[P2] Audit: HAR Viewer/Sanitizer safe defaults need verification and user-visible controls

[baixiangcpp]

Imported from the byteflow.tools deep audit on 2026-06-22.

Problem: HAR files can contain cookies, authorization headers, query strings, request/response bodies, IPs, hostnames, and user identifiers. HAR Viewer/Sanitizer must default to a safe redaction posture and expose controls so users know exactly what will be removed before export.

Affected URL:

• https://byteflow.tools/en/har-viewer-sanitizer

Reproduction steps:

1. Open HAR Viewer/Sanitizer.
2. Import a dummy HAR containing headers, cookies, query parameters, request bodies, response bodies, and timing data.
3. Check default redaction settings.
4. Export sanitized HAR.
5. Search the output for dummy sensitive values.

Expected behavior: dangerous fields should be redacted by default, with a clear checklist of what was removed.

Actual behavior: the tool claims sanitization, but safe defaults and visible controls need formal verification.

Impact: users may export network captures that still contain secrets or personal data.

Proposed fix:

• Default-redact authorization, cookie, set-cookie, query strings, request bodies, response bodies, and known secret-like values.
• Provide toggles for advanced users.
• Show a redaction summary before export.
• Add search-after-redaction verification.
• Add HAR fixture tests.

Acceptance criteria:

• Default export removes sensitive headers, cookies, query strings, bodies, and secret-like values.
• User sees a summary of redacted sections.
• Tests verify no fixture secret remains.
• Raw HAR is not persisted by default.

[baixiangcpp]

Closed as completed by the canonical BF audit backlog work. This older non-BF audit issue duplicates work now merged through PRs #209-#219, with the BF issues closed and guard/test coverage in place. The remaining non-duplicate follow-up is #7, which stays open because the upstream Next/PostCSS advisory is not fixed yet.