 0x05, which must differ. + + Note a comparison against chain_id=5 would NOT work: the RLP length was + always derived from the full value, so the buggy pre-image for 8453 is + malformed rather than equal to a well-formed single-byte encoding. The + twin must match on both low byte and byte-width. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + def sign(chain_id): + return self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=[0x80000000 | 44, 0x80000000 | 60, 0x80000000, 0, 0], + nonce=0, + gas_limit=0x5ac3, + max_fee_per_gas=0x16854be509, + max_priority_fee_per_gas=0x540ae480, + to=binascii.unhexlify("fc0cc6e85dff3d75e3985e0cb83b090cfd498dd1"), + value=0x1550f7dca70000, + chain_id=chain_id, + ) + + _, base_r, base_s = sign(8453) + _, twin_r, twin_s = sign(4357) + + self.assertNotEqual( + (binascii.hexlify(base_r), binascii.hexlify(base_s)), + (binascii.hexlify(twin_r), binascii.hexlify(twin_s)), + "chain_id 8453 and 4357 produced the same signature — only the low " + "byte of chain_id reached the EIP-1559 hash", + ) + def test_ethereum_signtx_nodata_eip_1559(self): self.requires_fullFeature() self.requires_firmware("7.2.1") @@ -503,15 +644,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_nodata(self): gas_limit=20, to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=10, + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 27) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 38) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "9b61192a161d056c66cfbbd331edb2d783a0193bd4f65f49ee965f791d898f72", + "e66bea09792bbb60b3166bd4526a26c741ad298266da6d86a32c828a6e5499b6", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "49c0bbe35131592c6ed5c871ac457feeb16a1493f64237387fab9b83c1a202f7", + "604c59f8aece9170a1d91fe7c6b09ce52e4de41b8bd572d945af171adbeafab6", ) sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( @@ -521,15 +663,16 @@ def test_ethereum_signtx_nodata(self): gas_limit=20000, to=binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef"), value=12345678901234567890, + chain_id=1, ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 28) + self.assertEqual(sig_v, 38) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_r), - "6de597b8ec1b46501e5b159676e132c1aa78a95bd5892ef23560a9867528975a", + "b37433f196fb64c7d6028907e5a7b75a4b02d2d822545b4d1014fe9cf172c526", ) self.assertEqual( binascii.hexlify(sig_s), - "6e33c4230b1ecf96a8dbb514b4aec0a6d6ba53f8991c8143f77812aa6daa993f", + "47a0d7c13f3cf0b260973ba90a86b42c01b7e7cd55adba1dc40dee1a79011144", ) diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit.py b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..083c358c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit.py @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +# This file is part of the KeepKey project. +# +# Copyright (C) 2026 KeepKey +# +# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# Test coverage for THORChain EVM depositWithExpiry() selector recognition. +# The legacy deposit() selector (0x1fece7b4) was already handled; firmware +# 7.14.2 adds recognition of the modern depositWithExpiry() selector (0x44bc937b). + +import unittest +import common +import binascii + +import keepkeylib.messages_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + + +THOR_ROUTER = "d37bbe5744d730a1d98d8dc97c42f0ca46ad7146" # ETH THORChain router +THOR_ROUTER_AVAX = "00dc6100103bc402d490aee3f9a5560cbd91f1d4" # Avalanche C-Chain router +ETH_NATIVE = "eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee" # sentinel for native ETH + + +def _build_deposit_calldata(memo): + """Build deposit(address,address,uint256,string) calldata (legacy selector).""" + selector = bytes.fromhex("1fece7b4") + vault = bytes(12) + bytes.fromhex(THOR_ROUTER) + asset = bytes(32) # address(0): the only native-ETH form the routers accept + amount = (500000000000000000).to_bytes(32, "big") # 0.5 ETH + memo_offset = (4 * 32).to_bytes(32, "big") # offset = 128 + memo_bytes = memo.encode("ascii") + memo_len = len(memo_bytes).to_bytes(32, "big") + pad = ((len(memo_bytes) + 31) // 32) * 32 + memo_data = memo_bytes + bytes(pad - len(memo_bytes)) + return selector + vault + asset + amount + memo_offset + memo_len + memo_data + + +def _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo, expiry=9999999999): + """Build depositWithExpiry(address,address,uint256,string,uint256) calldata.""" + selector = bytes.fromhex("44bc937b") + vault = bytes(12) + bytes.fromhex(THOR_ROUTER) + asset = bytes(32) # address(0): the only native-ETH form the routers accept + amount = (500000000000000000).to_bytes(32, "big") # 0.5 ETH + memo_offset = (5 * 32).to_bytes(32, "big") # offset = 160 (after expiry) + expiry_b = expiry.to_bytes(32, "big") + memo_bytes = memo.encode("ascii") + memo_len = len(memo_bytes).to_bytes(32, "big") + pad = ((len(memo_bytes) + 31) // 32) * 32 + memo_data = memo_bytes + bytes(pad - len(memo_bytes)) + return selector + vault + asset + amount + memo_offset + expiry_b + memo_len + memo_data + + +class TestMsgEthereumThorchainDeposit(common.KeepKeyTest): + + def test_deposit_legacy_selector(self): + """Existing deposit() selector (0x1fece7b4) is recognized without AdvancedMode.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.5.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0" + data = _build_deposit_calldata(memo) + + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0"), + nonce=1, + gas_price=50000000000, + gas_limit=300000, + to=binascii.unhexlify(THOR_ROUTER), + value=500000000000000000, + chain_id=1, + data=data, + ) + self.assertIn(sig_v, [37, 38]) # EIP-155 with chain_id=1: v = 35 + chain_id*2 + recovery + self.assertEqual(len(sig_r), 32) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_s), 32) + + def test_deposit_with_expiry_selector(self): + """Modern depositWithExpiry() selector (0x44bc937b) is recognized without AdvancedMode. + + Before 7.14.2 the firmware only matched the legacy 0x1fece7b4 selector. + All modern THORChain routers use depositWithExpiry. Without this fix the + device would fall through to the blind-sign gate and refuse to sign (or + require AdvancedMode), breaking every EVM->THORChain swap. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0" + data = _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo) + + # AdvancedMode is intentionally OFF — THORChain txs must sign without it. + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0"), + nonce=2, + gas_price=50000000000, + gas_limit=300000, + to=binascii.unhexlify(THOR_ROUTER), + value=500000000000000000, + chain_id=1, + data=data, + ) + self.assertIn(sig_v, [37, 38]) # EIP-155 with chain_id=1: v = 35 + chain_id*2 + recovery + self.assertEqual(len(sig_r), 32) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_s), 32) + + def test_deposit_with_expiry_non_thor_address_blind_sign_blocked(self): + """depositWithExpiry to a non-THORChain address must not be auto-approved. + + The firmware only clears the blind-sign gate when msg->has_to && the + deposit selector matches. Sending to an arbitrary address must still + require AdvancedMode so unrelated contracts can't exploit the selector. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + memo = "malicious memo" + data = _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo) + + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + import keepkeylib.types_pb2 as types + + # No AdvancedMode, random contract address — should be rejected + with self.assertRaises((CallException, Exception)): + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0"), + nonce=3, + gas_price=50000000000, + gas_limit=300000, + to=binascii.unhexlify("1234567890123456789012345678901234567890"), + value=0, + chain_id=1, + data=data, + ) + + def test_deposit_with_expiry_avalanche_router(self): + """A THORChain deposit on Avalanche clear-signs — the router pin is + (chain_id, address), not Ethereum-mainnet-only. + + Before the per-chain pin, thor_isThorchainTx only ever matched the + mainnet router, so an AVAX->ETH swap fell into the AdvancedMode + blind-sign gate and the device returned a bare ActionCancelled. The + signature is ECDSA-recovered against the host-built EIP-155 pre-image, + so a wrong digest, chain id, or key fails — not just a shape check. + The native amount screen shows msg.value with the CHAIN's ticker + (AVAX), never the mainnet pseudo-token's ETH label. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import eth_sighash_legacy, keccak256 + + memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0" + data = _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo) + + n = parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0") + nonce, gas_price, gas_limit = 4, 50000000000, 300000 + to = binascii.unhexlify(THOR_ROUTER_AVAX) + value = 500000000000000000 # 0.5 AVAX (native = msg.value) + chain_id = 43114 + + # AdvancedMode intentionally OFF — the deposit must clear-sign. + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + to=to, value=value, chain_id=chain_id, data=data, + ) + self.assertIn(sig_v, [2 * chain_id + 35, 2 * chain_id + 36]) + digest = eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value, + data, chain_id) + from ecdsa import VerifyingKey, SECP256k1, util + rec = sig_v - (35 + 2 * chain_id) + keys = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig_r + sig_s, digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=None, + sigdecode=util.sigdecode_string, + ) + signer = keccak256(keys[rec].to_string())[-20:] + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(n)) + + def test_deposit_unpinned_chain_blind_sign_blocked(self): + """A deposit-shaped tx on a chain with NO pinned router must fall to + the blind-sign gate — a router address borrowed onto an unpinned chain + (where it may hold attacker code) cannot inherit the deposit UX.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + + memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0" + data = _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo) + + with self.assertRaises((CallException, Exception)): + self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0"), + nonce=5, + gas_price=50000000000, + gas_limit=300000, + to=binascii.unhexlify(THOR_ROUTER), # real mainnet router addr + value=0, + chain_id=56, # BSC: no pinned router + data=data, + ) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_getaddress_taproot.py b/tests/test_msg_getaddress_taproot.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..650b8de6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_getaddress_taproot.py @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# This file is part of the KeepKey project. +# +# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License version 3 +# as published by the Free Software Foundation. +# +# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the License along with this library. +# If not, see . + +import common +import unittest + +from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + + + + +class TestMsgGetaddressTaproot(common.KeepKeyTest): + + def test_taproot_bip86_vectors(self): + """Official BIP-86 test vectors. + + https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0086.mediawiki + + BIP-86 publishes these against the "abandon abandon ... about" + mnemonic, which is exactly what setup_mnemonic_abandon loads. The + expected addresses are therefore the spec's own constants, not values + this implementation produced -- the comparison is against independent + ground truth. + """ + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.clear_session() + + # Account 0, first receiving address + self.assertEqual( + self.client.get_address( + "Bitcoin", parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), False, None, + script_type=proto.SPENDTAPROOT), + 'bc1p5cyxnuxmeuwuvkwfem96lqzszd02n6xdcjrs20cac6yqjjwudpxqkedrcr') + + # Account 0, second receiving address + self.assertEqual( + self.client.get_address( + "Bitcoin", parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/1"), False, None, + script_type=proto.SPENDTAPROOT), + 'bc1p4qhjn9zdvkux4e44uhx8tc55attvtyu358kutcqkudyccelu0was9fqzwh') + + # Account 0, first change address + self.assertEqual( + self.client.get_address( + "Bitcoin", parse_path("86'/0'/0'/1/0"), False, None, + script_type=proto.SPENDTAPROOT), + 'bc1p3qkhfews2uk44qtvauqyr2ttdsw7svhkl9nkm9s9c3x4ax5h60wqwruhk7') + + def test_show_taproot_address(self): + """Display the full BIP-86 address on the trusted OLED.""" + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.clear_session() + address = self.client.get_address( + "Bitcoin", parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), True, None, + script_type=proto.SPENDTAPROOT) + self.assertEqual( + address, + 'bc1p5cyxnuxmeuwuvkwfem96lqzszd02n6xdcjrs20cac6yqjjwudpxqkedrcr') + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_getentropy.py b/tests/test_msg_getentropy.py index 96ea7abe..f12d4f90 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_getentropy.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_getentropy.py @@ -20,35 +20,73 @@ from __future__ import print_function +import os import unittest import common -import math +from collections import Counter import keepkeylib.messages_pb2 as proto import keepkeylib.types_pb2 as proto_types -def entropy(data): - counts = {} - for c in data: - if c in counts: - counts[c] += 1 - else: - counts[c] = 1 - e = 0 - for _, v in counts.items(): - p = 1.0 * v / len(data) - e -= p * math.log(p, 256) - return e - class TestMsgGetentropy(common.KeepKeyTest): + @unittest.skipUnless( + os.getenv('KK_EXPECT_ENTROPY_BUDGET') == '1', + 'requires the RC23 entropy audit budget policy') def test_entropy(self): - for l in [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 32, 33, 64, 65, 128, 129, 256, 257, 512, 513, 1024]: + chunk_size = 8192 + chunk_count = 8 + + # A fresh budget must not make raw RNG output silently available from + # an initialized, PIN-protected, locked device. Confirm one request in + # that state before spending any of the press-free budget. + self.setup_mnemonic_pin_passphrase() + self.client.clear_session() + with self.client: + self.client.set_expected_responses([ + proto.ButtonRequest(code=proto_types.ButtonRequest_GetEntropy), + proto.Entropy(), + ]) + locked_sample = self.client.get_entropy(chunk_size) + self.assertEqual(len(locked_sample), chunk_size) + + # Wiping returns the device to the uninitialized audit state. The + # confirmed locked request above does not consume the fresh budget. + self.client.wipe_device() + + samples = [] + for _ in range(chunk_count): with self.client: - self.client.set_expected_responses([proto.ButtonRequest(code=proto_types.ButtonRequest_GetEntropy), proto.Entropy()]) - ent = self.client.get_entropy(l) - self.assertTrue(len(ent) >= l) - print('entropy = ', entropy(ent)) + self.client.set_expected_responses([proto.Entropy()]) + sample = self.client.get_entropy(chunk_size) + self.assertEqual(len(sample), chunk_size) + samples.append(sample) + + self.assertEqual(sum(len(sample) for sample in samples), 64 * 1024) + self.assertEqual(len(set(samples)), chunk_count) + + # Deliberately broad catastrophic-failure checks, not a statistical + # certification of the hardware RNG. They catch a stuck/constant or + # grossly biased source without imposing a fragile quality threshold. + combined = b''.join(samples) + counts = Counter(combined) + self.assertGreaterEqual(len(counts), 200) + self.assertLess(max(counts.values()), len(combined) // 20) + one_bits = sum(bin(value).count('1') for value in combined) + one_ratio = float(one_bits) / (8 * len(combined)) + self.assertGreater(one_ratio, 0.40) + self.assertLess(one_ratio, 0.60) + + # Exactly 64 KiB was press-free. The next request must restore the + # original confirmation flow and still return the requested length + # after the debug-link approval. + with self.client: + self.client.set_expected_responses([ + proto.ButtonRequest(code=proto_types.ButtonRequest_GetEntropy), + proto.Entropy(), + ]) + after_budget = self.client.get_entropy(chunk_size) + self.assertEqual(len(after_budget), chunk_size) if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_hive.py b/tests/test_msg_hive.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bee79251 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_hive.py @@ -0,0 +1,1077 @@ +# This file is part of the KeepKey project. +# +# Copyright (C) 2026 KeepKey +# +# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +# along with this library. If not, see . + +"""Hive (SLIP-0048) device tests — multi-role keys + account operations. + +Uses the standard 12-word test seed (mnemonic12, "alcohol ... aisle") via +setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase(). + +The account_create / account_update / transfer tests are self-validating: they +recover the signer from the 65-byte device signature over +SHA256(chain_id || serialized_tx) and assert it equals the device-derived +signing key. This exercises the device AND validates the attestation-digest +contract documented in keepkey-vault docs/HIVE-ATTESTATION-DIGEST-SPEC.md — +no precomputed golden vector required, and not circular (recovery is an +independent cryptographic check). +""" + +import hashlib +import struct +import unittest + +import common + +from ecdsa import SECP256k1, VerifyingKey +from ecdsa.util import sigdecode_string + +from keepkeylib import hive +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + +# Hive mainnet chain id: beeab0de followed by 28 zero bytes (32 bytes). +HIVE_CHAIN_ID = bytes.fromhex("beeab0de" + "00" * 28) + +# SLIP-0048 roles (hardened offsets within the role component). +ROLE_OWNER, ROLE_ACTIVE, ROLE_MEMO, ROLE_POSTING = 0, 1, 3, 4 + +HIVE_OP_VOTE = 0 +HIVE_OP_COMMENT = 1 +HIVE_OP_TRANSFER = 2 +HIVE_OP_ACCOUNT_CREATE = 9 +HIVE_OP_ACCOUNT_UPDATE = 10 +HIVE_OP_CUSTOM_JSON = 18 + + +def hive_path(role, account_index=0): + """m/48'/13'/role'/account'/0' — all five components hardened.""" + h = 0x80000000 + return [h + 48, h + 13, h + role, h + account_index, h] + + +def recover_compressed(serialized_tx, sig65): + """Recover the 33-byte compressed signer pubkey from a Hive device signature. + + Mirrors HIVE-ATTESTATION-DIGEST-SPEC.md §1-2: + digest = SHA256(chain_id || serialized_tx) + sig[0] = 27 + recovery_id + 4 -> recovery_id = sig[0] - 31 + sig[1:65] = r || s + """ + assert len(sig65) == 65, "Hive signature must be 65 bytes" + recid = sig65[0] - 31 + assert 0 <= recid <= 3, "unexpected recovery header byte %d" % sig65[0] + digest = hashlib.sha256(HIVE_CHAIN_ID + serialized_tx).digest() + candidates = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig65[1:], digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256, sigdecode=sigdecode_string + ) + return candidates[recid].to_string("compressed") + + +# ── Independent Graphene serializer for HiveSignOperations tests ────────── +# dhive-equivalent byte building, written here so firmware parser bugs can't +# cancel out against firmware serializer bugs. + +def _varint(n): + out = b"" + while True: + b_ = n & 0x7F + n >>= 7 + if n: + out += bytes([b_ | 0x80]) + else: + return out + bytes([b_]) + + +def _string(s): + if isinstance(s, str): + s = s.encode("utf-8") + return _varint(len(s)) + s + + +def _ops_tx(op_blobs, ref_num=12345, ref_prefix=67890, expiration=1700000000, + ext=b"\x00", opcount=None): + """header + varint op count + ops + extensions (default: empty).""" + head = struct.pack("transaction signature oracle.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignMessage") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + message = bytes(range(0, 48)) # non-printable bytes + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + hive.sign_message(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), message) + self.assertIn("printable", str(ctx.exception)) + + def test_hive_sign_message_long_printable_ok(self): + """Printable text over the 128-byte display budget still signs — it + routes through the hex-preview confirm (never silently truncated + text), and the signature covers every byte.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignMessage") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + message = (b"benign preamble. " * 20)[:300] # printable, > 128 bytes + posting = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_message(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), message) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_message_signer(message, resp.signature), + posting.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_message_max_length_ok(self): + """A message of exactly 1024 bytes (the proto cap) still signs.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignMessage") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + message = b"x" * 1024 + posting = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_message(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), message) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_message_signer(message, resp.signature), + posting.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_message_rejects_oversize(self): + """1025 bytes must fail (nanopb max_size cap — the proto and handler + agree on 1024).""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignMessage") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + hive.sign_message(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), b"x" * 1025) + + def test_hive_sign_message_rejects_bad_paths(self): + """Foreign trees, wrong network index, and unassigned roles must all + be rejected — same fence as the transaction handlers.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignMessage") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + h = 0x80000000 + bad_paths = [ + parse_path("m/44'/0'/0'/0/0"), # BIP-44 BTC + [h + 48, h + 3054, h + ROLE_POSTING, h, h], # registry 3054', not 13' + hive_path(2), # unassigned role 2' + hive_path(ROLE_OWNER), # owner' not a Keychain signBuffer role + [h + 48, h + 13, h + ROLE_POSTING, h], # short path + ] + for path in bad_paths: + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + hive.sign_message(self.client, path, b"login challenge") + self.assertIn("Invalid Hive SLIP-0048 path", str(ctx.exception)) + + # ── Operations signing (HiveSignOperations — parsed generic ops) ────── + # The test builds transactions byte-exactly with its OWN serializer + # (below, module level) — never firmware-emitted bytes — so a parser bug + # and a serializer bug cannot cancel out. + + def _recover_ops_signer(self, tx, sig65): + """digest = SHA256(chain_id || serialized_tx), same as transfers.""" + self.assertEqual(len(sig65), 65) + recid = sig65[0] - 31 + self.assertTrue(0 <= recid <= 3, "unexpected recovery header byte %d" % sig65[0]) + digest = hashlib.sha256(HIVE_CHAIN_ID + tx).digest() + candidates = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig65[1:], digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256, + sigdecode=sigdecode_string + ) + return candidates[recid].to_string("compressed") + + def test_hive_sign_ops_vote(self): + """A vote tx signs with the posting key and recovers to it.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + tx = _ops_tx([_op_vote("kkvoter", "someauthor", "cool-post-permlink", 10000)]) + posting = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), tx, chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_ops_signer(tx, resp.signature), posting.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_downvote_and_default_chain_id(self): + """Negative weight (downvote) signs; omitted chain_id defaults to + mainnet in firmware — recovery against the mainnet id proves it.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + tx = _ops_tx([_op_vote("kkvoter", "spammer", "bad-post", -10000)]) + posting = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), tx) # no chain_id + self.assertEqual(self._recover_ops_signer(tx, resp.signature), posting.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_comment(self): + """A top-level post (empty parent_author) with a unicode body signs — + the body routes through the non-ASCII display fallback.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + body = "skate clip of the day — hardflip".encode("utf-8") + tx = _ops_tx([_op_comment("", "hive-173115", "kkauthor", + "my-first-post", "My first post", body, "{}")]) + posting = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), tx, chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_ops_signer(tx, resp.signature), posting.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_custom_json_posting(self): + """custom_json with posting auths (Hive Engine style) signs with the + posting key.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + tx = _ops_tx([_op_custom_json([], ["kkplayer"], "ssc-mainnet-hive", + '{"contractName":"tokens","contractAction":"transfer"}')]) + posting = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), tx, chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_ops_signer(tx, resp.signature), posting.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_custom_json_active(self): + """custom_json with required_auths (active tier) must sign with the + ACTIVE key — and does.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + tx = _ops_tx([_op_custom_json(["kkadmin"], [], "witness-ops", '{"op":"x"}')]) + active = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE), tx, chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_ops_signer(tx, resp.signature), active.raw_public_key) + + def _assert_ops_fails(self, fragment, tx, path=None): + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + hive.sign_operations(self.client, path or hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), + tx, chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + if fragment: + self.assertIn(fragment, str(ctx.exception)) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_rejects_excluded_and_unknown_ops(self): + """Op types 2/9/10 are PERMANENTLY excluded (dedicated messages keep + their stronger invariants); unknown types reject too. The parser + refuses on the op-type byte, so the bodies never matter.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + for op_type in (2, 9, 10): + self._assert_ops_fails("dedicated message", + _ops_tx([_varint(op_type)])) + # 49 = recurrent_transfer: a real Hive op deliberately kept out of the + # table. (This previously used op 3, mislabelled "comment_options"; + # op 3 is transfer_to_vesting and is now clear-signed, so it no longer + # exercises the unknown-op path.) + self._assert_ops_fails("unsupported operation", + _ops_tx([_varint(49)])) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_rejects_malformed_structure(self): + """Zero ops, >4 ops, nonzero extensions, trailing bytes, overlong + varint, out-of-range weight — each refused with a specific error.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + vote = _op_vote("kkvoter", "author", "permlink", 100) + self._assert_ops_fails("op count", _ops_tx([], opcount=0)) + self._assert_ops_fails("op count", _ops_tx([vote] * 5)) + self._assert_ops_fails("extensions must be empty", + _ops_tx([vote], ext=b"\x01")) + self._assert_ops_fails("trailing bytes", _ops_tx([vote]) + b"\x00") + # op_count as an overlong 6-byte varint encoding of 1 + head = struct.pack(" 2048) + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + with self.assertRaises(CallException): + hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_POSTING), tx, + chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + + # ── Phase-3 op table ───────────────────────────────────────────────── + # Every tx below is built by THIS file's serializer, never by firmware, so + # a parser bug and a serializer bug cannot cancel out. + + def _ops_signs_with(self, tx, role): + """Sign tx with `role` and assert the signature recovers to that key.""" + key = hive.get_public_key(self.client, hive_path(role), show_display=False) + resp = hive.sign_operations(self.client, hive_path(role), tx, + chain_id=HIVE_CHAIN_ID) + self.assertEqual(self._recover_ops_signer(tx, resp.signature), + key.raw_public_key) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_limit_order_create(self): + """The op that motivated phase 3: a HIVE->HBD internal-market swap. + Active tier, since it moves funds.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + tx = _ops_tx([_op_limit_order_create("kktrader", 42, 1500, "HIVE", + 400, "HBD", True, 1700003600)]) + self._ops_signs_with(tx, ROLE_ACTIVE) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_limit_order_cancel(self): + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + self._ops_signs_with(_ops_tx([_op_limit_order_cancel("kktrader", 42)]), + ROLE_ACTIVE) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_active_tier_value_ops(self): + """The active-tier ops that move or lock value all sign with active.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + for op in ( + _op_transfer_to_vesting("kkuser", "kkuser", 1000), + _op_convert("kkuser", 7, 2500), + _op_transfer_to_savings("kkuser", "kkfriend", 1500, "HBD", "rent"), + _op_transfer_from_savings("kkuser", 7, "kkfriend", 1500, "HIVE"), + _op_delegate_vesting_shares("kkuser", "kkfriend", 1000000), + _op_withdraw_vesting("kkuser", 5000000), + ): + self._ops_signs_with(_ops_tx([op]), ROLE_ACTIVE) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_posting_tier_ops(self): + """claim_reward_balance is posting tier — claiming is not spending.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + tx = _ops_tx([_op_claim_reward_balance("kkuser", 1234, 5678, 90123456)]) + self._ops_signs_with(tx, ROLE_POSTING) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_zero_amount_semantics(self): + """Zero means something for these two and nothing for the rest, so the + parser must not apply one blanket rule.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + # 0 VESTS withdraw_vesting cancels an in-progress power-down. + self._ops_signs_with(_ops_tx([_op_withdraw_vesting("kkuser", 0)]), + ROLE_ACTIVE) + # 0 VESTS delegation removes an existing delegation. + self._ops_signs_with( + _ops_tx([_op_delegate_vesting_shares("kkuser", "kkfriend", 0)]), + ROLE_ACTIVE) + # A zero power-up, by contrast, does nothing and is refused. + self._assert_ops_fails("amount must be greater than zero", + _ops_tx([_op_transfer_to_vesting("kkuser", "kkuser", 0)]), + path=hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE)) + # Nothing to claim. + self._assert_ops_fails("no effect", + _ops_tx([_op_claim_reward_balance("kkuser", 0, 0, 0)])) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_asset_symbol_and_precision_pinned(self): + """A swapped symbol hides a ~2000x value difference behind an + identical-looking number; a wrong precision moves the decimal point + relative to what the chain applies. Both must be refused.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + active = hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE) + + # transfer_to_vesting is HIVE-only. + wrong_symbol = (_varint(3) + _string("kkuser") + _string("kkuser") + + _asset(1000, "HBD")) + self._assert_ops_fails("malformed operation", _ops_tx([wrong_symbol]), + path=active) + # Right symbol, wrong precision. + wrong_precision = (_varint(3) + _string("kkuser") + _string("kkuser") + + _asset_raw(1000, 6, "HIVE")) + self._assert_ops_fails("malformed operation", _ops_tx([wrong_precision]), + path=active) + # Negative int64 would render as an enormous positive amount. + negative = (_varint(3) + _string("kkuser") + _string("kkuser") + + _asset_raw(-1000, 3, "HIVE")) + self._assert_ops_fails("malformed operation", _ops_tx([negative]), + path=active) + # An order priced VESTS-for-HBD is not a market that exists. + vests_order = (_varint(5) + _string("kktrader") + struct.pack(" 100% + tx = _ops_tx([comment, _op_comment_options( + "kkauthor", "my-post", 1000000, 10000, beneficiaries=bens)]) + self._assert_ops_fails("beneficiaries", tx) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_account_update2_rejects_authority_change(self): + """account_update2 can rotate account keys. Only the profile-metadata + form is in the table — the same device-derived-keys invariant that + keeps ops 9/10 out, applied field-level.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + self._assert_ops_fails( + "authority changes", + _ops_tx([_op_account_update2("kkuser", '{"profile":{}}', "", + authority_present=True)]), + path=hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE)) + + # json_metadata is an active-key field... + self._ops_signs_with( + _ops_tx([_op_account_update2("kkuser", '{"profile":{}}', "")]), + ROLE_ACTIVE) + # ...while a posting-metadata-only profile edit stays posting tier. + self._ops_signs_with( + _ops_tx([_op_account_update2("kkuser", "", '{"profile":{}}')]), + ROLE_POSTING) + + def test_hive_sign_ops_truncated_bodies_rejected(self): + """The signature covers the whole buffer, so a short read would mean + signing bytes the device never displayed. Every truncation must be + refused rather than partially parsed.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignOperations") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + for op in (_op_limit_order_create("kktrader", 1, 100, "HIVE", 50, + "HBD", False, 9), + _op_claim_reward_balance("kkuser", 1, 1, 1), + _op_transfer_from_savings("kkuser", 7, "kkfriend", 1500, + "HBD", "memo")): + # One byte short is the boundary case; a deeper cut exercises the + # length-prefixed string readers. + for cut in (1, 5): + if cut >= len(op): + continue + self._assert_ops_fails(None, _ops_tx([op[:-cut]]), + path=hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE)) + + def test_hive_sign_message_rejects_chain_id_prefix(self): + """A 'message' that begins with the mainnet chain id would hash to a + broadcastable TRANSACTION digest (tx digest = SHA256(chain_id || tx)). + The firmware must refuse the collision.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_message("HiveSignMessage") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + from keepkeylib.client import CallException + disguised_tx = HIVE_CHAIN_ID + b"\x39\x30" + b"\x00" * 40 + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + hive.sign_message(self.client, hive_path(ROLE_ACTIVE), disguised_tx) + self.assertIn("chain ID", str(ctx.exception)) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_mayachain_signtx.py b/tests/test_msg_mayachain_signtx.py index fbac5107..9bdad8e3 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_mayachain_signtx.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_mayachain_signtx.py @@ -1,15 +1,24 @@ +import hashlib import unittest import common from base64 import b64encode from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify +from ecdsa import VerifyingKey, SECP256k1 +from ecdsa.util import sigdecode_string + import keepkeylib.messages_pb2 as proto import keepkeylib.types_pb2 as proto_types from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path +from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import eth_sighash_legacy, keccak256 DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH = "m/44h/931h/0h/0/0" +# Compressed secp256k1 pubkey for the standard test seed at m/44'/931'/0'/0/0. +# Proven by the (green) thorchain frozen-vector test over the same path/curve. +DEVICE_PUBKEY_HEX = b"031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3" + def make_send(from_address, to_address, amount): return { 'type': 'mayachain/MsgSend', @@ -23,31 +32,94 @@ def make_send(from_address, to_address, amount): } } +def recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, digest, chain_id): + """Recover the 20-byte Ethereum signer from a legacy (EIP-155) signature. + + Mirrors the helper proven in test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py. Verifying + recovery — rather than asserting r/s lengths — means a wrong digest, wrong + calldata or wrong key fails the test, and it stays correct across router + changes without re-freezing vectors. + """ + from ecdsa import VerifyingKey, SECP256k1, util + if chain_id: + rec = sig_v - (35 + 2 * chain_id) + else: + rec = sig_v - 27 + keys = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig_r + sig_s, digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=None, + sigdecode=util.sigdecode_string, + ) + return keccak256(keys[rec].to_string())[-20:] + + class TestMsgMayaChainSignTx(common.KeepKeyTest): - @unittest.skip("TODO: capture expected signatures from emulator") - def test_mayachain_sign_tx(self): - self.requires_firmware("7.9.1") - self.requires_fullFeature() - self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( + def _maya_send_digest(self, account_number, chain_id, fee, gas, memo, + amount, from_address, to_address, sequence): + """SHA256 of the amino StdSignDoc exactly as mayachain.c streams it. + + Byte-for-byte mirror of mayachain_signTxInit/UpdateMsgSend/Finalize + (denom "cacao", type "mayachain/MsgSend", from_address DERIVED BY THE + DEVICE — the host-supplied from_address is not part of the digest). + The identical construction for thorchain ("rune"/"thorchain/MsgSend") + reproduces that suite's green frozen vector, which pins this format. + """ + doc = ('{"account_number":"%s"' + ',"chain_id":"%s"' + ',"fee":{"amount":[{"amount":"%s","denom":"cacao"}],"gas":"%s"}' + ',"memo":"%s"' + ',"msgs":[{"type":"mayachain/MsgSend","value":{' + '"amount":[{"amount":"%s","denom":"cacao"}]' + ',"from_address":"%s"' + ',"to_address":"%s"' + '}}],"sequence":"%s"}') % ( + account_number, chain_id, fee, gas, memo, + amount, from_address, to_address, sequence) + return hashlib.sha256(doc.encode()).digest() + + def _sign_and_verify_send(self, memo, amount=10000, + to_address="maya1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7mdujp3"): + """Sign a single-MsgSend maya tx and verify the signature against the + host-reconstructed sign-doc digest and the known device pubkey. A wrong + digest (any field not bound), wrong key, or wrong curve fails here — + no frozen signature vectors to go stale.""" + # The device derives the sign-doc from_address itself (mainnet "maya" + # prefix); fetch it so the host digest matches by construction. + device_address = self.client.mayachain_get_address( + parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH)) + + resp = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), account_number=92, chain_id="mayachain", fee=3000, gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], - memo="foobar", + msgs=[make_send(device_address, to_address, amount)], + memo=memo, sequence=3, - testnet = True + testnet=False, ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "164ea435b39444fa780e453ffe0d0ca07fa74a44272713a283f6297b951e06dc71575e83a6a5405b324c8bc187c50951f1d46fd58acadf060fdf23980d61488a") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - return + + self.assertEqual(hexlify(resp.public_key), DEVICE_PUBKEY_HEX) + self.assertEqual(len(resp.signature), 64) + digest = self._maya_send_digest( + account_number=92, chain_id="mayachain", fee=3000, gas=200000, + memo=memo, amount=amount, from_address=device_address, + to_address=to_address, sequence=3) + vk = VerifyingKey.from_string(unhexlify(DEVICE_PUBKEY_HEX), + curve=SECP256k1) + # Raises BadSignatureError if the device signed anything but this doc. + self.assertTrue(vk.verify_digest(resp.signature, digest, + sigdecode=sigdecode_string)) + + def test_mayachain_sign_tx(self): + """Native CACAO MsgSend with a plain memo; the full raw memo is paged + on the OLED before signing (thorchain_confirm_full_memo is the sole + memo gate for native MAYA).""" + self.requires_firmware("7.9.1") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._sign_and_verify_send(memo="foobar") def test_sign_btc_eth_swap(self): self.requires_firmware("7.9.1") @@ -67,22 +139,16 @@ def test_sign_btc_eth_swap(self): (signatures, serialized_tx) = self.client.sign_tx('Bitcoin', [inp1, ], [out1, ]) self.assertEqual(hexlify(serialized_tx), '010000000182488650ef25a58fef6788bd71b8212038d7f2bbe4750bc7bcb44701e85ef6d5000000006b483045022100c1cf12191f0a50398dae21553d14d5c796ff3e2e1c378bce3d0a7d43fa9bdf4402201245f76291db518dd8b496b4406128ca0e07165c64d2fe927161eee17402f9c40121023230848585885f63803a0a8aecdd6538792d5c539215c91698e315bf0253b43dffffffff0100000000000000003d6a3b535741503a4554482e4554483a3078343165353536303035343832346561366230373332653635366533616436346532306539346534353a34323000000000') - + def test_sign_eth_btc_swap(self): self.requires_firmware("7.1.0") self.requires_fullFeature() self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() - sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( - n=[2147483692,2147483708,2147483648,0,0], - nonce=0x0, - gas_price=0x5FB9ACA00, - gas_limit=0x186A0, - value=0x00, - to=unhexlify('42a5ed456650a09dc10ebc6361a7480fdd61f27b'), - address_type=0, - chain_id=1, - data=unhexlify('1fece7b4' + - '000000000000000000000000345b297ec83add7ff74d2f7933651bffa037d956' + # asgard vault address + address_n = [2147483692,2147483708,2147483648,0,0] + nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, value = 0x0, 0x5FB9ACA00, 0x186A0, 0x00 + to = unhexlify('e3985e6b61b814f7cdb188766562ba71b446b46d') # Maya router v4 (firmware-pinned) + data = unhexlify('1fece7b4' + + '000000000000000000000000345b297ec83add7ff74d2f7933651bffa037d956' + # asgard vault address '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000' + # asset ETH '000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000065945acd2b867ef000' + # amount '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080' + # offset of memo string from after func sig @@ -90,10 +156,22 @@ def test_sign_eth_btc_swap(self): # SWAP:BTC.BTC:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:420 '535741503a4254432e4254433a30783431653535363030353438323465613662' + # mayachain transaction memo '30373332653635366533616436346532306539346534353a3432300000000000') - ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 37) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(sig_r), 'da472e9d40fb3c981cebbc6dec70d9d756e5f03aca1ca4259f26dd4c257f8a68') - self.assertEqual(hexlify(sig_s), '025af171f9bd0af71266417f82a72214f349d96ed6505288c1a4032463ef920a') + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=address_n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + value=value, to=to, address_type=0, chain_id=1, data=data) + # Verify the signature is over the EXACT tx above and by THIS device's + # key, rather than merely checking r/s lengths (which a wrong digest, + # wrong calldata or wrong key would also pass). Recovery keeps the test + # correct across router changes without re-freezing r/s vectors. + self.assertIn(sig_v, [37, 38]) # EIP-155 chain_id=1 + self.assertEqual(len(sig_r), 32) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_s), 32) + digest = eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value, + data, 1) + signer = recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, digest, 1) + # ethereum_get_address returns the raw 20 bytes. NB: KeepKeyTest's + # assertEqual override takes no msg argument. + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(address_n)) def test_sign_btc_add_liquidity(self): @@ -114,200 +192,74 @@ def test_sign_btc_add_liquidity(self): (signatures, serialized_tx) = self.client.sign_tx('Bitcoin', [inp1, ], [out1, ]) self.assertEqual(hexlify(serialized_tx), '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') - + def test_sign_eth_add_liquidity(self): self.requires_firmware("7.9.1") self.requires_fullFeature() self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() - sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( - n=[2147483692,2147483708,2147483648,0,0], - nonce=0x0, - gas_price=0x5FB9ACA00, - gas_limit=0x186A0, - value=0x00, - to=unhexlify('41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45'), - address_type=0, - chain_id=1, - data=unhexlify('1fece7b4' + - '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000' + + address_n = [2147483692,2147483708,2147483648,0,0] + nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, value = 0x0, 0x5FB9ACA00, 0x186A0, 0x00 + to = unhexlify('e3985e6b61b814f7cdb188766562ba71b446b46d') # Maya router v4 (firmware-pinned) + data = unhexlify('1fece7b4' + + '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000' + '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000' + '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000' + '0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080' + # offset of memo string from 4 - '000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003b' + # length of memo string in bytes + '000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003a' + # length of memo string in bytes (58, not 59: the 59th byte is ABI padding) # ADD:ETH.ETH:0xc5b2608927ea95ed43f842f553e3a27b09c050e8:420 '4144443a4554482e4554483a3078633562323630383932376561393565643433' + '663834326635353365336132376230396330353065383a343230000000000000') + sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx( + n=address_n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit, + value=value, to=to, address_type=0, chain_id=1, data=data) + # Verify the signature is over the EXACT tx above and by THIS device's + # key, rather than merely checking r/s lengths (which a wrong digest, + # wrong calldata or wrong key would also pass). Recovery keeps the test + # correct across router changes without re-freezing r/s vectors. + self.assertIn(sig_v, [37, 38]) # EIP-155 chain_id=1 + self.assertEqual(len(sig_r), 32) + self.assertEqual(len(sig_s), 32) + digest = eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value, + data, 1) + signer = recover_eth_signer(sig_r, sig_s, sig_v, digest, 1) + # ethereum_get_address returns the raw 20 bytes. NB: KeepKeyTest's + # assertEqual override takes no msg argument. + self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(address_n)) - ) - self.assertEqual(sig_v, 37) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(sig_r), '638f9f42c099d0d47f7fc70d248249d2db24ecabc2fdee5bf2f5ad73b5bbfd30') - self.assertEqual(hexlify(sig_s), '3dae036aabbe0ec55f7b9e4eef54e2b5335f62544d8c2ed041797a9397f185c7') - - @unittest.skip("TODO: capture expected signatures from emulator") def test_mayachain_remove_liquidity(self): - self.requires_firmware("7.1.1") + """WITHDRAW memo: pool + basis points paged in full on the OLED.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.9.1") self.requires_fullFeature() self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], - memo="WITHDRAW:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:10000", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "13d8ab1a8514c6163064a3e097dd8c33d7063b5994f2ce1c71c691f6fdcf4f1e54860ca7c6d8a478e15b2b07274d9752d8df0af0cd48a6113adf9ecf881ff20e") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - return + self._sign_and_verify_send( + memo="WITHDRAW:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:10000") - @unittest.skip("TODO: capture expected signatures from emulator") def test_mayachain_sign_tx_memos(self): + """Every memo shape MAYA routes on (SWAP/s/=/ADD/a/+ and bare-pool) + signs, and each signature is bound to its exact memo bytes — a memo + substitution changes the sign-doc digest and fails verification.""" self.requires_firmware("7.9.1") self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], + memos = [ # full memo - memo="SWAP:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:420", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "a1b9082c6817d4c80b82a2d955f2be26a39b8a5e6909c5fcc52114a5c5e5476e68df191c2be5c88e35ef3090c3bafbd44083e32fbf4d26a809218aeec42ec8a9") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], + "SWAP:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:420", # no limit, 's' for swap token - memo="s:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "77f24a90428d104fcb0b2bd5ffe1f05e800c032e01a0f1de883616ba8e26c3781044bc8ce1497d24b1b0997061ed664d378c62e04bac54b4ffe5699177c7387f") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], + "s:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45:", # swap to self, "=" for swap token - memo="=:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7::420", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "67ca2ad82a276645bea14fa9ae7d3f947fefe15906f93a605387d21db37c51f46f2961b62efcb7762d9008b1dbb723b2156294f35031cdd16e8e6931f68e4844") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], + "=:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7::420", # swap to self, no limit - memo="SWAP:BTC.BTC", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "6e6908262ae5f268e104a567f64b4be18297cc68577962925a1dcbcc2333f7ba5a5446f623a774359d68335804e88448bf432c95dc9777b26effecb339a790a9") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], + "SWAP:BTC.BTC", # full memo - memo="ADD:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "186e81a054517ce4f5134fa5ed6acc6398bd15d5c58361babadd9087fafd7a9122c7978ecc6710f76bebd46df72523f3409c33af387473f61ef167575f11a68b") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], - #'a' for add liquidity - memo="a:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45", - #memo="a:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "a98354ed6ee626603cd4416d314d1b875c5ab6a6af83fe1be05a6ac56d620e8f2322d500bba6a7f6e0e2fae810016ebc00be5a580766f171cd5f4a5b2e67263f") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - signature = self.client.mayachain_sign_tx( - address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), - account_number=92, - chain_id="mayachain", - fee=3000, - gas=200000, - msgs=[make_send( - "tthor1ls33ayg26kmltw7jjy55p32ghjna09zp6z69y8", - "tthor1jvt443rvhq5h8yrna55yjysvhtju0el7ldnwwy", - 10000 - )], - #"+" for add liquidity - memo="+:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45", - sequence=3, - testnet = True - ) - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.signature), "0409d104aaafe400e86b6172811bf1b44b6cc0065c13df10083a86d02b13b8ce7d40a4935bc022c76dae4793223c0c7d8446c83acdbd8d0188d35d2b7b8e22fc") - self.assertEqual(hexlify(signature.public_key), "031519713b8b42bdc367112d33132cf14cedf928ac5771d444ba459b9497117ba3") - - return + "ADD:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45", + # 'a' for add liquidity + "a:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45", + # "+" for add liquidity + "+:ETH.USDT-0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7:0x41e5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45", + ] + for memo in memos: + self._sign_and_verify_send(memo=memo) if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_osmosis_signtx.py b/tests/test_msg_osmosis_signtx.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90667e0e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_osmosis_signtx.py @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +"""Osmosis MsgSend signing — with the confirm-screen amount as the point. + +Osmosis had NO device tests at all: the confirm screens that render amounts +were covered only by host-side unit tests of the formatter in isolation. That +matters more than it sounds, because 7.15.0 CHANGED how every Osmosis amount +is drawn. + +Before, fsm_msg_osmosis.h rendered amounts with atof() + "%.6f". A float +carries ~7 significant decimal digits, so a large amount was displayed +ROUNDED on the very screen the user approves: + + 123456789123456 uosmo -> shown as "123456792.000000 OSMO" + actual 123456789.123456 OSMO + +The signature was over the correct amount either way — the lie was only on +the screen, which is the half a hardware wallet exists to get right. It now +formats with bounded decimal-string arithmetic. Native uosmo values must be +canonical uint64 strings; alternate spellings and overflow are rejected +before confirmation or hashing. + +These tests are paired with SECTIONS entries carrying screenshot hints, so +the rendered frame is captured as evidence. A test asserting only "it signed" +cannot prove what the OLED drew. + +pyk's osmosis_sign_tx currently implements osmosis-sdk/MsgSend only; the +delegate/undelegate/LP/swap/IBC screens share the same formatter but are not +reachable from here until the client learns those message types. +""" +import unittest +import common + +from binascii import hexlify + +from keepkeylib import messages_osmosis_pb2 as osmosis_proto +from keepkeylib.client import CallException +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + +# Osmosis uses the Cosmos coin type (118), not one of its own. +DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH = "m/44h/118h/0h/0/0" + + +def make_send(from_address, to_address, amount, denom='uosmo'): + return { + 'type': 'osmosis-sdk/MsgSend', + 'value': { + 'from_address': from_address, + 'to_address': to_address, + 'amount': [{'denom': denom, 'amount': str(amount)}], + }, + } + + +class TestMsgOsmosisSignTx(common.KeepKeyTest): + + def _address(self): + """Ask the device for its own osmo1 address. + + Deliberately NOT a hardcoded constant: the firmware bech32-decodes + to_address and refuses a bad checksum, so a literal invented by + swapping a cosmos1 prefix for osmo1 fails with the opaque "Failed to + include send message in transaction". Deriving it keeps the fixture + honest and makes these self-sends. + """ + # osmosis_get_address is decorated @field('address'), so it already + # returns the string rather than the OsmosisAddress message. + return self.client.osmosis_get_address( + address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH) + ) + + def _sign(self, amount, denom='uosmo'): + addr = self._address() + return self.client.osmosis_sign_tx( + address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), + account_number=16359, + chain_id="osmosis-1", + fee=800, + gas=290000, + msgs=[make_send(addr, addr, amount, denom)], + memo="", + sequence=17, + ) + + def _start_raw_signing(self): + """Start the wire protocol without the high-level MsgSend checks.""" + addr = self._address() + resp = self.client.call(osmosis_proto.OsmosisSignTx( + address_n=parse_path(DEFAULT_BIP32_PATH), + account_number=16359, + chain_id="osmosis-1", + fee_amount=800, + gas=290000, + memo="", + sequence=17, + msg_count=1, + )) + self.assertIsInstance(resp, osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgRequest) + return addr + + def test_osmosis_sign_tx(self): + """Baseline: a whole-OSMO send signs and returns a well-formed + secp256k1 signature + compressed pubkey.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + sig = self._sign(1500000) # 1.500000 OSMO + self.assertEqual(len(sig.signature), 64) + self.assertEqual(len(sig.public_key), 33) + self.assertIn(hexlify(sig.public_key)[:2], (b'02', b'03')) + + def test_osmosis_send_amount_beyond_float_precision(self): + """THE regression. 123456789123456 uosmo needs 15 significant digits; + a float holds ~7, so the old atof()+"%.6f" path drew + "123456792.000000 OSMO" over a transaction that actually moves + 123456789.123456 OSMO. The captured frame is the proof — assert here + only that the device signs it, and read the amount off the screenshot. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + sig = self._sign(123456789123456) + self.assertEqual(len(sig.signature), 64) + + def test_osmosis_send_subunit_amount(self): + """500 uosmo is 0.000500 OSMO — six decimal places, no integer part. + The formatter must not collapse it to "0" or drop the tail.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + sig = self._sign(500) + self.assertEqual(len(sig.signature), 64) + + def test_osmosis_send_denom_is_committed_to_the_signature(self): + """A raw MsgSend signs the reviewed canonical denomination. + + Two otherwise-identical sends must produce different signatures when + only the denomination changes. This catches both the old hardcoded + ``uosmo`` serializer and any future display/signing mismatch. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + def sign_denom(denom): + addr = self._start_raw_signing() + response = self.client.call(osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgAck( + send=osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgSend( + from_address=addr, + to_address=addr, + denom=denom, + amount='1500000', + ) + )) + self.assertIsInstance(response, osmosis_proto.OsmosisSignedTx) + self.assertEqual(len(response.signature), 64) + return response + + native = sign_denom('uosmo') + non_native = sign_denom('uatom') + self.assertNotEqual(hexlify(native.signature), + hexlify(non_native.signature)) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(native.public_key), + hexlify(non_native.public_key)) + + def test_osmosis_send_rejects_noncanonical_wire_amounts(self): + """Wire callers cannot exploit strtoull spellings or saturation.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + for amount in ('01', '-1', ' 1', '18446744073709551616'): + addr = self._start_raw_signing() + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + self.client.call(osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgAck( + send=osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgSend( + from_address=addr, + to_address=addr, + denom='uosmo', + amount=amount, + ) + )) + self.assertIn('Invalid Osmosis amount', str(ctx.exception)) + + def test_osmosis_swap_max_fields_are_fully_paged(self): + """Maximum Swap assets exercise separate three-row screen bounds.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + addr = self._start_raw_signing() + denom = 'ibc/' + ('A' * 64) + resp = self.client.call(osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgAck( + swap=osmosis_proto.OsmosisMsgSwap( + sender=addr, + pool_id=1, + token_out_denom=denom, + token_in_denom=denom, + token_in_amount='12345678901234567890123456789012', + token_out_min_amount='12345678901234567890123456789012', + ) + )) + self.assertIsInstance(resp, osmosis_proto.OsmosisSignedTx) + self.assertEqual(len(resp.signature), 64) + + def test_osmosis_amount_is_committed_to_the_signature(self): + """Guards the pairing between what is shown and what is signed: two + sends differing ONLY in amount must produce different signatures. If + they matched, the amount would not be in the digest and the confirm + screen would be decorative.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + a = self._sign(1500000) + b = self._sign(1500001) + self.assertNotEqual(hexlify(a.signature), hexlify(b.signature)) + # Same key throughout — only the message differed. + self.assertEqual(hexlify(a.public_key), hexlify(b.public_key)) + + def test_osmosis_signing_is_deterministic(self): + """RFC6979: identical input must yield an identical signature. A + mismatch here means nonce generation is not deterministic, which is a + key-recovery risk long before it is a display problem.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + first = self._sign(1500000) + second = self._sign(1500000) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(first.signature), hexlify(second.signature)) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ping.py b/tests/test_msg_ping.py index 2522105f..419414cb 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_ping.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_ping.py @@ -55,6 +55,47 @@ def test_ping(self): res = self.client.ping('random data', passphrase_protection=True) self.assertEqual(res, 'random data') + def test_ping_long_body_is_paged(self): + """A body that will not fit one screen must be shown across several. + + Before 7.14.2 the device drew what fitted and stopped: no ellipsis, no + warning, nothing to tell the user the tail of an address or an amount + had been dropped. A warning screen was then added that said "Hold to + view it anyway" and re-drew the SAME clipped body, which is worse -- + it claims a disclosure it does not make. + + Now the body is paged, and the titles carry n/m. This test exists so + those pages are CAPTURED: the screens are the evidence, and until this + test existed no suite with an over-long body was in the screenshot set, + so the pager's own rendering appeared nowhere in CI. + + The press DURATIONS -- click to page, hold to approve -- are not + assertable here. The emulator has no physical button; that half needs + hardware. + """ + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + # Digit ramp: the Nth character is str(N % 10), so a dropped or + # repeated character at a page seam is visible by inspection. + body = ''.join(str(i % 10) for i in range(255)) + res = self.client.ping(body, button_protection=True) + self.assertEqual(res, body) + + def test_ping_short_body_is_not_paged(self): + """The control for the test above. + + A body that fits must still take exactly one screen with an unnumbered + title. Without this, a pager that numbered every confirmation -- making + ordinary approvals cost two presses -- would pass unnoticed. + """ + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + + body = ''.join(str(i % 10) for i in range(100)) + res = self.client.ping(body, button_protection=True) + self.assertEqual(res, body) + def test_ping_format_specifier_sanitize(self): self.setup_mnemonic_pin_passphrase() self.client.clear_session() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_recoverydevice_cipher.py b/tests/test_msg_recoverydevice_cipher.py index a7dd891d..1521393e 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_recoverydevice_cipher.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_recoverydevice_cipher.py @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ def test_invalid_bip39_word_rejected(self): With enforce_wordlist=True, completing a word that isn't in the BIP-39 wordlist must return Failure immediately. - Requires firmware 7.15.0+ (per-word validation). + Requires firmware 7.15.1+ (per-word validation). """ self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.RecoveryDevice(word_count=12, diff --git a/tests/test_msg_resetdevice.py b/tests/test_msg_resetdevice.py index b4e04af2..385f878e 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_resetdevice.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_resetdevice.py @@ -18,11 +18,13 @@ # # The script has been modified for KeepKey Device. +import time import unittest import common import hashlib from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as proto_types from mnemonic import Mnemonic def generate_entropy(strength, internal_entropy, external_entropy): @@ -109,6 +111,141 @@ def test_reset_device(self): resp = self.client.call_raw(proto.Ping(pin_protection=True)) self.assertIsInstance(resp, proto.Success) + def test_reset_device_dice(self): + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + + external_entropy = b'zlutoucky kun upel divoke ody' * 2 + strength = 256 # 99 rolls + + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ResetDevice(display_random=False, + strength=strength, + passphrase_protection=False, + pin_protection=False, + language='english', + label='dice', + dice_entropy=True)) + + # Device announces the on-device dice entry screen + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.ButtonRequest) + self.assertEqual(ret.code, proto_types.ButtonRequest_DiceRoll) + + # Ack without blocking on the reply: the device only leaves the dice + # screen once the rolls are complete, and input is ignored until the + # ButtonRequest is acked. + self.client.transport.write(proto.ButtonAck()) + time.sleep(0.3) + + # Inject rolls in max_size-40 chunks, exercising undo ('u') along the + # way. Simulate the same rules host-side to know the expected string. + chunks = [ + "123456" * 6 + "1234", # 40 digits + "654321" * 6 + "43u2", # 39 digits + undo + "1234561234561234561u2u3", # more undo churn + "555555555555555555555555", # top up past 99 (extras dropped) + ] + expected = [] + for chunk in chunks: + for c in chunk: + if c == 'u': + if expected: + expected.pop() + elif len(expected) < 99: + expected.append(c) + self.client.debug.press_input(chunk) + time.sleep(0.2) + expected = ''.join(expected) + self.assertEqual(len(expected), 99) + + # Rolls complete -> digest confirmation screen + resp = self.client.transport.read_blocking() + self.assertIsInstance(resp, proto.ButtonRequest) + self.assertEqual(resp.code, proto_types.ButtonRequest_DiceRoll) + + # The device-computed digest must cover exactly the injected rolls + dice_digest = self.client.debug.read_dice_digest() + self.assertEqual(dice_digest, + hashlib.sha256(expected.encode('ascii')).digest()) + + self.client.debug.press_yes() + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) + + # From here the flow is the standard one: the displayed internal + # entropy is the post-dice-mix value and still binds the seed. + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.EntropyRequest) + internal_entropy = self.client.debug.read_reset_entropy() + resp = self.client.call_raw(proto.EntropyAck(entropy=external_entropy)) + + entropy = generate_entropy(strength, internal_entropy, external_entropy) + expected_mnemonic = Mnemonic('english').to_mnemonic(entropy) + + # Explainer dialog, then the paginated backup + self.assertIsInstance(resp, proto.ButtonRequest) + self.client.debug.press_yes() + resp = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) + + mnemonic = [] + while isinstance(resp, proto.ButtonRequest): + mnemonic.append(self.client.debug.read_reset_word()) + self.client.debug.press_yes() + resp = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) + + self.assertIsInstance(resp, proto.Success) + self.assertEqual(' '.join(mnemonic), expected_mnemonic) + + def test_reset_reentry_disarms_entropy_ack(self): + """An abandoned reset must never leave EntropyAck armed. + + Regression this guards: reset_init aborts (dice cancel, PIN mismatch, + ...) left awaiting_entropy set from an earlier run while zeroing + int_entropy, so a following EntropyAck derived the seed from + sha256(0*32 || host_bytes) -- entirely host-chosen. + + 7.15 closes it EARLIER and more strongly than the original fix did. + #429 replaced the separate awaiting_entropy flag with a single armed + (kind) ceremony, and setup_stage() now REFUSES to open a second + ceremony on top of an armed one. So the re-entry this test used to + perform is rejected outright rather than being allowed and then + disarmed -- there is no second ceremony to leave armed. Both halves are + asserted below: the refusal, and then the original property. + """ + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.client.wipe_device() + + # Arm a reset and walk away without acking the entropy request. + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ResetDevice(display_random=False, + strength=256, + passphrase_protection=False, + pin_protection=False, + language='english', + label='first')) + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.EntropyRequest) + + # Re-entry is REFUSED while a ceremony is armed. This is the #429 + # guard; before it, the second ResetDevice was accepted and the code + # had to remember to disarm the first one. + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ResetDevice(display_random=False, + strength=256, + passphrase_protection=False, + pin_protection=False, + language='english', + label='second', + dice_entropy=True)) + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.Failure) + self.assertIn('middle of setup', ret.message) + + # Abandon the FIRST ceremony the way the host is told to. + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.Cancel()) + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.Failure) + + # The abandoned reset must be disarmed, so this cannot generate a seed. + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.EntropyAck(entropy=b'H' * 32)) + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.Failure) + self.assertIn('Not in Reset mode', ret.message) + + # And the device must still be uninitialized. + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.Initialize()) + self.assertFalse(ret.initialized) + def test_reset_device_pin(self): external_entropy = b'zlutoucky kun upel divoke ody' * 2 strength = 128 @@ -120,10 +257,21 @@ def test_reset_device_pin(self): language='english', label='test')) - self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.ButtonRequest) - self.client.debug.press_yes() - ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) - + # display_random=True above is deliberate: the field stays in the wire + # schema for host compatibility. Firmware 7.15.0 (fw 320f0eb5, "no + # entropy display") stopped honouring it -- internal entropy is seed + # pre-image material, and a host that sets the flag and reads that + # screen once can compute SHA256(shown || ext) and derive the seed. + # + # Branch on the version rather than skipping the test: everything below + # (PIN entry, EntropyRequest/Ack, mnemonic derivation) is version- + # independent and must keep running on older firmware. + f = self.client.features + if (f.major_version, f.minor_version, f.patch_version) < (7, 15, 0): + # Pre-7.15: the Internal Entropy screen legitimately still exists. + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.ButtonRequest) + self.client.debug.press_yes() + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.PinMatrixRequest) # Enter PIN for first time @@ -193,10 +341,21 @@ def test_failed_pin(self): language='english', label='test')) - self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.ButtonRequest) - self.client.debug.press_yes() - ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) - + # display_random=True above is deliberate: the field stays in the wire + # schema for host compatibility. Firmware 7.15.0 (fw 320f0eb5, "no + # entropy display") stopped honouring it -- internal entropy is seed + # pre-image material, and a host that sets the flag and reads that + # screen once can compute SHA256(shown || ext) and derive the seed. + # + # Branch on the version rather than skipping the test: everything below + # (PIN entry, EntropyRequest/Ack, mnemonic derivation) is version- + # independent and must keep running on older firmware. + f = self.client.features + if (f.major_version, f.minor_version, f.patch_version) < (7, 15, 0): + # Pre-7.15: the Internal Entropy screen legitimately still exists. + self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.ButtonRequest) + self.client.debug.press_yes() + ret = self.client.call_raw(proto.ButtonAck()) self.assertIsInstance(ret, proto.PinMatrixRequest) # Enter PIN for first time diff --git a/tests/test_msg_ripple_sign_tx.py b/tests/test_msg_ripple_sign_tx.py index 891982d3..aaeab6cd 100644 --- a/tests/test_msg_ripple_sign_tx.py +++ b/tests/test_msg_ripple_sign_tx.py @@ -100,6 +100,71 @@ def test_sign(self): ) + @unittest.skip( + "XRP memo is not a supported feature yet. A THORChain memo cannot " + "traverse hdwallet -> RippleSignTx: the protobuf has no memo field " + "(RippleSignTx carries 1-6, RipplePayment carries " + "amount/destination/destination_tag), and hdwallet's rippleSignTx " + "never reads tx.value.memo. The firmware therefore never receives it " + "and cannot serialize it. Tracked as keepkey/keepkey-vault#422.\n" + "\n" + "This assertion is CORRECT and is deliberately left intact: it " + "describes the behaviour the product needs. Do NOT make it pass by " + "asserting the memo is absent -- that would encode the bug as the " + "contract. Re-enable only when the signed serialization actually " + "preserves the memo." + ) + def test_sign_with_thorchain_memo(self): + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0" + msg = messages.RippleSignTx( + address_n=parse_path("m/44'/144'/0'/0/0"), + payment=messages.RipplePayment( + amount=100000000, + destination="rBKz5MC2iXdoS3XgnNSYmF69K1Yo4NS3Ws" + ), + flags=0x80000000, + fee=100000, + sequence=25, + memo=memo + ) + resp = self.client.call(msg) + + # Verify the XRPL Memos array is appended to the serialized tx. + # Format: 0xF9 (STArray[9]) 0xEA (STObject[10]) 0x7D (MemoData VL[13]) + # 0xE1 (end object) 0xF1 (end array) + memo_bytes = memo.encode('ascii') + expected_tail = ( + bytes([0xF9, 0xEA, 0x7D, len(memo_bytes)]) + + memo_bytes + + bytes([0xE1, 0xF1]) + ) + self.assertTrue( + resp.serialized_tx.endswith(expected_tail), + "serialized_tx must end with XRPL Memos array containing THORChain routing memo" + ) + + # A plain send without memo must not contain the Memos marker + msg_no_memo = messages.RippleSignTx( + address_n=parse_path("m/44'/144'/0'/0/0"), + payment=messages.RipplePayment( + amount=100000000, + destination="rBKz5MC2iXdoS3XgnNSYmF69K1Yo4NS3Ws" + ), + flags=0x80000000, + fee=100000, + sequence=26 + ) + resp2 = self.client.call(msg_no_memo) + self.assertFalse( + b'\xf9\xea' in resp2.serialized_tx, + "plain send must not contain Memos array (0xF9 0xEA marker sequence)" + ) + def test_ripple_sign_invalid_fee(self): self.requires_fullFeature() self.requires_firmware("6.4.0") diff --git a/tests/test_msg_session_trust_lifetime.py b/tests/test_msg_session_trust_lifetime.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76e5caa0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_session_trust_lifetime.py @@ -0,0 +1,500 @@ +""" +Session and Trust Lifetime — provider trust must die on its own. + +Two claims in the 7.15 clear-sign design have never been tested end to end: + + 1. AdvancedMode is SESSION state, never a flash bit. storage.c writes bit 12 + of the storage flags word as zero and ignores it on read (four sites: + storage_writeStorageV11, storage_readStorageV11, + storage_writeStorageV16Plaintext, storage_readStorageV16Plaintext), each + with a comment saying the policy is session-scoped now. The only proof of + that is a power cycle: enable it, restart the firmware, and it must be OFF + while everything else in the same flags word survives. + + 2. A runtime clear-sign signer (LoadClearsignSigner) lives in RAM only and is + revoked by session teardown. session_clear() calls + signed_metadata_clear_signers() unconditionally, so both Initialize + (clear_pin=false) and ClearSession (clear_pin=true) drop it, and a reboot + drops it by construction. + +MODELLING A POWER CYCLE. The emulator's flash is an mmap of `emulator.img` in +its working directory (lib/emulator/setup.c). Killing and relaunching the +process WITHOUT touching that file is a REBOOT: flash contents survive, RAM and +every session variable do not. Deleting the image first would be a FACTORY WIPE +instead, and a wipe proves nothing here — every policy reads back off on a blank +device whether or not it was ever persisted. _power_cycle() therefore keeps the +image, and each power-cycle test asserts a persisted control value came back to +prove the flash really did survive the restart. + +WHY THE POLICY CALLS ARE RAW. ProtocolMixin.apply_policy() sends Initialize +afterwards to refresh Features, and Initialize is itself one of the teardown +paths under test — using it would clear the signer as a side effect and make +every assertion below vacuous. _apply_policy_raw() sends the bare ApplyPolicies +and reads state back with GetFeatures, which touches no session state. + +test_msg_ethereum_clear_signing.py covers loading a signer, the persist=true +refusal and the wipe path. Nothing here duplicates that: this file is only +about how loaded trust DIES. +""" + +from __future__ import print_function + +import os +import subprocess +import time +import unittest + +import common +import config + +from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as proto_types +from keepkeylib.client import CallException, KeepKeyDebuglinkClient +from keepkeylib.transport_udp import UDPTransport +from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import ( + ARG_FORMAT_STRING, + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, + CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, + serialize_metadata, + sign_metadata, + # aliased: pytest would otherwise collect the helper as a test function + test_signer_compressed_pubkey as signer_compressed_pubkey, +) + +# Same CI slot/alias the clear-sign suite uses. Phase-1 firmware ships with no +# built-in keys, so slot 3 is empty until LoadClearsignSigner fills it. +TEST_KEY_ID = 3 +CI_SIGNER_ALIAS = 'CI Test' + +AAVE_V3_POOL = bytes.fromhex('7d2768de32b0b80b7a3454c06bdac94a69ddc7a9') +AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR = bytes.fromhex('617ba037') +PROBE_ARGS = [ + {'name': 'protocol', 'format': ARG_FORMAT_STRING, 'value': b'Aave V3'}, +] + + +def probe_blob(): + """A VERIFIED-classification blob signed by the CI test key for slot 3. + + Used only as an oracle for "is the signer still in the slot?": the device + answers VERIFIED while the slot holds the matching pubkey and MALFORMED once + it does not. No transaction is signed, so no tx_hash binding is needed. + """ + return sign_metadata(serialize_metadata( + chain_id=1, + contract_address=AAVE_V3_POOL, + selector=AAVE_SUPPLY_SELECTOR, + tx_hash=b'\x00' * 32, + method_name='supply', + args=PROBE_ARGS, + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, + )) + + +# Names `ps -o comm=` reports for the emulator binary. Anything else bound to +# the port is not ours to kill -- see the guard in _emulator_process(). +_EMULATOR_EXE_NAMES = ('kkemu',) + + +def _emulator_process(port): + """(pid, exe, cwd) of the process BOUND to udp/port, or None. + + NOTE: subprocess.run(capture_output=/text=) is Python 3.7+. The CI test + container runs 3.6, where passing them raises TypeError inside subprocess + and this helper dies before any of its own logic runs -- which is why the + power-cycle tests FAILED in CI instead of skipping. PIPE plus + universal_newlines is the spelling both understand. + + Skips this test client's own connected socket, which lsof also reports on + the same port but as a `local->remote` pair rather than a bare bind. + """ + try: + out = subprocess.run(['lsof', '-nP', '-iUDP:%d' % port, '-Fpn'], + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, universal_newlines=True).stdout + except (FileNotFoundError, OSError): + # No lsof: this harness cannot identify, let alone restart, the + # emulator process -- the same situation as a remote one. Report "not + # found" so _power_cycle() skips with its explanation, rather than + # failing a green tree over a missing tool. + return None + pid = None + for line in out.splitlines(): + if line.startswith('p'): + pid = int(line[1:]) + elif line.startswith('n') and pid is not None: + name = line[1:] + if '->' in name or not name.endswith(':%d' % port): + continue + exe = subprocess.run(['ps', '-o', 'comm=', '-p', str(pid)], + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, universal_newlines=True).stdout.strip() + if os.path.basename(exe) not in _EMULATOR_EXE_NAMES: + # Whatever holds this port, it is not the firmware. Whenever the + # emulator runs in a container the bound process is the Docker + # port forwarder -- docker-proxy or dockerd on Linux, + # com.docker.backend on macOS -- in a different pid namespace + # from kkemu. Killing it does not reboot anything: it removes + # the port forward, and every later test in the run then blocks + # forever on a socket that will never answer again. Measured + # here: it took the whole Docker daemon down mid-suite. + # + # Fall through to "not found" so _power_cycle() takes its + # documented skip, which the report renders as WITHHELD rather + # than as a pass. + continue + cwd_out = subprocess.run( + ['lsof', '-a', '-p', str(pid), '-d', 'cwd', '-Fn'], + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, universal_newlines=True).stdout + cwd = None + for cwd_line in cwd_out.splitlines(): + if cwd_line.startswith('n'): + cwd = cwd_line[1:] + return pid, exe, cwd + return None + + +class TestSessionTrustLifetime(common.KeepKeyTest): + + MIN_FIRMWARE = "7.15.0" + + def setUp(self): + super(TestSessionTrustLifetime, self).setUp() + self.requires_firmware(self.MIN_FIRMWARE) + + # ── helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + + def _apply_policy_raw(self, name, enabled): + """ApplyPolicies with NO trailing Initialize. See module docstring.""" + return self.client.call(proto.ApplyPolicies( + policy=[proto_types.PolicyType(policy_name=name, enabled=enabled)])) + + def _policy(self, name): + """Read a policy back with GetFeatures — touches no session state.""" + features = self.client.call(proto.GetFeatures()) + for policy in features.policies: + if policy.policy_name == name: + return policy.enabled + self.fail("no such policy: %s" % name) + + def _signer_still_loaded(self): + """VERIFIED => slot 3 still holds the CI signer; MALFORMED => empty. + + Requires AdvancedMode ON: fsm_msgEthereumTxMetadata refuses outright + without it, which is a different answer from "the slot is empty" and is + asserted separately where it matters. + """ + resp = self.client.ethereum_send_tx_metadata( + signed_payload=probe_blob(), metadata_version=1, + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID) + return resp.classification + + def _assertClassification(self, expected, why): + """assertEqual with a message. common.KeepKeyTest narrows assertEqual to + two positional args, so the reason a lifetime assertion matters would + otherwise be lost at the point it fails.""" + got = self._signer_still_loaded() + self.assertTrue(got == expected, + "%s (classification %d, expected %d)" % (why, got, expected)) + + def _arm_session(self): + """Seed the device, turn AdvancedMode on, load the CI signer, and prove + the signer really is live before anything tries to revoke it.""" + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", True) + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=TEST_KEY_ID, pubkey=signer_compressed_pubkey(), + alias=CI_SIGNER_ALIAS) + self._assertClassification( + CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, + "the CI signer did not take — nothing below can be evidence about " + "revoking trust that was never armed") + + def _persist_marker_across_all_sectors(self): + """Set the Experimental policy, then commit enough times that EVERY + storage sector holds a record written after it was set. + + This exists because of a real emulator/firmware interaction that would + otherwise make every power-cycle assertion below vacuous. + storage_commit() calls wear_leveling_shift(), so consecutive commits + land in FLASH_STORAGE1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 1, and each commit erases the + sector it leaves. On the emulator flash_erase_word() is compiled out + entirely (keepkey_flash.c is `#ifndef EMULATOR`), so the abandoned + sectors keep their "stor" magic — and find_active_storage() takes the + FIRST sector carrying that magic. A rebooted emulator therefore reads + whichever record last happened to land in STORAGE1, which can be two + commits stale. + + Consequence if ignored: an AdvancedMode bit written one commit before + the restart lands in STORAGE2 or STORAGE3, boot reads the older + STORAGE1 record, and the policy reads back OFF for a reason that has + nothing to do with it being session-scoped. The test would pass on a + firmware that persisted it. Padding the commits removes the ambiguity, + and the Experimental marker is what proves it was removed: it is set + AFTER AdvancedMode, so any record containing it was written while + AdvancedMode was on in RAM. Assert the marker came back before + asserting anything about AdvancedMode. + """ + for _ in range(4): + self._apply_policy_raw("Experimental", True) + + def _power_cycle(self): + """Kill and relaunch the firmware, KEEPING its flash image. + + This is a reboot, not a wipe: emulator.img is left alone, so anything + committed to flash comes back and anything that only lived in RAM does + not. There is no protocol message that reboots a KeepKey, so on a + transport that is not a local UDP emulator this fails loudly rather than + skipping — a skipped lifetime test is indistinguishable from a passing + one in the report, and that is exactly how a real defect stayed hidden + for a release. + """ + if config.TRANSPORT is not UDPTransport: + self.fail("power cycle requires the local UDP emulator; on real " + "hardware this is an operator step (unplug/replug) and " + "must be recorded as manual evidence, not skipped") + + port = int(str(config.TRANSPORT_ARGS[0]).split(':')[1]) + found = _emulator_process(port) + if found is None: + # The emulator is reachable over UDP but is NOT a process this + # harness can signal -- in CI it runs as a separate docker-compose + # service, so there is no pid here to kill and relaunch. That is an + # environmental limit, not a firmware result, and failing on it + # makes a green tree look red for a reason no code change can fix. + # + # Skipping is still not free: the report renders this section as + # WITHHELD, which the atlas guide defines as "carries no evidence". + # So the property stays unproven wherever the harness does not own + # the emulator, and is proven on every local run and in the manual + # hardware round. Both facts are visible; neither is silent. + self.skipTest( + "power cycle needs an emulator process this harness owns; " + "none is bound to udp/%d (CI runs it as a separate container). " + "Run locally, or record the unplug/replug as manual evidence." + % port) + pid, exe, cwd = found + + self.client.close() + subprocess.run(['kill', str(pid)]) + for _ in range(100): + if _emulator_process(port) is None: + break + time.sleep(0.1) + self.assertIsNone(_emulator_process(port), + "emulator pid %d did not exit" % pid) + + env = dict(os.environ) + env['KEEPKEY_UDP_PORT'] = str(port) + subprocess.Popen([exe], cwd=cwd, env=env, + stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL) + + # Wait for the new instance to answer before reconnecting. + deadline = time.time() + 20 + while time.time() < deadline: + if _emulator_process(port) is not None: + break + time.sleep(0.1) + self.assertIsNotNone(_emulator_process(port), + "emulator did not come back on udp/%d" % port) + time.sleep(0.5) + + transport = config.TRANSPORT(*config.TRANSPORT_ARGS, + **config.TRANSPORT_KWARGS) + debug_transport = config.DEBUG_TRANSPORT(*config.DEBUG_TRANSPORT_ARGS, + **config.DEBUG_TRANSPORT_KWARGS) + client = KeepKeyDebuglinkClient(transport) + client.set_debuglink(debug_transport) + client.screenshot_dir = getattr(self.client, 'screenshot_dir', None) + client.screenshot_id = getattr(self.client, 'screenshot_id', 0) + self.client = client + self.client.init_device() + + # ── 1. AdvancedMode lifetime ─────────────────────────────────────── + + def test_advanced_mode_is_off_after_power_cycle(self): + """AdvancedMode must not survive a reboot, and the control must. + + Experimental and AdvancedMode are neighbouring bits of the SAME storage + flags word (11 and 12), set by the SAME ApplyPolicies message, written + by the SAME storage_writeStorageV16Plaintext call. Turning both on and + rebooting separates a persisted policy from a session one: Experimental + comes back, AdvancedMode must not. Experimental is set AFTER + AdvancedMode, so the record it came back from was written while + AdvancedMode was armed — bit 12 was offered to the writer and dropped. + The seed and label surviving are the second control: without them a + reboot would be indistinguishable from a factory wipe, which turns every + policy off for the wrong reason. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", True) + self._persist_marker_across_all_sectors() + self.assertTrue(self._policy("AdvancedMode")) + self.assertTrue(self._policy("Experimental")) + + self._power_cycle() + + self.assertTrue(self.client.features.initialized, + "reboot lost the seed — this modelled a wipe, not a " + "power cycle, and proves nothing about persistence") + self.assertEqual(self.client.features.label, 'test') + self.assertTrue(self._policy("Experimental"), + "the marker policy did not come back, so the record " + "read at boot predates the AdvancedMode change and no " + "conclusion about bit 12 can be drawn from it") + self.assertFalse(self._policy("AdvancedMode"), + "AdvancedMode came back ON after a power cycle — it " + "is being persisted to flash, which storage.c " + "explicitly forbids (bit 12 is burned)") + + def test_advanced_mode_survives_initialize_but_not_clear_session(self): + """The asymmetry in session_clear() is deliberate; pin it down. + + session_clear_impl() disarms AdvancedMode only when clear_pin is set. + ClearSession passes true, Initialize passes false. Hosts send + Initialize before nearly every operation, so disarming there would cost + a fresh button press each time; ClearSession is an explicit lock and + must revoke the capability. If this ever inverts, blind signing either + becomes unusable or outlives the lock. + """ + self.setup_mnemonic_nopin_nopassphrase() + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", True) + + self.client.call(proto.Initialize()) + self.assertTrue(self._policy("AdvancedMode"), + "Initialize disarmed AdvancedMode — every host sends " + "it routinely, so the policy would be unusable") + + self.client.clear_session() + self.assertFalse(self._policy("AdvancedMode"), + "ClearSession left AdvancedMode armed — an explicit " + "lock must revoke the blind-signing capability") + + # ── 2. Loaded-signer lifetime ────────────────────────────────────── + + def test_signer_dropped_by_initialize(self): + """Session teardown revokes the signer while the policy stays armed. + + The MALFORMED here is unambiguous: AdvancedMode is asserted still ON + immediately before the probe, so the metadata gate cannot be what + refused it — the slot is empty. The GetFeatures probe first is the + negative control: merely exchanging messages must NOT drop a signer, or + this test would pass for the wrong reason. + """ + self._arm_session() + + self.client.call(proto.GetFeatures()) + self._assertClassification( + CLASSIFICATION_VERIFIED, + "an ordinary message dropped the signer; the teardown assertion " + "below would then prove nothing") + + self.client.call(proto.Initialize()) + self.assertTrue(self._policy("AdvancedMode")) + self._assertClassification( + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, + "the signer survived session teardown — runtime trust must not " + "outlive the session that consented to it") + + def test_signer_dropped_by_clear_session(self): + """ClearSession revokes both halves of the trust. + + Right after the lock the metadata message is refused outright, because + ClearSession also disarmed AdvancedMode — that Failure is the policy + gate, not evidence about the slot. Re-arming the policy WITHOUT an + Initialize isolates the slot: MALFORMED then means the signer itself is + gone. + """ + self._arm_session() + + self.client.clear_session() + + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + self._signer_still_loaded() + self.assertIn("AdvancedMode required", str(ctx.exception)) + + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", True) + self._assertClassification( + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, + "the signer survived ClearSession — an explicit lock left provider " + "trust loaded in RAM") + + def test_signer_dropped_by_power_cycle(self): + """Reboot drops the signer; the seed proves it was a reboot. + + Loaded signers are RAM only, so this should be true by construction — + but "by construction" is exactly the claim a persist=true bug would + break, and the report needs the reboot on record rather than inferred. + Storage is preserved (see _power_cycle), so the surviving seed, label + and marker policy rule out a wipe having done the work. The marker is + set after the signer is loaded, so the record the device boots into is + one that was written while the signer was live — if a build ever did + persist signers, this is the record it would have persisted them into. + """ + self._arm_session() + self._persist_marker_across_all_sectors() + + self._power_cycle() + + self.assertTrue(self.client.features.initialized, + "reboot lost the seed — this modelled a wipe, not a " + "power cycle") + self.assertEqual(self.client.features.label, 'test') + self.assertTrue(self._policy("Experimental"), + "the marker policy did not come back, so flash was not " + "preserved across the restart") + self.assertFalse(self._policy("AdvancedMode")) + + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", True) + self._assertClassification( + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, + "the signer came back after a power cycle — it was written to flash") + + def test_disabling_advanced_mode_revokes_the_signer(self): + """Turning the policy off DROPS the provider, it does not suspend it. + + Every consumer in signed_metadata.c already refuses a runtime slot + while AdvancedMode is off, so with the policy off the two behaviours + are indistinguishable — the metadata fails closed either way. The + difference only shows on the way back. + + Suspending would mean re-enabling the policy silently re-arms a + provider the user never re-loaded, on a confirmation screen that names + the policy and never names the signer. A user who disabled + AdvancedMode to drop a provider would not have dropped it. So + fsm_msgApplyPolicies calls signed_metadata_clear_signers() on disable, + and coming back costs a fresh LoadClearsignSigner consent — the screen + that names the alias and fingerprint, which is the screen that should + appear whenever trust begins. + + The re-enable is sent as the bare message with the exact expected + response list: one ApplyPolicies ButtonRequest and a Success. No trust + screen appears there, which is the point — trust cannot be restored by + a policy toggle at all. + """ + self._arm_session() + + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", False) + with self.assertRaises(CallException) as ctx: + self._signer_still_loaded() + self.assertIn("AdvancedMode required", str(ctx.exception)) + + with self.client: + self.client.set_expected_responses([ + proto.ButtonRequest( + code=proto_types.ButtonRequest_ApplyPolicies), + proto.Success(), + ]) + self._apply_policy_raw("AdvancedMode", True) + + self._assertClassification( + CLASSIFICATION_MALFORMED, + "the signer survived disabling AdvancedMode — re-enabling the " + "policy re-armed a provider the user never re-loaded, on a screen " + "that never named it") + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_signtx_taproot.py b/tests/test_msg_signtx_taproot.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7dcc3cd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_signtx_taproot.py @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +# This file is part of the KeepKey project. +# +# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License version 3 +# as published by the Free Software Foundation. +# +# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the License along with this library. +# If not, see . + +import common +import unittest + +from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify + +from common import KeepKeyTest +from keepkeylib import messages_pb2 as proto +from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as proto_types +from keepkeylib.client import CallException +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path +from keepkeylib.tx_api import TxApiBitcoin + + + +# Synthetic prev tx paying 100000 sat to the BIP-86 first receiving address of +# the "abandon abandon ... about" mnemonic +# (bc1p5cyxnuxmeuwuvkwfem96lqzszd02n6xdcjrs20cac6yqjjwudpxqkedrcr). +# The fixture lives in tests/txcache and was produced together with the +# expected witness below by an independent Python implementation of +# BIP-340/341, keyed from BIP-86's own published xprv. +PREV_TXID = "6e32033911982f7550ab1d26232adfd08711293e15085f77cd27628be0a6ee37" +IN_AMOUNT = 100000 +OUT_AMOUNT = 90000 +OUT_ADDRESS = "1BitcoinEaterAddressDontSendf59kuE" + +EXPECTED_WITNESS = ( + "afe221b16d648a1ad7329f9765930732380cc67765bd73af7ce13b5991146851" + "2d9ee77e34af56fe1f59f98372011f7cb400ced614d808c690c5ba907fb62de9" +) + +EXPECTED_CHANGE_WITNESS = ( + "e3c44408fe61256ad406733f100f1ee856eb31854335efa59e60a61ea5d41ab" + "341802f0cccb55f644042a1ab390f0a406b9d3efe3996d05442b4ee43d5355eab" +) +EXPECTED_CHANGE_SCRIPT = ( + "5120882d74e5d0572d5a816cef0041a96b6c1de832f6f9676d9605c44d5e9a97d3dc" +) + +MIXED_PREV_TXID = ( + "3e1fdf082678a8a2f378995ffc0e4f853942c55c4ddbc2771b348413eeeca9a4" +) +EXPECTED_MIXED_WITNESS = ( + "b596e1bbefb855af9852942797075d4f452b2d186cb17a76226892334a497a62" + "adb9a02f7c1b4573e4d48b92e2307bb0b2282c97e2c5350bb3c21619fab855a2" +) + + +# Full BIP-144 serializations, captured from the emulator and cross-checked +# against an independent derivation from this file's own inputs and the +# EXPECTED_* witnesses above. These pin the bytes the host would broadcast -- +# `signature` alone was populated correctly even while the witness and the +# locktime footer were being dropped on the wire. +EXPECTED_SERIALIZED_TX = ( + "0100000000010137eea6e08b6227cd775f08153e291187d0df2a23261dab50752f98" + "113903326e0000000000ffffffff01905f0100000000001976a914759d6677091e97" + "3b9e9d99f19c68fbf43e3f05f988ac0140afe221b16d648a1ad7329f976593073238" + "0cc67765bd73af7ce13b59911468512d9ee77e34af56fe1f59f98372011f7cb400ce" + "d614d808c690c5ba907fb62de900000000" +) +EXPECTED_SERIALIZED_TX_CHANGE = ( + "0100000000010137eea6e08b6227cd775f08153e291187d0df2a23261dab50752f98" + "113903326e0000000000ffffffff0250c30000000000001976a914759d6677091e97" + "3b9e9d99f19c68fbf43e3f05f988ac409c000000000000225120882d74e5d0572d5a" + "816cef0041a96b6c1de832f6f9676d9605c44d5e9a97d3dc0140e3c44408fe61256a" + "d406733f100f1ee856eb31854335efa59e60a61ea5d41ab341802f0cccb55f644042" + "a1ab390f0a406b9d3efe3996d05442b4ee43d5355eab00000000" +) +EXPECTED_SERIALIZED_TX_MIXED = ( + "01000000000102a4a9ecee1384341b77c2db4d5cc54239854f0efc5f9978f3a2a878" + "2608df1f3e0000000000ffffffffa4a9ecee1384341b77c2db4d5cc54239854f0efc" + "5f9978f3a2a8782608df1f3e010000006a47304402205aa50469308c21e9e1ba0299" + "cd235add026914e4406bcfa6d9c0403c8cc3cf580220764a5832ad1bc36ba6a21020" + "a253c2272bca5aa1643d9c41b12c318b0a38824e012103aaeb52dd7494c361049de6" + "7cc680e83ebcbbbdbeb13637d92cd845f70308af5effffffff01e022020000000000" + "1976a914759d6677091e973b9e9d99f19c68fbf43e3f05f988ac0140b596e1bbefb8" + "55af9852942797075d4f452b2d186cb17a76226892334a497a62adb9a02f7c1b4573" + "e4d48b92e2307bb0b2282c97e2c5350bb3c21619fab855a20000000000" +) + + +class TestMsgSigntxTaproot(KeepKeyTest): + + def assertCompleteSegwitTx(self, raw, signatures, n_in, n_out): + """Parse the serialized tx strictly; it must consume exactly len(raw). + + `signature` and `serialized_tx` are separate nanopb fields on + TxRequestSerializedType, each with its own presence flag. Asserting + only `signature` passes even when the device never transmits the + witness stack -- the host then gets a tx that declares the segwit + marker/flag, carries no witness and no locktime, and every node + rejects it. A structural parse catches that: the marker promises + witnesses, so the stream ends early and the offset check fails. + + Returns the witness stacks, one list per input. + """ + pos = [0] + + def take(n): + if len(raw) < pos[0] + n: + raise AssertionError( + "tx truncated at offset %d: wanted %d more byte(s) of %d " + "total: %s" + % (pos[0], n, len(raw), hexlify(raw).decode())) + out = raw[pos[0]:pos[0] + n] + pos[0] += n + return out + + def varint(): + first = take(1)[0] + if first < 0xfd: + return first + width = {0xfd: 2, 0xfe: 4, 0xff: 8}[first] + return int.from_bytes(take(width), "little") + + take(4) # nVersion + marker = take(2) + if marker != unhexlify("0001"): + raise AssertionError( + "missing segwit marker/flag: got %s" % hexlify(marker).decode()) + if varint() != n_in: + raise AssertionError("unexpected input count") + for _ in range(n_in): + take(32); take(4); take(varint()); take(4) # outpoint, sig, seq + if varint() != n_out: + raise AssertionError("unexpected output count") + for _ in range(n_out): + take(8); take(varint()) # value, scriptPubKey + witnesses = [[take(varint()) for _ in range(varint())] + for _ in range(n_in)] + take(4) # nLockTime footer + if pos[0] != len(raw): + raise AssertionError( + "trailing bytes: parsed %d of %d" % (pos[0], len(raw))) + + # Every BIP-340 signature the device reported must actually appear in + # the witness data it serialized. + flat = [item for stack in witnesses for item in stack] + for sig in signatures: + if len(sig) == 64 and sig not in flat: + raise AssertionError( + "schnorr signature absent from serialized_tx witnesses") + return witnesses + + def test_send_p2tr(self): + """Spend a P2TR input and compare the witness byte for byte. + + BIP-340 signing is deterministic given aux_rand, and the firmware + signs with an all-zero aux, so this is an equality check against a + signature computed independently of the firmware -- not a round trip + through our own verifier, which would pass even if the device + committed to the wrong transaction. + """ + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.set_tx_api(TxApiBitcoin) + + inp1 = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=IN_AMOUNT, + prev_hash=unhexlify(PREV_TXID), + prev_index=0, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDTAPROOT, + ) + out1 = proto_types.TxOutputType( + address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=OUT_AMOUNT, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS, + ) + + with self.client: + self.client.set_expected_responses([ + proto.TxRequest( + request_type=proto_types.TXINPUT, + details=proto_types.TxRequestDetailsType( + request_index=0)), + proto.TxRequest( + request_type=proto_types.TXOUTPUT, + details=proto_types.TxRequestDetailsType( + request_index=0)), + proto.ButtonRequest( + code=proto_types.ButtonRequest_ConfirmOutput), + proto.ButtonRequest( + code=proto_types.ButtonRequest_SignTx), + proto.TxRequest( + request_type=proto_types.TXINPUT, + details=proto_types.TxRequestDetailsType( + request_index=0)), + proto.TxRequest( + request_type=proto_types.TXOUTPUT, + details=proto_types.TxRequestDetailsType( + request_index=0)), + proto.TxRequest( + request_type=proto_types.TXINPUT, + details=proto_types.TxRequestDetailsType( + request_index=0)), + proto.TxRequest(request_type=proto_types.TXFINISHED), + ]) + (signatures, serialized) = self.client.sign_tx( + "Bitcoin", [inp1], [out1]) + + self.assertEqual(len(signatures), 1) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(signatures[0]).decode(), EXPECTED_WITNESS) + witnesses = self.assertCompleteSegwitTx(serialized, signatures, 1, 1) + # key-path spend: exactly one stack item, the bare 64-byte signature + self.assertEqual(witnesses[0], [signatures[0]]) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(serialized).decode(), EXPECTED_SERIALIZED_TX) + + def test_send_p2tr_with_change(self): + """P2TR change is device-derived and omitted from recipient prompts.""" + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.set_tx_api(TxApiBitcoin) + + inp1 = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=IN_AMOUNT, + prev_hash=unhexlify(PREV_TXID), + prev_index=0, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDTAPROOT, + ) + recipient = proto_types.TxOutputType( + address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=50000, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS, + ) + change = proto_types.TxOutputType( + address_n=parse_path("86'/0'/0'/1/0"), + amount=40000, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOTAPROOT, + ) + + (signatures, serialized) = self.client.sign_tx( + "Bitcoin", [inp1], [recipient, change]) + + self.assertEqual(hexlify(signatures[0]).decode(), + EXPECTED_CHANGE_WITNESS) + # EXPECTED_CHANGE_SCRIPT is a phase-1 output byte, which the device + # transmits regardless of whether the witness ever reaches the host. + # Assert the whole transaction, not just that prefix. + self.assertIn(unhexlify(EXPECTED_CHANGE_SCRIPT), serialized) + witnesses = self.assertCompleteSegwitTx(serialized, signatures, 1, 2) + self.assertEqual(witnesses[0], [signatures[0]]) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(serialized).decode(), + EXPECTED_SERIALIZED_TX_CHANGE) + + def test_send_mixed_p2tr_and_legacy(self): + """A P2TR signature commits to the legacy input's real prevout.""" + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.set_tx_api(TxApiBitcoin) + + taproot = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=100000, + prev_hash=unhexlify(MIXED_PREV_TXID), + prev_index=0, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDTAPROOT, + ) + legacy = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("44'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=50000, + prev_hash=unhexlify(MIXED_PREV_TXID), + prev_index=1, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDADDRESS, + ) + recipient = proto_types.TxOutputType( + address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=140000, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS, + ) + + (signatures, serialized) = self.client.sign_tx( + "Bitcoin", [taproot, legacy], [recipient]) + + self.assertEqual(len(signatures), 2) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(signatures[0]).decode(), + EXPECTED_MIXED_WITNESS) + self.assertTrue(signatures[1]) + witnesses = self.assertCompleteSegwitTx(serialized, signatures, 2, 1) + self.assertEqual(witnesses[0], [signatures[0]]) + # the legacy input must still serialize an EMPTY witness (0x00) + self.assertEqual(witnesses[1], []) + self.assertEqual(hexlify(serialized).decode(), + EXPECTED_SERIALIZED_TX_MIXED) + + def test_mixed_p2tr_requires_every_input_amount(self): + """Fail closed instead of signing an incomplete BIP-341 commitment.""" + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.set_tx_api(TxApiBitcoin) + + taproot = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=100000, + prev_hash=unhexlify(MIXED_PREV_TXID), + prev_index=0, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDTAPROOT, + ) + incomplete_legacy = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("44'/0'/0'/0/0"), + prev_hash=unhexlify(MIXED_PREV_TXID), + prev_index=1, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDADDRESS, + ) + recipient = proto_types.TxOutputType( + address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=140000, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS, + ) + + with self.assertRaisesRegex( + CallException, + "Taproot transaction input without amount"): + self.client.sign_tx( + "Bitcoin", [taproot, incomplete_legacy], [recipient]) + + def test_mixed_p2tr_rejects_wrong_legacy_amount(self): + """Reject a host amount that disagrees with the actual legacy prevout.""" + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.set_tx_api(TxApiBitcoin) + + taproot = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=100000, + prev_hash=unhexlify(MIXED_PREV_TXID), + prev_index=0, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDTAPROOT, + ) + tampered_legacy = proto_types.TxInputType( + address_n=parse_path("44'/0'/0'/0/0"), + amount=50001, + prev_hash=unhexlify(MIXED_PREV_TXID), + prev_index=1, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDADDRESS, + ) + recipient = proto_types.TxOutputType( + address=OUT_ADDRESS, + amount=140000, + script_type=proto_types.PAYTOADDRESS, + ) + + with self.assertRaisesRegex( + CallException, + "Input amount or script does not match prevout"): + self.client.sign_tx( + "Bitcoin", [taproot, tampered_legacy], [recipient]) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_msg_solana_lut_attestation.py b/tests/test_msg_solana_lut_attestation.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbca5b26 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_msg_solana_lut_attestation.py @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +"""KKSOLSW1 -- transaction-bound lookup-table account attestation. + +A Solana v0 message may source instruction accounts from an Address Lookup +Table. Those accounts are NOT in the bytes being signed, so the device cannot +derive them: it forces the whole transaction to SOL_TX_REVIEW_OPAQUE, refuses +it outright without AdvancedMode, and treats it as an explicit BLIND SIGN with +AdvancedMode on. The instruction's meaning is never shown. + +A clear-sign provider may attest the resolved account list for THIS exact +transaction, turning that blind sign into a described one. The attestation is: + + * DOMAIN-TAGGED -- "KeepKeySolanaTxAccounts/1", so a signature made for any + other purpose (an EVM metadata blob, a token definition) + cannot be replayed as one; + * TX-BOUND -- over sha256(raw_tx), so it cannot be replayed onto a + different transaction; + * ADDITIVE -- the blind-sign warning still follows it. A runtime signer + is annotation, never authority. + +These tests assert all three, and assert that every failure mode degrades to +exactly the flow that exists today rather than to something new. +""" +import struct +import unittest + +import common +import keepkeylib.messages_solana_pb2 as messages +import keepkeylib.types_pb2 as proto_types +from keepkeylib.client import CallException +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + +TAG = b"KeepKeySolanaTxAccounts/1" +SLOT = 3 + + +class TestSolanaLutAttestation(common.KeepKeyTest): + + SYSTEM_PROGRAM = b'\x00' * 32 + + def setUp(self): + super(TestSolanaLutAttestation, self).setUp() + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_message("LoadClearsignSigner") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + # ---------------------------------------------------------------- helpers + + def _raw_pubkey(self): + """The device's Solana (ed25519) pubkey, decoded from the base58 + address. get_public_node() would hand back a secp256k1 key, which is + not what signs a Solana transaction -- the device would then reject the + tx with "Derived key is not a signer".""" + addr = self.client.call(messages.SolanaGetAddress( + address_n=parse_path("m/44'/501'/0'/0'"), + show_display=False)).address + ALPHABET = ('123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ' + 'abcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz') + n = 0 + for c in addr: + n = n * 58 + ALPHABET.index(c) + return n.to_bytes(32, 'big') + + def _build_lut_tx(self, from_pubkey): + """A v0 message carrying a lookup-table section. + + The ALT section is what forces the device opaque -- exactly the case + KKSOLSW1 exists for. Built by hand rather than reused from another test + so the shape under test is visible here. + """ + tx = bytearray() + tx.append(0x80) # versioned, v0 + tx.extend([1, 0, 1]) # header: 1 sig, 0 ro-signed, 1 ro-unsigned + tx.append(2) # 2 static accounts + tx.extend(from_pubkey) + tx.extend(self.SYSTEM_PROGRAM) + tx.extend(b'\xbb' * 32) # recent blockhash + tx.append(1) # 1 instruction + tx.extend(bytes([1])) # program index -> SYSTEM_PROGRAM + tx.append(1) # 1 account index + tx.append(3) # index 3: BEYOND the static table -> external + tx.append(4) # data len + tx.extend(struct.pack('") before the amount — + the authenticated token identity cannot be pushed off-view by a + host-controlled symbol. The (unattested) host token_info symbol is + shown next to the amount, and decimals come from the signed + instruction, never from the host.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + from_pubkey = self._get_from_pubkey() + to_account = b'\x33' * 32 # destination token account + authority = b'\x44' * 32 # transfer authority + + # USDC mint (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v) + usdc_mint = bytes([ + 0xc6, 0xfa, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0xbe, 0xdb, 0xad, 0x3a, + 0x3d, 0x65, 0xf3, 0x6a, 0xab, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x31, + 0xb1, 0xbb, 0xe4, 0xc2, 0xd2, 0xf6, 0xe0, 0xe4, + 0x7c, 0xa6, 0x02, 0x03, 0x45, 0x2f, 0x5d, 0x61, + ]) + + # TransferChecked: opcode=12 (u8) + amount (LE u64) + decimals (u8); + # accounts [source, mint, destination, authority] + instr_data = bytes([12]) + struct.pack(' ' screen; decimals must + also match the signed instruction bytes or the symbol is not trusted. + Runtime identities require AdvancedMode.""" + self.requires_firmware("7.15.0") + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_message("LoadClearsignSigner") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + import hashlib + from ecdsa import SigningKey, SECP256k1 + from ecdsa.util import sigencode_string + from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import ( + TEST_PRIVATE_KEY, test_signer_compressed_pubkey, + assert_test_key_matches_slot3) + + # Load the CI signer into slot 3 through the production trust path + # (device confirm auto-acked by debuglink) — phase 1 has no built-ins. + assert_test_key_matches_slot3() + self.client.apply_policy('AdvancedMode', True) + self.client.load_clearsign_signer( + key_id=3, + pubkey=test_signer_compressed_pubkey(), + alias="CI Test", + ) + + from_pubkey = self._get_from_pubkey() + to_account = b'\x33' * 32 + authority = b'\x44' * 32 + usdc_mint = bytes([ + 0xc6, 0xfa, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0xbe, 0xdb, 0xad, 0x3a, + 0x3d, 0x65, 0xf3, 0x6a, 0xab, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x31, + 0xb1, 0xbb, 0xe4, 0xc2, 0xd2, 0xf6, 0xe0, 0xe4, + 0x7c, 0xa6, 0x02, 0x03, 0x45, 0x2f, 0x5d, 0x61, + ]) + decimals = 6 + symbol = "USDC" + + # TransferChecked with decimals matching the attested value. + instr_data = bytes([12]) + struct.pack(' storage_fromFlash() -> version_from_int(raw_version) +# An unrecognised version returns StorageVersion_NONE, storage_fromFlash() +# returns SUS_Invalid, and storage_init() runs storage_reset() + +# storage_commit(). No prompt, no warning -- the wallet is gone at boot. +# +# So "does this firmware recognise the version in flash?" IS the whole +# question, and every test below is a way of asking it. +# +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# What runs where, and why the emulator can prove any of this at all +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +# The version gate only runs at BOOT. There is no host-driven reboot: the +# SoftReset message (messages.proto type 89) has no entry in +# lib/firmware/messagemap.def, and fsm_msgDebugLinkFlashDump() is compiled out +# under #ifndef EMULATOR, so the emulator can neither be rebooted nor have its +# flash read over the wire. The only way to cross the boot boundary is to own +# the emulator process and its flash image file. +# +# That is what TestStorageUpgradePreservation does: it starts its OWN kkemu on +# its OWN port pair in its OWN temp directory, so it never touches whichever +# emulator the rest of the suite is talking to. Killing the process and +# starting it again on the same emulator.img IS a power cycle -- lib/emulator/ +# setup.c mmaps that file as the flash array, so every flash write survives. +# +# Restamping the version word in that image is not "faking an upgrade". It +# reproduces exactly what an arriving device presents to the incoming +# firmware: a blob whose header says one version while the firmware compiled +# in says another. It does NOT exercise the layout migration chain, because +# the bytes under the stamp were written by this build -- see +# test_v16_blob_upgrades_without_wiping for how far that is taken, and the +# module docstring in the report section for what is still untested. +# +# TestStorageVersionGateSource needs no device at all: it reads the firmware +# sources and asserts the gate's own invariants. Those tests run everywhere, +# including CI, so this section is never completely dark. +# +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Why the source tests name no version number +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +# They used to. test_active_flash_format_is_v20 asserted STORAGE_VERSION == 20 +# and test_burned_versions_are_dispatched_to_the_wipe_path asserted the literal +# string "case StorageVersion_18:", because 7.16 writes V20 and burns 18/19. +# Both are true on the passkeys branch and both are FALSE on the 7.15 line, +# where STORAGE_VERSION is 17 and nothing is burned. python-keepkey is one +# submodule shared by every firmware branch, and CI now builds the emulator +# from whichever branch is under test, so a test pinned to one branch's version +# reports a failure whose only cause is which branch you are on. +# +# A test that reads a source file has to assert properties of what it read. +# What follows is derived, per tree: +# +# STORAGE_VERSION, STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED, include/.../storage.h +# STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE +# the version ladder lib/firmware/storage_versions.inc +# which versions are BURNED lib/firmware/storage_versions.inc +# which versions have a reader / hit the wipe path lib/firmware/storage.c +# +# The only version number still written down is +# STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED_FLOOR, and it is a FLOOR, not an equality -- see +# its comment for why that distinction is the whole argument. (The V16 numbers +# in the emulator section are a different thing: they describe the format 7.14.x +# shipped, which is finished history and cannot change. The flash offsets are +# unchanged by the V20 bump -- V20 keeps V17's layout and puts passkey state in +# its reserved area at +501 -- so the migration test reads the same way on both +# lines.) +# +# Decoupling is not the same as weakening. The property docs/StorageVersionGate +# .md exists to protect -- "a bump is a deliberate release act, never an +# accident" -- is enforced harder than before, because it no longer rests on +# somebody also editing a constant in this file. A bare `#define +# STORAGE_VERSION 18` now has to survive: +# +# * the ladder must be contiguous 1..N and END at STORAGE_VERSION, so the +# bump forces an append to storage_versions.inc; +# * every ladder version must be dispatched in storage_fromFlash, so the bump +# forces a case label; +# * the version this firmware WRITES must have a reader, so the bump forces a +# reader behind that label. +# +# Three files have to move together, and every one of them is a file that has +# to move anyway for the firmware to be correct. The old constant was the only +# artifact in the set that did not. + +from __future__ import print_function + +import glob +import os +import re +import shutil +import socket +import struct +import subprocess +import sys +import tempfile +import time +import unittest + +_HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) +if _HERE not in sys.path: + sys.path.insert(0, _HERE) +_PYKEEPKEY = os.path.dirname(_HERE) +if _PYKEEPKEY not in sys.path: + sys.path.insert(0, _PYKEEPKEY) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Flash layout constants +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Emulator flash file offsets. lib/emulator/setup.c mmaps emulator.img at +# FLASH_ORIGIN (0x08000000), so a flash address maps to file offset +# address - 0x08000000. The three storage sectors come from +# flash_sector_map[] in include/keepkey/board/memory.h. +SECTOR_OFFSETS = (0x4000, 0x8000, 0xC000) # FLASH_STORAGE1/2/3 +SECTOR_RECORD_LEN = 2572 # sizeof(flash_temp) in storage_commit() + +# STORAGE_MAGIC_STR, include/keepkey/board/keepkey_board.h +STORAGE_MAGIC = b"stor" + +# Metadata is 44 bytes; the Storage record starts right after it, and its +# first word is the version. Everything below is (44 + offset-within-Storage), +# with the inner offsets taken from storage_readStorageV16Plaintext() and +# storage_readStorageV17() in lib/firmware/storage.c -- NOT from docs/ +# Storage.md, whose V17 table has a stale byte count. +OFF_VERSION = 44 + 0 +OFF_FLAGS = 44 + 4 +OFF_AUTHDATA_FINGERPRINT = 44 + 469 # 32 bytes, V17 only +OFF_ENCSEC_VERSION = 44 + 1497 +OFF_ENCSEC = 44 + 1501 +V16_ENCSEC_SIZE = 512 # lib/firmware/storage.h +V17_ENCSEC_SIZE = 1024 + +FLAG_HAS_SEC_FINGERPRINT = 1 << 14 +FLAG_AUTHDATA_INITIALIZED = 1 << 18 +FLAG_AUTHDATA_ENCRYPTED = 1 << 19 + +# include/keepkey/firmware/storage.h. Cross-checked against the header by +# test_version_never_drops_below_a_shipped_release -- the emulator tests below +# stamp wallets into this band by hand, so a drift between the two would make +# them exercise a band the firmware does not use. +STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE = 10000 + +# The lowest value STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED may ever hold. 7.15 shipped +# storage V17; that is a fact about the past and cannot become false, so this +# is a RATCHET and not a version pin. Raise it when a later release actually +# ships (the same commit that raises the constant in storage.h); there is no +# branch on which it needs lowering, and lowering it is the edit this exists to +# stop. +# +# The distinction matters. `assertEqual(17, last_shipped)` is wrong the day +# 7.16 ships and wrong on any branch that has already bumped it, so it rots and +# gets "fixed" by whoever the failure inconveniences. `>= 17` is wrong only if +# somebody deletes history. It still catches the edit docs/StorageVersionGate.md +# calls the single highest-severity review item in the file: the static assert +# is STORAGE_VERSION >= STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED, so the way to make a +# LOWERED storage version compile is to lower LAST_SHIPPED to match it, and +# both numbers live in the same header where one commit reaches both. An +# independent witness is the only thing that sees it. +STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED_FLOOR = 17 + +MNEMONIC_ALL = " ".join(["all"] * 12) +LABEL = "storagegate" +PIN = "1234" +BIP44_ADDRESS_N = [2147483692, 2147483648, 2147483648, 0, 0] # m/44'/0'/0'/0/0 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Firmware source access +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def _repo_root(): + """Directory of the firmware checkout this python-keepkey lives under. + + KK_FIRMWARE_ROOT wins, so the gate can be pointed at a tree this clone is + not nested inside. That is not a convenience: these tests now derive every + version number from the tree, and the only way to show they hold on BOTH + release lines is to run one checkout of them against two firmware trees. + Unset -- which is how CI runs, from deps/python-keepkey -- the walk up is + unchanged. + """ + env = os.environ.get("KK_FIRMWARE_ROOT") + if env: + assert os.path.isfile(os.path.join(env, "lib", "firmware", "storage.c")), ( + "KK_FIRMWARE_ROOT=%s has no lib/firmware/storage.c" % env) + return env + d = _HERE + for _ in range(8): + if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, "lib", "firmware", "storage.c")): + return d + parent = os.path.dirname(d) + if parent == d: + break + d = parent + return None + + +_ROOT = _repo_root() + + +def _read_source(rel): + assert _ROOT, ( + "firmware sources not found above %s -- the storage version gate is a " + "property of lib/firmware/storage.c and cannot be checked without it" % _HERE + ) + with open(os.path.join(_ROOT, rel)) as f: + return f.read() + + +def _define(text, name): + """Value of a simple integer #define, tolerating a line continuation. + + STORAGE_VERSION is written as `#define STORAGE_VERSION \\\n 17 /* ... */`, + so the continuation has to be folded before matching. + """ + folded = text.replace("\\\n", " ") + m = re.search(r"^\s*#\s*define\s+" + name + r"\b\s+(\d+)", folded, re.M) + assert m, "no integer #define %s found" % name + return int(m.group(1)) + + +def _strip_c_comments(text): + """Comments are prose and must never be mistaken for code. + + Both files this module parses argue their case in long comments that name + the very identifiers being searched for -- the burned arm in storage.c says + "there is deliberately NO reader" a few words from where a reader would be + written. Classification runs on the stripped text so a rewording can never + change a verdict. + """ + text = re.sub(r"/\*.*?\*/", " ", text, flags=re.S) + return re.sub(r"//[^\n]*", " ", text) + + +# -- lib/firmware/storage_versions.inc -------------------------------------- + +_LADDER_ENTRY = re.compile( + r"STORAGE_VERSION_(?:ENTRY|LAST)\s*\(\s*(\d+)\s*\)") +_LADDER_LAST = re.compile(r"STORAGE_VERSION_LAST\s*\(\s*(\d+)\s*\)") +_ENTRY_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*STORAGE_VERSION_ENTRY\s*\(\s*(\d+)\s*\)\s*$") +_BURNED_WORD = re.compile(r"\bBURNED\b") + + +def _ladder(inc): + """Every version in storage_versions.inc, in file order. + + The x-macro definitions at the top of the file take a parameter named X, + not a digit, so they do not match. + """ + return [int(m) for m in _LADDER_ENTRY.findall(_strip_c_comments(inc))] + + +def _ladder_last(inc): + """The single STORAGE_VERSION_LAST(N) entry: the version this build writes.""" + last = _LADDER_LAST.findall(_strip_c_comments(inc)) + assert len(last) == 1, ( + "storage_versions.inc must have exactly one STORAGE_VERSION_LAST entry, " + "found %s" % last) + return int(last[0]) + + +def _burned_declared(inc): + """Versions storage_versions.inc annotates as BURNED. + + THE DECLARATION SITE. A burned version is one that a pre-release build + wrote with a layout that was later abandoned, so devices carrying it exist + and no reader may ever be written for it -- parsing such a blob as the + current format is worse than refusing it, because nothing announces the + misparse. That is a fact about history, not about code, so it cannot be + inferred from the code: it has to be stated somewhere and read from there. + + The convention is a comment containing the word BURNED, immediately above + the entries it applies to: + + STORAGE_VERSION_ENTRY(17) + /* 18 and 19 are BURNED. */ + STORAGE_VERSION_ENTRY(18) + STORAGE_VERSION_ENTRY(19) + STORAGE_VERSION_LAST(20) + + The run ends at the first line that is not a bare STORAGE_VERSION_ENTRY -- + a blank line, another comment, or the STORAGE_VERSION_LAST line, which by + definition is the version being written and so can never be burned. + + Numbers inside the comment text are deliberately NOT scraped: that prose + mentions the commit that reverted the format and the version it reverted + TO, and reading V17 out of it would declare a shipped version burned. + Position is the annotation; the words are for humans. + + An unannotated version that turns out to be dispatched to the wipe path is + a mismatch, not a silent pass -- see + test_burned_versions_agree_between_the_ladder_and_the_dispatch. + """ + burned = set() + lines = inc.splitlines() + i = 0 + while i < len(lines): + if "/*" not in lines[i]: + i += 1 + continue + block = [] + while i < len(lines): + block.append(lines[i]) + if "*/" in lines[i]: + break + i += 1 + i += 1 + if not _BURNED_WORD.search("\n".join(block)): + continue + while i < len(lines): + m = _ENTRY_LINE.match(lines[i]) + if not m: + break + burned.add(int(m.group(1))) + i += 1 + return burned + + +# -- lib/firmware/storage.c -------------------------------------------------- + +_CASE_LABEL = re.compile(r"case\s+StorageVersion_(\w+)\s*:") +_READER_CALL = re.compile(r"\bstorage_read\w*\s*\(") +_WIPE_RETURN = re.compile(r"return\s+SUS_Invalid\b") + + +def _from_flash_arms(c): + """Map every StorageVersion_X label in storage_fromFlash to its arm text. + + Consecutive labels share one arm: `case 2: case 3: ... case 10:` is a + single body reached by nine versions, and each of them must be credited + with what that body does. So labels accumulate until one is followed by + something other than whitespace and comments, and the whole group is + assigned that text. + + Keys are the label suffixes as written -- "17", "BTC_ONLY", "NONE" -- so + the non-numeric arms stay visible to the tests that care about them. + """ + i = c.index("StorageUpdateStatus storage_fromFlash") + body = c[i:c.index("\n}", i)] + assert "case StorageVersion_NONE" in body, ( + "storage_fromFlash body was cut short before the end of its switch; " + "the parse below would under-report every arm") + + labels = list(_CASE_LABEL.finditer(body)) + assert labels, "no case StorageVersion_* labels in storage_fromFlash" + + arms = {} + group = [] + for idx, m in enumerate(labels): + group.append(m.group(1)) + end = labels[idx + 1].start() if idx + 1 < len(labels) else len(body) + own = body[m.end():end] + if _strip_c_comments(own).strip(): + for name in group: + arms[name] = own + group = [] + for name in group: # labels trailing the last statement: no body at all + arms[name] = "" + return arms + + +def _reads(arm): + """Does this arm call a storage_readVxx reader?""" + return bool(_READER_CALL.search(_strip_c_comments(arm))) + + +def _wipes(arm): + """Does this arm return SUS_Invalid -- the reset-and-commit path?""" + return bool(_WIPE_RETURN.search(_strip_c_comments(arm))) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Emulator process management +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def _find_emulator(): + """Locate a kkemu binary this test can start and stop. + + KK_EMULATOR_BIN wins. Otherwise look where the two build recipes put it: + scripts/emulator/Dockerfile configures in-source (bin/kkemu at the repo + root), while local work uses an out-of-tree build-* directory. build-emu is + named before the generic glob on purpose -- a bitcoin-only build stamps its + own wallets into the reserved band, which is a different device under + test_bitcoin_only_band_refuses_without_wiping. + """ + env = os.environ.get("KK_EMULATOR_BIN") + if env: + return env if os.access(env, os.X_OK) else None + if not _ROOT: + return None + candidates = [os.path.join(_ROOT, "bin", "kkemu"), + os.path.join(_ROOT, "build-emu", "bin", "kkemu")] + candidates += sorted(glob.glob(os.path.join(_ROOT, "build*", "bin", "kkemu"))) + for c in candidates: + if os.access(c, os.X_OK): + return c + return None + + +_EMULATOR_BIN = _find_emulator() + +_NO_EMULATOR = ( + "no kkemu binary to start and stop (looked at $KK_EMULATOR_BIN, " + "/bin/kkemu, /build*/bin/kkemu). The version gate only runs at " + "boot, and there is no host-driven reboot -- SoftReset is unimplemented and " + "DebugLinkFlashDump is compiled out under EMULATOR -- so these tests must " + "own the emulator process. In CI the python-keepkey container is built from " + "scripts/emulator/python-keepkey.Dockerfile, which copies the source but " + "never builds the emulator, so this section is UNPROVEN there until that " + "image ships a kkemu." +) + + +def _free_port_pair(): + """A UDP port p where p and p+1 are both free (kkemu uses p and p+1).""" + for _ in range(200): + s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) + try: + s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0)) + p = s.getsockname()[1] + finally: + s.close() + if p % 2: + continue + t = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) + try: + t.bind(("127.0.0.1", p + 1)) + except socket.error: + continue + finally: + t.close() + return p + raise RuntimeError("no free UDP port pair for the emulator") + + +class Emulator(object): + """One kkemu process over one flash image, restartable. + + The image is the whole point: lib/emulator/setup.c mmaps emulator.img over + the firmware's flash array, so halting the process and booting it again + replays storage_init() against exactly the bytes the previous run left. + """ + + def __init__(self, workdir): + self.workdir = workdir + self.port = _free_port_pair() + self.img = os.path.join(workdir, "emulator.img") + self.proc = None + + # -- process ------------------------------------------------------------ + + def _ping(self): + s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) + s.settimeout(0.5) + try: + s.sendto(b"PINGPING", ("127.0.0.1", self.port)) + return s.recv(8) == b"PONGPONG" + except socket.error: + return False + finally: + s.close() + + def boot(self): + assert self.proc is None, "already booted" + env = dict(os.environ, KEEPKEY_UDP_PORT=str(self.port)) + with open(os.path.join(self.workdir, "emu.log"), "ab") as log: + self.proc = subprocess.Popen( + [_EMULATOR_BIN], cwd=self.workdir, env=env, stdout=log, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) + for _ in range(100): + time.sleep(0.1) + if self.proc.poll() is not None: + raise RuntimeError( + "emulator exited rc=%s before answering; see %s" + % (self.proc.returncode, os.path.join(self.workdir, "emu.log"))) + if self._ping(): + return + raise RuntimeError("emulator did not answer PINGPING on port %d" % self.port) + + def halt(self): + """Power cycle, not a graceful shutdown -- flash keeps whatever + storage_commit() already wrote, which is what a real yank does.""" + if self.proc is None: + return + if self.proc.poll() is None: + self.proc.terminate() + try: + self.proc.wait(timeout=10) + except Exception: + self.proc.kill() + self.proc.wait() + self.proc = None + time.sleep(0.2) + + # -- client ------------------------------------------------------------- + + def client(self, method, pin=None): + """Debuglink client bound to THIS emulator. + + Deliberately does not go through tests/config.py: that module picks + HID/WebUSB when a real KeepKey is plugged in, which would send these + wipes at somebody's hardware wallet. + """ + from keepkeylib.client import KeepKeyDebuglinkClient + from keepkeylib.transport_udp import UDPTransport + + c = KeepKeyDebuglinkClient(UDPTransport("127.0.0.1:%d" % self.port)) + c.set_debuglink(UDPTransport("127.0.0.1:%d" % (self.port + 1))) + c.setup_debuglink(button=True, pin_correct=True) + _screenshots_to(c, method) + if pin: + _teach_pin(c, pin) + return c + + # -- flash image -------------------------------------------------------- + + def image(self): + with open(self.img, "rb") as f: + return f.read() + + def active_sector(self): + """Offset find_active_storage() would pick: FIRST sector with the magic. + + lib/board/memory.c scans FLASH_STORAGE1..3 in order and takes the first + one whose first four bytes are "stor". Order matters, not recency. + """ + img = self.image() + for off in SECTOR_OFFSETS: + if img[off:off + 4] == STORAGE_MAGIC: + return off + return None + + def sector(self, off): + return self.image()[off:off + SECTOR_RECORD_LEN] + + def patch(self, off, rel, data): + assert self.proc is None, "patch the image only while the device is off" + with open(self.img, "r+b") as f: + f.seek(off + rel) + f.write(data) + f.flush() + os.fsync(f.fileno()) + + def read_u32(self, off, rel): + return struct.unpack("/), + and must be set before the first ButtonRequest: the wipe and load confirms + are captured by the client's own callback, and without this they land in + the SCREENSHOT_DIR root where _build_frame_census() cannot see them. + + Set here rather than by conftest.py because these tests do not inherit + common.KeepKeyTest -- its setUp() builds a client from config.py and wipes + whatever that resolves to -- so the conftest hook never fires for them. + """ + if os.environ.get("KEEPKEY_SCREENSHOT") != "1": + return + d = os.path.join(os.environ.get("SCREENSHOT_DIR", "screenshots"), + "storage_version_gate", method) + if not os.path.isdir(d): + os.makedirs(d) + client.screenshot_dir = d + client.screenshot_id = len(glob.glob(os.path.join(d, "btn*.png"))) + + +def _capture(client): + """Grab the OLED as it stands. The confirm screens capture themselves on + ButtonRequest; the home screen after a boot has no button behind it, so it + has to be asked for.""" + if os.environ.get("KEEPKEY_SCREENSHOT") != "1": + return + client._capture_oled() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# The gate's own invariants, read out of the firmware sources +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class TestStorageVersionGateSource(unittest.TestCase): + """No device needed. These are the checks that survive a CI runner which + cannot restart an emulator, so the section is never entirely unmeasured. + + Every number these tests compare against is read out of the tree they are + run in, so one copy of this file states the same invariants on the 7.15 + line (STORAGE_VERSION 17, nothing burned) and on 7.16 (20, with 18 and 19 + burned). See the note at the top of the module for why that is a + strengthening rather than a relaxation. + """ + + def setUp(self): + self.h = _read_source("include/keepkey/firmware/storage.h") + self.c = _read_source("lib/firmware/storage.c") + self.inc = _read_source("lib/firmware/storage_versions.inc") + self.version = _define(self.h, "STORAGE_VERSION") + self.last_shipped = _define(self.h, "STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED") + + self.ladder = _ladder(self.inc) + self.burned = _burned_declared(self.inc) + self.arms = _from_flash_arms(self.c) + + # -- helpers ------------------------------------------------------------ + + def _arm(self, version): + arm = self.arms.get(str(version)) + self.assertIsNotNone( + arm, + "storage_fromFlash has no `case StorageVersion_%d:` -- see " + "test_every_ladder_version_is_dispatched" % version) + return arm + + # -- the ladder --------------------------------------------------------- + + def test_version_ladder_is_contiguous_and_ends_at_storage_version(self): + """storage_versions.inc may only ever be APPENDED to. + + The enum is emitted in .inc order after StorageVersion_NONE = 0, so a + contiguous 1..N list is what makes StorageVersion_N == N. Deleting or + renumbering an entry silently drops a version from version_from_int() + and wipes every device carrying it. + + Ending AT StorageVersion is the half that makes a bare header bump + loud: raise STORAGE_VERSION without appending here and the two numbers + disagree. + """ + self.assertTrue(self.ladder, "no version entries parsed from the ladder") + self.assertEqual(list(range(1, len(self.ladder) + 1)), self.ladder, + "storage_versions.inc is not contiguous from 1") + self.assertEqual( + self.version, _ladder_last(self.inc), + "STORAGE_VERSION is %d but the ladder ends at %d. A version this " + "firmware writes and cannot enumerate is not recognised on the next " + "boot -- it wipes itself." % (self.version, _ladder_last(self.inc))) + + def test_version_never_drops_below_a_shipped_release(self): + """Lowering STORAGE_VERSION wipes every device upgrading FROM a shipped + release: its blob's version stops being recognised, so the gate maps it + to StorageVersion_NONE and storage_init() resets. The version must also + stay under the bitcoin-only band, or a multi-chain wallet would be + stamped into the band that multi-chain firmware refuses to load.""" + self.assertGreaterEqual(self.version, self.last_shipped) + band = _define(self.h, "STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE") + self.assertEqual( + STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE, band, + "the header moved the bitcoin-only band to %d; the emulator tests " + "in this file stamp wallets into %d by hand and would be measuring " + "a band the firmware no longer uses" + % (band, STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE)) + self.assertLess(self.version, band) + + def test_last_shipped_never_moves_backwards(self): + """STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED is a high-water mark of the FIELD. + + It records the newest format any signed release ever wrote, so it can + only rise, and only in the commit that ships. The compile-time assert + in storage.c is STORAGE_VERSION >= STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED, and + both operands live in the same header -- so the way to make a LOWERED + storage version build is to lower this to match, which is exactly the + edit that turns every upgrade in the field into a silent wipe. + docs/StorageVersionGate.md calls that the highest-severity review item + in the file. + + A floor asserted from outside the header is the independent witness. + It is not a version pin: it stays true when 7.16 raises the constant to + 20, and it is only ever raised, never corrected. + """ + self.assertGreaterEqual( + self.last_shipped, STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED_FLOOR, + "STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED is %d, below the %d that 7.15 shipped. " + "Either a signed release is being un-remembered to make a lowered " + "STORAGE_VERSION compile, or the ratchet in this file is wrong -- " + "and only one of those two has ever happened." + % (self.last_shipped, STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED_FLOOR)) + + # -- the dispatch ------------------------------------------------------- + + def test_every_ladder_version_is_dispatched(self): + """Every version in the ladder needs a case in storage_fromFlash(). + + This is the failure the static asserts do NOT cover. They pin the enum + to its own numbering; they say nothing about the switch. + + The switch has no default case, deliberately, so that -Werror=switch + names any version we forget -- which means on ARM this is also a build + failure. It is asserted anyway because the emulator and the unit tests + are built by other toolchains and other flag sets, and because the + message here says which device gets wiped, where the compiler says + which enumerator is unhandled. + """ + missing = [v for v in self.ladder if str(v) not in self.arms] + self.assertEqual( + [], missing, + "storage_fromFlash has no case for version(s) %s -- a device " + "carrying one is wiped at boot" % missing) + + def test_an_unrecognised_version_reaches_the_wipe_path(self): + """version_from_int() maps anything off the ladder to + StorageVersion_NONE, and that arm must return SUS_Invalid. + + This is the mechanism the downgrade half of the policy rests on: a + device that has run newer firmware carries a stamp older firmware + cannot read, and it must reset rather than load a blob it will + misparse. The emulator test test_unrecognised_version_wipes_on_boot + proves the behaviour end to end; this proves the arm still exists on a + runner with no emulator. + """ + arm = self.arms.get("NONE") + self.assertIsNotNone(arm, "storage_fromFlash has no StorageVersion_NONE case") + self.assertTrue( + _wipes(arm), + "StorageVersion_NONE no longer returns SUS_Invalid. An unknown " + "storage version would be accepted, and an attacker could roll back " + "to an older signed image with a known extraction bug and keep the " + "seed. Arm was:\n%s" % arm) + self.assertFalse( + _reads(arm), + "a reader behind StorageVersion_NONE parses a blob whose format is " + "by definition unknown. Arm was:\n%s" % arm) + + def test_every_dispatched_version_either_reads_or_refuses(self): + """An arm reads a blob or it refuses one. Never both, never neither. + + Neither means control reached a case that falls out of the switch -- + storage_fromFlash ends in `return SUS_Invalid`, so the device wipes, + and nothing in the source says that was meant. + + Both means the classification below cannot say what the arm is for, and + an arm that reads before refusing has already parsed the blob. If a + real reader ever needs an error return, this assertion is where that + design gets argued rather than assumed -- which is the point of the + gate. + """ + for version in self.ladder: + arm = self._arm(version) + reads, wipes = _reads(arm), _wipes(arm) + self.assertNotEqual( + reads, wipes, + "version %d %s. Arm was:\n%s" + % (version, + "both reads a blob and returns SUS_Invalid" if reads else + "neither reads a blob nor returns SUS_Invalid, so it falls " + "out of the switch and wipes without saying so", + arm)) + + def test_every_shipped_version_has_a_reader(self): + """THE upgrade-never-wipes property, for every device in the field. + + An upgrading device arrives carrying the format written by the release + it is leaving. STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED is the newest of those, so + 1..LAST_SHIPPED is the set of formats that exist on real hardware, and + every one of them must be read rather than refused. Lose a reader here + and every wallet carrying that version is erased at boot with no + prompt, while the build stays green. + + This is the test that carries the section on a release line with + nothing burned, and it is the reason a burned version can never be one + that shipped -- see test_no_shipped_version_is_burned. + """ + for version in range(1, self.last_shipped + 1): + arm = self._arm(version) + self.assertTrue( + _reads(arm), + "version %d has SHIPPED (STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED is %d) " + "but storage_fromFlash does not read it. Every device carrying " + "it is wiped on upgrade. Arm was:\n%s" + % (version, self.last_shipped, arm)) + self.assertFalse( + _wipes(arm), + "version %d has SHIPPED but its arm returns SUS_Invalid, which " + "is storage_reset() + storage_commit() at boot. Arm was:\n%s" + % (version, arm)) + + def test_the_version_this_firmware_writes_can_be_read_back(self): + """A device commits STORAGE_VERSION and reboots into the same firmware. + + If the arm for the version it just wrote does not read, storage_init() + resets on the very next boot -- the wallet does not survive a power + cycle of the build that created it. The emulator test + test_reboot_preserves_the_wallet proves this on a running device; here + it also makes a header bump carry a reader with it, because there is no + version so new that the firmware writing it may refuse to read it. + """ + arm = self._arm(self.version) + self.assertTrue( + _reads(arm), + "STORAGE_VERSION is %d and storage_fromFlash does not read version " + "%d. This firmware cannot load the blob it writes. Arm was:\n%s" + % (self.version, self.version, arm)) + self.assertNotIn( + self.version, self.burned, + "storage_versions.inc declares version %d BURNED and storage.h " + "writes it. A burned version is one no reader may exist for." + % self.version) + + # -- burned versions ---------------------------------------------------- + + def test_burned_versions_agree_between_the_ladder_and_the_dispatch(self): + """Two files, one answer. + + storage_versions.inc DECLARES which versions are burned; storage.c + DEMONSTRATES it by dispatching them to SUS_Invalid with no reader. + Neither file can be the only witness: + + * derived from storage.c alone, deleting the reader for a shipped + version would silently reclassify it as burned and the suite would + approve of it; + * declared in the .inc alone, a reader wired in behind a burned label + would parse a blob written by a build whose layout was abandoned, + and the declaration would sit there saying otherwise. + + Requiring the two to match catches both, and matching costs an edit in + two files -- which is what "a deliberate act" means here. On a line + with no burned versions both sides are empty and this test says so. + """ + dispatched = set( + v for v in self.ladder + if not _reads(self._arm(v)) and _wipes(self._arm(v))) + self.assertEqual( + sorted(self.burned), sorted(dispatched), + "storage_versions.inc declares %s BURNED; storage_fromFlash sends " + "%s to the wipe path. Whichever is right, the other is a lie about " + "what happens to a device carrying one of these blobs." + % (sorted(self.burned) or "nothing", sorted(dispatched) or "nothing")) + + def test_burned_versions_are_dispatched_to_the_wipe_path(self): + """A burned version must be listed, must refuse, and must have no reader. + + Burned means: a pre-release build wrote this format, devices carrying + it exist, and the number was then reused for something else -- so the + blob's bytes mean one thing and the stamp claims another. Refusing it + wipes, which is the documented behaviour for a format we do not + recognise and strictly better than misparsing one. + + LISTED, not defaulted. storage_fromFlash has no default case on + purpose, so an unlisted version fails the -Werror=switch build rather + than falling anywhere. + """ + if not self.burned: + self.skipTest( + "no version is declared BURNED in storage_versions.inc on this " + "line -- STORAGE_VERSION is %d and the whole ladder has " + "readers. Nothing to measure here; the upgrade path is carried " + "by test_every_shipped_version_has_a_reader." % self.version) + for version in sorted(self.burned): + self.assertIn( + version, self.ladder, + "version %d is declared BURNED but is not in the ladder. The " + "entry has to stay: the enum is positional, so removing one " + "renumbers every version after it." % version) + arm = self._arm(version) + self.assertTrue( + _wipes(arm), + "burned version %d does not return SUS_Invalid. Arm was:\n%s" + % (version, arm)) + self.assertFalse( + _reads(arm), + "a reader behind burned version %d would parse a blob written " + "by a build whose layout has nothing to do with the current " + "format, and would do it silently. Arm was:\n%s" % (version, arm)) + + def test_no_shipped_version_is_burned(self): + """Burning a version that SHIPPED wipes every device carrying it. + + This is what keeps the burned set from being a loophole. Burnedness is + declared, and a declaration can be written for any number -- so the one + thing it may never cover is a format that reached real hardware. + STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED is where the firmware records how far that + reaches, and STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED_FLOOR keeps that record from + being quietly walked back. + + A version may only be burned if it lives strictly above the last + shipped release: written by an alpha, never by anything signed. + """ + shipped_and_burned = sorted( + v for v in self.burned if v <= self.last_shipped) + self.assertEqual( + [], shipped_and_burned, + "version(s) %s are declared BURNED but are at or below " + "STORAGE_VERSION_LAST_SHIPPED (%d), so signed firmware wrote them " + "and devices in the field carry them. Burning one erases those " + "wallets at boot." + % (shipped_and_burned, self.last_shipped)) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Behaviour across a real power cycle +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +@unittest.skipIf(_EMULATOR_BIN is None, _NO_EMULATOR) +class TestStorageUpgradePreservation(unittest.TestCase): + + def setUp(self): + self.method = self.id().split(".")[-1] + self.workdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="kk-storage-gate-") + self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, self.workdir, True) + self.emu = Emulator(self.workdir) + self.addCleanup(self.emu.halt) + + # -- shared arrangement ------------------------------------------------- + + def _create_wallet(self): + """Boot a virgin device, load a known seed behind a PIN, record the + address, and power it off. Returns the address.""" + self.emu.boot() + c = self.emu.client(self.method) + try: + c.wipe_device() + c.load_device_by_mnemonic( + mnemonic=MNEMONIC_ALL, pin=PIN, passphrase_protection=False, + label=LABEL, language="english") + c.init_device() + self.assertTrue(c.features.initialized) + addr = c.get_address("Bitcoin", BIP44_ADDRESS_N) + finally: + c.close() + self.emu.halt() + + off = self.emu.active_sector() + self.assertIsNotNone( + off, "no storage sector carries the %r magic after a wallet was " + "created -- nothing was persisted" % STORAGE_MAGIC) + return addr, off + + def _make_v16_blob(self, off): + """Rewrite the committed V17 record as the V16 record a 7.14.x device + would be carrying when it arrives for this upgrade. + + Only the four things that actually differ between the two formats, + per storage_readStorageV17() vs storage_readStorageV16(): + + * the version stamp; + * flags bits 18/19 (authdata_initialized / authdata_encrypted) -- + V16 has no authenticator section, so both are clear; + * authdata_fingerprint at +469, reserved bytes in V16; + * encrypted_sec is 512 bytes in V16, 1024 in V17. The upper half is + the authenticator block, which a V16 device never wrote. + + Bit 14 (has_sec_fingerprint) is cleared too, and that is not cosmetic: + the fingerprint is taken over 1024 bytes when encrypted_sec_version > + 16 and over 512 when it is not, so a V17 fingerprint can never match a + V16 read. A real V16 blob carries a V16 fingerprint; we cannot forge + one without the storage key, so we present a device that never had + one -- storage_secMigrate() then recomputes and stores it, which is the + same path a genuinely older wallet takes. + """ + flags = self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_FLAGS) + self.emu.write_u32(off, OFF_FLAGS, flags & ~( + FLAG_HAS_SEC_FINGERPRINT | FLAG_AUTHDATA_INITIALIZED + | FLAG_AUTHDATA_ENCRYPTED)) + self.emu.patch(off, OFF_AUTHDATA_FINGERPRINT, b"\x00" * 32) + self.emu.patch(off, OFF_ENCSEC + V16_ENCSEC_SIZE, + b"\x00" * (V17_ENCSEC_SIZE - V16_ENCSEC_SIZE)) + self.emu.write_u32(off, OFF_ENCSEC_VERSION, 16) + self.emu.write_u32(off, OFF_VERSION, 16) + + # -- tests -------------------------------------------------------------- + + def test_reboot_preserves_the_wallet(self): + """The boundary docs/StorageVersionGate.md says the ordinary tests never + cross. Everything else in this suite lives inside one session, where the + wallet is a RAM shadow; only a power cycle re-runs storage_init() and + proves the bytes in flash were both written and readable. + + The PIN is load-bearing. The seed lives in encrypted_sec, and the key + that decrypts it is only ever stored wrapped by the PIN. An address + that still derives after the reboot proves the wrapped key, its + fingerprint and the ciphertext all round-tripped together. + """ + addr, off = self._create_wallet() + # The stamp in flash must be the version the header declares. This is + # not a tautology and it is not a version pin either: the emulator was + # built from _ROOT, so the two sides are the WRITER and the DECLARATION, + # and a writer that stamps anything else produces blobs the next boot + # does not recognise. Reading 17 or 20 out of this file instead would + # only record which branch the author was standing on. + declared = _define(_read_source("include/keepkey/firmware/storage.h"), + "STORAGE_VERSION") + self.assertEqual( + declared, self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_VERSION), + "the firmware committed a storage version other than the %d its " + "header declares" % declared) + + before = self.emu.image() + self.emu.boot() + c = self.emu.client(self.method, pin=PIN) + try: + c.init_device() + # Steady state: storage_fromFlash() returns SUS_Valid for a record + # already at STORAGE_VERSION, so storage_init() commits nothing. + # This is also the control for the migration test below, where the + # same comparison is what proves the V16 branch ran. + self.assertEqual(before, self.emu.image(), + "booting an already-current record rewrote flash") + _capture(c) + self.assertTrue(c.features.initialized, "the wallet did not survive") + self.assertEqual(LABEL, c.features.label) + self.assertTrue(c.features.pin_protection) + # show_display so the recovered address is ON SCREEN, not just on + # the wire: the OLED frame is the report's evidence that the same + # wallet came back. + self.assertEqual( + addr, c.get_address("Bitcoin", BIP44_ADDRESS_N, + show_display=True)) + finally: + c.close() + + def test_v16_blob_upgrades_without_wiping(self): + """A V16 wallet, booted by V17 firmware, keeps its seed. + + This is the whole policy in one test: the device arrives carrying the + format the release it is leaving wrote, and the incoming firmware must + read it rather than reset it. storage_fromFlash() takes + case StorageVersion_16, reads through storage_readV16(), restamps the + record V17 and reports SUS_Updated, which storage_init() answers with a + commit -- a migration, not a wipe. + + The same address, behind the same PIN, is the assertion. It can only + derive if the wrapped storage key unwrapped, the 512-byte V16 + ciphertext decrypted, and the seed came back byte-identical. + """ + addr, off = self._create_wallet() + self._make_v16_blob(off) + self.assertEqual(16, self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_VERSION)) + + before = self.emu.image() + self.emu.boot() + c = self.emu.client(self.method, pin=PIN) + try: + c.init_device() + # A surviving wallet alone would not prove the V16 branch ran -- + # a V17 record decodes to the same wallet. The migration is what + # is under test, so assert the side effect only it has: SUS_Updated + # makes storage_init() commit at boot, where SUS_Valid writes + # nothing (asserted as the control in the reboot test above). + self.assertNotEqual( + before, self.emu.image(), + "nothing was written to flash at boot, so storage_fromFlash " + "did not report SUS_Updated and case StorageVersion_16 never " + "ran -- this test is not exercising the migration") + _capture(c) + self.assertTrue( + c.features.initialized, + "V17 firmware WIPED a V16 wallet at boot -- every device " + "upgrading from 7.14.x loses its seed") + self.assertEqual(LABEL, c.features.label) + self.assertEqual( + addr, c.get_address("Bitcoin", BIP44_ADDRESS_N, + show_display=True), + "the V16 wallet survived the boot but derives a DIFFERENT " + "address -- the migration corrupted the seed, which is worse " + "than a wipe because nothing announces it") + finally: + c.close() + + def test_unrecognised_version_wipes_on_boot(self): + """A downgrade wipes, deliberately -- do not "fix" this. + + A device that has run newer firmware carries a newer stamp. Older + firmware cannot read it, so version_from_int() returns + StorageVersion_NONE and storage_init() resets. That is the property + that stops an attacker flashing an older, validly signed image with a + known extraction bug and keeping the seed. + + One past the version this build just committed is the tightest + possible case, and it is measured from the device rather than read out + of the header: it is exactly what the next format bump will look like + to this firmware. + """ + addr, off = self._create_wallet() + unknown = self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_VERSION) + 1 + self.emu.write_u32(off, OFF_VERSION, unknown) + + self.emu.boot() + c = self.emu.client(self.method) + try: + c.init_device() + _capture(c) + self.assertFalse( + c.features.initialized, + "a storage record stamped v%d -- which this firmware does not " + "recognise -- was loaded anyway. Rollback protection is gone: " + "an older signed image would keep the seed." % unknown) + self.assertFalse(c.features.pin_protection) + self.assertNotEqual(LABEL, c.features.label) + finally: + c.close() + + def test_bitcoin_only_band_refuses_without_wiping(self): + """A bitcoin-only wallet is refused, and REFUSING IS NOT WIPING. + + Seeds created under bitcoin-only firmware are stamped in a reserved + band (10000 + the normal version). Multi-chain firmware must not load + one -- the seed was never meant to be multi-chain-exposed -- but it + must also leave it alone: SUS_BitcoinOnlyLocked resets only the RAM + shadow, and storage_commit() returns early while btc_only_locked, so + flash is never touched. Reflashing bitcoin-only firmware recovers the + wallet; leaving requires an explicit wipe. + + Three assertions, in order of what they cost you if they fail: the + device is locked, the sector is byte-for-byte what it was, and the + wallet comes back once the stamp is the multi-chain one again. + """ + addr, off = self._create_wallet() + self.assertLess( + self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_VERSION), STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE, + "this emulator already stamps its wallets into the bitcoin-only " + "band, so it is not the multi-chain firmware this test is about") + before = self.emu.sector(off) + self.emu.write_u32( + off, OFF_VERSION, + STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE + self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_VERSION)) + + self.emu.boot() + c = self.emu.client(self.method) + try: + c.init_device() + _capture(c) + self.assertFalse( + c.features.initialized, + "multi-chain firmware loaded a wallet stamped in the " + "bitcoin-only band") + finally: + c.close() + self.emu.halt() + + after = self.emu.sector(off) + self.assertEqual( + before[:OFF_VERSION] + before[OFF_VERSION + 4:], + after[:OFF_VERSION] + after[OFF_VERSION + 4:], + "the locked boot MODIFIED the bitcoin-only record. The wallet is " + "supposed to stay recoverable by reflashing bitcoin-only firmware") + + self.emu.write_u32(off, OFF_VERSION, + self.emu.read_u32(off, OFF_VERSION) + - STORAGE_VERSION_BTC_ONLY_BASE) + self.emu.boot() + c = self.emu.client(self.method, pin=PIN) + try: + c.init_device() + self.assertTrue(c.features.initialized) + self.assertEqual( + addr, c.get_address("Bitcoin", BIP44_ADDRESS_N, + show_display=True), + "the refused wallet did not come back intact, so 'refuse " + "rather than wipe' did not actually preserve anything") + finally: + c.close() + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_taproot_screens.py b/tests/test_taproot_screens.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eff527a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_taproot_screens.py @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +"""Gate-3 OLED capture: long bech32 addresses on the verification screen.""" +import common +import unittest + +from common import KeepKeyTest +from keepkeylib import ckd_public as bip32 +from keepkeylib import types_pb2 as proto_types +from keepkeylib.tools import parse_path + + +class TestTaprootScreens(KeepKeyTest): + + def test_show_taproot_receive_address(self): + self.requires_taproot() + self.setup_mnemonic_abandon() + self.client.clear_session() + addr = self.client.get_address( + "Bitcoin", parse_path("86'/0'/0'/0/0"), True, None, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDTAPROOT) + self.assertEqual( + addr, + 'bc1p5cyxnuxmeuwuvkwfem96lqzszd02n6xdcjrs20cac6yqjjwudpxqkedrcr') + + def test_show_p2wsh_multisig_address(self): + """Native segwit multisig: 62 chars, same as p2tr. Predates taproot.""" + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + self.client.clear_session() + nodes = [self.client.get_public_node(parse_path("999'/1'/%d'" % i)) + for i in range(1, 4)] + multisig = proto_types.MultisigRedeemScriptType( + pubkeys=[proto_types.HDNodePathType( + node=bip32.deserialize(n.xpub), address_n=[2, 0]) for n in nodes], + signatures=[b'', b'', b''], + m=2, + ) + addr = self.client.get_address( + "Testnet", parse_path("999'/1'/1'/2/0"), True, multisig, + script_type=proto_types.SPENDWITNESS) + print("\nP2WSH address (%d chars): %s" % (len(addr), addr)) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/test_verify_typed_data.py b/tests/test_verify_typed_data.py index 25ef5ca6..86bb0934 100644 --- a/tests/test_verify_typed_data.py +++ b/tests/test_verify_typed_data.py @@ -29,6 +29,39 @@ class TestMsgE712Verify(common.KeepKeyTest): + def test_structured_eip712_is_refused(self): + """7.14.2 disables structured EIP-712 outright. + + ethereum_structured_eip712_enabled() returns false + (lib/firmware/ethereum.c), so fsm_msgEthereum712TypesValues fails closed + before parsing anything. The legacy JSON parser could not guarantee that + every displayed value was the canonical value being hashed, and the + release withdrew the feature rather than ship a screen it could not + vouch for. + + This is NOT an AdvancedMode gate and there is no opt-in: assert the + refusal. When a canonical implementation lands, this test should be + replaced by test_verify below, not simply deleted. + """ + self.requires_fullFeature() + self.requires_firmware("7.14.2") + self.setup_mnemonic_allallall() + + try: + self.client.e712_types_values( + n=tools.parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0"), + types_prop='{"types": {"EIP712Domain": []}}', + ptype_prop='{"primaryType": "EIP712Domain"}', + value_prop='{"domain": {}}', + typevals=1, + ) + self.fail("Expected Failure -- structured EIP-712 is disabled in 7.14.2") + except CallException as e: + self.assertIn("Structured EIP-712 disabled", str(e)) + + @unittest.skip("structured EIP-712 is disabled in 7.14.2; see " + "test_structured_eip712_is_refused. Re-enable together with " + "a canonical display implementation.") def test_verify(self): self.requires_fullFeature() self.requires_firmware("7.5.1") diff --git a/tests/test_zcash_seed_fingerprint_helper.py b/tests/test_zcash_seed_fingerprint_helper.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30cc99e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_zcash_seed_fingerprint_helper.py @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# Pure-Python tests for the ZIP-32 §6.1 seed fingerprint helper. +# +# This module deliberately does NOT import `common`, `keepkeylib.transport`, +# or any protobuf bindings — those would require a device/emulator to be +# wired up. Tests here run on any plain dev box: +# +# pytest tests/test_zcash_seed_fingerprint_helper.py + +import unittest + +from keepkeylib.zcash import calculate_seed_fingerprint + + +class TestSeedFingerprintHelper(unittest.TestCase): + + def test_reference_vector(self): + """Cross-check against keystone3-firmware + rust/keystore/src/algorithms/zcash/mod.rs::test_keystore_derive_zcash_ufvk: + + seed = 000102...1f (32 bytes) + fp = deff604c246710f7176dead02aa746f2fd8d5389f7072556dcb555fdbe5e3ae3 + """ + seed = bytes(range(32)) + fp = calculate_seed_fingerprint(seed) + self.assertEqual( + fp.hex(), + "deff604c246710f7176dead02aa746f2fd8d5389f7072556dcb555fdbe5e3ae3", + ) + + def test_rejects_trivial_seeds(self): + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + calculate_seed_fingerprint(b"\x00" * 32) + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + calculate_seed_fingerprint(b"\xff" * 32) + + def test_rejects_out_of_range(self): + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + calculate_seed_fingerprint(b"\x01" * 31) # too short + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + calculate_seed_fingerprint(b"\x01" * 253) # too long + + def test_length_prefix_domain_separation(self): + """Two seeds where one is a prefix of the other must produce + distinct fingerprints (this is what the I2LEBSP_8(len) prefix buys us).""" + seed_short = bytes(range(32)) + seed_long = bytes(range(33)) + self.assertNotEqual( + calculate_seed_fingerprint(seed_short), + calculate_seed_fingerprint(seed_long), + ) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/tests/txcache/insight_bitcoin_tx_3e1fdf082678a8a2f378995ffc0e4f853942c55c4ddbc2771b348413eeeca9a4.json b/tests/txcache/insight_bitcoin_tx_3e1fdf082678a8a2f378995ffc0e4f853942c55c4ddbc2771b348413eeeca9a4.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d999532 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/txcache/insight_bitcoin_tx_3e1fdf082678a8a2f378995ffc0e4f853942c55c4ddbc2771b348413eeeca9a4.json @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +{ + "txid": "3e1fdf082678a8a2f378995ffc0e4f853942c55c4ddbc2771b348413eeeca9a4", + "version": 1, + "locktime": 0, + "vin": [ + { + "txid": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "vout": 0, + "sequence": 4294967295, + "scriptSig": {"hex": ""} + } + ], + "vout": [ + { + "value": "0.00100000", + "n": 0, + "scriptPubKey": { + "hex": "5120a60869f0dbcf1dc659c9cecbaf8050135ea9e8cdc487053f1dc6880949dc684c" + } + }, + { + "value": "0.00050000", + "n": 1, + "scriptPubKey": { + "hex": "76a914d986ed01b7a22225a70edbf2ba7cfb63a15cb3aa88ac" + } + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/txcache/insight_bitcoin_tx_6e32033911982f7550ab1d26232adfd08711293e15085f77cd27628be0a6ee37.json b/tests/txcache/insight_bitcoin_tx_6e32033911982f7550ab1d26232adfd08711293e15085f77cd27628be0a6ee37.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5bb8521e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/txcache/insight_bitcoin_tx_6e32033911982f7550ab1d26232adfd08711293e15085f77cd27628be0a6ee37.json @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +{ + "txid": "6e32033911982f7550ab1d26232adfd08711293e15085f77cd27628be0a6ee37", + "version": 1, + "locktime": 0, + "vin": [ + { + "txid": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "vout": 0, + "sequence": 4294967295, + "scriptSig": { + "hex": "" + } + } + ], + "vout": [ + { + "value": "0.00100000", + "n": 0, + "scriptPubKey": { + "hex": "5120a60869f0dbcf1dc659c9cecbaf8050135ea9e8cdc487053f1dc6880949dc684c" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/vectors/eip155_oracle.py b/tests/vectors/eip155_oracle.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b9abe41 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/vectors/eip155_oracle.py @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +"""Independent EIP-155 signing oracle for the 7.14.2 chain_id fix. + +Reimplements the signing path from scratch (BIP39 -> BIP32 -> RLP -> keccak -> +RFC6979 ECDSA) so the new golden vectors are NOT taken from the device under +test. Negative control: it must first reproduce the four existing pre-EIP-155 +vectors in tests/test_msg_ethereum_signtx.py byte for byte. If it cannot, the +oracle is wrong and its EIP-155 output is worthless. +""" +import hashlib, hmac, binascii +import ecdsa +from ecdsa.util import sigencode_strings_canonize + +# ---------------------------------------------------------------- keccak-256 +RC = [0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000008082, 0x800000000000808A, + 0x8000000080008000, 0x000000000000808B, 0x0000000080000001, + 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008009, 0x000000000000008A, + 0x0000000000000088, 0x0000000080008009, 0x000000008000000A, + 0x000000008000808B, 0x800000000000008B, 0x8000000000008089, + 0x8000000000008003, 0x8000000000008002, 0x8000000000000080, + 0x000000000000800A, 0x800000008000000A, 0x8000000080008081, + 0x8000000000008080, 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008008] +ROT = [[0, 36, 3, 41, 18], [1, 44, 10, 45, 2], [62, 6, 43, 15, 61], + [28, 55, 25, 21, 56], [27, 20, 39, 8, 14]] +M = (1 << 64) - 1 + + +def _rol(x, n): + return ((x << n) | (x >> (64 - n))) & M + + +def _keccak_f(A): + for rnd in range(24): + C = [A[x][0] ^ A[x][1] ^ A[x][2] ^ A[x][3] ^ A[x][4] for x in range(5)] + D = [C[(x - 1) % 5] ^ _rol(C[(x + 1) % 5], 1) for x in range(5)] + for x in range(5): + for y in range(5): + A[x][y] ^= D[x] + B = [[0] * 5 for _ in range(5)] + for x in range(5): + for y in range(5): + B[y][(2 * x + 3 * y) % 5] = _rol(A[x][y], ROT[x][y]) + for x in range(5): + for y in range(5): + A[x][y] = B[x][y] ^ ((~B[(x + 1) % 5][y]) & M & B[(x + 2) % 5][y]) + A[0][0] ^= RC[rnd] + return A + + +def keccak256(data): + rate = 136 + pad = bytearray(data) + b'\x01' + while len(pad) % rate != 0: + pad += b'\x00' + pad = bytearray(pad) + pad[-1] ^= 0x80 + A = [[0] * 5 for _ in range(5)] + for off in range(0, len(pad), rate): + blk = pad[off:off + rate] + for i in range(rate // 8): + lane = int.from_bytes(blk[i * 8:i * 8 + 8], 'little') + A[i % 5][i // 5] ^= lane + A = _keccak_f(A) + out = b'' + for i in range(4): + out += A[i % 5][i // 5].to_bytes(8, 'little') + return out[:32] + + +# ------------------------------------------------------------------ bip32/39 +def seed_from_mnemonic(m, passphrase=""): + return hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha512', m.encode(), + ("mnemonic" + passphrase).encode(), 2048, 64) + + +CURVE = ecdsa.SECP256k1 +N = CURVE.order + + +def _ser_pub(k): + p = ecdsa.SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(k, CURVE).get_verifying_key().pubkey.point + return (b'\x03' if p.y() & 1 else b'\x02') + p.x().to_bytes(32, 'big') + + +def derive(seed, path): + I = hmac.new(b"Bitcoin seed", seed, hashlib.sha512).digest() + k, c = int.from_bytes(I[:32], 'big'), I[32:] + for idx in path: + if idx & 0x80000000: + data = b'\x00' + k.to_bytes(32, 'big') + idx.to_bytes(4, 'big') + else: + data = _ser_pub(k) + idx.to_bytes(4, 'big') + I = hmac.new(c, data, hashlib.sha512).digest() + k = (int.from_bytes(I[:32], 'big') + k) % N + c = I[32:] + return k + + +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------- rlp +def rlp(x): + if isinstance(x, int): + x = b'' if x == 0 else x.to_bytes((x.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big') + if isinstance(x, (bytes, bytearray)): + x = bytes(x) + if len(x) == 1 and x[0] < 0x80: + return x + return _len(len(x), 0x80) + x + body = b''.join(rlp(i) for i in x) + return _len(len(body), 0xc0) + body + + +def _len(n, off): + if n < 56: + return bytes([off + n]) + b = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big') + return bytes([off + 55 + len(b)]) + b + + +# ------------------------------------------------------------------- signing +def sign(priv, nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value, data, chain_id=None): + fields = [nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value, data] + if chain_id is not None: + fields += [chain_id, 0, 0] + digest = keccak256(rlp(fields)) + + sk = ecdsa.SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(priv, CURVE) + sig = sk.sign_digest_deterministic(digest, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256, + sigencode=sigencode_strings_canonize) + r, s = int.from_bytes(sig[0], 'big'), int.from_bytes(sig[1], 'big') + + want = sk.get_verifying_key().to_string() + rec = None + for cand in range(2): + try: + vk = ecdsa.VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest( + sig[0] + sig[1], digest, CURVE, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256)[cand] + except Exception: + continue + if vk.to_string() == want: + rec = cand + break + assert rec is not None, "no recovery id matched" + v = rec + 27 if chain_id is None else rec + 35 + 2 * chain_id + return v, r.to_bytes(32, 'big'), s.to_bytes(32, 'big') + + +MNEMONIC = 'alcohol woman abuse must during monitor noble actual mixed trade anger aisle' +TO = binascii.unhexlify("1d1c328764a41bda0492b66baa30c4a339ff85ef") + +if __name__ == "__main__": + # oracle self-check against a published keccak-256 vector + assert binascii.hexlify(keccak256(b"")).decode() == \ + "c5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470", "keccak broken" + print("keccak-256 self-check OK") + + priv = derive(seed_from_mnemonic(MNEMONIC), [0, 0]) + + # ---- NEGATIVE CONTROL: reproduce the shipped pre-EIP-155 golden vectors + GOLDEN = [ + ("signtx_data value=10 data=abc*16", dict(nonce=0, gas_price=20, gas_limit=20, + to=TO, value=10, data=b"abcdefghijklmnop" * 16), + 28, "6da89ed8627a491bedc9e0382f37707ac4e5102e25e7a1234cb697cedb7cd2c0", + "691f73b145647623e2d115b208a7c3455a6a8a83e3b4db5b9c6d9bc75825038a"), + ] + ok = True + for name, kw, ev, er, es in GOLDEN: + v, r, s = sign(priv, chain_id=None, **kw) + good = (v == ev and binascii.hexlify(r).decode() == er + and binascii.hexlify(s).decode() == es) + ok &= good + print(f"[{'PASS' if good else 'FAIL'}] {name}") + if not good: + print(f" want v={ev} r={er} s={es}") + print(f" got v={v} r={binascii.hexlify(r).decode()} s={binascii.hexlify(s).decode()}") + print("\nNEGATIVE CONTROL:", "oracle reproduces shipped vectors" if ok + else "ORACLE IS WRONG - do not use its output") diff --git a/tests/vectors/regenerate_eip155_vectors.py b/tests/vectors/regenerate_eip155_vectors.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..deed8403 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/vectors/regenerate_eip155_vectors.py @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +"""Negative-control the oracle on ALL six shipped pre-EIP-155 vectors, then +emit their EIP-155 (chain_id=1) replacements for the 7.14.2 fix.""" +import binascii +from eip155_oracle import sign, derive, seed_from_mnemonic, MNEMONIC, TO + +D16 = b"abcdefghijklmnop" * 16 +D256 = b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP" * 256 + b"!!!" + +# name, kwargs, shipped pre-155 v/r/s +VEC = [ + ("signtx_data #1", dict(nonce=0, gas_price=20, gas_limit=20, to=TO, value=10, data=D16), + 28, "6da89ed8627a491bedc9e0382f37707ac4e5102e25e7a1234cb697cedb7cd2c0", + "691f73b145647623e2d115b208a7c3455a6a8a83e3b4db5b9c6d9bc75825038a"), + ("signtx_data #3", dict(nonce=123456, gas_price=20000, gas_limit=20000, to=TO, + value=12345678901234567890, data=D256), + 28, "4e90b13c45c6a9bf4aaad0e5427c3e62d76692b36eb727c78d332441b7400404", + "3ff236e7d05f0f9b1ee3d70599bb4200638f28388a8faf6bb36db9e04dc544be"), + ("signtx_message", dict(nonce=0, gas_price=20000, gas_limit=20000, to=TO, value=0, data=D256), + 28, "070e9dafda4d9e733fa7b6747a75f8a4916459560efb85e3e73cd39f31aa160d", + "7842db33ef15c27049ed52741db41fe3238a6fa3a6a0888fcfb74d6917600e41"), + ("signtx_newcontract", dict(nonce=0, gas_price=20000, gas_limit=20000, to=b"", + value=12345678901234567890, data=D256), + 28, "b401884c10ae435a2e792303b5fc257a09f94403b2883ad8c0ac7a7282f5f1f9", + "4742fc9e6a5fa8db3db15c2d856914a7f3daab21603a6c1ce9e9927482f8352e"), + ("signtx_nodata #1", dict(nonce=0, gas_price=20, gas_limit=20, to=TO, value=10, data=b""), + 27, "9b61192a161d056c66cfbbd331edb2d783a0193bd4f65f49ee965f791d898f72", + "49c0bbe35131592c6ed5c871ac457feeb16a1493f64237387fab9b83c1a202f7"), + ("signtx_nodata #2", dict(nonce=123456, gas_price=20000, gas_limit=20000, to=TO, + value=12345678901234567890, data=b""), + 28, "6de597b8ec1b46501e5b159676e132c1aa78a95bd5892ef23560a9867528975a", + "6e33c4230b1ecf96a8dbb514b4aec0a6d6ba53f8991c8143f77812aa6daa993f"), +] + +priv = derive(seed_from_mnemonic(MNEMONIC), [0, 0]) +hx = lambda b: binascii.hexlify(b).decode() + +print("=" * 72) +print("NEGATIVE CONTROL - oracle vs the six SHIPPED pre-EIP-155 vectors") +print("=" * 72) +allok = True +for name, kw, ev, er, es in VEC: + v, r, s = sign(priv, chain_id=None, **kw) + ok = (v == ev and hx(r) == er and hx(s) == es) + allok &= ok + print(f"[{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}] {name:22s} v={v}") + if not ok: + print(f" want v={ev} r={er}\n s={es}") + print(f" got v={v} r={hx(r)}\n s={hx(s)}") + +print() +if not allok: + print("ORACLE IS WRONG - not emitting replacements") + raise SystemExit(1) +print("Oracle reproduces all six. Its EIP-155 output is trustworthy.\n") + +print("=" * 72) +print("REPLACEMENT VECTORS - same txs with chain_id=1 (EIP-155)") +print("=" * 72) +for name, kw, _, _, _ in VEC: + v, r, s = sign(priv, chain_id=1, **kw) + print(f"\n{name} chain_id=1") + print(f" sig_v = {v}") + print(f" sig_r = {hx(r)}") + print(f" sig_s = {hx(s)}")